passless-core 0.12.0

//! Application configuration using clap-serde-derive
//!
//! This module provides a unified configuration approach where settings can come from:
//! 1. CLI arguments (highest priority)
//! 2. Configuration file (medium priority)
//! 3. Default values (lowest priority)

use std::fs::File;
use std::io::BufReader;
use std::path::PathBuf;

use clap::{ArgAction, Parser, Subcommand};
use clap_serde_derive::ClapSerde;
use libc::{PR_SET_DUMPABLE, prctl};
use libc::{mlock, munlock};
use log::debug;
use nix::sys::resource::{Resource, setrlimit};
use passless_config_doc::ConfigDoc;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// Compute default local storage path
pub fn local_path() -> String {
    dirs::data_dir()
        .expect("Could not determine data directory: $XDG_DATA_HOME or $HOME/.local/share")
        .join("passless/local")
        .to_string_lossy()
        .into_owned()
}

/// Local backend configuration
#[derive(ClapSerde, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ConfigDoc)]
#[group(id = "local-backend-config")]
pub struct LocalBackendConfig {
    /// Path to local storage directory
    #[arg(
        long = "local-path",
        env = "PASSLESS_LOCAL_PATH",
        id = "local-path",
        value_name = "PATH"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(local_path())]
    pub path: String,
}

/// Compute default password-store path
pub fn pass_store_path() -> String {
    dirs::home_dir()
        .expect("Could not determine home directory: $HOME")
        .join(".password-store")
        .to_string_lossy()
        .into_owned()
}
/// Pass (password-store) backend configuration
#[derive(ClapSerde, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ConfigDoc)]
#[group(id = "pass-backend-config")]
pub struct PassBackendConfig {
    /// Path to password store directory
    #[arg(
        long = "pass-store-path",
        env = "PASSLESS_PASS_STORE_PATH",
        id = "pass-store-path",
        value_name = "PATH"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(pass_store_path())]
    pub store_path: String,

    /// Relative path within password store for FIDO2 entries
    #[arg(
        long = "pass-path",
        env = "PASSLESS_PASS_PATH",
        id = "pass-path",
        value_name = "PATH"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default("fido2".to_string())]
    pub path: String,

    /// GPG backend: "gpgme" or "gnupg-bin"
    #[arg(
        long = "pass-gpg-backend",
        env = "PASSLESS_PASS_GPG_BACKEND",
        value_name = "BACKEND"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default("gnupg-bin".to_string())]
    pub gpg_backend: String,
}

/// Compute default TPM storage path
pub fn tpm_path() -> String {
    dirs::data_dir()
        .expect("Could not determine data directory: $XDG_DATA_HOME or $HOME/.local/share")
        .join("passless/tpm")
        .to_string_lossy()
        .into_owned()
}

/// TPM backend configuration
#[cfg(feature = "tpm")]
#[derive(ClapSerde, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ConfigDoc)]
#[group(id = "tpm-backend-config")]
pub struct TpmBackendConfig {
    /// Path to TPM storage directory
    #[arg(
        long = "tpm-path",
        env = "PASSLESS_TPM_PATH",
        id = "tpm-path",
        value_name = "PATH"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(tpm_path())]
    pub path: String,

    /// TPM TCTI (TPM Command Transmission Interface) configuration
    #[arg(long = "tpm-tcti", env = "PASSLESS_TPM_TCTI", value_name = "TCTI")]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default("device:/dev/tpmrm0".to_string())]
    pub tcti: String,
}

/// Security configuration
#[derive(ClapSerde, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ConfigDoc)]
#[group(id = "security")]
pub struct SecurityConfig {
    /// Check if mlock is available to prevent credentials from being swapped to disk
    #[arg(long = "check-mlock", env = "PASSLESS_CHECK_MLOCK")]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(true)]
    pub check_mlock: bool,

    /// Disable core dumps to prevent credential leakage
    #[arg(long = "disable-core-dumps", env = "PASSLESS_DISABLE_CORE_DUMPS")]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(true)]
    pub disable_core_dumps: bool,

    /// Enable constant signature counter to help RPs detect cloned authenticators
    #[arg(
        long = "constant-signature-counter",
        env = "PASSLESS_CONSTANT_SIGNATURE_COUNTER",
        action = ArgAction::Set,
        require_equals = true,
        num_args = 0..=1,
        default_missing_value = "true"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    pub constant_signature_counter: bool,

    /// Always require user verification for all operations
    /// - When PIN is set + pin.enforcement="required": requires PIN
    /// - When PIN is set + pin.enforcement="optional": depends on context
    /// - When PIN is set + pin.enforcement="never": uses notification fallback
    /// - When PIN not set: uses notification
    #[arg(
        long = "always-uv",
        env = "PASSLESS_ALWAYS_UV",
        action = ArgAction::Set,
        require_equals = true,
        num_args = 0..=1,
        default_value = "true",
        default_missing_value = "true"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(true)]
    pub always_uv: bool,

    /// Show user verification notification during registration
    #[arg(
        long = "user-verification-registration",
        env = "PASSLESS_USER_VERIFICATION_REGISTRATION"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(true)]
    pub user_verification_registration: bool,

    /// Show user verification notification during authentication
    #[arg(
        long = "user-verification-authentication",
        env = "PASSLESS_USER_VERIFICATION_AUTHENTICATION"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(true)]
    pub user_verification_authentication: bool,

    /// Notification timeout in seconds (0 = no timeout)
    #[arg(
        long = "notification-timeout",
        env = "PASSLESS_NOTIFICATION_TIMEOUT",
        value_name = "SECONDS"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(30)]
    pub notification_timeout: u32,
}

/// PIN enforcement policy
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum PinEnforcement {
    /// Never require PIN, always use notification fallback (backward compatible)
    Never,
    /// Use PIN only when always_uv=true or client requests UV
    #[default]
    Optional,
    /// Always require PIN when set (most secure)
    Required,
}

impl std::str::FromStr for PinEnforcement {
    type Err = String;

    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
        match s.to_lowercase().as_str() {
            "never" => Ok(PinEnforcement::Never),
            "optional" => Ok(PinEnforcement::Optional),
            "required" => Ok(PinEnforcement::Required),
            _ => Err(format!(
                "Invalid PIN enforcement '{}'. Must be: never, optional, or required",
                s
            )),
        }
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Display for PinEnforcement {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            PinEnforcement::Never => write!(f, "never"),
            PinEnforcement::Optional => write!(f, "optional"),
            PinEnforcement::Required => write!(f, "required"),
        }
    }
}

/// PIN configuration
#[derive(ClapSerde, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, ConfigDoc)]
#[group(id = "pin")]
pub struct PinConfig {
    /// PIN enforcement policy when PIN is set:
    /// - "never": Always use notification fallback (backward compatible, convenience)
    /// - "optional": Use PIN only when always_uv=true or client requests UV
    /// - "required": Always require PIN when set (most secure)
    #[arg(
        long = "pin-enforcement",
        env = "PASSLESS_PIN_ENFORCEMENT",
        value_name = "POLICY"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(PinEnforcement::Optional)]
    pub enforcement: PinEnforcement,

    /// Minimum PIN length in characters (CTAP spec: 4-63)
    #[arg(
        long = "pin-min-length",
        env = "PASSLESS_PIN_MIN_LENGTH",
        value_name = "LENGTH"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(4)]
    pub min_length: u8,

    /// Maximum PIN retry attempts before lockout (CTAP spec: 8)
    #[arg(
        long = "pin-max-retries",
        env = "PASSLESS_PIN_MAX_RETRIES",
        value_name = "RETRIES"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(8)]
    pub max_retries: u8,

    /// Auto-lock timeout in seconds after max failed attempts (0 = disabled)
    /// After lockout, authenticator must be reset to use PIN again
    #[arg(
        long = "pin-auto-lock-timeout",
        env = "PASSLESS_PIN_AUTO_LOCK_TIMEOUT",
        value_name = "SECONDS"
    )]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default(0)]
    pub auto_lock_timeout: u32,
}

impl SecurityConfig {
    /// Apply security hardening measures
    pub fn apply_hardening(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
        if self.disable_core_dumps {
            self.disable_core_dumps_impl()?;
        }
        if self.check_mlock {
            self.probe_mlock_capability()?;
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Disable core dumps to prevent credential leakage
    fn disable_core_dumps_impl(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
        debug!("Disabling core dumps to prevent credential leakage");
        setrlimit(Resource::RLIMIT_CORE, 0, 0)?;
        let r = unsafe { prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) };
        if r != 0 {
            log::warn!("prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) failed: {}", r);
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Probe mlock capability by testing with a small allocation
    fn probe_mlock_capability(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
        debug!("Check mlock capability");

        let test_size = 4096;
        let test_buffer = vec![0u8; test_size];
        let ptr = test_buffer.as_ptr() as *const libc::c_void;

        let lock_result = unsafe { mlock(ptr, test_size) };

        if lock_result == 0 {
            unsafe { munlock(ptr, test_size) };
            log::debug!("MLOCK is enabled - sensitive data will not be swapped to disk");
        } else {
            log::warn!(
                "mlock capability probe failed - memory locking may not be available.\n\
                 Hint: grant CAP_IPC_LOCK to the binary with: 'sudo setcap cap_ipc_lock=+ep $(which passless)'"
            );
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Main application configuration
/// Note: Cannot derive Clone/Debug because it has #[clap_serde] fields
#[derive(ClapSerde, Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, ConfigDoc)]
pub struct AppConfig {
    /// Storage backend type: pass, tpm (experimental), or local (for testing)
    #[arg(short = 't', long = "backend-type", env = "PASSLESS_BACKEND_TYPE")]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[default("pass".to_string())]
    pub backend_type: String,

    /// Enable verbose logging
    // workaround for allowing `-v` syntax instead of `-v=true`
    #[arg(
        short,
        long,
        env = "PASSLESS_VERBOSE",
        action = ArgAction::Set,
        require_equals = true,
        num_args = 0..=1,
        default_missing_value = "true"
    )]
    #[default(true)]
    #[serde(default)]
    pub verbose: bool,

    /// Pass backend configuration
    #[clap_serde]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub pass: PassBackendConfig,

    /// TPM backend configuration
    #[cfg(feature = "tpm")]
    #[clap_serde]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub tpm: TpmBackendConfig,

    /// Local backend configuration
    #[clap_serde]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub local: LocalBackendConfig,

    /// Security hardening configuration
    #[clap_serde]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub security: SecurityConfig,

    /// PIN configuration
    #[clap_serde]
    #[serde(default)]
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub pin: PinConfig,
}

/// Backend-specific configuration
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum BackendConfig {
    Local {
        path: String,
    },
    Pass {
        store_path: String,
        path: String,
        gpg_backend: String,
    },
    #[cfg(feature = "tpm")]
    Tpm {
        path: String,
        tcti: String,
    },
}

impl AppConfig {
    /// Load configuration with precedence: CLI > config file > defaults
    pub fn load(args: &mut Args) -> Self {
        // Try to load config file
        let default_config_path = dirs::config_dir().map(|p| p.join("passless/config.toml"));

        let config_file_path = args
            .config_path
            .as_ref()
            .or(default_config_path.as_ref())
            .filter(|p| p.exists());

        if let Some(path) = config_file_path
            && let Ok(f) = File::open(path)
        {
            log::info!("Loading configuration from: {}", path.display());
            let content = std::io::read_to_string(BufReader::new(f)).unwrap_or_default();
            match toml::from_str::<<AppConfig as ClapSerde>::Opt>(&content) {
                Ok(file_config) => {
                    // Deserialize into Opt, then convert with defaults and merge CLI args
                    return AppConfig::from(file_config).merge(&mut args.config);
                }
                Err(e) => log::warn!("Failed to parse config file {}: {}", path.display(), e),
            }
        }

        // No config file or parse failed - use CLI args + defaults
        AppConfig::from(&mut args.config)
    }

    /// Get the backend configuration based on the backend_type
    pub fn backend(&self) -> crate::error::Result<BackendConfig> {
        match self.backend_type.as_str() {
            "local" => Ok(BackendConfig::Local {
                path: self.local.path.clone(),
            }),
            "pass" => Ok(BackendConfig::Pass {
                store_path: self.pass.store_path.clone(),
                path: self.pass.path.clone(),
                gpg_backend: self.pass.gpg_backend.clone(),
            }),
            #[cfg(feature = "tpm")]
            "tpm" => Ok(BackendConfig::Tpm {
                path: self.tpm.path.clone(),
                tcti: self.tpm.tcti.clone(),
            }),
            _ => Err(crate::error::Error::Config(format!(
                "Invalid backend_type '{}'. Must be one of: local, pass, tpm",
                self.backend_type
            ))),
        }
    }

    /// Apply security hardening measures
    pub fn apply_security_hardening(&self) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
        self.security.apply_hardening()
    }

    /// Get security configuration
    pub fn security_config(&self) -> SecurityConfig {
        self.security.clone()
    }

    /// Get PIN configuration
    pub fn pin_config(&self) -> PinConfig {
        self.pin.clone()
    }
}

/// CLI arguments structure
#[derive(Parser)]
#[command(author, version, about)]
pub struct Args {
    /// Path to configuration file (TOML format)
    #[arg(short, long, env = "PASSLESS_CONFIG")]
    pub config_path: Option<PathBuf>,

    /// Application configuration (can come from CLI or config file)
    #[command(flatten)]
    pub config: <AppConfig as ClapSerde>::Opt,

    /// Subcommands
    #[command(subcommand)]
    pub command: Option<Commands>,
}

/// Output format for client commands
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum OutputFormat {
    /// Human-readable plain text output
    Plain,
    /// JSON output for programmatic consumption
    Json,
}

impl std::str::FromStr for OutputFormat {
    type Err = String;

    fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
        match s.to_lowercase().as_str() {
            "plain" => Ok(OutputFormat::Plain),
            "json" => Ok(OutputFormat::Json),
            _ => Err(format!(
                "Invalid output format '{}'. Must be 'plain' or 'json'",
                s
            )),
        }
    }
}

impl std::fmt::Display for OutputFormat {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        match self {
            OutputFormat::Plain => write!(f, "plain"),
            OutputFormat::Json => write!(f, "json"),
        }
    }
}

/// Subcommands for passless
#[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Commands {
    /// Configuration management commands
    Config {
        #[command(subcommand)]
        action: ConfigAction,
    },
    /// FIDO2 client commands for managing authenticators
    ///
    /// These commands require a running authenticator. For testing:
    /// 1. Start authenticator: PASSLESS_E2E_AUTO_ACCEPT_UV=1 cargo run -- --backend-type local
    /// 2. Run client commands in another terminal with the same environment variable
    Client {
        /// Select device by index (0-based) or name. Use 'devices' subcommand to list available devices.
        #[arg(short = 'D', long = "device", value_name = "INDEX|NAME", global = true)]
        device: Option<String>,

        /// Output format: plain (default) or json
        #[arg(
            short = 'o',
            long = "output",
            value_name = "FORMAT",
            default_value = "plain",
            global = true
        )]
        output: OutputFormat,

        #[command(subcommand)]
        action: ClientAction,
    },
}

/// Configuration actions
#[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ConfigAction {
    /// Print the default configuration in TOML format
    Print,
}

/// Client actions for FIDO2 authenticator management
#[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum ClientAction {
    /// List all available FIDO2 authenticators/devices
    Devices,
    /// Get authenticator information (capabilities, AAGUID, versions, etc.)
    Info,
    /// Reset the authenticator (WARNING: deletes ALL credentials)
    Reset {
        /// Confirmation flag that must be provided twice for safety
        #[arg(long = "yes-i-really-want-to-reset-my-device", action = ArgAction::Count)]
        confirm: u8,
    },
    /// List all credentials on the authenticator
    List {
        /// Filter by relying party ID (domain)
        #[arg(short = 'd', long = "domain", value_name = "DOMAIN")]
        rp_id: Option<String>,
    },
    /// Show detailed information about a specific credential
    Show {
        /// Credential ID in hexadecimal format
        #[arg(value_name = "CREDENTIAL_ID")]
        credential_id: String,
    },
    /// Delete a specific credential by ID
    Delete {
        /// Credential ID in hexadecimal format
        #[arg(value_name = "CREDENTIAL_ID")]
        credential_id: String,
    },
    /// Rename a credential (update user name and/or display name)
    Rename {
        /// Credential ID in hexadecimal format
        #[arg(value_name = "CREDENTIAL_ID")]
        credential_id: String,
        /// New user name (login identifier)
        #[arg(short = 'u', long = "user-name", value_name = "NAME")]
        user_name: Option<String>,
        /// New display name (friendly name)
        #[arg(short = 'n', long = "display-name", value_name = "NAME")]
        display_name: Option<String>,
    },
    /// PIN management commands
    Pin {
        #[command(subcommand)]
        action: PinAction,
    },
}

/// PIN management actions
#[derive(Subcommand, Debug, Clone)]
pub enum PinAction {
    /// Set a new PIN (authenticator must not have a PIN set)
    Set {
        /// The new PIN (minimum 4 characters)
        #[arg(value_name = "PIN")]
        pin: String,
    },
    /// Change the existing PIN
    Change {
        /// The current PIN
        #[arg(value_name = "OLD_PIN")]
        old_pin: String,
        /// The new PIN (minimum 4 characters)
        #[arg(value_name = "NEW_PIN")]
        new_pin: String,
    },
    /// Reset built-in user verification retries without deleting credentials
    UvReset,
}