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//! The policy's `taint:` section (ADR-020, docs/POLICY.md ยง4.1): what session
//! taint protects beyond the built-in list, and whether file provenance
//! (ADR-029) is on. The engine applies the list in `engine/taint.rs`; the CLI
//! keeps provenance in the audit log.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::pattern::GlobPattern;
use crate::policy::PolicyError;
/// Files whose change runs code or steers the agent later, beyond the edit
/// itself: CI, git hooks, editor tasks, the build and test definitions of every
/// ecosystem whose commands the default policy runs, and agent instructions and
/// settings. Writing them is ordinary work, until the session has read content an
/// attacker may control. Source and test files, including test-runner configs
/// written in JavaScript (`jest.config.js`), are not listed: they are code the run
/// executes like any other file, and the command that runs them is named in a
/// listed file (`package.json`).
const PROTECTED_WRITES: [&str; 108] = [
"**/.github/workflows/**",
"**/.gitlab-ci.yml",
"**/.circleci/**",
"**/azure-pipelines.yml",
"**/Jenkinsfile",
"**/.buildkite/**",
"**/.husky/**",
"**/.githooks/**",
"**/.pre-commit-config.yaml",
"**/lefthook.yml",
"**/.lefthook.yml",
"**/.vscode/**",
// JavaScript: scripts, and package-manager settings that pick the script shell
"**/package.json",
"**/.npmrc",
"**/.yarnrc",
"**/.yarnrc.yml",
"**/pnpm-workspace.yaml",
// make, just, task
"**/Makefile",
"**/makefile",
"**/GNUmakefile",
"**/*.mk",
"**/justfile",
"**/Justfile",
"**/.justfile",
"**/Taskfile.yml",
"**/Taskfile.yaml",
// Rust: build scripts, `[build]`/`runner` settings
"**/build.rs",
"**/Cargo.toml",
"**/.cargo/config",
"**/.cargo/config.toml",
// Go: a `toolchain` line downloads and runs another Go
"**/go.mod",
"**/go.work",
// CMake
"**/CMakeLists.txt",
"**/*.cmake",
"**/CMakePresets.json",
"**/CMakeUserPresets.json",
// Maven
"**/pom.xml",
"**/.mvn/**",
"**/mvnw",
"**/mvnw.cmd",
// Gradle
"**/*.gradle",
"**/*.gradle.kts",
"**/gradle.properties",
"**/gradlew",
"**/gradlew.bat",
"**/gradle/wrapper/**",
// .NET: projects and the MSBuild files they import
"**/*.csproj",
"**/*.fsproj",
"**/*.vbproj",
"**/*.props",
"**/*.targets",
"**/global.json",
"**/NuGet.config",
"**/nuget.config",
// Ruby
"**/Rakefile",
"**/*.rake",
"**/Gemfile",
"**/*.gemspec",
"**/.rspec",
// PHP
"**/composer.json",
"**/artisan",
"**/phpunit.xml",
"**/phpunit.xml.dist",
// Python: pytest loads `conftest.py` and its config before any test
"**/conftest.py",
"**/pytest.ini",
"**/pyproject.toml",
"**/setup.py",
"**/setup.cfg",
"**/tox.ini",
"**/noxfile.py",
// containers
"**/Dockerfile",
"**/docker-compose*.yml",
"**/docker-compose*.yaml",
"**/compose*.yml",
"**/compose*.yaml",
// agents
"**/CLAUDE.md",
"**/AGENTS.md",
"**/.claude/**",
"**/.claude.json",
"**/.codex/**",
"**/.cursor/**",
"**/.cursorrules",
"**/.mcp.json",
// generated:taint from each host spec's `protect.taint` (openmoat-hosts `tests/protect.rs`)
// OpenClaw: its configuration, OpenMoat's plugin and the plugin directories the
// Gateway loads; not the whole state directory, whose workspace is ordinary work
"**/.openclaw",
"**/.openclaw/openclaw.json",
"**/.openclaw/openmoat",
"**/.openclaw/openmoat/**",
"**/.openclaw/extensions/**",
// the database where the Gateway keeps cron jobs and exec approvals
"**/.openclaw/state/**",
// GitHub Copilot CLI: its hooks, settings, MCP servers, plugins and custom
// agents, not its session folders; a repository's hooks, settings and
// instructions
"**/.copilot",
"**/.copilot/hooks",
"**/.copilot/hooks/**",
"**/.copilot/settings.json",
"**/.copilot/config.json",
"**/.copilot/mcp-config.json",
"**/.copilot/installed-plugins/**",
"**/.copilot/agents/**",
"**/.github/hooks/**",
"**/.github/mcp.json",
"**/.github/agents/**",
"**/.github/copilot/**",
"**/.github/copilot-instructions.md",
// pi: its agent directory (extensions, settings, trust decisions) and a
// project's `.pi` (extensions, settings, MCP servers, system prompt)
"**/.pi",
"**/.pi/**",
// Gemini CLI: its settings, extensions and the memory file it loads into
// every session
"**/GEMINI.md",
"**/.gemini",
"**/.gemini/**",
// /generated
// OpenMoat's own state (`kernel-self` denies it outright)
"**/.moat/**",
];
/// The `taint:` section. Absent in policies written before it existed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct TaintSettings {
/// Path globs a write to asks once the session read untrusted content, in
/// addition to the built-in list, which a policy cannot shorten. No `!`
/// exclusions, for the same reason.
#[serde(default)]
pub protected_writes: Vec<String>,
/// File provenance (ADR-029): a file a session wrote after reading
/// untrusted content taints the sessions that later read or run it.
/// Absent means on; `false` turns it off.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub provenance: Option<bool>,
}
impl TaintSettings {
/// Whether file provenance is on under `settings` (the policy's `taint:`
/// section, if any). On unless the section says `provenance: false`.
#[must_use]
pub fn provenance_on(settings: Option<&Self>) -> bool {
settings.and_then(|s| s.provenance).unwrap_or(true)
}
}
/// The built-in protected paths followed by the ones `settings` adds.
pub(crate) fn protected_writes(settings: Option<&TaintSettings>) -> impl Iterator<Item = &str> {
PROTECTED_WRITES.into_iter().chain(
settings
.into_iter()
.flat_map(|s| s.protected_writes.iter().map(String::as_str)),
)
}
/// Each added path is a glob that compiles and is not an exclusion, which
/// would take a built-in path out of protection.
pub(crate) fn check(settings: Option<&TaintSettings>) -> Result<(), PolicyError> {
let problem = |problem: String| PolicyError::Rule {
rule: "taint.protected_writes".to_owned(),
problem,
};
for p in settings.iter().flat_map(|s| &s.protected_writes) {
if p.trim_start().starts_with('!') {
return Err(problem(format!(
"`{p}` is an exclusion; the list can only add paths"
)));
}
GlobPattern::compile(p, false).map_err(|e| problem(e.to_string()))?;
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::policy::{Policy, PolicyError};
#[test]
fn protected_writes_must_be_plain_globs() {
let ok = "version: 1\ntaint:\n protected_writes: ['**/deploy/**', '${project}/run.sh']\n";
assert_eq!(
Policy::parse(ok)
.unwrap()
.taint
.unwrap()
.protected_writes
.len(),
2
);
assert!(Policy::parse("version: 1\ntaint: {}\n").is_ok());
for bad in ["'**/[x'", "'!**/package.json'", "''"] {
let yaml = format!("version: 1\ntaint:\n protected_writes: [{bad}]\n");
assert!(
matches!(Policy::parse(&yaml), Err(PolicyError::Rule { rule, .. }) if rule == "taint.protected_writes"),
"{bad} must be rejected"
);
}
assert!(Policy::parse("version: 1\ntaint: { bogus: [] }\n").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn provenance_is_on_unless_the_policy_turns_it_off() {
use super::TaintSettings;
let on =
|yaml: &str| TaintSettings::provenance_on(Policy::parse(yaml).unwrap().taint.as_ref());
assert!(on("version: 1\n"));
assert!(on("version: 1\ntaint: {}\n"));
assert!(on("version: 1\ntaint: { provenance: true }\n"));
assert!(!on("version: 1\ntaint: { provenance: false }\n"));
assert!(Policy::parse("version: 1\ntaint: { provenance: maybe }\n").is_err());
}
/// A path a `fs.write` pattern of the default policy names: `~` as a home,
/// `**/` as a project, a trailing `/**` as a file below, `*` as a word.
fn sample(pattern: &str) -> String {
let path = pattern
.replacen('~', "/home/u", 1)
.replacen("**/", "/home/u/work/repo/", 1);
let path = match path.strip_suffix("/**") {
Some(dir) => format!("{dir}/x"),
None => path,
};
path.replace('*', "v1")
}
/// One list of "files that run later": every file `runs-later` asks for and
/// every OpenMoat or host config file `kernel-self` denies is also a write
/// session taint protects. (`sandbox/patterns.rs` `RUNS_LATER` is checked
/// against `runs-later` in the CLI.)
#[test]
fn protected_writes_cover_runs_later_and_the_kernel_config_files() {
let policy = Policy::parse(crate::DEFAULT_POLICY).unwrap();
let protected: Vec<_> = super::PROTECTED_WRITES
.iter()
.map(|p| crate::pattern::GlobPattern::compile(p, false).unwrap())
.collect();
let rule = |groups: &[crate::RuleGroup], id: &str| {
groups.iter().find(|g| g.id == id).unwrap().fs_write.clone()
};
let mut files = rule(&policy.ask, "runs-later");
// the binary is not a file that runs later as configuration does
files.extend(rule(&policy.deny, "kernel-self").into_iter().filter(|p| {
!["/bin/moat", "apps/moat", "/bin/openmoat", "apps/openmoat"]
.iter()
.any(|binary| p.contains(binary))
}));
assert!(files.len() > 30, "{files:?}");
for pattern in &files {
let path = sample(pattern);
assert!(
protected.iter().any(|g| g.is_match(&path)),
"`{pattern}` ({path}) is not in PROTECTED_WRITES"
);
}
}
}