omamori

Deterministic semantic guard for AI CLI tools. Blocks covered destructive commands and self-disablement attempts, with tamper-evident audit trails.

Fast local checks — no model calls, no daemon, no network dependency.

omamori is not a sandbox or a permission classifier. It is a local deterministic semantic guard for AI-triggered shell commands: it blocks covered destructive command classes before execution, blocks AI-driven self-disablement attempts, and runs alongside sandbox isolation and provider-level permission systems.

macOS only — terminal commands are passed through unless an AI tool environment is detected. See Tool Compatibility for supported AI tools and coverage.

Quick Start

# Install (macOS)
brew install yottayoshida/tap/omamori

# Setup (shims + hooks + config — all in one)
omamori install --hooks

# Add to your shell profile (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc)
export PATH="$HOME/.omamori/shim:$PATH"

# Verify everything is healthy
omamori doctor

That's it. Works with Claude Code Auto mode — no extra config needed.

report and the trust-dashboard doctor output require omamori >= 0.10.0.

Verifiable Claims

What omamori claims, and how to verify each one:

Bypass classes outside this coverage scope remain possible — this is inherent to the PATH-shim and static-analysis approach. See SECURITY.md for the full bypass corpus and defense boundary.

What It Blocks

--delete, --del, --delete-before, --delete-during, --delete-after, --delete-excluded, --delete-delay, --remove-source-files

Layer 2 hooks additionally block evasion patterns such as pipe-to-shell (curl URL | bash), dynamic command generation (bash -c "$(cmd)"), static shell expansion obfuscation ($'rm', {rm,-rf,/}), environment-variable tampering, PATH override attempts targeting shimmed commands, and self-modification commands (config disable, uninstall, etc.) via builtin rules.

All rules are customizable via TOML config. See Configuration below.

Tool Compatibility

The demo image above is a Claude Code capture; the same block / log-only / trash behavior applies on Codex CLI and Cursor when their env vars are detected.

Platforms

macOS only at runtime — shim paths and Trash integration are macOS-specific. CI verifies contributors' PRs on macOS + Ubuntu (#[cfg(unix)] regressions caught before merge). Windows is not supported.

How omamori handles new / renamed tools

omamori routes by payload shape (tool_input.command / cmd / file_path / path / url), not by tool name. A renamed AI tool carrying a command field still reaches the full pipeline; unrecognised shapes still allow but emit unknown_tool_fail_open audit events. Review with omamori audit unknown or check omamori doctor's 30-day count line.

For the full shape catalogue, scope, known operational noise (legitimate tools like Glob / Task landing in fail-open), and the strict-mode trade-off, see SECURITY.md → Hook Coverage.

How It Works

AI CLI tool → CLAUDECODE=1 → rm -rf src/
                                ↓
                          [omamori shim]
                                ↓
                        blocked (protected path)

Terminal → rm -rf src/
                ↓
          [/usr/bin/rm]
                ↓
          deleted normally

Defense layers

Core policy: built-in rules (13 as of v0.10.4, including self-protection rules) cannot be disabled via config.toml — an AI agent setting enabled = false is ignored. For legitimate overrides, see omamori override in CLI Reference.

Performance: hook check completes in well under 0.1ms in the benchmark harness — typically ~1 µs to block and ~57 µs to allow. Subprocess startup by the AI tool dominates total cost. See benches/ and #124 for methodology.

Verifiability

doctor groups installation checks into Layer 1, Layer 2, and Integrity, then adds recent risk signals from the audit report.

$ omamori doctor
Protection status: OK

  [Layer 1] PATH shims 6/6
  [Layer 2] Hook defense 4/4
  [Integrity] Config & baseline 3/3
  [Risk signals] Last 30 days: quiet

  run `omamori doctor --verbose` for full details

$ omamori report --last 7d
omamori report — last 7 days

  Block events: 42
    by layer: layer2: 42
    by provider: claude-code: 38, codex: 4
  Audit log: intact

Field Notes

omamori is dogfooded daily on the developer's own setup. Recent observed cases:

2026-04-23: Codex CLI tried to read config.toml during MCP re-auth

When Codex CLI ran mcp login notion, it first attempted rg / sed against ~/.codex/config.toml to find the auth setting. omamori hooks blocked both reads ("blocked attempt to edit Codex config"). Codex then tried to use omamori explain -- ... as an oracle to probe protection — also blocked by oracle-attack prevention. Codex pivoted to codex mcp --help → codex mcp login notion and completed OAuth via the browser. No protection bypassed; user-side hint preserved for after-the-fact verification.

Full transcript: docs/dogfood/2026-04-23-codex-notion-mcp-reauth.md.

These are honest snapshots of a single developer's environment, not benchmark claims.

Configuration

Context-aware actions

omamori can adjust actions based on what the command targets:

Opt-in: add [context] to ~/.config/omamori/config.toml. Built-in lists for regenerable (target/, node_modules/, etc.) and protected (src/, .git/, .env, etc.) paths activate automatically.

[context]
# Built-in defaults activate with just [context].
# To customize, specify your own lists (replaces built-in defaults):
# regenerable_paths = ["target/", "node_modules/", "my-cache/"]
# protected_paths = ["src/", "lib/", ".git/", ".env", ".ssh/", "secrets/"]

Note: specifying regenerable_paths or protected_paths replaces the built-in defaults (not appends). Include the built-in entries you want to keep.

Security features: symlink defense via canonicalize(), path traversal normalization, NEVER_REGENERABLE hardcoded list, fail-close on errors.

Rule configuration

Built-in rules are always inherited. Only write the rules you want to change:

omamori config list                          # show all rules
omamori config disable git-push-force-block  # disable a rule
omamori config enable git-push-force-block   # restore default
omamori test                                 # verify policy

Or edit ~/.config/omamori/config.toml directly. Config is auto-created by install --hooks. See omamori init --stdout for the full template.

Disable a rule:

[[rules]]
name = "git-push-force-block"
enabled = false

Move files to a custom directory:

[[rules]]
name = "rm-to-backup"
command = "rm"
action = "move-to"
destination = "/tmp/omamori-quarantine/"
match_any = ["-r", "-rf", "-fr", "--recursive"]

Override an existing rule:

[[rules]]
name = "rm-recursive-to-trash"
action = "move-to"
destination = "/tmp/omamori-quarantine/"

Enable audit retention (prunes entries older than N days):

[audit]
retention_days = 90  # 0 = keep all (default). Minimum 7 days.

Enable strict mode (block shim-intercepted commands when HMAC secret is unavailable):

[audit]
strict = true  # default: false. Hook-only commands (ls, cat, etc.) are not affected.

Notes: config requires chmod 600. Destinations must be absolute paths on the same volume. System directories and symlinks are rejected.

CLI Reference

omamori install [--hooks]                # Setup shims + hooks + config (re-run after brew upgrade for Cursor)
omamori doctor [--fix] [--verbose] [--json]  # Diagnose and auto-repair installation
omamori explain [--json] -- <cmd...>     # Show what would happen to a command and why
omamori test [--config PATH]             # Verify policy rules
omamori status [--refresh]               # Health check all defense layers
omamori exec [--config PATH] -- CMD      # Run command through policy engine

omamori report [--last 7d] [--json] [--verbose]  # Aggregate audit summary (1d–90d)

omamori audit verify                     # Verify hash chain integrity (exit 0/1/2)
omamori audit show [--last N] [--json]   # View recent audit entries (default: last 20)
omamori audit show --all                 # View all entries
omamori audit show --rule <name>         # Filter by rule (substring match)
omamori audit show --provider <name>     # Filter by provider
omamori audit show --relaxed             # Filter to relaxed allows (legacy data-context flag; pre-v0.10.4 logs only)

omamori config list                      # Show rules with status
omamori config disable <rule>            # Disable a rule
omamori config enable <rule>             # Re-enable a rule
omamori override disable <rule>          # Override a core safety rule
omamori override enable <rule>           # Restore a core safety rule

omamori init [--force] [--stdout]        # Create/reset config
omamori uninstall                        # Remove shims + hooks
omamori hook-check [--provider NAME] [--json-error]  # Hook detection engine (used internally by hooks)
omamori cursor-hook                      # Cursor hook handler
omamori --version                        # Show version

Scope and Limitations

Sandbox complementarity

omamori operates at the semantic layer — it understands what a command does (Layer 1: shim, Layer 2: hooks). A filesystem sandbox operates at the OS boundary — it restricts where processes can read and write. These are complementary:

• omamori catches rm -rf src/ before it runs (semantic: "dangerous command").
• A sandbox prevents damage if something slips through (boundary: "this process cannot write outside /tmp").

For defense in depth, combine omamori with your AI tool's sandbox (Codex CLI sandbox (default-on), Claude Code /sandbox, Cursor agent sandbox) or nono.

Structural limitations

These are inherent to the PATH shim approach:

• Full-path execution (/bin/rm) bypasses the shim — mitigated by Layer 2 hooks.
• sudo changes PATH — omamori blocks when it detects elevated execution.
• Interpreter commands (python -c "shutil.rmtree(...)") — not detected. Decided out of scope per #74: zero real-world incidents in target tools.
• Obfuscated commands (base64, runtime variable indirection) — runtime-evaluated forms cannot be detected by static analysis. Static shell expansion at command verb position ($'rm', {rm,-rf,/}) is caught since v0.10.2.
• AI self-bypass — config disable / uninstall are blocked; direct file editing blocked by hooks (Claude Code only).

For what omamori does not catch — by design or by structural limit — and for the full security model and bypass corpus, see SECURITY.md.

Contributing & License

Bug reports, security disclosures, and PRs welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md for branch naming, the SHA-pin policy, and the local pre-PR gate (./scripts/pre-pr-check.sh). Releases are reproducible: Cargo.lock is tracked, every CI cargo invocation runs with --locked, and every GitHub Action uses: ref is pinned to a 40-char SHA (Dependabot keeps them current). See SECURITY.md for the five invariants that govern AI-assisted contributions.

Licensed under either of Apache License, Version 2.0 or MIT license at your option.