pqfile 4.3.1

Quantum-resistant file encryption: ML-KEM (512/768/1024), hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768, ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA signing, multi-recipient, Shamir sharing
Documentation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use ml_dsa::{
    EncodedSignature, EncodedVerifyingKey, Generate, Keypair, MlDsa65, Signature, Signer,
    SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey,
};
use pem::Pem;
use slh_dsa::signature::{
    Keypair as SlhKeypairTrait, Signer as SlhSignerTrait, Verifier as SlhVerifierTrait,
};
use slh_dsa::Shake192f;
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

use crate::error::PqfileError;
use crate::hardware;
use crate::passphrase;

pub(crate) const VK_TAG: &str = "ML-DSA-65 VERIFYING KEY";
pub(crate) const SK_TAG: &str = "ML-DSA-65 SIGNING KEY";
pub(crate) const SK_ENC_TAG: &str = "ML-DSA-65 ENCRYPTED SIGNING KEY";
const SIG_TAG: &str = "ML-DSA-65 SIGNATURE";

const VK_LEN: usize = 1952;
const SK_SEED_LEN: usize = 32;
const SIG_LEN: usize = 3309;

pub(crate) const SLH_VK_TAG: &str = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192F VERIFYING KEY";
pub(crate) const SLH_SK_TAG: &str = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192F SIGNING KEY";
pub(crate) const SLH_SK_ENC_TAG: &str = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192F ENCRYPTED SIGNING KEY";
const SLH_SIG_TAG: &str = "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192F SIGNATURE";

/// FIPS 205 security parameter n for the SHAKE-192 parameter sets.
const SLH_N: usize = 24;
/// Verifying key is PK.seed ‖ PK.root.
const SLH_VK_LEN: usize = 2 * SLH_N;
/// The stored private key is the seed triple SK.seed ‖ SK.prf ‖ PK.seed;
/// the full signing key is deterministically recomputed from it (FIPS 205
/// `slh_keygen_internal`), which also revalidates PK.root on every load.
pub(crate) const SLH_SK_SEED_LEN: usize = 3 * SLH_N;
const SLH_SIG_LEN: usize = 35664;

/// Signature algorithm selector for key generation.
///
/// Detached signatures, signcrypt payloads, and key PEMs are all
/// self-describing (the PEM tag carries the algorithm), so only key
/// generation needs an explicit choice; `sign_bytes`/`verify_bytes`
/// dispatch on the key that is supplied.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum SigAlgorithm {
    /// ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), lattice-based. Fast signing, 3309-byte
    /// signatures. The default.
    MlDsa65,
    /// SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f (FIPS 205), hash-based. Rests on much more
    /// conservative assumptions than lattices, at the cost of slower
    /// signing and 35664-byte signatures. Suited to long-lived
    /// signatures such as archival or release signing.
    SlhDsaShake192f,
}

impl SigAlgorithm {
    /// Human-readable algorithm name.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn name(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65 => "ML-DSA-65",
            SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f => "SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f",
        }
    }
}

/// Result of generating an ML-DSA-65 signing key pair.
#[non_exhaustive]
pub struct SignKeygenResult {
    /// PEM-encoded verifying (public) key.
    pub vk_pem: String,
    /// PEM-encoded signing (private) key, optionally passphrase-encrypted.
    pub sk_pem: String,
    /// SHA3-256 fingerprint of the verifying key (first 8 bytes, colon-separated hex).
    pub vk_fingerprint: String,
}

/// Generates an ML-DSA-65 signing key pair in memory.
/// If `passphrase` is `Some`, the signing seed is encrypted before PEM encoding.
#[must_use = "signing key pair must be saved or the generated keys are lost"]
pub fn sign_keygen_bytes(passphrase: Option<&str>) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65, passphrase)
}

/// Generates a signing key pair for `algorithm` in memory.
/// If `passphrase` is `Some`, the signing seed is encrypted before PEM encoding.
#[must_use = "signing key pair must be saved or the generated keys are lost"]
pub fn sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(
    algorithm: SigAlgorithm,
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    match algorithm {
        SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65 => ml_dsa_keygen_bytes(passphrase),
        SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f => slh_dsa_keygen_bytes(passphrase),
    }
}

/// Deterministically rebuilds an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f signing key from its
/// 72-byte seed triple (FIPS 205 Algorithm 18, `slh_keygen_internal`).
///
/// Calling `slh_keygen_internal` with freshly generated randomness is exactly
/// FIPS 205 `slh_keygen` (Algorithm 21) with the RNG factored out; storing the
/// seed triple instead of the expanded key mirrors the ML-DSA seed design and
/// recomputes PK.root on every load, so a corrupted key cannot go unnoticed.
fn slh_signing_key_from_seed(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<slh_dsa::SigningKey<Shake192f>, PqfileError> {
    if seed.len() != SLH_SK_SEED_LEN {
        return Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: SLH_SK_SEED_LEN,
            got: seed.len(),
        });
    }
    Ok(slh_dsa::SigningKey::<Shake192f>::slh_keygen_internal(
        &seed[..SLH_N],
        &seed[SLH_N..2 * SLH_N],
        &seed[2 * SLH_N..],
    ))
}

fn slh_dsa_keygen_bytes(passphrase: Option<&str>) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    let mut seed = Zeroizing::new([0u8; SLH_SK_SEED_LEN]);
    getrandom::fill(seed.as_mut()).map_err(|_| PqfileError::EncryptionFailure)?;
    let sk = slh_signing_key_from_seed(seed.as_ref())?;
    let vk_bytes = SlhKeypairTrait::verifying_key(&sk).to_vec();

    let vk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_VK_TAG, vk_bytes.clone()));
    let sk_pem = if let Some(pp) = passphrase {
        let body = passphrase::encrypt_slh_signing_seed(&seed, pp)?;
        pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_SK_ENC_TAG, body))
    } else {
        pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_SK_TAG, seed.to_vec()))
    };

    let vk_fingerprint = crate::keygen::fingerprint(&vk_bytes);

    Ok(SignKeygenResult {
        vk_pem,
        sk_pem,
        vk_fingerprint,
    })
}

fn ml_dsa_keygen_bytes(passphrase: Option<&str>) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    let sk = SigningKey::<MlDsa65>::generate();
    let vk = sk.verifying_key();

    let vk_encoded: EncodedVerifyingKey<MlDsa65> = vk.encode();
    let vk_bytes: &[u8] = vk_encoded.as_ref();

    let seed = Zeroizing::new(sk.to_seed());
    let seed_bytes: &[u8] = seed.as_slice();

    let vk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(VK_TAG, vk_bytes.to_vec()));
    let sk_pem = if let Some(pp) = passphrase {
        if seed_bytes.len() != SK_SEED_LEN {
            return Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
                expected: SK_SEED_LEN,
                got: seed_bytes.len(),
            });
        }
        let mut seed_arr = Zeroizing::new([0u8; SK_SEED_LEN]);
        seed_arr.copy_from_slice(seed_bytes);
        let body = passphrase::encrypt_signing_seed(&seed_arr, pp)?;
        pem::encode(&Pem::new(SK_ENC_TAG, body))
    } else {
        pem::encode(&Pem::new(SK_TAG, seed_bytes.to_vec()))
    };

    let vk_fingerprint = crate::keygen::fingerprint(vk_bytes);

    Ok(SignKeygenResult {
        vk_pem,
        sk_pem,
        vk_fingerprint,
    })
}

/// Generates an ML-DSA-65 signing key pair and writes it to `out_dir`.
/// Returns `OutputExists` if key files already exist and `force` is false.
pub fn sign_keygen(
    out_dir: &Path,
    force: bool,
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    sign_keygen_with_algorithm(out_dir, force, passphrase, SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65)
}

/// Generates a signing key pair for `algorithm` and writes it to `out_dir`.
/// Returns `OutputExists` if key files already exist and `force` is false.
pub fn sign_keygen_with_algorithm(
    out_dir: &Path,
    force: bool,
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
    algorithm: SigAlgorithm,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    let vk_path = out_dir.join("sign_pubkey.pem");
    let sk_path = out_dir.join("sign_privkey.pem");

    if !force {
        if vk_path.exists() {
            return Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(vk_path));
        }
        if sk_path.exists() {
            return Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(sk_path));
        }
    }

    let result = sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(algorithm, passphrase)?;
    fs::write(&vk_path, &result.vk_pem)?;
    crate::fsutil::write_private_file(&sk_path, result.sk_pem.as_bytes())?;

    Ok(result)
}

/// Generates a hardware-backed ML-DSA-65 signing key pair and writes it to `out_dir`.
///
/// The signing key seed is stored in the OS credential store under `label`;
/// only a PEM stub is written to disk. Returns `OutputExists` if key files
/// already exist and `force` is false.
#[must_use = "hardware sign keygen result must be saved"]
pub fn sign_keygen_hardware(
    out_dir: &Path,
    force: bool,
    label: &str,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    sign_keygen_hardware_with_algorithm(out_dir, force, label, SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65)
}

/// Generates a hardware-backed signing key pair for `algorithm` and writes it
/// to `out_dir`.
///
/// The signing key seed is stored in the OS credential store under `label`;
/// only a PEM stub is written to disk. Returns `OutputExists` if key files
/// already exist and `force` is false.
#[must_use = "hardware sign keygen result must be saved"]
pub fn sign_keygen_hardware_with_algorithm(
    out_dir: &Path,
    force: bool,
    label: &str,
    algorithm: SigAlgorithm,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    let vk_path = out_dir.join("sign_pubkey.pem");
    let sk_path = out_dir.join("sign_privkey.pem");

    if !force {
        if vk_path.exists() {
            return Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(vk_path));
        }
        if sk_path.exists() {
            return Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(sk_path));
        }
    }

    let result = sign_keygen_hardware_bytes_with_algorithm(label, algorithm)?;
    fs::write(&vk_path, &result.vk_pem)?;
    crate::fsutil::write_private_file(&sk_path, result.sk_pem.as_bytes())?;
    Ok(result)
}

/// Generates a hardware-backed ML-DSA-65 signing key pair in memory.
///
/// The seed (32 bytes) is stored in the OS credential store under `label`.
/// Returns `(vk_pem, hw_stub_pem)` via `SignKeygenResult`.
#[must_use = "hardware sign keygen result must be saved"]
pub fn sign_keygen_hardware_bytes(label: &str) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    sign_keygen_hardware_bytes_with_algorithm(label, SigAlgorithm::MlDsa65)
}

/// Generates a hardware-backed signing key pair for `algorithm` in memory.
///
/// The seed (32 bytes for ML-DSA-65, 72 bytes for SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f) is
/// stored in the OS credential store under `label`. Returns
/// `(vk_pem, hw_stub_pem)` via `SignKeygenResult`.
#[must_use = "hardware sign keygen result must be saved"]
pub fn sign_keygen_hardware_bytes_with_algorithm(
    label: &str,
    algorithm: SigAlgorithm,
) -> Result<SignKeygenResult, PqfileError> {
    let backend_id = hardware::default_backend_id();

    if algorithm == SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f {
        let (stub_body, seed) = hardware::generate_and_store(label, SLH_SK_SEED_LEN, backend_id)?;
        let sk = slh_signing_key_from_seed(&seed)?;
        let vk_bytes = SlhKeypairTrait::verifying_key(&sk).to_vec();
        let vk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_VK_TAG, vk_bytes.clone()));
        let sk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING_SLH, stub_body));
        let vk_fingerprint = crate::keygen::fingerprint(&vk_bytes);
        return Ok(SignKeygenResult {
            vk_pem,
            sk_pem,
            vk_fingerprint,
        });
    }

    let (stub_body, seed) = hardware::generate_and_store(label, SK_SEED_LEN, backend_id)?;

    if seed.len() != SK_SEED_LEN {
        return Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: SK_SEED_LEN,
            got: seed.len(),
        });
    }
    let mut seed_arr = [0u8; SK_SEED_LEN];
    seed_arr.copy_from_slice(&seed);
    let sk = SigningKey::<MlDsa65>::from_seed(&seed_arr.into());
    let vk = sk.verifying_key();

    let vk_encoded: EncodedVerifyingKey<MlDsa65> = vk.encode();
    let vk_bytes: &[u8] = vk_encoded.as_ref();
    let vk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(VK_TAG, vk_bytes.to_vec()));
    let sk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING, stub_body));
    let vk_fingerprint = crate::keygen::fingerprint(vk_bytes);

    Ok(SignKeygenResult {
        vk_pem,
        sk_pem,
        vk_fingerprint,
    })
}

/// Signs `data` with the signing key in `sk_pem` and returns the raw signature
/// bytes. The algorithm (ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f) is determined by the
/// key's PEM tag.
#[must_use = "sign result must be used"]
pub fn sign_bytes(
    sk_pem: &str,
    data: &[u8],
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PqfileError> {
    match parse_signing_key(sk_pem, passphrase)? {
        AnySigningKey::MlDsa(sk) => {
            let sig: Signature<MlDsa65> = sk.sign(data);
            let encoded: EncodedSignature<MlDsa65> = sig.encode();
            let bytes: &[u8] = encoded.as_ref();
            Ok(bytes.to_vec())
        }
        AnySigningKey::SlhDsa(sk) => {
            let sig = SlhSignerTrait::sign(&*sk, data);
            Ok(sig.to_vec())
        }
    }
}

/// Signs the file at `input` and writes a PEM signature to `sig_out`.
#[must_use = "sign result must be used"]
pub fn sign_file(
    sk_pem: &str,
    input: &Path,
    sig_out: &Path,
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(), PqfileError> {
    let data = fs::read(input)?;
    let sig_bytes = sign_bytes(sk_pem, &data, passphrase)?;
    let sig_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(sig_tag_for_len(sig_bytes.len()), sig_bytes));
    fs::write(sig_out, sig_pem)?;
    Ok(())
}

/// PEM tag for a raw signature, inferred from its length. The two supported
/// algorithms have distinct fixed signature lengths.
fn sig_tag_for_len(len: usize) -> &'static str {
    if len == SLH_SIG_LEN {
        SLH_SIG_TAG
    } else {
        SIG_TAG
    }
}

/// Verifies `sig_bytes` against `data` using the verifying key in `vk_pem`.
/// The algorithm (ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f) is determined by the key's
/// PEM tag.
#[must_use = "verify result must be used"]
pub fn verify_bytes(vk_pem: &str, data: &[u8], sig_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), PqfileError> {
    let p = pem::parse(vk_pem).map_err(|e| PqfileError::InvalidPem(e.to_string()))?;
    match p.tag() {
        VK_TAG => {
            let vk = decode_ml_verifying_key(p.contents())?;
            if sig_bytes.len() != SIG_LEN {
                return Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature);
            }
            let sig = Signature::<MlDsa65>::try_from(sig_bytes)
                .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidSignature)?;
            vk.verify(data, &sig)
                .map_err(|_| PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        }
        SLH_VK_TAG => {
            let vk_bytes = p.contents();
            if vk_bytes.len() != SLH_VK_LEN {
                return Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
                    expected: SLH_VK_LEN,
                    got: vk_bytes.len(),
                });
            }
            let vk = slh_dsa::VerifyingKey::<Shake192f>::try_from(vk_bytes)
                .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidPem("malformed SLH-DSA verifying key".into()))?;
            if sig_bytes.len() != SLH_SIG_LEN {
                return Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature);
            }
            let sig = slh_dsa::Signature::<Shake192f>::try_from(sig_bytes)
                .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidSignature)?;
            SlhVerifierTrait::verify(&vk, data, &sig)
                .map_err(|_| PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        }
        tag => Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(format!(
            "expected tag '{VK_TAG}' or '{SLH_VK_TAG}', got '{tag}'"
        ))),
    }
}

/// Signature length implied by the algorithm of the verifying key in `vk_pem`.
/// Used by signcrypt to know how many payload bytes to treat as the signature.
pub(crate) fn sig_len_for_vk(vk_pem: &str) -> Result<usize, PqfileError> {
    let p = pem::parse(vk_pem).map_err(|e| PqfileError::InvalidPem(e.to_string()))?;
    match p.tag() {
        VK_TAG => Ok(SIG_LEN),
        SLH_VK_TAG => Ok(SLH_SIG_LEN),
        tag => Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(format!(
            "expected tag '{VK_TAG}' or '{SLH_VK_TAG}', got '{tag}'"
        ))),
    }
}

/// Reads `input` and its detached PEM signature from `sig_path`, then verifies.
#[must_use = "verify result must be used"]
pub fn verify_file(vk_pem: &str, input: &Path, sig_path: &Path) -> Result<(), PqfileError> {
    let data = fs::read(input)?;
    let sig_pem_str = fs::read_to_string(sig_path)?;
    let sig_bytes = parse_sig_pem(&sig_pem_str)?;
    verify_bytes(vk_pem, &data, &sig_bytes)
}

/// Returns the default signature output path for `input` (appends `.sig` to the extension).
#[must_use]
pub fn default_sig_path(input: &Path) -> PathBuf {
    let mut p = input.to_path_buf();
    let ext = match p.extension() {
        Some(e) => format!("{}.sig", e.to_string_lossy()),
        None => "sig".to_owned(),
    };
    p.set_extension(ext);
    p
}

/// A parsed signing key of either supported algorithm.
enum AnySigningKey {
    MlDsa(Box<SigningKey<MlDsa65>>),
    SlhDsa(Box<slh_dsa::SigningKey<Shake192f>>),
}

fn ml_signing_key_from_seed(seed_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<SigningKey<MlDsa65>, PqfileError> {
    let seed_arr: &[u8; SK_SEED_LEN] =
        seed_bytes
            .try_into()
            .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
                expected: SK_SEED_LEN,
                got: seed_bytes.len(),
            })?;
    Ok(SigningKey::<MlDsa65>::from_seed(seed_arr.into()))
}

fn parse_signing_key(
    pem_str: &str,
    passphrase: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<AnySigningKey, PqfileError> {
    let p = pem::parse(pem_str).map_err(|e| PqfileError::InvalidPem(e.to_string()))?;

    match p.tag() {
        // Hardware stubs: load seed from OS credential store.
        hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING => {
            let seed_bytes = hardware::load_seed(p.contents())?;
            Ok(AnySigningKey::MlDsa(Box::new(ml_signing_key_from_seed(
                &seed_bytes,
            )?)))
        }
        hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING_SLH => {
            let seed_bytes = hardware::load_seed(p.contents())?;
            Ok(AnySigningKey::SlhDsa(Box::new(slh_signing_key_from_seed(
                &seed_bytes,
            )?)))
        }
        SK_ENC_TAG => {
            let pp = passphrase.ok_or(PqfileError::PassphraseRequired)?;
            let seed = passphrase::decrypt_signing_seed(p.contents(), pp)?;
            Ok(AnySigningKey::MlDsa(Box::new(ml_signing_key_from_seed(
                seed.as_slice(),
            )?)))
        }
        SK_TAG => {
            let seed = Zeroizing::new(p.contents().to_vec());
            Ok(AnySigningKey::MlDsa(Box::new(ml_signing_key_from_seed(
                &seed,
            )?)))
        }
        SLH_SK_ENC_TAG => {
            let pp = passphrase.ok_or(PqfileError::PassphraseRequired)?;
            let seed = passphrase::decrypt_slh_signing_seed(p.contents(), pp)?;
            Ok(AnySigningKey::SlhDsa(Box::new(slh_signing_key_from_seed(
                seed.as_slice(),
            )?)))
        }
        SLH_SK_TAG => {
            let seed = Zeroizing::new(p.contents().to_vec());
            Ok(AnySigningKey::SlhDsa(Box::new(slh_signing_key_from_seed(
                &seed,
            )?)))
        }
        tag => Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(format!(
            "expected tag '{}', '{}', '{}', '{}', '{}', or '{}', got '{tag}'",
            SK_TAG,
            SK_ENC_TAG,
            SLH_SK_TAG,
            SLH_SK_ENC_TAG,
            hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING,
            hardware::HW_TAG_SIGNING_SLH,
        ))),
    }
}

fn decode_ml_verifying_key(vk_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<VerifyingKey<MlDsa65>, PqfileError> {
    if vk_bytes.len() != VK_LEN {
        return Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: VK_LEN,
            got: vk_bytes.len(),
        });
    }
    let vk_arr: &[u8; VK_LEN] = vk_bytes
        .try_into()
        .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength {
            expected: VK_LEN,
            got: vk_bytes.len(),
        })?;
    Ok(VerifyingKey::<MlDsa65>::decode(vk_arr.into()))
}

/// Encodes raw signature bytes into a PEM string suitable for writing to a `.sig` file.
/// The PEM tag is inferred from the signature length (ML-DSA-65 or SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f).
#[must_use = "encoded signature must be used"]
pub fn encode_sig_pem(sig_bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
    pem::encode(&pem::Pem::new(
        sig_tag_for_len(sig_bytes.len()),
        sig_bytes.to_vec(),
    ))
    .into_bytes()
}

/// Decodes a PEM signature file and returns the raw signature bytes.
#[must_use = "decoded signature bytes must be used"]
pub fn decode_sig_pem(pem_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PqfileError> {
    let s = std::str::from_utf8(pem_bytes)
        .map_err(|_| PqfileError::InvalidPem("not valid UTF-8".into()))?;
    parse_sig_pem(s)
}

fn parse_sig_pem(pem_str: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, PqfileError> {
    let p = pem::parse(pem_str).map_err(|e| PqfileError::InvalidPem(e.to_string()))?;
    if p.tag() != SIG_TAG && p.tag() != SLH_SIG_TAG {
        return Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(format!(
            "expected tag '{}' or '{}', got '{}'",
            SIG_TAG,
            SLH_SIG_TAG,
            p.tag()
        )));
    }
    Ok(p.contents().to_vec())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_bytes_produces_correct_pem_tags() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        assert!(r.vk_pem.contains(VK_TAG));
        assert!(r.sk_pem.contains(SK_TAG));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_bytes_vk_is_1952_bytes() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&r.vk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p.contents().len(), VK_LEN);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_bytes_sk_seed_is_32_bytes() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&r.sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p.contents().len(), SK_SEED_LEN);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_and_verify_roundtrip() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello pqfile";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &sig).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_rejects_tampered_message() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello pqfile";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        let result = verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, b"tampered", &sig);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_rejects_tampered_signature() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello pqfile";
        let mut sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        sig[0] ^= 0xff;
        let result = verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &sig);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature | PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_rejects_wrong_key() {
        let r1 = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let r2 = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello pqfile";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r1.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        let result = verify_bytes(&r2.vk_pem, msg, &sig);
        assert!(matches!(
            result,
            Err(PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_files_written_correctly() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let r = sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None).unwrap();
        assert!(dir.path().join("sign_pubkey.pem").exists());
        assert!(dir.path().join("sign_privkey.pem").exists());
        assert!(!r.vk_fingerprint.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_refuses_overwrite_without_force() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None).unwrap();
        let result = sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(_))));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_force_overwrites() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None).unwrap();
        sign_keygen(dir.path(), true, None).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_file_and_verify_file_roundtrip() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let r = sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None).unwrap();
        let input = dir.path().join("data.txt");
        fs::write(&input, b"some file content").unwrap();
        let sig_path = dir.path().join("data.txt.sig");
        let sk_pem = fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("sign_privkey.pem")).unwrap();
        sign_file(&sk_pem, &input, &sig_path, None).unwrap();
        let vk_pem = fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("sign_pubkey.pem")).unwrap();
        verify_file(&vk_pem, &input, &sig_path).unwrap();
        drop(r);
    }

    #[test]
    fn default_sig_path_appends_sig_extension() {
        let p = Path::new("file.txt");
        assert_eq!(default_sig_path(p), PathBuf::from("file.txt.sig"));

        let p2 = Path::new("file");
        assert_eq!(default_sig_path(p2), PathBuf::from("file.sig"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_bytes_wrong_pem_tag_returns_error() {
        let wrong_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new("WRONG TAG", vec![0u8; SK_SEED_LEN]));
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_bytes(&wrong_pem, b"data", None),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_bytes_wrong_seed_length_returns_error() {
        let wrong_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(SK_TAG, vec![0u8; 16]));
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_bytes(&wrong_pem, b"data", None),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength { .. })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_bytes_wrong_vk_pem_tag_returns_error() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        let wrong_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new("WRONG TAG", vec![0u8; VK_LEN]));
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&wrong_pem, msg, &sig),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_bytes_wrong_vk_length_returns_error() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        let wrong_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(VK_TAG, vec![0u8; 16]));
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&wrong_pem, msg, &sig),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength { .. })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_bytes_wrong_sig_length_returns_error() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let short_sig = vec![0u8; 16];
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, b"data", &short_sig),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature)
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn verify_file_wrong_sig_pem_tag_returns_error() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        let input = dir.path().join("data.txt");
        fs::write(&input, b"payload").unwrap();
        let sig_path = dir.path().join("data.txt.sig");
        let wrong_sig_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new("WRONG TAG", vec![0u8; SIG_LEN]));
        fs::write(&sig_path, wrong_sig_pem).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_file(&r.vk_pem, &input, &sig_path),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidPem(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_blocks_when_only_privkey_exists() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        fs::write(dir.path().join("sign_privkey.pem"), b"dummy").unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, None),
            Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(_))
        ));
    }

    // ── SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192f ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    // Signing is expensive in debug builds (~3 s per signature), so these
    // tests sign once and reuse the signature for several assertions.

    #[test]
    fn slh_keygen_bytes_produces_correct_tags_and_lengths() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f, None).unwrap();
        assert!(r.vk_pem.contains(SLH_VK_TAG));
        assert!(r.sk_pem.contains(SLH_SK_TAG));
        let vk = pem::parse(&r.vk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(vk.contents().len(), SLH_VK_LEN);
        let sk = pem::parse(&r.sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sk.contents().len(), SLH_SK_SEED_LEN);
        assert!(!r.vk_fingerprint.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn slh_sign_verify_roundtrip_and_rejects_tampering() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f, None).unwrap();
        let msg = b"hello slh-dsa";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sig.len(), SLH_SIG_LEN);

        // Valid signature verifies.
        verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &sig).unwrap();

        // Tampered message rejected.
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, b"tampered", &sig),
            Err(PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        ));

        // Tampered signature rejected.
        let mut bad_sig = sig.clone();
        bad_sig[0] ^= 0xff;
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &bad_sig),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature | PqfileError::SignatureVerificationFailed)
        ));

        // Wrong-algorithm verifying key rejects by signature length.
        let ml = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        assert!(matches!(
            verify_bytes(&ml.vk_pem, msg, &sig),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidSignature)
        ));

        // Detached-signature PEM helpers pick the SLH tag and roundtrip.
        let sig_pem = encode_sig_pem(&sig);
        assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&sig_pem).contains(SLH_SIG_TAG));
        assert_eq!(decode_sig_pem(&sig_pem).unwrap(), sig);
    }

    #[test]
    fn slh_sign_verify_roundtrip_with_passphrase() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes_with_algorithm(SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f, Some("mypass"))
            .unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&r.sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p.tag(), SLH_SK_ENC_TAG);
        assert_eq!(
            p.contents().len(),
            crate::passphrase::ENCRYPTED_SLH_SIGNING_BODY_LEN
        );

        // Wrong passphrase and missing passphrase both fail before signing.
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, b"data", Some("wrong")),
            Err(PqfileError::WrongPassphrase)
        ));
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, b"data", None),
            Err(PqfileError::PassphraseRequired)
        ));

        let msg = b"signed with encrypted slh key";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, Some("mypass")).unwrap();
        verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &sig).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn slh_keygen_writes_files() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let r = sign_keygen_with_algorithm(dir.path(), false, None, SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f)
            .unwrap();
        assert!(dir.path().join("sign_pubkey.pem").exists());
        assert!(dir.path().join("sign_privkey.pem").exists());
        assert!(!r.vk_fingerprint.is_empty());
        // Second call without force refuses to overwrite.
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_keygen_with_algorithm(dir.path(), false, None, SigAlgorithm::SlhDsaShake192f),
            Err(PqfileError::OutputExists(_))
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn slh_seed_is_deterministic() {
        // The same 72-byte seed triple must always rebuild the same key pair.
        let seed = [7u8; SLH_SK_SEED_LEN];
        let sk1 = slh_signing_key_from_seed(&seed).unwrap();
        let sk2 = slh_signing_key_from_seed(&seed).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            SlhKeypairTrait::verifying_key(&sk1).to_vec(),
            SlhKeypairTrait::verifying_key(&sk2).to_vec()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn slh_wrong_seed_length_returns_error() {
        let wrong_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_SK_TAG, vec![0u8; 32]));
        assert!(matches!(
            sign_bytes(&wrong_pem, b"data", None),
            Err(PqfileError::InvalidKeyLength { .. })
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sig_len_for_vk_dispatches_on_tag() {
        let ml = sign_keygen_bytes(None).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sig_len_for_vk(&ml.vk_pem).unwrap(), SIG_LEN);
        let slh_vk_pem = pem::encode(&Pem::new(SLH_VK_TAG, vec![0u8; SLH_VK_LEN]));
        assert_eq!(sig_len_for_vk(&slh_vk_pem).unwrap(), SLH_SIG_LEN);
        assert!(sig_len_for_vk(&ml.sk_pem).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_bytes_with_passphrase_uses_encrypted_tag() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(Some("secret")).unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&r.sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p.tag(), SK_ENC_TAG);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_bytes_encrypted_body_is_76_bytes() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(Some("secret")).unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&r.sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            p.contents().len(),
            crate::passphrase::ENCRYPTED_SIGNING_BODY_LEN
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_and_verify_roundtrip_with_passphrase() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(Some("mypass")).unwrap();
        let msg = b"signed with encrypted key";
        let sig = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, msg, Some("mypass")).unwrap();
        verify_bytes(&r.vk_pem, msg, &sig).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_bytes_wrong_passphrase_returns_error() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(Some("correct")).unwrap();
        let result = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, b"data", Some("wrong"));
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(PqfileError::WrongPassphrase)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_bytes_encrypted_key_no_passphrase_returns_error() {
        let r = sign_keygen_bytes(Some("secret")).unwrap();
        let result = sign_bytes(&r.sk_pem, b"data", None);
        assert!(matches!(result, Err(PqfileError::PassphraseRequired)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_keygen_with_passphrase_writes_encrypted_key() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        sign_keygen(dir.path(), false, Some("secret")).unwrap();
        let sk_pem = fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("sign_privkey.pem")).unwrap();
        let p = pem::parse(&sk_pem).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p.tag(), SK_ENC_TAG);
    }
}