orbok-fs 0.7.0

orbok safe file access boundary, source policy, scanner (RFC-003/RFC-004)
Documentation 
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//! PathGuard tests (RFC-003 §14: path traversal, symlink escape, hidden
//! exclusion, outside-source rejection) and sensitive-path warnings.

use crate::path_guard::{GuardedSource, PathGuard};
use crate::sensitive::sensitive_warning;
use crate::tests::common::{register_dir_source, register_dir_source_with};
use orbok_core::{HiddenFilePolicy, OrbokError, SymlinkPolicy};
use orbok_db::Catalog;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;

fn guard_for(catalog: &Catalog, root: &Path) -> PathGuard {
    let record = register_dir_source(catalog, root);
    PathGuard::new(vec![GuardedSource::from_record(&record)])
}

// RFC-003 §14 test 5: reject request for non-source path.
#[test]
fn rejects_path_outside_sources() {
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let outside = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(outside.path().join("secret.txt"), "secret").unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let guard = guard_for(&catalog, dir.path());

    let err = guard.validate(&outside.path().join("secret.txt")).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PathOutsideSources));
}

// RFC-003 §14 test 4: reject path traversal read. `..` segments resolve
// during canonicalization; the canonical target decides membership.
#[test]
fn rejects_dot_dot_traversal() {
    let parent = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let root = parent.path().join("source");
    fs::create_dir(&root).unwrap();
    fs::write(parent.path().join("outside.txt"), "x").unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let guard = guard_for(&catalog, &root);

    let sneaky = root.join("..").join("outside.txt");
    let err = guard.validate(&sneaky).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PathOutsideSources));
}

// RFC-003 §14 test 7: symlink pointing outside the source is rejected
// (membership is decided on the canonical target).
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn rejects_symlink_escape() {
    let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let outside = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(outside.path().join("escape.txt"), "x").unwrap();
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(
        outside.path().join("escape.txt"),
        root.path().join("link.txt"),
    )
    .unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let guard = guard_for(&catalog, root.path());

    let err = guard.validate(&root.path().join("link.txt")).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PathOutsideSources));
}

// Symlink inside the source under Ignore policy: also blocked.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn ignore_policy_blocks_internal_symlink() {
    let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(root.path().join("real.txt"), "x").unwrap();
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(root.path().join("real.txt"), root.path().join("alias.txt"))
        .unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let guard = guard_for(&catalog, root.path());

    let err = guard.validate(&root.path().join("alias.txt")).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PolicyBlocked("symlink_policy_blocked")));
    // The real file is fine.
    assert!(guard.validate(&root.path().join("real.txt")).is_ok());
}

// FollowWithinSource admits internal links but still rejects escapes.
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn follow_within_source_admits_internal_rejects_external() {
    let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let outside = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(root.path().join("real.txt"), "x").unwrap();
    fs::write(outside.path().join("evil.txt"), "x").unwrap();
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(root.path().join("real.txt"), root.path().join("ok.txt")).unwrap();
    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(outside.path().join("evil.txt"), root.path().join("bad.txt"))
        .unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let record = register_dir_source_with(
        &catalog,
        root.path(),
        HiddenFilePolicy::Exclude,
        SymlinkPolicy::FollowWithinSource,
    );
    let guard = PathGuard::new(vec![GuardedSource::from_record(&record)]);

    assert!(guard.validate(&root.path().join("ok.txt")).is_ok());
    assert!(matches!(
        guard.validate(&root.path().join("bad.txt")).unwrap_err(),
        OrbokError::PathOutsideSources
    ));
}

// RFC-003 §14 test 6: hidden file excluded by default.
#[test]
fn hidden_file_excluded_by_default() {
    let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(root.path().join(".env"), "SECRET=1").unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let guard = guard_for(&catalog, root.path());

    let err = guard.validate(&root.path().join(".env")).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PolicyBlocked("hidden_file_excluded")));
}

// RFC-003 §8 item 6: file size limit enforced at the boundary.
#[test]
fn oversized_file_blocked() {
    let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    fs::write(root.path().join("big.txt"), vec![b'a'; 64]).unwrap();

    let catalog = Catalog::open_in_memory().unwrap();
    let mut record = register_dir_source(&catalog, root.path());
    record.max_file_size_bytes = Some(16);
    let guard = PathGuard::new(vec![GuardedSource::from_record(&record)]);

    let err = guard.validate(&root.path().join("big.txt")).unwrap_err();
    assert!(matches!(err, OrbokError::PolicyBlocked("file_too_large")));
}

// RFC-003 §14 test 10: sensitive path warning triggered.
#[test]
fn sensitive_paths_warn() {
    assert_eq!(
        sensitive_warning(Path::new("/home/user/.ssh")),
        Some("credential_directory")
    );
    assert_eq!(
        sensitive_warning(Path::new("/home/user/.config")),
        Some("hidden_configuration_directory")
    );
    assert!(sensitive_warning(Path::new("/home/user/Documents")).is_none());
    #[cfg(unix)]
    assert_eq!(sensitive_warning(Path::new("/etc/passwd")), Some("system_directory"));
}