procjail 0.2.0

Process sandbox for running untrusted code — Linux namespaces, seccomp, firejail, bubblewrap, rlimits
Documentation

procjail

Run untrusted code in a sandbox. procjail picks the best containment strategy available on the system (bubblewrap > firejail > unshare > rlimits), strips secret environment variables, enforces timeouts, and reports resource usage.

use procjail::{SandboxConfig, SandboxedProcess};
use std::path::Path;

let config = SandboxConfig::builder()
    .runtime("/usr/bin/node")
    .max_memory_mb(256)
    .max_cpu_seconds(30)
    .timeout_seconds(60)
    .build();

let mut proc = SandboxedProcess::spawn(
    Path::new("harness.js"),
    Path::new("/path/to/package"),
    &config,
).unwrap();

proc.send(r#"{"method":"eval","args":["1+1"]}"#).unwrap();
let response = proc.recv().unwrap();

Containment strategies

Strategy PID isolation Network Filesystem How
Bubblewrap Yes Yes Full (ro-bind) Recommended. Rootless.
Firejail Yes Yes Full (--private) Adds seccomp + rlimits.
Unshare Yes Yes Partial (mount ns) No full FS restriction.
RlimitsOnly No No No Harness enforces limits. Last resort.

procjail auto-detects which strategies work on the current system. Override with .strategy(Strategy::Bubblewrap).

Secret stripping

36 environment variables are stripped by default (AWS keys, GitHub tokens, database URLs, API keys). Custom additions via .env_strip(&["MY_SECRET"]). The passthrough list cannot re-add stripped secrets.

Resource reporting

let usage = proc.wait_with_usage().unwrap();
println!("peak memory: {} bytes", usage.peak_memory_bytes);
println!("cpu time: {:.2}s", usage.cpu_time_secs);
println!("killed by timeout: {}", proc.killed_by_timeout);

Contributing

Pull requests are welcome. There is no such thing as a perfect crate. If you find a bug, a better API, or just a rough edge, open a PR. We review quickly.

License

MIT. Copyright 2026 CORUM COLLECTIVE LLC.

crates.io docs.rs