qudag-protocol 0.5.0

Protocol implementation for QuDAG - Orchestrates crypto, DAG, and network components
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
//! Quantum-resistant handshake procedures for QuDAG protocol.

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::{debug, error, info};
use uuid::Uuid;

use qudag_crypto::{
    Ciphertext as KemCiphertext, KeyPair as KemKeyPair, MlDsaKeyPair, MlDsaPublicKey, MlKem768,
    PublicKey as KemPublicKey, SecretKey, SharedSecret,
};
use rand;

use crate::message::{HandshakeType, Message, MessageError, MessageType, ProtocolVersion};
use crate::state::{ProtocolStateMachine, StateError};

/// Handshake-related errors
#[derive(Debug, Error)]
pub enum HandshakeError {
    /// Cryptographic operation failed
    #[error("Cryptographic operation failed: {reason}")]
    CryptoError { reason: String },

    /// Invalid handshake message
    #[error("Invalid handshake message: {reason}")]
    InvalidMessage { reason: String },

    /// Handshake timeout
    #[error("Handshake timed out after {timeout:?}")]
    Timeout { timeout: Duration },

    /// Protocol version mismatch
    #[error("Protocol version mismatch: expected {expected:?}, got {actual:?}")]
    VersionMismatch {
        expected: ProtocolVersion,
        actual: ProtocolVersion,
    },

    /// Unsupported capabilities
    #[error("Unsupported capabilities: {capabilities:?}")]
    UnsupportedCapabilities { capabilities: Vec<String> },

    /// Invalid peer credentials
    #[error("Invalid peer credentials")]
    InvalidCredentials,

    /// State machine error
    #[error("State machine error: {0}")]
    StateMachine(#[from] StateError),

    /// Message error
    #[error("Message error: {0}")]
    Message(#[from] MessageError),

    /// Handshake already in progress
    #[error("Handshake already in progress with session {session_id}")]
    HandshakeInProgress { session_id: Uuid },

    /// Replay attack detected
    #[error("Replay attack detected: timestamp {timestamp} is too old")]
    ReplayAttack { timestamp: u64 },
}

/// Handshake configuration
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct HandshakeConfig {
    /// Timeout for handshake completion
    pub timeout: Duration,
    /// Supported protocol versions
    pub supported_versions: Vec<ProtocolVersion>,
    /// Required capabilities
    pub required_capabilities: Vec<String>,
    /// Optional capabilities
    pub optional_capabilities: Vec<String>,
    /// Maximum timestamp skew allowed (to prevent replay attacks)
    pub max_timestamp_skew: Duration,
    /// Enable mutual authentication
    pub mutual_auth: bool,
}

impl Default for HandshakeConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
            supported_versions: vec![ProtocolVersion::CURRENT],
            required_capabilities: vec![
                "dag-consensus".to_string(),
                "quantum-resistant-crypto".to_string(),
            ],
            optional_capabilities: vec![
                "anonymous-routing".to_string(),
                "dark-addressing".to_string(),
            ],
            max_timestamp_skew: Duration::from_secs(300), // 5 minutes
            mutual_auth: true,
        }
    }
}

/// Handshake session state
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct HandshakeSession {
    /// Session identifier
    pub session_id: Uuid,
    /// Peer identifier (if known)
    pub peer_id: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    /// Handshake state
    pub state: HandshakeSessionState,
    /// Protocol version negotiated
    pub negotiated_version: Option<ProtocolVersion>,
    /// Peer capabilities
    pub peer_capabilities: Vec<String>,
    /// Our ephemeral keys for this session
    pub our_keys: HandshakeKeys,
    /// Peer's public keys
    pub peer_keys: Option<PeerKeys>,
    /// Shared secrets
    pub shared_secrets: Option<SharedSecrets>,
    /// Session start time
    pub started_at: SystemTime,
    /// Last activity
    pub last_activity: SystemTime,
    /// Nonce for this session
    pub nonce: u64,
}

/// Handshake session state
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum HandshakeSessionState {
    /// Waiting to start handshake
    Waiting,
    /// Sent initial handshake message
    InitSent,
    /// Received initial handshake message
    InitReceived,
    /// Sent handshake response
    ResponseSent,
    /// Received handshake response
    ResponseReceived,
    /// Handshake completed successfully
    Completed,
    /// Handshake failed
    Failed,
}

/// Handshake keys for a session
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct HandshakeKeys {
    /// ML-DSA keypair for authentication
    pub signature_keypair: MlDsaKeyPair,
    /// ML-KEM keypair for key exchange
    pub kem_keypair: KemKeyPair,
}

/// Peer's public keys
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PeerKeys {
    /// Peer's ML-DSA public key
    pub signature_public_key: MlDsaPublicKey,
    /// Peer's ML-KEM public key
    pub kem_public_key: KemPublicKey,
}

/// Derived shared secrets
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SharedSecrets {
    /// Shared secret from ML-KEM
    pub kem_shared_secret: SharedSecret,
    /// Derived encryption key
    pub encryption_key: Vec<u8>,
    /// Derived MAC key
    pub mac_key: Vec<u8>,
    /// Session identifier
    pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
}

/// Handshake message payloads
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum HandshakeMessagePayload {
    /// Initial handshake message
    Init {
        protocol_version: ProtocolVersion,
        supported_versions: Vec<ProtocolVersion>,
        capabilities: Vec<String>,
        signature_public_key: Vec<u8>,
        kem_public_key: Vec<u8>,
        nonce: u64,
        timestamp: u64,
    },
    /// Handshake response message
    Response {
        protocol_version: ProtocolVersion,
        capabilities: Vec<String>,
        signature_public_key: Vec<u8>,
        kem_ciphertext: Vec<u8>, // Encapsulated shared secret
        nonce: u64,
        timestamp: u64,
    },
    /// Handshake completion message
    Complete { session_id: Vec<u8>, timestamp: u64 },
    /// Version negotiation message
    VersionNegotiation {
        supported_versions: Vec<ProtocolVersion>,
        preferred_version: ProtocolVersion,
    },
}

/// Handshake coordinator
pub struct HandshakeCoordinator {
    /// Handshake configuration
    config: HandshakeConfig,
    /// Active handshake sessions
    sessions: HashMap<Uuid, HandshakeSession>,
    /// Our long-term identity keys
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    identity_keys: HandshakeKeys,
    /// Protocol state machine
    state_machine: ProtocolStateMachine,
}

impl HandshakeCoordinator {
    /// Create a new handshake coordinator
    pub fn new(
        config: HandshakeConfig,
        identity_keys: HandshakeKeys,
        state_machine: ProtocolStateMachine,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            config,
            sessions: HashMap::new(),
            identity_keys,
            state_machine,
        }
    }

    /// Generate new handshake keys
    pub fn generate_keys() -> Result<HandshakeKeys, HandshakeError> {
        // Generate ML-DSA keypair
        let signature_keypair = MlDsaKeyPair::generate(&mut rand::thread_rng()).map_err(|e| {
            HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                reason: format!("Failed to generate ML-DSA keypair: {:?}", e),
            }
        })?;

        // Generate ML-KEM keypair
        let (kem_public_key, kem_secret_key) =
            MlKem768::keygen().map_err(|e| HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                reason: format!("Failed to generate ML-KEM keypair: {:?}", e),
            })?;
        let kem_keypair = KemKeyPair {
            public_key: kem_public_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
            secret_key: kem_secret_key.as_bytes().to_vec(),
        };

        Ok(HandshakeKeys {
            signature_keypair,
            kem_keypair,
        })
    }

    /// Initiate handshake with a peer
    pub fn initiate_handshake(
        &mut self,
        peer_id: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    ) -> Result<(Uuid, Message), HandshakeError> {
        // Generate ephemeral keys for this session
        let session_keys = Self::generate_keys()?;
        let session_id = Uuid::new_v4();
        let nonce = rand::random::<u64>();

        // Create handshake session
        let session = HandshakeSession {
            session_id,
            peer_id,
            state: HandshakeSessionState::Waiting,
            negotiated_version: None,
            peer_capabilities: Vec::new(),
            our_keys: session_keys,
            peer_keys: None,
            shared_secrets: None,
            started_at: SystemTime::now(),
            last_activity: SystemTime::now(),
            nonce,
        };

        // Create initial handshake message
        let payload = HandshakeMessagePayload::Init {
            protocol_version: ProtocolVersion::CURRENT,
            supported_versions: self.config.supported_versions.clone(),
            capabilities: [
                self.config.required_capabilities.clone(),
                self.config.optional_capabilities.clone(),
            ]
            .concat(),
            signature_public_key: session.our_keys.signature_keypair.public_key().to_vec(),
            kem_public_key: session.our_keys.kem_keypair.public_key().to_vec(),
            nonce,
            timestamp: SystemTime::now()
                .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
                .unwrap()
                .as_millis() as u64,
        };

        let payload_bytes =
            bincode::serialize(&payload).map_err(|e| HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Failed to serialize handshake init: {:?}", e),
            })?;

        let mut message = Message::new(MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Init), payload_bytes);

        // Sign the message
        message.sign(&session.our_keys.signature_keypair)?;

        // Update session state
        let mut session = session;
        session.state = HandshakeSessionState::InitSent;
        session.last_activity = SystemTime::now();

        // Store session
        self.sessions.insert(session_id, session);

        info!("Initiated handshake session: {}", session_id);
        Ok((session_id, message))
    }

    /// Process incoming handshake message
    pub fn process_handshake_message(
        &mut self,
        message: &Message,
        session_id: Option<Uuid>,
    ) -> Result<Option<Message>, HandshakeError> {
        // Validate message timestamp to prevent replay attacks
        self.validate_timestamp(message)?;

        match &message.msg_type {
            MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Init) => self.process_handshake_init(message),
            MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Response) => {
                self.process_handshake_response(message, session_id)
            }
            MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Complete) => {
                self.process_handshake_complete(message, session_id)
            }
            MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::VersionNegotiation) => {
                self.process_version_negotiation(message, session_id)
            }
            _ => Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: "Not a handshake message".to_string(),
            }),
        }
    }

    /// Process handshake init message
    fn process_handshake_init(
        &mut self,
        message: &Message,
    ) -> Result<Option<Message>, HandshakeError> {
        let payload: HandshakeMessagePayload =
            bincode::deserialize(&message.payload).map_err(|e| HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Failed to deserialize handshake init: {:?}", e),
            })?;

        if let HandshakeMessagePayload::Init {
            protocol_version,
            supported_versions,
            capabilities,
            signature_public_key,
            kem_public_key,
            nonce,
            timestamp: _,
        } = payload
        {
            // Verify protocol version compatibility
            let negotiated_version =
                self.negotiate_version(&supported_versions, &protocol_version)?;

            // Verify required capabilities
            self.verify_capabilities(&capabilities)?;

            // Parse peer keys
            let peer_signature_key =
                MlDsaPublicKey::from_bytes(&signature_public_key).map_err(|e| {
                    HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                        reason: format!("Invalid peer signature key: {:?}", e),
                    }
                })?;

            let peer_kem_key = KemPublicKey::from_bytes(&kem_public_key).map_err(|e| {
                HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                    reason: format!("Invalid peer KEM key: {:?}", e),
                }
            })?;

            // Verify message signature
            if !message.verify(&peer_signature_key)? {
                return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidCredentials);
            }

            // Generate ephemeral keys for this session
            let session_keys = Self::generate_keys()?;
            let session_id = Uuid::new_v4();
            let our_nonce = rand::random::<u64>();

            // Perform key exchange
            let (kem_ciphertext, shared_secret) =
                MlKem768::encapsulate(&peer_kem_key).map_err(|e| HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                    reason: format!("KEM encapsulation failed: {:?}", e),
                })?;

            // Derive session keys
            let shared_secrets = self.derive_session_keys(&shared_secret, nonce, our_nonce)?;

            // Create handshake session
            let session = HandshakeSession {
                session_id,
                peer_id: None, // Will be set later if needed
                state: HandshakeSessionState::InitReceived,
                negotiated_version: Some(negotiated_version.clone()),
                peer_capabilities: capabilities,
                our_keys: session_keys,
                peer_keys: Some(PeerKeys {
                    signature_public_key: peer_signature_key,
                    kem_public_key: peer_kem_key,
                }),
                shared_secrets: Some(shared_secrets),
                started_at: SystemTime::now(),
                last_activity: SystemTime::now(),
                nonce: our_nonce,
            };

            // Create response message
            let response_payload = HandshakeMessagePayload::Response {
                protocol_version: negotiated_version,
                capabilities: [
                    self.config.required_capabilities.clone(),
                    self.config.optional_capabilities.clone(),
                ]
                .concat(),
                signature_public_key: session.our_keys.signature_keypair.public_key().to_vec(),
                kem_ciphertext: kem_ciphertext.as_bytes().to_vec(),
                nonce: our_nonce,
                timestamp: SystemTime::now()
                    .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
                    .unwrap()
                    .as_millis() as u64,
            };

            let response_bytes = bincode::serialize(&response_payload).map_err(|e| {
                HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                    reason: format!("Failed to serialize handshake response: {:?}", e),
                }
            })?;

            let mut response_message = Message::new(
                MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Response),
                response_bytes,
            );

            // Sign the response
            response_message.sign(&session.our_keys.signature_keypair)?;

            // Update session state
            let mut session = session;
            session.state = HandshakeSessionState::ResponseSent;
            session.last_activity = SystemTime::now();

            // Store session
            self.sessions.insert(session_id, session);

            // Update protocol state machine
            self.state_machine
                .process_message(message, Some(session_id))?;

            info!(
                "Processed handshake init, sending response for session: {}",
                session_id
            );
            Ok(Some(response_message))
        } else {
            Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: "Expected handshake init payload".to_string(),
            })
        }
    }

    /// Process handshake response message
    fn process_handshake_response(
        &mut self,
        message: &Message,
        session_id: Option<Uuid>,
    ) -> Result<Option<Message>, HandshakeError> {
        let session_id = session_id.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
            reason: "Session ID required for handshake response".to_string(),
        })?;

        let session = self
            .sessions
            .get_mut(&session_id)
            .ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Session not found: {}", session_id),
            })?;

        if session.state != HandshakeSessionState::InitSent {
            return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Invalid session state for response: {:?}", session.state),
            });
        }

        let payload: HandshakeMessagePayload =
            bincode::deserialize(&message.payload).map_err(|e| HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Failed to deserialize handshake response: {:?}", e),
            })?;

        if let HandshakeMessagePayload::Response {
            protocol_version,
            capabilities,
            signature_public_key,
            kem_ciphertext,
            nonce,
            timestamp: _,
        } = payload
        {
            // Parse peer keys
            let peer_signature_key =
                MlDsaPublicKey::from_bytes(&signature_public_key).map_err(|e| {
                    HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                        reason: format!("Invalid peer signature key: {:?}", e),
                    }
                })?;

            // Verify message signature
            if !message.verify(&peer_signature_key)? {
                return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidCredentials);
            }

            // Verify protocol version
            if !self.config.supported_versions.contains(&protocol_version) {
                return Err(HandshakeError::VersionMismatch {
                    expected: ProtocolVersion::CURRENT,
                    actual: protocol_version,
                });
            }

            // Verify capabilities first
            {
                // Check required capabilities
                for required_cap in &self.config.required_capabilities {
                    if !capabilities.contains(required_cap) {
                        return Err(HandshakeError::UnsupportedCapabilities {
                            capabilities: vec![required_cap.clone()],
                        });
                    }
                }
            }

            // Decapsulate shared secret
            let kem_ciphertext_bytes = KemCiphertext::from_bytes(&kem_ciphertext).map_err(|e| {
                HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                    reason: format!("Invalid KEM ciphertext: {:?}", e),
                }
            })?;

            let secret_key = SecretKey::from_bytes(session.our_keys.kem_keypair.secret_key())
                .map_err(|e| HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                    reason: format!("Invalid secret key: {:?}", e),
                })?;

            let shared_secret =
                MlKem768::decapsulate(&secret_key, &kem_ciphertext_bytes).map_err(|e| {
                    HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                        reason: format!("KEM decapsulation failed: {:?}", e),
                    }
                })?;

            // Derive session keys
            let session_nonce = session.nonce;
            let shared_secrets = {
                let secret_bytes = shared_secret.as_bytes();

                // Combine nonces for key derivation
                let combined_nonce = session_nonce ^ nonce;
                let nonce_bytes = combined_nonce.to_be_bytes();

                // Use HKDF for key derivation (simplified)
                let mut key_material = Vec::new();
                key_material.extend_from_slice(secret_bytes);
                key_material.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);

                // Derive different keys using BLAKE3 with different contexts
                let encryption_key = blake3::keyed_hash(
                    blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-Encryption-Key").as_bytes(),
                    &key_material,
                )
                .as_bytes()
                .to_vec();

                let mac_key =
                    blake3::keyed_hash(blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-MAC-Key").as_bytes(), &key_material)
                        .as_bytes()
                        .to_vec();

                let session_key = blake3::keyed_hash(
                    blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-Session-Key").as_bytes(),
                    &key_material,
                )
                .as_bytes()
                .to_vec();

                SharedSecrets {
                    kem_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
                    encryption_key,
                    mac_key,
                    session_key,
                }
            };

            // Update session
            session.negotiated_version = Some(protocol_version);
            session.peer_capabilities = capabilities;
            session.peer_keys = Some(PeerKeys {
                signature_public_key: peer_signature_key,
                kem_public_key: KemPublicKey::from_bytes(session.our_keys.kem_keypair.public_key())
                    .map_err(|e| HandshakeError::CryptoError {
                        reason: format!("Invalid public key: {:?}", e),
                    })?, // Placeholder
            });
            session.shared_secrets = Some(shared_secrets);
            session.state = HandshakeSessionState::ResponseReceived;
            session.last_activity = SystemTime::now();

            // Create completion message
            let complete_payload = HandshakeMessagePayload::Complete {
                session_id: session_id.as_bytes().to_vec(),
                timestamp: SystemTime::now()
                    .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
                    .unwrap()
                    .as_millis() as u64,
            };

            let complete_bytes = bincode::serialize(&complete_payload).map_err(|e| {
                HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                    reason: format!("Failed to serialize handshake complete: {:?}", e),
                }
            })?;

            let mut complete_message = Message::new(
                MessageType::Handshake(HandshakeType::Complete),
                complete_bytes,
            );

            // Sign the completion message
            complete_message.sign(&session.our_keys.signature_keypair)?;

            // Update session state
            session.state = HandshakeSessionState::Completed;

            // Update protocol state machine
            self.state_machine
                .process_message(message, Some(session_id))?;

            info!(
                "Processed handshake response, sending completion for session: {}",
                session_id
            );
            Ok(Some(complete_message))
        } else {
            Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: "Expected handshake response payload".to_string(),
            })
        }
    }

    /// Process handshake complete message
    fn process_handshake_complete(
        &mut self,
        message: &Message,
        session_id: Option<Uuid>,
    ) -> Result<Option<Message>, HandshakeError> {
        let session_id = session_id.ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
            reason: "Session ID required for handshake complete".to_string(),
        })?;

        let session = self
            .sessions
            .get_mut(&session_id)
            .ok_or(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Session not found: {}", session_id),
            })?;

        if session.state != HandshakeSessionState::ResponseSent {
            return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Invalid session state for complete: {:?}", session.state),
            });
        }

        // Verify message signature
        if let Some(peer_keys) = &session.peer_keys {
            if !message.verify(&peer_keys.signature_public_key)? {
                return Err(HandshakeError::InvalidCredentials);
            }
        }

        // Update session state
        session.state = HandshakeSessionState::Completed;
        session.last_activity = SystemTime::now();

        // Update protocol state machine
        self.state_machine
            .process_message(message, Some(session_id))?;

        info!(
            "Handshake completed successfully for session: {}",
            session_id
        );
        Ok(None) // No response needed
    }

    /// Process version negotiation message
    fn process_version_negotiation(
        &mut self,
        message: &Message,
        _session_id: Option<Uuid>,
    ) -> Result<Option<Message>, HandshakeError> {
        let payload: HandshakeMessagePayload =
            bincode::deserialize(&message.payload).map_err(|e| HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: format!("Failed to deserialize version negotiation: {:?}", e),
            })?;

        if let HandshakeMessagePayload::VersionNegotiation {
            supported_versions,
            preferred_version,
        } = payload
        {
            // Find compatible version
            let compatible_version =
                self.negotiate_version(&supported_versions, &preferred_version)?;

            // Update our supported versions if needed
            debug!("Negotiated protocol version: {:?}", compatible_version);

            // No response needed for version negotiation
            Ok(None)
        } else {
            Err(HandshakeError::InvalidMessage {
                reason: "Expected version negotiation payload".to_string(),
            })
        }
    }

    /// Negotiate protocol version
    fn negotiate_version(
        &self,
        peer_versions: &[ProtocolVersion],
        peer_preferred: &ProtocolVersion,
    ) -> Result<ProtocolVersion, HandshakeError> {
        // Try peer's preferred version first
        if self.config.supported_versions.contains(peer_preferred) {
            return Ok(peer_preferred.clone());
        }

        // Find highest compatible version
        for our_version in &self.config.supported_versions {
            for peer_version in peer_versions {
                if our_version.is_compatible(peer_version) {
                    return Ok(our_version.clone());
                }
            }
        }

        Err(HandshakeError::VersionMismatch {
            expected: ProtocolVersion::CURRENT,
            actual: peer_preferred.clone(),
        })
    }

    /// Verify peer capabilities
    fn verify_capabilities(&self, peer_capabilities: &[String]) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
        for required_cap in &self.config.required_capabilities {
            if !peer_capabilities.contains(required_cap) {
                return Err(HandshakeError::UnsupportedCapabilities {
                    capabilities: vec![required_cap.clone()],
                });
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Derive session keys from shared secret
    fn derive_session_keys(
        &self,
        shared_secret: &SharedSecret,
        our_nonce: u64,
        peer_nonce: u64,
    ) -> Result<SharedSecrets, HandshakeError> {
        let secret_bytes = shared_secret.as_bytes();

        // Combine nonces for key derivation
        let combined_nonce = our_nonce ^ peer_nonce;
        let nonce_bytes = combined_nonce.to_be_bytes();

        // Use HKDF for key derivation (simplified)
        let mut key_material = Vec::new();
        key_material.extend_from_slice(secret_bytes);
        key_material.extend_from_slice(&nonce_bytes);

        // Derive different keys using BLAKE3 with different contexts
        let encryption_key = blake3::keyed_hash(
            blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-Encryption-Key").as_bytes(),
            &key_material,
        )
        .as_bytes()
        .to_vec();

        let mac_key = blake3::keyed_hash(blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-MAC-Key").as_bytes(), &key_material)
            .as_bytes()
            .to_vec();

        let session_key =
            blake3::keyed_hash(blake3::hash(b"QuDAG-Session-Key").as_bytes(), &key_material)
                .as_bytes()
                .to_vec();

        Ok(SharedSecrets {
            kem_shared_secret: shared_secret.clone(),
            encryption_key,
            mac_key,
            session_key,
        })
    }

    /// Validate message timestamp to prevent replay attacks
    fn validate_timestamp(&self, message: &Message) -> Result<(), HandshakeError> {
        let now = SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
            .unwrap()
            .as_millis() as u64;

        let message_time = message.timestamp;
        let max_skew = self.config.max_timestamp_skew.as_millis() as u64;

        if now > message_time + max_skew || message_time > now + max_skew {
            return Err(HandshakeError::ReplayAttack {
                timestamp: message_time,
            });
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    /// Get handshake session
    pub fn get_session(&self, session_id: &Uuid) -> Option<&HandshakeSession> {
        self.sessions.get(session_id)
    }

    /// Remove completed or failed sessions
    pub fn cleanup_sessions(&mut self) {
        let now = SystemTime::now();
        let timeout = self.config.timeout;

        self.sessions.retain(|_, session| {
            let elapsed = now
                .duration_since(session.started_at)
                .unwrap_or(Duration::ZERO);

            match session.state {
                HandshakeSessionState::Completed | HandshakeSessionState::Failed => false,
                _ => elapsed < timeout,
            }
        });
    }

    /// Get all active sessions
    pub fn get_active_sessions(&self) -> Vec<&HandshakeSession> {
        self.sessions
            .values()
            .filter(|s| {
                !matches!(
                    s.state,
                    HandshakeSessionState::Completed | HandshakeSessionState::Failed
                )
            })
            .collect()
    }

    /// Check if handshake is completed for a session
    pub fn is_handshake_completed(&self, session_id: &Uuid) -> bool {
        self.sessions
            .get(session_id)
            .map(|s| s.state == HandshakeSessionState::Completed)
            .unwrap_or(false)
    }

    /// Get shared secrets for a completed session
    pub fn get_shared_secrets(&self, session_id: &Uuid) -> Option<&SharedSecrets> {
        self.sessions
            .get(session_id)
            .and_then(|s| s.shared_secrets.as_ref())
    }
}