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//! Secret redaction for anything on its way into a log.
//!
//! The Telegram Bot API puts the bot token in the URL path, and `reqwest`'s
//! error `Display` carries the failing URL, so `tracing::warn!("...: {e}")` on
//! any Telegram call writes the token to disk in plaintext (#1322). Anyone
//! with read access to the log directory then has the bot, as does anyone
//! handed a log excerpt in a bug report.
//!
//! Nothing at those call sites is doing anything unusual: logging a transport
//! error is right, and the token rides along invisibly. That is what makes a
//! per-site fix unreliable, and there are over a hundred such sites. So the
//! redaction lives at the writer instead, where every event passes through
//! whatever its origin, and [`scrub`] is exposed for call sites that want to
//! redact earlier.
use Cow;
use Regex;
/// `bot<id>:<secret>` as it appears in a Bot API URL. The id is the bot's
/// public numeric id and stays legible; only the secret half is replaced, so a
/// redacted line still says which bot failed.
///
/// The secret is at least 20 chars of the token alphabet, which is short
/// enough to catch every real token and long enough that ordinary prose
/// (`bot1:ok`) is left alone.
/// What a redacted token is replaced with, kept as one constant so a test can
/// assert on it without restating the format.
pub const REDACTED: &str = ":<redacted>";
/// `text` with any Telegram bot token replaced by `bot<id><REDACTED>`.
///
/// Borrows when there is nothing to redact, which is the overwhelming majority
/// of log lines, so the common path allocates nothing.
pub
/// True when `text` still carries something shaped like a bot token. Exists so
/// tests can assert the negative without duplicating the pattern.
pub