proof_system 0.34.0

Proof system to comprise various cryptographic primitives
Documentation
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use ark_bls12_381::{Bls12_381, Fr, G1Affine};
use ark_serialize::{CanonicalDeserialize, CanonicalSerialize};
use ark_std::{
    rand::{prelude::StdRng, SeedableRng},
    UniformRand,
};
use blake2::Blake2b512;
use kvac::bbdt_2016::mac::MAC;
use proof_system::{
    meta_statement::{EqualWitnesses, MetaStatements, WitnessRef},
    prelude::Witness,
    proof::Proof,
    proof_spec::ProofSpec,
    setup_params::SetupParams,
    statement::{
        accumulator::keyed_verification::{
            KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKV, KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKVFullVerifier,
            KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKV,
            KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKVFullVerifier, VBAccumulatorMembershipKV,
            VBAccumulatorMembershipKVFullVerifier,
        },
        bbdt16_kvac::{PoKOfMAC, PoKOfMACFullVerifier},
        ped_comm::PedersenCommitment as PedersenCommitmentStmt,
        Statements,
    },
    witness::{
        KBUniMembership, KBUniNonMembership, Membership as MembershipWit, PoKOfBBDT16MAC, Witnesses,
    },
};
use std::{
    collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet},
    time::Instant,
};
use test_utils::{
    accumulators::{setup_kb_universal_accum_given_domain, setup_positive_accum},
    kvac::bbdt16_mac_setup,
    test_serialization,
};
use vb_accumulator::positive::Accumulator;

// #[test]
// fn pok_of_3_macs_and_message_equality() {
// // Prove knowledge of 3 BBS+ signatures and 3 of the messages are same among them.
// let mut rng = StdRng::seed_from_u64(0u64);
//
// // 1st BBS+ sig
// let msg_count_1 = 6;
// let (msgs_1, params_1, sk_1, sig_1) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_1 as u32);
//
// // 2nd BBS+ sig
// let msg_count_2 = 10;
// let (mut msgs_2, params_2, sk_2, _) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_2 as u32);
//
// // 3rd BBS+ sig
// let msg_count_3 = 12;
// let (mut msgs_3, params_3, sk_3, _) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_3 as u32);
//
// // Make 3 messages same
// msgs_2[9] = msgs_1[5];
// msgs_3[9] = msgs_1[5];
// msgs_2[8] = msgs_1[4];
// msgs_3[8] = msgs_1[4];
// msgs_2[7] = msgs_1[3];
// msgs_3[7] = msgs_1[3];
//
// msgs_3[5] = msgs_3[7];
//
// let mac_2 =
// MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_2, &sk_2, &params_2).unwrap();
// mac_2
// .verify(&msgs_2, &sk_2, &params_2)
// .unwrap();
//
// let sig_3 =
// MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_3, &sk_3, &params_3).unwrap();
// sig_3
// .verify(&msgs_3, &sk_3, &params_3)
// .unwrap();
//
// // Prepare revealed messages for the proof of knowledge of 1st signature
// let mut revealed_indices_1 = BTreeSet::new();
// revealed_indices_1.insert(0);
// revealed_indices_1.insert(2);
//
// let mut revealed_msgs_1 = BTreeMap::new();
// let mut unrevealed_msgs_1 = BTreeMap::new();
// for i in 0..msg_count_1 {
// if revealed_indices_1.contains(&i) {
// revealed_msgs_1.insert(i, msgs_1[i]);
// } else {
// unrevealed_msgs_1.insert(i, msgs_1[i]);
// }
// }
//
// // Prepare revealed messages for the proof of knowledge of 2nd signature
// let mut revealed_indices_2 = BTreeSet::new();
// revealed_indices_2.insert(1);
// revealed_indices_2.insert(3);
// revealed_indices_2.insert(5);
//
// let mut revealed_msgs_2 = BTreeMap::new();
// let mut unrevealed_msgs_2 = BTreeMap::new();
// for i in 0..msg_count_2 {
// if revealed_indices_2.contains(&i) {
// revealed_msgs_2.insert(i, msgs_2[i]);
// } else {
// unrevealed_msgs_2.insert(i, msgs_2[i]);
// }
// }
//
// let unrevealed_msgs_3 = msgs_3
// .iter()
// .enumerate()
// .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
// .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();
//
// // Since proving knowledge of 3 BBS+ signatures, add 3 statements, all of the same type though.
// let mut prover_statements = Statements::new();
// prover_statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
// params_1.clone(),
// revealed_msgs_1.clone(),
// ));
// prover_statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
// params_2.clone(),
// revealed_msgs_2.clone(),
// ));
// prover_statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
// params_3.clone(),
// BTreeMap::new(),
// ));
//
// // Since 3 of the messages are being proven equal, add a `MetaStatement` describing that
// let mut meta_statements = MetaStatements::new();
// meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
// vec![(0, 5), (1, 9), (2, 9)] // 0th statement's 5th witness is equal to 1st statement's 9th witness and 2nd statement's 9th witness
// .into_iter()
// .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
// ));
// meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
// vec![(0, 4), (1, 8), (2, 8)] // 0th statement's 4th witness is equal to 1st statement's 8th witness and 2nd statement's 8th witness
// .into_iter()
// .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
// ));
// meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
// vec![(0, 3), (1, 7), (2, 7)] // 0th statement's 3rd witness is equal to 1st statement's 7th witness and 2nd statement's 7th witness
// .into_iter()
// .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
// ));
// meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
// vec![(2, 5), (2, 7)]
// .into_iter()
// .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
// ));
//
// test_serialization!(Statements<Bls12_381>, prover_statements);
// test_serialization!(MetaStatements, meta_statements);
//
// // Create a proof spec, this is shared between prover and verifier
// // Context must be known to both prover and verifier
// let context = Some(b"test".to_vec());
// let prover_proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(prover_statements, meta_statements.clone(), vec![], context.clone());
// prover_proof_spec.validate().unwrap();
//
// test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, prover_proof_spec);
//
// // Prover now creates/loads it witnesses corresponding to the proof spec
// let mut witnesses = Witnesses::new();
// witnesses.add($wit::new_as_witness(
// sig_1,
// unrevealed_msgs_1.clone(),
// ));
// witnesses.add($wit::new_as_witness(
// sig_2,
// unrevealed_msgs_2.clone(),
// ));
// witnesses.add($wit::new_as_witness(
// sig_3,
// unrevealed_msgs_3,
// ));
//
// test_serialization!(Witnesses<Bls12_381>, witnesses);
//
// // Prover now creates the proof using the proof spec and witnesses. This will be sent to the verifier
// let nonce = Some(b"some nonce".to_vec());
// let proof = Proof::new::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// prover_proof_spec,
// witnesses,
// nonce.clone(),
// Default::default(),
// )
// .unwrap()
// .0;
//
// let mut verifier_statements = Statements::new();
// verifier_statements.add($verifier_stmt::new_statement_from_params(
// params_1,
// keypair_1.public_key.clone(),
// revealed_msgs_1.clone(),
// ));
// verifier_statements.add($verifier_stmt::new_statement_from_params(
// params_2,
// keypair_2.public_key.clone(),
// revealed_msgs_2.clone(),
// ));
// verifier_statements.add($verifier_stmt::new_statement_from_params(
// params_3,
// keypair_3.public_key.clone(),
// BTreeMap::new(),
// ));
// let verifier_proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(verifier_statements.clone(), meta_statements, vec![], context);
// verifier_proof_spec.validate().unwrap();
//
// test_serialization!(Statements<Bls12_381>, verifier_statements);
// test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, verifier_proof_spec);
//
// // Proof with no nonce shouldn't verify
// assert!(proof
// .clone()
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(&mut rng, verifier_proof_spec.clone(), None, Default::default())
// .is_err());
// assert!(proof
// .clone()
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// verifier_proof_spec.clone(),
// None,
// VerifierConfig {
// use_lazy_randomized_pairing_checks: Some(false),
// },
// )
// .is_err());
//
// // Proof with invalid nonce shouldn't verify
// assert!(proof
// .clone()
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// verifier_proof_spec.clone(),
// Some(b"random...".to_vec()),
// Default::default()
// )
// .is_err());
// assert!(proof
// .clone()
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// verifier_proof_spec.clone(),
// Some(b"random...".to_vec()),
// VerifierConfig {
// use_lazy_randomized_pairing_checks: Some(false),
// },
// )
// .is_err());
//
// test_serialization!(Proof<Bls12_381>, proof);
//
// // Verifier verifies the proof
// let start = Instant::now();
// proof
// .clone()
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// verifier_proof_spec.clone(),
// nonce.clone(),
// Default::default(),
// )
// .unwrap();
// println!(
// "Time to verify proof with 3 BBS+ signatures: {:?}",
// start.elapsed()
// );
//
// let start = Instant::now();
// proof
// .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
// &mut rng,
// verifier_proof_spec,
// nonce,
// VerifierConfig {
// use_lazy_randomized_pairing_checks: Some(false),
// },
// )
// .unwrap();
// println!(
// "Time to verify proof with 3 BBS+ signatures with randomized pairing check: {:?}",
// start.elapsed()
// );
// }

#[test]
fn proof_of_knowledge_of_macs_and_equality_of_messages_and_kv_accumulator() {
    // Prove knowledge of 3 KVAC and membership in accumulator. Membership proof verification is keyed
    let mut rng = StdRng::seed_from_u64(0u64);

    let msg_count_1 = 6;
    let (msgs_1, params_1, sk_1, mac_1) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_1 as u32);

    let msg_count_2 = 10;
    let (mut msgs_2, params_2, sk_2, _) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_2 as u32);

    let msg_count_3 = 12;
    let (mut msgs_3, params_3, sk_3, _) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count_3 as u32);

    // Make 3 messages same
    msgs_2[9] = msgs_1[5];
    msgs_3[9] = msgs_1[5];
    msgs_2[8] = msgs_1[4];
    msgs_3[8] = msgs_1[4];
    msgs_2[7] = msgs_1[3];
    msgs_3[7] = msgs_1[3];

    msgs_3[5] = msgs_3[7];

    let mac_2 = MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_2, &sk_2, &params_2).unwrap();
    mac_2.verify(&msgs_2, &sk_2, &params_2).unwrap();

    let mac_3 = MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_3, &sk_3, &params_3).unwrap();
    mac_3.verify(&msgs_3, &sk_3, &params_3).unwrap();

    let (_, pos_accum_keypair, mut pos_accumulator, mut pos_state) = setup_positive_accum(&mut rng);

    let max = 100;
    let mut domain = msgs_1.clone();
    while domain.len() < max as usize {
        domain.push(Fr::rand(&mut rng));
    }
    let (_, uni_accum_keypair, mut uni_accumulator, mut uni_mem_state, mut uni_non_mem_state) =
        setup_kb_universal_accum_given_domain(&mut rng, domain);

    // Message with index `accum_member_1_idx` is added in the positive VB accumulator
    let accum_member_1_idx = 1;
    let accum_member_1 = msgs_1[accum_member_1_idx];
    pos_accumulator = pos_accumulator
        .add(
            accum_member_1,
            &pos_accum_keypair.secret_key,
            &mut pos_state,
        )
        .unwrap();
    let mem_1_wit = pos_accumulator
        .get_membership_witness(&accum_member_1, &pos_accum_keypair.secret_key, &pos_state)
        .unwrap();

    // Message with index `accum_member_2_idx` is added in the KB universal accumulator
    let accum_member_2_idx = 3;
    let accum_member_2 = msgs_1[accum_member_2_idx];
    uni_accumulator = uni_accumulator
        .add(
            accum_member_2,
            &uni_accum_keypair.secret_key,
            &mut uni_mem_state,
            &mut uni_non_mem_state,
        )
        .unwrap();
    let mem_2_wit = uni_accumulator
        .get_membership_witness(
            &accum_member_2,
            &uni_accum_keypair.secret_key,
            &uni_mem_state,
        )
        .unwrap();

    // Message with index `accum_non_member_idx` is not added in the KB universal accumulator
    let accum_non_member_idx = 4;
    let accum_non_member = msgs_1[accum_non_member_idx];
    let non_mem_wit = uni_accumulator
        .get_non_membership_witness(
            &accum_non_member,
            &uni_accum_keypair.secret_key,
            &uni_non_mem_state,
        )
        .unwrap();

    // Prepare revealed messages for the proof of knowledge of 1st MAC
    let mut revealed_indices_1 = BTreeSet::new();
    revealed_indices_1.insert(0);
    revealed_indices_1.insert(2);

    let mut revealed_msgs_1 = BTreeMap::new();
    let mut unrevealed_msgs_1 = BTreeMap::new();
    for i in 0..msg_count_1 {
        if revealed_indices_1.contains(&i) {
            revealed_msgs_1.insert(i, msgs_1[i]);
        } else {
            unrevealed_msgs_1.insert(i, msgs_1[i]);
        }
    }

    // Prepare revealed messages for the proof of knowledge of 2nd MAC
    let mut revealed_indices_2 = BTreeSet::new();
    revealed_indices_2.insert(1);
    revealed_indices_2.insert(3);
    revealed_indices_2.insert(5);

    let mut revealed_msgs_2 = BTreeMap::new();
    let mut unrevealed_msgs_2 = BTreeMap::new();
    for i in 0..msg_count_2 {
        if revealed_indices_2.contains(&i) {
            revealed_msgs_2.insert(i, msgs_2[i]);
        } else {
            unrevealed_msgs_2.insert(i, msgs_2[i]);
        }
    }

    let unrevealed_msgs_3 = msgs_3
        .iter()
        .enumerate()
        .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
        .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();

    // Prove knowledge of 3 MACs, add 3 statements
    let mut statements = Statements::<Bls12_381>::new();
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
        params_1.clone(),
        revealed_msgs_1.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
        params_2.clone(),
        revealed_msgs_2.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params(
        params_3.clone(),
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));

    statements.add(VBAccumulatorMembershipKV::new(*pos_accumulator.value()));
    statements.add(KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKV::new(
        *uni_accumulator.mem_value(),
    ));
    statements.add(KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKV::new(
        *uni_accumulator.non_mem_value(),
    ));

    // Since 3 of the messages are being proven equal, add a `MetaStatement` describing that
    let mut meta_statements = MetaStatements::new();
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, 5), (1, 9), (2, 9)] // 0th statement's 5th witness is equal to 1st statement's 9th witness and 2nd statement's 9th witness
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, 4), (1, 8), (2, 8)] // 0th statement's 4th witness is equal to 1st statement's 8th witness and 2nd statement's 8th witness
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, 3), (1, 7), (2, 7)] // 0th statement's 3rd witness is equal to 1st statement's 7th witness and 2nd statement's 7th witness
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(2, 5), (2, 7)]
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));

    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, accum_member_1_idx), (3, 0)]
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, accum_member_2_idx), (4, 0)]
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));
    meta_statements.add_witness_equality(EqualWitnesses(
        vec![(0, accum_non_member_idx), (5, 0)]
            .into_iter()
            .collect::<BTreeSet<WitnessRef>>(),
    ));

    test_serialization!(Statements<Bls12_381>, statements);
    test_serialization!(MetaStatements, meta_statements);

    // Create a proof spec, this is shared between prover and verifier
    // Context must be known to both prover and verifier
    let context = Some(b"test".to_vec());
    let proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(statements, meta_statements.clone(), vec![], context.clone());
    proof_spec.validate().unwrap();

    test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, proof_spec);

    // Prover now creates/loads it witnesses corresponding to the proof spec
    let mut witnesses = Witnesses::new();
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_1,
        unrevealed_msgs_1.clone(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_2,
        unrevealed_msgs_2.clone(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(mac_3, unrevealed_msgs_3));
    witnesses.add(MembershipWit::new_as_witness(
        accum_member_1,
        mem_1_wit.clone(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(KBUniMembership::new_as_witness(
        accum_member_2,
        mem_2_wit.clone(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(KBUniNonMembership::new_as_witness(
        accum_non_member,
        non_mem_wit.clone(),
    ));

    test_serialization!(Witnesses<Bls12_381>, witnesses);

    // Prover now creates the proof using the proof spec and witnesses. This will be sent to the verifier
    let nonce = Some(b"some nonce".to_vec());
    let proof = Proof::new::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
        &mut rng,
        proof_spec.clone(),
        witnesses,
        nonce.clone(),
        Default::default(),
    )
    .unwrap()
    .0;

    test_serialization!(Proof<Bls12_381>, proof);

    // Verifier verifies the proof
    let start = Instant::now();
    proof
        .clone()
        .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
            &mut rng,
            proof_spec.clone(),
            nonce.clone(),
            Default::default(),
        )
        .unwrap();
    println!("Time to verify proof with 3 MACs: {:?}", start.elapsed());

    let mut statements = Statements::new();
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params(
        sk_1,
        params_1,
        revealed_msgs_1.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params(
        sk_2,
        params_2,
        revealed_msgs_2.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params(
        sk_3,
        params_3,
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));
    statements.add(VBAccumulatorMembershipKVFullVerifier::new(
        *pos_accumulator.value(),
        pos_accum_keypair.secret_key.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(KBUniversalAccumulatorMembershipKVFullVerifier::new(
        *uni_accumulator.mem_value(),
        uni_accum_keypair.secret_key.clone(),
    ));
    statements.add(KBUniversalAccumulatorNonMembershipKVFullVerifier::new(
        *uni_accumulator.non_mem_value(),
        uni_accum_keypair.secret_key.clone(),
    ));
    let proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(statements, meta_statements, vec![], context);
    proof_spec.validate().unwrap();

    // Verifier verifies the full proof
    let start = Instant::now();
    proof
        .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(&mut rng, proof_spec, nonce, Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    println!(
        "Time to verify full proof with 3 MACs: {:?}",
        start.elapsed()
    );
}

#[test]
fn pok_of_knowledge_of_macs_with_reusing_setup_params() {
    let mut rng = StdRng::seed_from_u64(0u64);

    let msg_count = 5;
    let (msgs_1, params_1, sk_1, mac_1) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count as u32);
    let (msgs_2, params_2, sk_2, mac_2) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, msg_count as u32);

    let msgs_3: Vec<Fr> = (0..msg_count).map(|_| Fr::rand(&mut rng)).collect();
    let mac_3 = MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_3, &sk_1, &params_1).unwrap();
    let msgs_4: Vec<Fr> = (0..msg_count).map(|_| Fr::rand(&mut rng)).collect();
    let mac_4 = MAC::<G1Affine>::new(&mut rng, &msgs_4, &sk_2, &params_2).unwrap();

    let mut all_setup_params = Vec::<SetupParams<Bls12_381>>::new();
    all_setup_params.push(SetupParams::BBDT16MACParams(params_1.clone()));
    all_setup_params.push(SetupParams::BBDT16MACParams(params_2.clone()));

    test_serialization!(Vec<SetupParams<Bls12_381>>, all_setup_params);

    let mut statements = Statements::new();
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params_ref(0, BTreeMap::new()));
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params_ref(0, BTreeMap::new()));
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params_ref(1, BTreeMap::new()));
    statements.add(PoKOfMAC::new_statement_from_params_ref(1, BTreeMap::new()));

    test_serialization!(Statements<Bls12_381>, statements);

    let proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(
        statements,
        MetaStatements::new(),
        all_setup_params.clone(),
        None,
    );
    proof_spec.validate().unwrap();

    test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, proof_spec);

    let mut witnesses = Witnesses::new();
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_1,
        msgs_1
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
            .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_3,
        msgs_3
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
            .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_2,
        msgs_2
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
            .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>(),
    ));
    witnesses.add(PoKOfBBDT16MAC::new_as_witness(
        mac_4,
        msgs_4
            .iter()
            .enumerate()
            .map(|(i, m)| (i, *m))
            .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>(),
    ));
    test_serialization!(Witnesses<Bls12_381>, witnesses);

    let proof = Proof::new::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
        &mut rng,
        proof_spec.clone(),
        witnesses,
        None,
        Default::default(),
    )
    .unwrap()
    .0;

    let start = Instant::now();
    proof
        .clone()
        .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(&mut rng, proof_spec, None, Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    println!("Time to verify proof with 4 MACs: {:?}", start.elapsed());

    let mut statements = Statements::new();
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params_ref(
        sk_1.clone(),
        0,
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params_ref(
        sk_1,
        0,
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params_ref(
        sk_2.clone(),
        1,
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));
    statements.add(PoKOfMACFullVerifier::new_statement_from_params_ref(
        sk_2,
        1,
        BTreeMap::new(),
    ));

    let proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(statements, MetaStatements::new(), all_setup_params, None);
    proof_spec.validate().unwrap();

    test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, proof_spec);

    let start = Instant::now();
    proof
        .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(&mut rng, proof_spec, None, Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    println!(
        "Time to verify full proof with 4 MACs: {:?}",
        start.elapsed()
    );
}

#[test]
fn requesting_blind_mac() {
    // Request a blind MAC by first proving knowledge of values in a Pedersen commitment. The
    // requester then unblinds the MAC and verifies it.

    let mut rng = StdRng::seed_from_u64(0u64);

    // The total number of messages in the MAC
    let total_msg_count = 10;

    // Setup params and messages
    let (msgs, mac_params, sk, _) = bbdt16_mac_setup(&mut rng, total_msg_count as u32);

    // Message indices hidden from signer. Here signer does not know msgs[0], msgs[4] and msgs[6]
    let committed_indices = vec![0, 4, 6].into_iter().collect::<BTreeSet<usize>>();

    let blinding = Fr::rand(&mut rng);
    let committed_messages = committed_indices
        .iter()
        .map(|i| (*i, &msgs[*i]))
        .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();
    let commitment = mac_params
        .commit_to_messages(committed_messages, &blinding)
        .unwrap();

    // Requester proves knowledge of committed messages
    let mut statements = Statements::<Bls12_381>::new();
    let mut bases = vec![mac_params.g];
    let mut committed_msgs = vec![blinding];
    for i in committed_indices.iter() {
        bases.push(mac_params.g_vec[*i]);
        committed_msgs.push(msgs[*i]);
    }
    statements.add(PedersenCommitmentStmt::new_statement_from_params(
        bases.clone(),
        commitment,
    ));

    test_serialization!(Statements<Bls12_381>, statements);

    let context = Some(b"test".to_vec());
    let proof_spec = ProofSpec::new(statements.clone(), MetaStatements::new(), vec![], context);
    proof_spec.validate().unwrap();

    test_serialization!(ProofSpec<Bls12_381>, proof_spec);

    let mut witnesses = Witnesses::new();
    witnesses.add(Witness::PedersenCommitment(committed_msgs));

    test_serialization!(Witnesses<Bls12_381>, witnesses);

    let nonce = Some(b"test nonce".to_vec());
    let proof = Proof::new::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(
        &mut rng,
        proof_spec.clone(),
        witnesses.clone(),
        nonce.clone(),
        Default::default(),
    )
    .unwrap()
    .0;

    test_serialization!(Proof<Bls12_381>, proof);

    proof
        .verify::<StdRng, Blake2b512>(&mut rng, proof_spec, nonce, Default::default())
        .unwrap();

    // Now requester picks the messages he is revealing to the signer and prepares `uncommitted_messages`
    // to request the blind MAC
    let uncommitted_messages = (0..total_msg_count)
        .filter(|i| !committed_indices.contains(i))
        .map(|i| (i, &msgs[i]))
        .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();

    // Signer creates the blind MAC using the commitment
    let blinded_mac = MAC::<G1Affine>::new_with_committed_messages(
        &mut rng,
        &commitment,
        uncommitted_messages,
        &sk,
        &mac_params,
    )
    .unwrap();

    let mac = blinded_mac.unblind(&blinding);
    mac.verify(&msgs, &sk, &mac_params).unwrap();
}