---
title: Development
description:
Learn about the development of pure being from Hegel's Science of Logic.
isArticle: true
authors: Filip Niklas (2024)
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contributors:
---
## The Development of Being
### Quote
> _Being, pure being_ – without further determination. In its
> indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with
> respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly. If any
> determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited
> by this determination or content as distinct from an other, it would thereby
> fail to hold fast to its purity. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.
> – There is _nothing_ to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of
> intuiting; or, it is only this pure empty intuiting itself. Just as little is
> anything to be thought in it, or, it is equally only this empty thinking.
> Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact _nothing_, and neither more nor
> less than nothing (Hegel 2010, 59/21.68-9).
### Examination
```md
_Being, pure being_ - without further determination.
```
Hegel's _Science of Logic_ begins with a fragment: "_Being, pure being_
–". `being` is a notoriously difficult category to grasp, and a great part
of its difficulty lies in its simplicity. After the first word comes a
qualification that this category _must_ be grasped in its purity. Any further
specification, or _determination_, loses sight of exactly this purity. While
such an attempt to determine being may appear to illuminate some content, it
does not illuminate anything about _being_ as such, and will therefore have lost
sight exactly the being it meant to say something meaningful about.
```md
In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal
with respect to another; it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly.
```
The terms equality and inequality here are used to establish difference
vis-à-vis being and something else. However, _no difference can_ be established
since being is positively not something different from an other. Considered
otherwise, there is nothing with respect to being that can be differentiated
from it. The thought of `being` in this sense extends in all directions. One
might say that everything is being and being is everything, but this view
presupposes something that is non-being against which being is differentiated;
but this is inadequate, for, as Hegel emphasizes, there is no difference
inwardly or _outwardly_. Viewed internally according to its conception then
there is _simply_ being.
```md
If any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were
posited by this determination or content as distinct from an other, it would
thereby fail to hold fast to its purity.
```
Mention of attempting to generate difference with being, inwardly or outwardly,
has already been made. Hegel additionally adds the term `content` here which
suggests that the form-content distinction cannot be employed to determine
being. Being is not some form that stands over against some non-being content,
or, vice-versa, that being is some content that fills out some non-being form.
```md
It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.
```
Paradoxically, the first positive thing said about `being` other than repeating
it or its purity, is that it _is_ indeterminate and empty. This is perhaps
already transitioning the logic beyond being, since the focus shifts towards
indeterminateness and emptiness.
```md
– There is _nothing_ to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of
intuiting; or, it is only this pure empty intuiting itself.
```
The en dash (–) is often used by Hegel to inline a quick comment. It
serves to swiftly elaborate on a logical passage and provide additional
guidance. Importantly, in these mini-commentaries, Hegel steps out of the
logical development to reflect upon it.Immediately after the en dash Hegel
begins to speak about intuiting and "speaking of" and that does not seem
appropriate for a purely logical development. If it is correct that the en dash
signals the start of a brief commentary here, then it makes sense why Hegel
begins to employ intuition and vague language like "speaking of", since he is
now reflecting upon the matter at hand as it has been developed thus far and
attempts to help his readers to understand an otherwise extremely abstract idea.
If the en dash does not signal the start of a comment and the logical
development still continues, then that invites interpretation as to the precise
status of intuition this early in the logic of pure thinking. Discussions on
this issue will be provided elsewhere. For the remainder of this development,
the en dash is understood to be the start of a comment.
Intuition is a concept with its own rich history. Spinoza considers it the
superior form of knowledge as it basically does everything that intellectual
cognition is capable of except it does it immediately.[^1] With intuitive
knowledge of a matter, one does not pause to think and piece together various
bits in order to arrive at a conception; one simply grasps the conception
immediately. For example, one does not need to wait for the pincer maneuver to
complete in order to see that one's force is becoming surrounded and cut off
from supplies, but instantly recognize the doomed outcome the moment the pincer
has been allowed to take shape.
What does intuition signify for Hegel here? Against Spinoza, whose intuitive
knowledge seems to always be a determinate conception, intuition does not have
any determinate content here. Indeed, intuition appears to actively fail to
grasp any determinate matter whatsoever. However, this does not negate that
intuition is adequately performing its cognitive function, for as Hegel points
out, there really _is_ nothing to be intuited or grasped in pure being.
Lastly, Hegel equates the activity of intuiting pure being with the matter
itself. In intuiting that pure being is nothing—or there is nothing to be
intuited in pure being—the intuiting activity is itself neither more or
less than the matter it intuits, namely, pure emptiness.
[^1]:
[Spinoza on Intuition from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-epistemology-mind/#KindCognIIIIntu)
```md
Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or, it is equally only this
empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact _nothing_, and
neither more nor less than nothing
```
Hegel continues his comment by reinforcing that no determinate content is to be
found in pure being. He once more equates the form of its thinking with the
matter. At this zero level of
[presuppositionless thinking](/hegel/guides/presuppositionless-thinking), no
difference can be established between pure being and its thinking, as that would
presuppose a form-content difference _internal_ to the conception of pure being
itself. But pure being _cannot be_ that which is separable from the pure thought
of it—pure being does not exist externally to its thought, and certainly
not as an entity in the world _apart_ from thought. Indeed, in strictest terms,
pure being does not exist, as existence etymologically signals that something
stands out, which nominally means that some contrast or determinacy obtains. But
no such contrast or determinacy is the case with pure being, and least of all a
contrast between pure being and its thinking.
Hegel moves to affirm the emptiness of thinking and establishes that the form is
no less than the content (if such distinctions are to be employed), and that as
the form is empty and the form is indistinguishable from its content, the
content is empty also. Now, this reading employs a syllogistic pattern that
distinguishes two elements and establishes a truth based on their union, which
appears to be a third element, and one might be tempted to think that that is
how Hegel reasons himself to the outcome of the development of being. But the
problem here is that these distinctions of form and content, pure being and its
thinking, strictly do not exist; that is, they cannot be independently
established and so cannot be used in syllogistic reasoning to arrive at the
truth. The form-content distinction, along with the matter and its thought, are
downstream from the issue and do not serve provide any new information that has
not already been given in the conception of pure being. Indeed, the more apt
procedure is the one Hegel has already provided, namely, the use of intuition.
Intuition is a helpful contrast to syllogistic inference in that where the
latter may appear more truthful due to its impressive complexity, it is in fact
less since the matter itself cannot be parsed in mediated terms without
tampering with its purity. Therefore, intuition with its affinity for
_immediate_ cognition, is a more truthful aid in discerning the conception of
pure being.
And so the net result of pure being is that it _is_ simply nothing. No cause or
pattern of inference can be employed to establish this result without
tautologically repeating it.
## Further Commentary
### Burbidge
John Burbidge provides a more psychological reading of being, which focuses on
what and how categories and conceptions are present to the attention of thought.
However, his account has merit because of the solid groundwork he lays when
dealing with the many nuances of Hegel's project, opening a compelling way into
its immanent development.
Burbidge stresses the intellectual dimension of thought and the operations that
the understanding undergoes in preparing for pure thinking. Pure thought is
defined as the sphere of intellectual relations purged of spatio-temporal,
subjective and cultural contingencies (Burbidge 1981, 37). As a _science_, the
logic articulates the relations between these intellectual relations: "in
rendering a concept precise, thought moves to a related category; this movement
in turn is named, and itself becomes a new concept" (Burbidge 1981, 37). In
other words, pure thought is the purified intellectual dimension that considers
intellectual relations _as_ intellectual relations and discovers what particular
inter-intellectual relations obtain or simply pure concepts.
Moreover, further to this, if the science of logic is to become _a system_, it
must consider its starting point carefully, since a paradoxical problem presents
itself at the outset. Logic cannot itself begin as the product of a process,
since that inevitably entails that that process is then the actual starting
point. "This poses a paradoxical problem," Burbidge notes, "The promotive
concept is to be immediate and not the determinate result of inferential
transitions. Yet is it is the name of an intellectual relation, presupposing
terms to be related" (Burbidge 1981, 37).
Any intellectual relation condition by distinctive moments of personal or social
history must be left aside in the abstract discipline of thought. "Yet once the
relativizing conditions have been dissolved away in pure self-knowledge, we are
left with simple intellectual relations that are not in themselves determinate"
(Burbidge 1981, 38). This simple intellectual relating bereft of all reference
terms is prior to even the reference immediacy, as that is a reflective thought
that introduces a contrast with mediation. Instead, it simply _is_.
> In other words the verb 'to be' fills the requirement quite precisely: as a
> verb it expresses a relating; it can be used with any subject whatsoever; and
> it is incomplete and points toward the need for further
> determination—although not itself determined it is open to
> determinations ... _Being_ is thus the most primitive category of the logical
> science. It lacks any determinations by which thought can distinguish one
> thing or idea from another. But at the same time it articulates a
> comprehensive relation that is immediately common to all things or ideas
> (Burbidge 1981, 38).
Pure thought, according to Burbidge, is driven to render its concepts precise in
order to understand what is involved in a concept and thereby becoming aware of
the network of relations it involves. However, with the most primitive concept,
it faces a difficulty: how can `being` be defined? A definition requires a
specific contrast with something else, but how can `being` _be_ contrasted
anything else? This contrast would involve the negation of being, but all things
_are_, and so there is nothing against which being could be contrasted against
since that would mean that contrasting element is the negation of being. Thus,
`being` is only equivalent to itself.
> _Being_ is equivalent only to itself. This positive assertion, though, does
> not distinguish it from anything to which it is unequal, for all specific
> determinations have been excluded. When it considers this, its most primitive
> category, then, thought finds nothing there to think. It is pure thinking
> without any content. But _nothing_ certainly is not the same thing as _being_.
> In thinking the concept _being_, then, a new concept, _nothing_, has emerged.
> There has been no explicit inference here. The second thought simply and
> immediately comes to mind (Burbidge 1981, 39).
A major part of Burbidge's account relies on the operations of the understanding
and reason (or the intellect), and, while helpful in unpacking the intricacies
the logical development, it assumes too much to be fully presuppositionless,
since terms like understanding, reason, intellect, cognition, reflection,
require their own development and justification. But, what is particularly
problematic in Burbidge's account is that it appears that the real reason _why_
the categories develop is because the understanding fails to define them instead
of the categories themselves taking the fall, as it were. While it is implied in
Burbidge that the categories are the primary movers of logic, the explicit focus
shifts to the understanding and psychological operations of the mind, which
leaves a possibility that the categories may perhaps be otherwise if the
understanding were different.
### Houlgate
Stephen Houlgate emphasizes that the start of Hegel's _Logic_ is both a logic
and a metaphysics at once. He further points out that the thought of `being`
under consideration is not the being _of something_ or the being expressed in
the _copula_ of a judgment (e.g. the squirrel _is_ fluffy), "Being is to be
understood simply as pure indeterminate being" (Houlgate 2022, 135).
He further reinforces Hegel's conception of being as utterly indeterminate by
contrasting it to Parmenides' conception of being, who understands being in
contrast to nothing, as that which is _not_ nothing. This view by Parmenides
holds a difference between the two such that being and nothing are kept apart
and ossified, neither changing into the other (or indeed any other change for
that matter). As Houlgate writes,
> This is precisely what makes being “changeless”: for, as not-nothing, being
> neither arises from, nor passes into, nothing. In Parmenides' words, “it
> exists without beginning or ceasing”, but, “remaining the same and in the same
> place, it lies on its own and thus fixed it will remain”. Parmenides goes on
> to claim that “strong necessity holds it [being] within the bonds of a limit”
> – a limit that preserves being as being and keeps it apart from nothing
> (Houlgate 2022, 136).
Hegel, in contrast to Parmenides, does not distinguish being from nothing, or
essence, things, entities, worlds or anything else for that matter. Any such
distinction would render being determinate, and being would not be understood in
its utter indeterminacy.
Moreover, Houlgate points out that `being` is not to be understood in terms of
the negation of immediacy ("im-mediacy") or the negation of determinacy
("in-determinate"). This line of thinking would also render `being` something
determinate and fail to hold fast to its purity. Instead, `being` must be
understood _in_ its immediacy and indeterminate, rather than _as_ immediate and
indeterminate. "At the start of logic being must be thought in its utter
indeterminacy and immediacy – and so without being explicitly contrasted
with determinacy or mediation – as pure and simple being" (Houlgate 2022,
136).
This thinking in terms of _in_ rather than _as_ further helps understand how
Hegel's initial fragment concerning `without further determination` is not a
defining of `being` _as_ the-being-without-determination, but that of holding
`being` _free_ of determination, and to think it in its purity and simplicity
(Houlgate 2022, 136).
It seen how a non-trivial amount of effort is needed to keep at bay the mind's
reflective reflexes, which employ difference, equality, likeness and so forth in
understanding a matter. This language of difference with its reflective
categories cannot be entirely avoided, but they need not determine the matter,
that is, understand `being` in terms of contrasts and mediation. Using negation
on these reflective categories, or just careful language, one is able to keep at
bay their determination of the matter at hand and allow it to be understood
freely on its own terms, which in the case of `being` means its simplicity and
purity (Houlgate 2022, 137).
A key part of of that simplicity and purity, Houlgate further notes, is that
being is not understood in terms of its mediation or as a result of a prior
process. One could point to the fact that Hegel's conception of being is the
result of presuppositionless thinking and that therefore it must presuppose it,
thus showing that `being` is implicitly dependent on an external process which
serves to define it and that thinking of it purely according to its own
conception is impossible. But Houlgate argues that this omits precisely that
`being` as an abstraction must itself also be abstracted, and that this is
indeed done in its concept:
> To think of being in this way, we must first abstract from all we ordinarily
> take being to be; but we must then abstract from, and set aside, the very fact
> that pure being is the result of abstraction. Only thus will the process of
> abstraction lead to the thought of being as pure and immediate, rather than as
> mediated result (or “essence”)(Houlgate 2022, 138).
In other words, to adequately think pure being is to already have abstracted the
fact that it is the result of an abstraction—the result of a methodical
and careful process of presuppositionless thinking. There is nothing _in_ pure
being—internal to its conception—that suggests or leads one to think
that it is the result of a process. Indeed, were that the case, pure being could
not itself be nothing. To arrive at the thought of pure being, as it were, is to
arrive at the infinite shores of beginning that have no end in sight.
### McTaggart
John McTaggart looks at Hegel's opening category not so much an affirmation of
being as an affirmation of nothing else. He further considers that being has no
nature, since any nature would indicate some kind of determinacy vis-à-vis
another being whose nature is different; however, with pure being this cannot be
case. "Any determination would give it some particular nature, as against some
other particular nature—would make it _X_ rather than _not-X_. It has
therefore no determination whatever" (McTaggart 1910, 15).
He then considers being in light of predication and reasons that the development
is spurred its outcome. "But to be completely free of any determination is just
what we mean by Nothing. Accordingly, when we predicate Being as an adequate
expression of existence, we find that in doing so we are also predicating
Nothing as an adequate expression of existence" (McTaggart 1910, 15). Following
McTaggart, then, it seems that `nothing` necessarily follows `being` inasmuch as
one attempts to predicate an adequate expression of existence.
However, McTaggart's account involves too much for presuppositionless thinking,
or the means by which he attempts to give expression to the matter are not
properly self-sublated and are therefore left as unanswered questions or
unwarranted claims. How is the structure of predication justified? Why must
"adequate expression of existence" be a factor in understanding the purity of
being? What qualifies as an "adequate" expression as such, much less of
existence?