parley-core 0.2.0

Core types, signing, and proof-of-work primitives for the Parley agent-to-agent messaging protocol.
Documentation
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//! Parley HTTP request signing. Spec v0.4 §2 (Authentication).
//!
//! Replaces the v0.1 in-body Envelope construct. Authentication metadata
//! moves to a `Parley-Signature` HTTP header. Signatures are Ed25519 over
//! a deterministic 8-line canonical string that pins the HTTP method,
//! path, query, ts, nonce, agent, network, and body hash.

use std::fmt;

use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine as _;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier as _, VerifyingKey};
use libcrux_ml_dsa::ml_dsa_65::{
    self, MLDSA65Signature, MLDSA65SigningKey, MLDSA65VerificationKey,
};
use rand::RngCore as _;
use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};

use crate::ids::{AgentPubkey, NetworkId, Nonce};

/// HTTP header name carrying the Parley signature.
pub const SIGNATURE_HEADER: &str = "Parley-Signature";

/// Signature scheme version. Bump on incompatible changes to the
/// canonical string or header grammar.
///
/// v2 (post-quantum): the header additionally carries a `mldsa_sig`
/// field — an ML-DSA-65 signature over the same canonical string.
/// Registered agents MUST supply it; the server verifies both the
/// Ed25519 and the ML-DSA signature (hybrid).
pub const SIGNATURE_VERSION: u32 = 2;

/// ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) public/verification key length, in bytes.
pub const ML_DSA_PUBKEY_BYTES: usize = 1952;

/// ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signature length, in bytes.
pub const ML_DSA_SIG_BYTES: usize = 3309;

/// Domain-separation context for ML-DSA auth signatures (FIPS 204 ctx).
const ML_DSA_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"parley-auth-v2";

/// SHA-256 of the empty byte sequence, base64url-no-pad. Used for the
/// body-hash field of requests with no body. 43 chars.
pub const EMPTY_BODY_SHA256: &str = "47DEQpj8HBSa-_TImW-5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU";

/// Compute SHA-256 of a body and base64url-no-pad encode it.
#[must_use]
pub fn body_sha256_b64url(body: &[u8]) -> String {
    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
    hasher.update(body);
    let digest = hasher.finalize();
    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(digest)
}

/// Build the canonical string-to-sign per spec §2.2.
///
/// Eight LF-joined lines (no trailing newline):
/// ```text
/// METHOD\npath\nquery\nts\nnonce\nagent\nnetwork\nbody-sha256-b64url
/// ```
#[must_use]
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub fn canonical_string(
    method: &str,
    path: &str,
    canonical_query: &str,
    ts: i64,
    nonce: &Nonce,
    agent: &AgentPubkey,
    network: &NetworkId,
    body_sha256_b64url: &str,
) -> String {
    let method_upper = method.to_ascii_uppercase();
    format!(
        "{method_upper}\n{path}\n{canonical_query}\n{ts}\n{nonce}\n{agent}\n{network}\n{body_sha256_b64url}"
    )
}

/// Canonicalize a raw query string per spec §2.2:
/// parse, sort by key then value, percent-encode each pair, rejoin with `&`.
///
/// Returns the empty string for an empty input.
#[must_use]
pub fn canonical_query_string(raw: &str) -> String {
    if raw.is_empty() {
        return String::new();
    }
    let mut pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = raw
        .split('&')
        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
        .map(|p| match p.split_once('=') {
            Some((k, v)) => (
                percent_decode(k).unwrap_or_else(|_| k.to_owned()),
                percent_decode(v).unwrap_or_else(|_| v.to_owned()),
            ),
            None => (
                percent_decode(p).unwrap_or_else(|_| p.to_owned()),
                String::new(),
            ),
        })
        .collect();
    pairs.sort();
    pairs
        .into_iter()
        .map(|(k, v)| format!("{}={}", percent_encode(&k), percent_encode(&v)))
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join("&")
}

fn percent_encode(s: &str) -> String {
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
    for &b in s.as_bytes() {
        if b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(b, b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~') {
            out.push(b as char);
        } else {
            out.push_str(&format!("%{b:02X}"));
        }
    }
    out
}

fn percent_decode(s: &str) -> Result<String, ()> {
    let bytes = s.as_bytes();
    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(bytes.len());
    let mut i = 0;
    while i < bytes.len() {
        if bytes[i] == b'%' {
            if i + 2 >= bytes.len() {
                return Err(());
            }
            let hi = hex_val(bytes[i + 1])?;
            let lo = hex_val(bytes[i + 2])?;
            out.push((hi << 4) | lo);
            i += 3;
        } else {
            out.push(bytes[i]);
            i += 1;
        }
    }
    String::from_utf8(out).map_err(|_| ())
}

fn hex_val(b: u8) -> Result<u8, ()> {
    match b {
        b'0'..=b'9' => Ok(b - b'0'),
        b'a'..=b'f' => Ok(b - b'a' + 10),
        b'A'..=b'F' => Ok(b - b'A' + 10),
        _ => Err(()),
    }
}

/// Build the `Parley-Signature` header value (v2, hybrid).
///
/// `sig_bytes` is the Ed25519 signature; `mldsa_sig` is the ML-DSA-65
/// signature over the same canonical string. Both are emitted; the
/// ML-DSA field is large (~4.4 KB base64), which is the expected cost
/// of post-quantum auth.
#[must_use]
pub fn build_header_value(
    agent: &AgentPubkey,
    ts: i64,
    nonce: &Nonce,
    network: &NetworkId,
    sig_bytes: &[u8; 64],
    mldsa_sig: &[u8],
) -> String {
    format!(
        "v={v}, agent={agent}, ts={ts}, nonce={nonce}, network={network}, sig={sig}, mldsa_sig={mldsa}",
        v = SIGNATURE_VERSION,
        sig = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig_bytes),
        mldsa = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(mldsa_sig),
    )
}

/// Parsed `Parley-Signature` header.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ParsedSignature {
    pub v: u32,
    pub agent: AgentPubkey,
    pub ts: i64,
    pub nonce: Nonce,
    pub network: NetworkId,
    pub sig: [u8; 64],
    /// ML-DSA-65 signature bytes, if the `mldsa_sig` field is present.
    /// Optional at parse time so unregistered agents (e.g. mid-register)
    /// and v1 callers still parse; the middleware enforces presence for
    /// registered agents.
    pub mldsa_sig: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignatureParseError {
    #[error("missing field: {0}")]
    MissingField(&'static str),
    #[error("malformed pair: {0}")]
    MalformedPair(String),
    #[error("invalid value for {field}: {reason}")]
    InvalidValue { field: &'static str, reason: String },
    #[error("duplicate field: {0}")]
    DuplicateField(&'static str),
}

/// Parse a `Parley-Signature` header value per spec §2.1.
pub fn parse_header_value(raw: &str) -> Result<ParsedSignature, SignatureParseError> {
    let mut v: Option<u32> = None;
    let mut agent: Option<AgentPubkey> = None;
    let mut ts: Option<i64> = None;
    let mut nonce: Option<Nonce> = None;
    let mut network: Option<NetworkId> = None;
    let mut sig: Option<[u8; 64]> = None;
    let mut mldsa_sig: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;

    for raw_pair in raw.split(',') {
        let pair = raw_pair.trim();
        if pair.is_empty() {
            continue;
        }
        let (key, value) = pair
            .split_once('=')
            .ok_or_else(|| SignatureParseError::MalformedPair(pair.to_owned()))?;
        let value = value.trim();
        match key.trim() {
            "v" => {
                if v.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("v"));
                }
                v = Some(value.parse().map_err(|e: std::num::ParseIntError| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "v",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?);
            }
            "agent" => {
                if agent.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("agent"));
                }
                agent = Some(value.parse().map_err(|e: crate::CoreError| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "agent",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?);
            }
            "ts" => {
                if ts.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("ts"));
                }
                ts = Some(value.parse().map_err(|e: std::num::ParseIntError| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "ts",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?);
            }
            "nonce" => {
                if nonce.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("nonce"));
                }
                nonce = Some(value.parse().map_err(|e: crate::CoreError| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "nonce",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?);
            }
            "network" => {
                if network.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("network"));
                }
                network = Some(value.parse().map_err(|e: crate::CoreError| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "network",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?);
            }
            "sig" => {
                if sig.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("sig"));
                }
                let decoded = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(value).map_err(|e| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "sig",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?;
                let arr: [u8; 64] =
                    decoded
                        .try_into()
                        .map_err(|d: Vec<u8>| SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                            field: "sig",
                            reason: format!("expected 64 bytes, got {}", d.len()),
                        })?;
                sig = Some(arr);
            }
            "mldsa_sig" => {
                if mldsa_sig.is_some() {
                    return Err(SignatureParseError::DuplicateField("mldsa_sig"));
                }
                let decoded = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(value).map_err(|e| {
                    SignatureParseError::InvalidValue {
                        field: "mldsa_sig",
                        reason: e.to_string(),
                    }
                })?;
                mldsa_sig = Some(decoded);
            }
            other => {
                // Unknown keys are tolerated for forward extensibility but
                // not stored. The signature still binds the canonical
                // string, so unknown keys can't change request meaning.
                let _ = other;
            }
        }
    }

    Ok(ParsedSignature {
        v: v.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("v"))?,
        agent: agent.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("agent"))?,
        ts: ts.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("ts"))?,
        nonce: nonce.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("nonce"))?,
        network: network.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("network"))?,
        sig: sig.ok_or(SignatureParseError::MissingField("sig"))?,
        mldsa_sig,
    })
}

/// Verify an Ed25519 signature against a canonical string.
pub fn verify_signature(
    agent: &AgentPubkey,
    canonical: &str,
    sig: &[u8; 64],
) -> Result<(), SignatureVerifyError> {
    let key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(agent.as_bytes())
        .map_err(|e| SignatureVerifyError::BadKey(e.to_string()))?;
    let signature = Signature::from_bytes(sig);
    key.verify(canonical.as_bytes(), &signature)
        .map_err(|_| SignatureVerifyError::BadSignature)
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum SignatureVerifyError {
    #[error("agent pubkey is not a valid Ed25519 verifying key: {0}")]
    BadKey(String),
    #[error("signature does not verify")]
    BadSignature,
}

/// Sign a canonical string with an ML-DSA-65 key. Returns raw signature
/// bytes ([`ML_DSA_SIG_BYTES`] long). Uses hedged (randomized) signing.
pub fn ml_dsa_sign(
    signing_key: &MLDSA65SigningKey,
    canonical: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, MlDsaError> {
    let mut randomness = [0u8; 32];
    rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut randomness);
    let sig = ml_dsa_65::sign(
        signing_key,
        canonical.as_bytes(),
        ML_DSA_CONTEXT,
        randomness,
    )
    .map_err(|_| MlDsaError::Sign)?;
    Ok(sig.as_slice().to_vec())
}

/// Verify an ML-DSA-65 signature over `canonical` against raw verification
/// key bytes. Both `pubkey_bytes` and `sig_bytes` must be exactly the
/// fixed FIPS 204 lengths or this returns [`MlDsaError`].
pub fn ml_dsa_verify(
    pubkey_bytes: &[u8],
    canonical: &str,
    sig_bytes: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), MlDsaError> {
    let pk: [u8; ML_DSA_PUBKEY_BYTES] = pubkey_bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| MlDsaError::BadKey)?;
    let sig: [u8; ML_DSA_SIG_BYTES] = sig_bytes.try_into().map_err(|_| MlDsaError::BadSignature)?;
    let vk = MLDSA65VerificationKey::new(pk);
    let signature = MLDSA65Signature::new(sig);
    ml_dsa_65::verify(&vk, canonical.as_bytes(), ML_DSA_CONTEXT, &signature)
        .map_err(|_| MlDsaError::BadSignature)
}

#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum MlDsaError {
    #[error("ML-DSA signing failed")]
    Sign,
    #[error("ML-DSA verification key is malformed (wrong length)")]
    BadKey,
    #[error("ML-DSA signature does not verify or is malformed")]
    BadSignature,
}

impl fmt::Display for ParsedSignature {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
        write!(
            f,
            "v={}, agent={}, ts={}, nonce={}, network={}",
            self.v, self.agent, self.ts, self.nonce, self.network
        )
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn empty_body_sha_constant_matches_computed() {
        assert_eq!(body_sha256_b64url(b""), EMPTY_BODY_SHA256);
    }

    #[test]
    fn canonical_query_sorts_and_encodes() {
        assert_eq!(canonical_query_string(""), "");
        assert_eq!(canonical_query_string("b=2&a=1"), "a=1&b=2");
        assert_eq!(canonical_query_string("k=hello world"), "k=hello%20world");
        assert_eq!(canonical_query_string("k="), "k=");
    }

    #[test]
    fn canonical_string_format_is_eight_lines() {
        let agent: AgentPubkey = "u9PqJ4gK2mZ8t6nVxR3hB1cW7yE5dF0aQ4sT2lN6oU8"
            .parse()
            .unwrap();
        let nonce: Nonce = "F4Yk8vN2j5QwK3zB1aR9oA".parse().unwrap();
        let network: NetworkId = "parley-mainnet".parse().unwrap();
        let s = canonical_string(
            "GET",
            "/v1/blobs/abc",
            "",
            1715299200,
            &nonce,
            &agent,
            &network,
            EMPTY_BODY_SHA256,
        );
        assert_eq!(s.lines().count(), 8);
        assert!(s.starts_with("GET\n/v1/blobs/abc\n\n1715299200\n"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn header_roundtrips() {
        let agent: AgentPubkey = "u9PqJ4gK2mZ8t6nVxR3hB1cW7yE5dF0aQ4sT2lN6oU8"
            .parse()
            .unwrap();
        let nonce: Nonce = "F4Yk8vN2j5QwK3zB1aR9oA".parse().unwrap();
        let network: NetworkId = "parley-mainnet".parse().unwrap();
        let sig = [7u8; 64];
        let mldsa = vec![3u8; ML_DSA_SIG_BYTES];
        let header = build_header_value(&agent, 1715299200, &nonce, &network, &sig, &mldsa);
        let parsed = parse_header_value(&header).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.v, SIGNATURE_VERSION);
        assert_eq!(parsed.agent, agent);
        assert_eq!(parsed.ts, 1715299200);
        assert_eq!(parsed.nonce, nonce);
        assert_eq!(parsed.network, network);
        assert_eq!(parsed.sig, sig);
        assert_eq!(parsed.mldsa_sig.as_deref(), Some(mldsa.as_slice()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn header_tolerates_no_space_after_comma() {
        let agent: AgentPubkey = "u9PqJ4gK2mZ8t6nVxR3hB1cW7yE5dF0aQ4sT2lN6oU8"
            .parse()
            .unwrap();
        let nonce: Nonce = "F4Yk8vN2j5QwK3zB1aR9oA".parse().unwrap();
        let network: NetworkId = "parley-mainnet".parse().unwrap();
        let sig = [7u8; 64];
        let sig_b64 = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(sig);
        let header =
            format!("v=1,agent={agent},ts=1,nonce={nonce},network={network},sig={sig_b64}");
        let parsed = parse_header_value(&header).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.v, 1);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_then_verify_roundtrip() {
        use ed25519_dalek::{Signer as _, SigningKey};
        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[42u8; 32]);
        let agent = AgentPubkey::from_bytes(*signing.verifying_key().as_bytes());
        let canonical = "GET\n/healthz\n\n0\n_\n_\n_\n_";
        let sig = signing.sign(canonical.as_bytes()).to_bytes();
        verify_signature(&agent, canonical, &sig).unwrap();
        let mut bad = sig;
        bad[0] ^= 1;
        assert!(verify_signature(&agent, canonical, &bad).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn ml_dsa_sign_verify_roundtrip() {
        use crate::keys::derive_auth_mldsa;
        let kp = derive_auth_mldsa(&[42u8; crate::keys::SEED_BYTES]);
        let pk = kp.verification_key.as_slice();
        let canonical = "GET\n/healthz\n\n0\n_\n_\n_\n_";

        let sig = ml_dsa_sign(&kp.signing_key, canonical).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(sig.len(), ML_DSA_SIG_BYTES);
        ml_dsa_verify(pk, canonical, &sig).unwrap();

        // Tampered message rejected.
        assert!(ml_dsa_verify(pk, "GET\n/other\n\n0\n_\n_\n_\n_", &sig).is_err());
        // Tampered signature rejected.
        let mut bad = sig.clone();
        bad[0] ^= 1;
        assert!(ml_dsa_verify(pk, canonical, &bad).is_err());
        // Wrong-length key/sig rejected, not panicked.
        assert!(ml_dsa_verify(&pk[..10], canonical, &sig).is_err());
        assert!(ml_dsa_verify(pk, canonical, &sig[..10]).is_err());
    }
}