opaque-vx 1.0.0-rc.0

An implementation of the OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange protocol
Documentation
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
// Copyright (c) VexaHub and contributors.
// Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.

use core::ops::Add;

use derive_where::derive_where;
use digest::block_api::{CoreProxy, SmallBlockSizeUser};
use digest::{Digest, Mac, Output, OutputSizeUser, Update};
use generic_array::typenum::{IsLess, Le, NonZero, Sum, U1, U2, U32, U256, Unsigned};
use generic_array::{ArrayLength, GenericArray};
use hkdf::SimpleHkdf as Hkdf;
use hkdf::SimpleHkdfExtract as HkdfExtract;
use hmac::{KeyInit, SimpleHmac};
use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng};

use super::{
    Deserialize, GenerateKe1Result, KeyExchange, Serialize, SerializedContext,
    SerializedCredentialRequest, SerializedCredentialResponse, SerializedIdentifiers,
};
use crate::ciphersuite::{CipherSuite, KeGroup, KeHash};
use crate::errors::{InternalError, ProtocolError};
use crate::hash::{Hash, OutputSize, ProxyHash};
use crate::key_exchange::group::Group;
use crate::keypair::{KeyPair, PrivateKey, PublicKey};
use crate::serialization::{ConcatExt, SliceExt, UpdateExt, i2osp};

///////////////
// Constants //
// ========= //
///////////////

pub(crate) type NonceLen = U32;
pub(super) static STR_CONTEXT: &[u8] = b"OPAQUEv1-";
static STR_CLIENT_MAC: &[u8] = b"ClientMAC";
static STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET: &[u8] = b"HandshakeSecret";
static STR_SERVER_MAC: &[u8] = b"ServerMAC";
static STR_SESSION_KEY: &[u8] = b"SessionKey";
static STR_OPAQUE: &[u8] = b"OPAQUE-";

////////////////////////////
// High-level API Structs //
// ====================== //
////////////////////////////

/// Trait required by [`Group::Sk`] to be compatible with
/// [`TripleDh`](crate::TripleDh) and [`SigmaI`](crate::SigmaI).
pub trait DiffieHellman<G: Group> {
    /// Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
    fn diffie_hellman(&self, pk: &G::Pk) -> GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>;
}

/// The client state produced after the first key exchange message
#[cfg_attr(
    feature = "serde",
    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
    serde(bound(
        deserialize = "G::Sk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
        serialize = "G::Sk: serde::Serialize"
    ))
)]
#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Sk)]
pub struct Ke1State<G: Group> {
    pub(super) client_e_sk: PrivateKey<G>,
    pub(super) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
}

/// The first key exchange message
#[cfg_attr(
    feature = "serde",
    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
    serde(bound(
        deserialize = "G::Pk: serde::Deserialize<'de>",
        serialize = "G::Pk: serde::Serialize"
    ))
)]
#[derive_where(Clone, ZeroizeOnDrop)]
#[derive_where(Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd; G::Pk)]
pub struct Ke1Message<G: Group> {
    pub(super) client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
    #[derive_where(skip(Zeroize))]
    pub(super) client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
}

/////////////////////////
// Convenience Structs //
//==================== //
/////////////////////////

// Consists of a session key, followed by two mac keys: (session_key, km2, km3)
pub(super) struct DerivedKeys<H: OutputSizeUser> {
    pub(super) session_key: Output<H>,
    pub(super) km2: Output<H>,
    pub(super) km3: Output<H>,
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) handshake_secret: Output<H>,
}

/// Helper bundle containing the common `TripleDH` server state that both
/// `TripleDh` and `TripleDhKem` builders need.
pub(super) struct Ke2BuilderCommon<G: Group, H: Hash>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
{
    pub(super) server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
    pub(super) transcript_hasher: H,
    pub(super) client_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
    pub(super) server_e_pk: PublicKey<G>,
    pub(super) shared_secret_1: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
    pub(super) shared_secret_3: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
}

////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Helper functions and Trait Implementations //
// ========================================== //
////////////////////////////////////////////////

// Helper functions

pub(super) fn generate_ke1<
    R: Rng + CryptoRng,
    KE: KeyExchange<KE1State = Ke1State<G>, KE1Message = Ke1Message<G>>,
    G: Group,
>(
    rng: &mut R,
) -> Result<GenerateKe1Result<KE>, ProtocolError> {
    let client_e_kp = KeyPair::<G>::derive_random(rng);
    let client_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);

    let ke1_message = Ke1Message {
        client_nonce,
        client_e_pk: client_e_kp.public().clone(),
    };

    Ok(GenerateKe1Result {
        state: Ke1State {
            client_e_sk: client_e_kp.private().clone(),
            client_nonce,
        },
        message: ke1_message,
    })
}

// Generate a random nonce up to NonceLen::USIZE bytes.
pub(super) fn generate_nonce<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(rng: &mut R) -> GenericArray<u8, NonceLen> {
    let mut nonce_bytes = GenericArray::default();
    rng.fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
    nonce_bytes
}

pub(super) fn transcript<CS: CipherSuite, KE: Group>(
    context: &SerializedContext<'_>,
    identifiers: &SerializedIdentifiers<'_, KeGroup<CS>>,
    credential_request: &SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
    ke1_message: &Ke1MessageIter<KE>,
    credential_response: &SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
    server_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
    server_e_pk: &GenericArray<u8, KE::PkLen>,
) -> KeHash<CS> {
    KeHash::<CS>::new()
        .chain_iter(context.iter())
        .chain_iter(identifiers.client.iter())
        .chain_iter(credential_request.iter())
        .chain_iter(ke1_message.iter())
        .chain_iter(identifiers.server.iter())
        .chain_iter(credential_response.iter())
        .chain(server_nonce)
        .chain(server_e_pk)
}

/// Generates the server-side `TripleDH` transcript state shared by multiple
/// key-exchange variants.
pub(super) fn ke2_builder_common<'a, G, H, CS, R>(
    rng: &mut R,
    credential_request: SerializedCredentialRequest<CS>,
    ke1_message: Ke1Message<G>,
    credential_response: SerializedCredentialResponse<CS>,
    client_s_pk: PublicKey<G>,
    identifiers: SerializedIdentifiers<'a, KeGroup<CS>>,
    context: SerializedContext<'a>,
) -> Result<Ke2BuilderCommon<G, H>, ProtocolError>
where
    G: Group,
    H: Hash,
    R: Rng + CryptoRng,
    CS: CipherSuite,
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
    G::Sk: DiffieHellman<G>,
    CS::KeyExchange: KeyExchange<Group = G, Hash = H>,
{
    let server_ephemeral = KeyPair::<G>::derive_random(rng);
    let server_nonce = generate_nonce::<R>(rng);
    let server_e_pk_bytes = server_ephemeral.public().serialize();

    let ke1_iter = ke1_message.to_iter();
    let client_e_pk = ke1_message.client_e_pk.clone();

    let transcript_hasher = transcript(
        &context,
        &identifiers,
        &credential_request,
        &ke1_iter,
        &credential_response,
        server_nonce,
        &server_e_pk_bytes,
    );

    let shared_secret_1 = server_ephemeral
        .private()
        .ke_diffie_hellman(&ke1_message.client_e_pk);
    let shared_secret_3 = server_ephemeral.private().ke_diffie_hellman(&client_s_pk);

    Ok(Ke2BuilderCommon {
        server_nonce,
        transcript_hasher,
        client_e_pk,
        server_e_pk: server_ephemeral.public().clone(),
        shared_secret_1,
        shared_secret_3,
    })
}

// Internal function which takes computed shared secrets, along with some
// auxiliary metadata, to produce the session key and two MAC keys
pub(super) fn derive_keys<'a, H: Hash>(
    ikms: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
    hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
) -> Result<DerivedKeys<H>, ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    let mut hkdf = HkdfExtract::<H>::new(None);

    for ikm in ikms {
        hkdf.input_ikm(ikm);
    }

    let (_, extracted_ikm) = hkdf.finalize();
    let handshake_secret = derive_secrets::<H>(
        &extracted_ikm,
        STR_HANDSHAKE_SECRET,
        hashed_derivation_transcript,
    )?;
    let session_key = derive_secrets::<H>(
        &extracted_ikm,
        STR_SESSION_KEY,
        hashed_derivation_transcript,
    )?;

    let km2 = hkdf_expand_label::<H>(&handshake_secret, STR_SERVER_MAC, b"")?;
    let km3 = hkdf_expand_label::<H>(&handshake_secret, STR_CLIENT_MAC, b"")?;

    Ok(DerivedKeys {
        session_key,
        km2,
        km3,
        #[cfg(test)]
        handshake_secret,
    })
}

/// Helper function for shared functionality in KE2 MAC computation
/// for both `TripleDH` and TripleDH-KEM
pub(super) fn compute_ke2_macs<H: Hash>(
    transcript_hasher: &mut H,
    derived_keys: &DerivedKeys<H>,
    transcript_digest: &[u8],
) -> Result<(Output<H>, Output<H>), ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    let mut mac_hasher =
        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
    Mac::update(&mut mac_hasher, transcript_digest);
    let mac = mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();

    Update::update(transcript_hasher, &mac);
    let finalized_transcript = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();

    let mut expected_mac_hasher =
        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
    Mac::update(&mut expected_mac_hasher, &finalized_transcript);
    let expected_mac = expected_mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();

    Ok((mac, expected_mac))
}

/// Finalizes the KE3 transcript by deriving session material from the provided
/// shared secrets and verifying the server's MAC, returning both the derived
/// keys and the client's MAC response. Callers are expected to supply any
/// protocol-specific shared secrets (e.g. classic Diffie-Hellman results or
/// KEM outputs) as byte slices.
pub(super) fn finalize_ke3_transcript<'a, H: Hash>(
    transcript_hasher: &mut H,
    shared_secrets: impl Iterator<Item = &'a [u8]>,
    server_mac: &Output<H>,
) -> Result<(DerivedKeys<H>, Output<H>), ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    let transcript_digest = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();
    let derived_keys = derive_keys::<H>(shared_secrets, &transcript_digest)?;
    let mut server_mac_hasher =
        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km2).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
    Mac::update(&mut server_mac_hasher, &transcript_digest);
    server_mac_hasher
        .verify(server_mac)
        .map_err(|_| ProtocolError::InvalidLoginError)?;

    Update::update(transcript_hasher, server_mac);
    let finalized_transcript = transcript_hasher.clone().finalize();

    let mut client_mac_hasher =
        SimpleHmac::<H>::new_from_slice(&derived_keys.km3).map_err(|_| InternalError::HmacError)?;
    Mac::update(&mut client_mac_hasher, &finalized_transcript);

    let client_mac = client_mac_hasher.finalize().into_bytes();

    Ok((derived_keys, client_mac))
}

fn hkdf_expand_label<H: Hash>(
    secret: &[u8],
    label: &[u8],
    context: &[u8],
) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    let h = Hkdf::<H>::from_prk(secret).map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
    hkdf_expand_label_extracted(&h, label, context)
}

fn hkdf_expand_label_extracted<H: Hash>(
    hkdf: &Hkdf<H>,
    label: &[u8],
    context: &[u8],
) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    let mut okm = GenericArray::default().into_ha0_4();

    let length = i2osp::<U2>(OutputSize::<H>::USIZE)?;
    let label_length = i2osp::<U1>(STR_OPAQUE.len() + label.len())?;
    let context_len = i2osp::<U1>(context.len())?;

    let hkdf_label = [
        length.as_slice(),
        &label_length,
        STR_OPAQUE,
        label,
        &context_len,
        context,
    ];

    hkdf.expand_multi_info(&hkdf_label, &mut okm)
        .map_err(|_| InternalError::HkdfError)?;
    Ok(okm)
}

fn derive_secrets<H: Hash>(
    hkdf: &Hkdf<H>,
    label: &[u8],
    hashed_derivation_transcript: &[u8],
) -> Result<Output<H>, ProtocolError>
where
    H::Core: ProxyHash,
    <<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize: IsLess<U256>,
    Le<<<H as CoreProxy>::Core as SmallBlockSizeUser>::_BlockSize, U256>: NonZero,
    OutputSize<H>: ArrayLength,
{
    hkdf_expand_label_extracted::<H>(hkdf, label, hashed_derivation_transcript)
}

// Serialization and deserialization implementations

impl<G: Group> Deserialize for Ke1State<G> {
    fn deserialize_take(bytes: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
        Ok(Self {
            client_e_sk: PrivateKey::deserialize_take(bytes)?,
            client_nonce: bytes.take_array("client nonce")?,
        })
    }
}

impl<G: Group> Serialize for Ke1State<G>
where
    // Ke1State: KeSk + Nonce
    G::SkLen: Add<NonceLen>,
    Sum<G::SkLen, NonceLen>: ArrayLength,
{
    type Len = Sum<G::SkLen, NonceLen>;

    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
        self.client_e_sk.serialize().cat(self.client_nonce)
    }
}

impl<G: Group> Deserialize for Ke1Message<G> {
    fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
        Ok(Self {
            client_nonce: input.take_array("client nonce")?,
            client_e_pk: PublicKey::deserialize_take(input)?,
        })
    }
}

impl<G: Group> Serialize for Ke1Message<G>
where
    // Ke1Message: Nonce + KePk
    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
    Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>: ArrayLength,
{
    type Len = Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>;

    fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Self::Len> {
        self.client_nonce.cat(self.client_e_pk.serialize())
    }
}

impl<G: Group> Ke1Message<G> {
    pub(crate) fn to_iter(&self) -> Ke1MessageIter<G> {
        Ke1MessageIter {
            client_nonce: self.client_nonce,
            client_e_pk: self.client_e_pk.serialize(),
        }
    }
}

#[cfg_attr(
    feature = "serde",
    derive(serde::Deserialize, serde::Serialize),
    serde(bound = "")
)]
#[derive_where(Clone, Debug, Eq, Hash, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Zeroize)]
pub(crate) struct Ke1MessageIter<G: Group> {
    client_nonce: GenericArray<u8, NonceLen>,
    client_e_pk: GenericArray<u8, G::PkLen>,
}

pub(crate) type Ke1MessageIterLen<G: Group> = Sum<NonceLen, G::PkLen>;

impl<G: Group> Ke1MessageIter<G> {
    pub(crate) fn iter(&self) -> impl Clone + Iterator<Item = &[u8]> {
        [self.client_nonce.as_slice(), self.client_e_pk.as_slice()].into_iter()
    }

    pub(crate) fn deserialize_take(input: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
        Ok(Ke1MessageIter {
            client_nonce: input.take_array("client nonce")?,
            client_e_pk: input.take_array("client ephemeral public key")?,
        })
    }
}

impl<G: Group> Ke1MessageIter<G>
where
    NonceLen: Add<G::PkLen>,
    Ke1MessageIterLen<G>: ArrayLength,
{
    pub(crate) fn serialize(&self) -> GenericArray<u8, Ke1MessageIterLen<G>> {
        self.client_nonce.cat(self.client_e_pk.clone())
    }
}