offline_protocol_mls/

manager.rs

//! Main MLS manager - the primary interface for MLS operations.

use crate::error::{MlsError, Result};
use crate::group::{GroupManager, DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE};
use crate::provider::MlsProvider;
use crate::session::SessionManager;
use crate::storage::MlsStorage;
use crate::storage_adapter::MlsStorageAdapter;
use crate::types::{
    EncryptedMessage, GroupId, GroupInfo, GroupMetadata, GroupRole, KeyPackageBundle,
    MlsMessageType, StorageKeyType, WelcomeMessage,
};

use offline_protocol_core::Address;
use offline_protocol_sealed::MAX_ACCEPTED_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME;
use openmls::prelude::tls_codec::{Deserialize as TlsDeserialize, Serialize as TlsSerialize};
use openmls::prelude::*;
use openmls_basic_credential::SignatureKeyPair;
use openmls_traits::OpenMlsProvider;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use uuid::Uuid;

/// Default lifetime for key packages (30 days in seconds).
///
/// Two things read this, and until issue 396 only one of them did: the stored
/// bundle's `expires_at_ms`, which is when this install stops offering the
/// package, and the MLS validity window on the wire, which is when everyone
/// else stops accepting it. The second was never set. `KeyPackage::builder()`
/// left OpenMLS to apply its own default of three months plus an hour, so a
/// package this SDK described as living 30 days was cryptographically valid
/// for 84, and the number below documented an intention nothing carried out.
///
/// They are one number because they are one fact. A package that expires
/// locally before its window closes leaves peers holding something we will not
/// answer for; one whose window closes first is offered after it is already
/// refused.
const DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS: u64 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;

// What we mint has to survive what we admit, and both this and the cap are
// edited by hand. See `MAX_ACCEPTED_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME` for why the margin is
// not decoration.
const _: () = assert!(
    DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS + LIFETIME_SKEW_MARGIN_SECS
        <= MAX_ACCEPTED_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME.as_secs(),
    "this install mints a key package it would refuse from a peer"
);

/// How far into the past a key package's validity window starts.
///
/// `Lifetime::new` backdates by exactly this much, so a package handed to a
/// peer whose clock runs slightly behind ours is not refused for not yet being
/// valid. It is part of the window's total width, which is why the assertion
/// above adds it before comparing against the cap: an off-by-this-margin cap
/// is the failure OpenMLS's own constant walks into.
const LIFETIME_SKEW_MARGIN_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60;

/// How long an expired key package's private init key is kept before it is
/// destroyed (7 days in seconds).
///
/// Expiry stops a package being advertised; this window is what still lets a
/// Welcome built against it just before that moment be processed. Past it the
/// material is genuinely deleted — without this, every package this device ever
/// minted would keep its init key in provider storage for the life of the
/// install, because the only other thing that removes one is a peer actually
/// using it.
const KEY_PACKAGE_PURGE_GRACE_SECS: u64 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60;

/// Ceiling on live, unconsumed key packages the push path will keep in flight.
///
/// The pool is normally self-limiting: one package per peer, minted only when
/// that peer's previous one was consumed or expired, so its size tracks the
/// number of peers with an outstanding unused advertisement. This is the
/// backstop for the case where it does not — a device meeting an unbounded
/// stream of peers that never establish sessions. Reaching it degrades the
/// push path to sharing one package again, which is what it did unconditionally
/// before, so the failure mode is the old behaviour rather than a new one; it
/// is reported (see `PushKeyPackagePoolExhausted`) rather than left silent.
pub const MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES: usize = 64;

/// A key package handed to the push path, plus how healthy the pool was.
///
/// The flag is not an error: the package is usable either way. It reports that
/// the pool hit [`MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES`] and this package is therefore shared
/// with another peer, which is the one condition under which the push path
/// still has the reuse shape it otherwise no longer has.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PushKeyPackage {
    /// The package to advertise.
    pub bundle: KeyPackageBundle,
    /// Whether the pool ceiling forced this package to be shared.
    pub pool_exhausted: bool,
}

/// Whether `candidate` was minted more recently than `current`, treating an
/// absent `current` as older than anything.
fn newer_than(candidate: &KeyPackageBundle, current: Option<&KeyPackageBundle>) -> bool {
    current.is_none_or(|existing| candidate.created_at_ms > existing.created_at_ms)
}

/// Main MLS manager for end-to-end encryption.
pub struct MlsManager {
    /// The local user's ID.
    user_id: String,

    /// Storage backend for persisting MLS state.
    storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage>,

    /// OpenMLS provider.
    provider: MlsProvider,

    /// Cached credential.
    credential: RwLock<Option<CredentialWithKey>>,

    /// Cached signature key pair (avoids re-reading storage on every crypto op).
    cached_signer: RwLock<Option<SignatureKeyPair>>,

    /// Session manager for 1:1 messaging.
    session_manager: SessionManager,

    /// Group manager for multi-party groups.
    group_manager: GroupManager,
}

impl MlsManager {
    /// Creates a new MLS manager.
    pub fn new(user_id: impl Into<String>, storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage>) -> Result<Self> {
        let user_id = user_id.into();

        let adapter = MlsStorageAdapter::new(storage.clone());
        let provider = MlsProvider::new(adapter);

        let session_manager =
            SessionManager::new(user_id.clone(), storage.clone(), provider.clone());
        let group_manager = GroupManager::new(storage.clone(), provider.clone());

        let manager = Self {
            user_id,
            storage,
            provider,
            credential: RwLock::new(None),
            cached_signer: RwLock::new(None),
            session_manager,
            group_manager,
        };

        manager.ensure_identity()?;

        Ok(manager)
    }

    /// Returns the local user's ID.
    pub fn user_id(&self) -> &str {
        &self.user_id
    }

    /// Loads this device's identity key from `storage`, minting and persisting
    /// one on first call, and returns the address it derives to.
    ///
    /// This is the bootstrap entry point: it exists so the address can be known
    /// *before* an [`MlsManager`] is constructed. The manager needs its own id
    /// at construction time (it goes into the credential and every session
    /// slot), but under self-certifying addressing that id is a function of the
    /// identity key — which used to be minted inside the constructor. Callers
    /// break the circle by calling this first and passing the resulting address
    /// to [`Self::new`].
    ///
    /// Idempotent: a second call returns the stored key and the same address.
    /// The keypair is written before the address is derived, so a caller that
    /// crashes between the two finds the same identity on the next start rather
    /// than minting a second one.
    pub fn load_or_create_identity(
        storage: &Arc<dyn MlsStorage>,
    ) -> Result<(SignatureKeyPair, Address)> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::Identity.as_str();

        let signature_keys = match storage.load(key_type, "key_pair")? {
            Some(json) => serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(|e| {
                MlsError::Deserialization(format!("Failed to deserialize signature keys: {}", e))
            })?,
            None => {
                let keys = SignatureKeyPair::new(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm())
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::CryptoGeneration(format!("{:?}", e)))?;
                let keys_json = serde_json::to_vec(&keys)
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
                storage.store(key_type, "key_pair", &keys_json)?;
                info!("Minted a new identity key");
                keys
            }
        };

        let address = Self::derive_address(signature_keys.public())?;
        Ok((signature_keys, address))
    }

    /// Ensures the user has an identity.
    fn ensure_identity(&self) -> Result<()> {
        if self.load_identity()? {
            return Ok(());
        }
        self.create_identity()?;
        info!(user_id = %self.user_id, "Created new MLS identity");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Requires the stored identity key to derive to `self.user_id` when that
    /// id is an address.
    ///
    /// A nickname id (tests, legacy) has no derivation to check, so it passes
    /// unchecked — the check is about catching a *broken* self-certifying
    /// identity, not about enforcing that ids are addresses.
    fn verify_identity_binding(&self, public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
        let Ok(expected) = self.user_id.parse::<Address>() else {
            return Ok(());
        };

        let derived = Self::derive_address(public_key)?;
        if derived != expected {
            return Err(MlsError::IdentityAddressMismatch {
                expected: expected.to_string(),
                derived: derived.to_string(),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Loads the identity from storage.
    fn load_identity(&self) -> Result<bool> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::Identity.as_str();
        let keys_data = self.storage.load(key_type, "key_pair")?;

        match keys_data {
            Some(json) => {
                let signature_keys: SignatureKeyPair =
                    serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(|e| {
                        MlsError::Deserialization(format!(
                            "Failed to deserialize signature keys: {}",
                            e
                        ))
                    })?;

                let public_key = signature_keys.public();

                // Under self-certifying addressing the id is this key's hash,
                // so a disagreement means the wrong namespace was opened or the
                // stored key was replaced. Caught here rather than shipping a
                // credential every peer would reject.
                self.verify_identity_binding(public_key)?;

                let credential =
                    Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, self.user_id.as_bytes().to_vec());

                let credential_with_key = CredentialWithKey {
                    credential,
                    signature_key: public_key.into(),
                };

                {
                    let mut guard = self
                        .credential
                        .write()
                        .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
                    *guard = Some(credential_with_key);
                }
                {
                    let mut guard = self
                        .cached_signer
                        .write()
                        .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
                    *guard = Some(signature_keys);
                }

                debug!(user_id = %self.user_id, "Loaded existing MLS identity");
                Ok(true)
            }
            None => Ok(false),
        }
    }

    /// Creates a new identity.
    fn create_identity(&self) -> Result<()> {
        let signature_keys = SignatureKeyPair::new(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm())
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::CryptoGeneration(format!("{:?}", e)))?;

        // A freshly minted key derives to a fresh address, so an
        // address-shaped `user_id` reaching here means the caller asked this
        // manager to *claim* an address whose key it does not hold — the
        // storage was empty when it should have held that identity. Checked
        // before the key is persisted so the refusal leaves nothing behind.
        // The supported bootstrap is `load_or_create_identity` first, then
        // `new` with the address it returned.
        self.verify_identity_binding(signature_keys.public())?;

        let keys_json = serde_json::to_vec(&signature_keys)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        let key_type = StorageKeyType::Identity.as_str();
        self.storage.store(key_type, "key_pair", &keys_json)?;

        let public_key = signature_keys.public();

        let credential = Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, self.user_id.as_bytes().to_vec());

        let credential_with_key = CredentialWithKey {
            credential,
            signature_key: public_key.into(),
        };

        {
            let mut guard = self
                .credential
                .write()
                .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
            *guard = Some(credential_with_key);
        }
        {
            let mut guard = self
                .cached_signer
                .write()
                .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
            *guard = Some(signature_keys);
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    /// Gets the credential with key.
    fn get_credential(&self) -> Result<CredentialWithKey> {
        let guard = self
            .credential
            .read()
            .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
        guard.clone().ok_or(MlsError::NotInitialized)
    }

    /// Gets a signer for MLS operations, using the in-memory cache.
    ///
    /// `SignatureKeyPair` doesn't implement `Clone`, so we serialize from
    /// the cached copy to avoid hitting storage on every crypto operation.
    fn get_signer(&self) -> Result<SignatureKeyPair> {
        let guard = self
            .cached_signer
            .read()
            .map_err(|_| MlsError::NotInitialized)?;

        let cached = guard.as_ref().ok_or(MlsError::NotInitialized)?;
        let bytes =
            serde_json::to_vec(cached).map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
        serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|e| MlsError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // KEY PACKAGE MANAGEMENT
    // ========================================================================

    /// Generates a new key package for distribution over the push path.
    pub fn generate_key_package(&self) -> Result<KeyPackageBundle> {
        self.generate_key_package_inner(false)
    }

    /// Generates a key package reserved for a publication slot.
    ///
    /// Distinct from [`Self::generate_key_package`] only in that the result is
    /// withheld from [`Self::get_or_create_key_package`] — see
    /// [`KeyPackageBundle::reserved_for_publication`] for why sharing one
    /// package between a published record and a pushed exchange corrupts both.
    pub fn generate_publication_key_package(&self) -> Result<KeyPackageBundle> {
        self.generate_key_package_inner(true)
    }

    fn generate_key_package_inner(&self, reserved: bool) -> Result<KeyPackageBundle> {
        let credential = self.get_credential()?;
        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;

        // Stated rather than defaulted. Left to OpenMLS this is three months
        // plus an hour, which is both wider than this SDK documents anywhere
        // and exactly the library's own declared maximum, so a package minted
        // that way clears every cap by nothing at all (issue 396).
        let key_package_bundle = KeyPackage::builder()
            .key_package_lifetime(Lifetime::new(DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS))
            .build(
                DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE,
                &self.provider,
                &signature_keys,
                credential,
            )
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::KeyPackageCreation(e.to_string()))?;

        let key_package_data = key_package_bundle
            .key_package()
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        // Stamped now because deriving it later from the serialized bytes
        // costs a parse plus a signature validation, which the pool scan
        // would pay per stored package per push. Best-effort: a record
        // without it takes the derive path once and is backfilled on load.
        let provider_hash_ref = key_package_bundle
            .key_package()
            .hash_ref(self.provider.crypto())
            .ok()
            .and_then(|hash_ref| hash_ref.tls_serialize_detached().ok());

        let package_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();

        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let mut bundle = KeyPackageBundle::new(
            package_id,
            self.user_id.clone(),
            key_package_data,
            DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS,
        );
        bundle.reserved_for_publication = reserved;
        bundle.provider_hash_ref = provider_hash_ref;
        let serialized =
            serde_json::to_vec(&bundle).map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
        self.storage
            .store(key_type, &bundle.package_id, &serialized)?;

        debug!(package_id = %bundle.package_id, "Generated new key package");
        Ok(bundle)
    }

    /// Gets an existing *unclaimed* key package or generates a new one.
    ///
    /// Two kinds of package are skipped, for the same underlying reason — an
    /// MLS init key is consumed by its first user, so two parties must never be
    /// pointed at one:
    ///
    /// - packages reserved for publication slots, or a pushed-to peer and a
    ///   stranger who fetched the published record would race for it;
    /// - packages already claimed by a peer over the push path
    ///   ([`Self::take_push_key_package`]), or this peer-less entry point would
    ///   hand out a key another peer is expected to use.
    ///
    /// This is the peer-less escape hatch (the FFI surface and tests). Callers
    /// that know the recipient should use [`Self::take_push_key_package`],
    /// which is what actually holds the one-key-per-peer property; a package
    /// handed out here is unclaimed, so the push path may later claim it for
    /// the first peer it is pushed to.
    pub fn get_or_create_key_package(&self) -> Result<KeyPackageBundle> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let packages = self.storage.list_keys(key_type)?;

        for package_id in packages {
            if let Some(bundle) = self.load_stored_key_package(&package_id)? {
                if bundle.reserved_for_publication || bundle.assigned_peer.is_some() {
                    continue;
                }
                return Ok(bundle);
            }
        }

        self.generate_key_package()
    }

    /// Hands `peer_id` the key package to advertise to it, minting one if it
    /// has no live package of its own.
    ///
    /// This is the push path's entry point, and the whole point of it is that
    /// two peers never receive the same init key. Before this existed the push
    /// path returned the first stored package to every caller until somebody's
    /// Welcome consumed it — the LastResort-style reuse RFC 9420 §16.8 permits
    /// only as a denial-of-service fallback, and which the Least Authority MDK
    /// audit flagged as enabling unsolicited joins and cross-group linkage. It
    /// also made a second peer's Welcome unprocessable once the first had used
    /// the key, with nothing to re-drive the exchange.
    ///
    /// Assignment is stored on the package rather than in a separate map, so it
    /// survives restarts for free and cannot disagree with the pool it
    /// describes. Resolution order:
    ///
    /// 1. this peer's own live package — a repeat push costs no new material;
    /// 2. an unclaimed package (minted by the peer-less entry point, or by a
    ///    build predating assignment), claimed here so upgrading does not
    ///    strand it;
    /// 3. a freshly minted package, claimed for this peer.
    ///
    /// Past [`MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES`] live packages it stops growing the pool
    /// and reuses the newest one, reporting that through
    /// [`PushKeyPackage::pool_exhausted`] so the caller can surface it. That is
    /// a deliberate degradation to the old behaviour rather than an error: the
    /// alternative — refusing to advertise, or evicting a package a peer may
    /// still be about to use — costs session establishment, which is worse than
    /// the weakened forward secrecy it would buy.
    ///
    /// Only step 3 is gated by the ceiling, because only minting grows the
    /// pool: claiming an unclaimed package relabels one that already exists, so
    /// degrading to a shared package while a claimable one sits idle would buy
    /// nothing. A corollary is that the shared package is always assigned to
    /// *another* peer — reaching that branch means neither an own nor an
    /// unclaimed package was found — and "newest" makes it the most recently
    /// assigned one, which has the most lifetime left but is also the peer most
    /// likely to be mid-establishment. If the over-ceiling peer's Welcome lands
    /// first, that peer's held advertisement becomes unprocessable until the
    /// next push to it mints a successor. Sharing the oldest instead would
    /// trade that for the shortest remaining lifetime; neither is free, and the
    /// exhaustion report is what makes the condition visible either way.
    ///
    /// Consumption is what rotates a peer's key: a Welcome built against the
    /// package removes its init key from provider storage, the loader then
    /// reports the package gone, and the next push to that peer mints a fresh
    /// one.
    pub fn take_push_key_package(&self, peer_id: &str) -> Result<PushKeyPackage> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let package_ids = self.storage.list_keys(key_type)?;

        let mut live = 0usize;
        let mut assigned_here: Option<KeyPackageBundle> = None;
        let mut unclaimed: Option<KeyPackageBundle> = None;
        let mut newest: Option<KeyPackageBundle> = None;

        // One pass, which also does the pruning: `load_stored_key_package`
        // drops consumed and long-expired entries as it reads them, so the
        // count below is of genuinely usable packages.
        for package_id in package_ids {
            let Some(bundle) = self.load_stored_key_package(&package_id)? else {
                continue;
            };
            if bundle.reserved_for_publication {
                continue;
            }
            live += 1;

            if bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref() == Some(peer_id) {
                // Newest wins if a past interruption left this peer two.
                if newer_than(&bundle, assigned_here.as_ref()) {
                    assigned_here = Some(bundle.clone());
                }
            } else if bundle.assigned_peer.is_none() && newer_than(&bundle, unclaimed.as_ref()) {
                unclaimed = Some(bundle.clone());
            }

            if newer_than(&bundle, newest.as_ref()) {
                newest = Some(bundle);
            }
        }

        if let Some(bundle) = assigned_here {
            return Ok(PushKeyPackage {
                bundle,
                pool_exhausted: false,
            });
        }

        // Before the ceiling check, not after: claiming relabels a package that
        // already exists, so it cannot breach a bound on how many exist.
        if let Some(bundle) = unclaimed {
            return Ok(PushKeyPackage {
                bundle: self.claim_key_package(bundle, peer_id)?,
                pool_exhausted: false,
            });
        }

        // Minting is the only thing left that would grow the pool, so it is the
        // only thing the ceiling gates.
        if live >= MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES {
            // `live` is non-zero here, so `newest` is `Some`; minting on the
            // unreachable branch keeps this total without an unwrap.
            if let Some(bundle) = newest {
                debug!(
                    peer_id = %peer_id,
                    live = live,
                    "Push key-package pool at capacity; reusing an existing package"
                );
                return Ok(PushKeyPackage {
                    bundle,
                    pool_exhausted: true,
                });
            }
        }

        let bundle = self.claim_key_package(self.generate_key_package()?, peer_id)?;

        Ok(PushKeyPackage {
            bundle,
            pool_exhausted: false,
        })
    }

    /// Records `peer_id` as the owner of `bundle` and persists the claim.
    fn claim_key_package(
        &self,
        mut bundle: KeyPackageBundle,
        peer_id: &str,
    ) -> Result<KeyPackageBundle> {
        bundle.assigned_peer = Some(peer_id.to_string());
        let serialized =
            serde_json::to_vec(&bundle).map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
        self.storage.store(
            StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(),
            &bundle.package_id,
            &serialized,
        )?;
        debug!(
            package_id = %bundle.package_id,
            peer_id = %peer_id,
            "Assigned key package to peer"
        );
        Ok(bundle)
    }

    /// Loads a specific key package this device owns, or `None` if it is gone.
    ///
    /// `None` is the *consumption signal* the publication slots run on: the
    /// load prunes and reports missing any package whose private init key has
    /// left the OpenMLS provider, which is exactly what processing a Welcome
    /// built against it does. A slot whose package reads back `None` has been
    /// used by somebody and needs replacing.
    pub fn key_package_by_id(&self, package_id: &str) -> Result<Option<KeyPackageBundle>> {
        self.load_stored_key_package(package_id)
    }

    /// Deletes a key package this device owns.
    ///
    /// Exists to reclaim a *publication* package that was minted but whose
    /// record was never built or queued. Such a package is reserved, so
    /// [`Self::get_or_create_key_package`] will never hand it out, and no slot
    /// references it — nothing else would remove it before its lifetime runs
    /// out, so a repeatedly failing publish would otherwise strand fresh
    /// provider key material every refresh.
    ///
    /// "Strand" is meant literally, which is why this destroys the private init
    /// key too: deleting the bundle record alone leaves the material OpenMLS
    /// holds in place with nothing left pointing at it.
    pub fn delete_key_package(&self, package_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let Some(data) = self
            .storage
            .load(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), package_id)?
        else {
            return Ok(());
        };

        match serde_json::from_slice::<KeyPackageBundle>(&data) {
            Ok(bundle) => self.purge_key_package_material(package_id, &bundle),
            // Legacy raw storage: the record *is* the serialized key package,
            // the same reading `load_stored_key_package` applies when it
            // upgrades one. Wrapping it lets the purge derive the provider ref
            // and destroy the init key instead of stranding it — and if the
            // bytes are not a key package at all, the purge finds no ref and
            // falls back to deleting the record, which is all that is left to
            // do for a record that names nothing.
            Err(_) => {
                let legacy = KeyPackageBundle::new(
                    package_id.to_string(),
                    self.user_id.clone(),
                    data,
                    DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS,
                );
                self.purge_key_package_material(package_id, &legacy)
            }
        }
    }

    /// Imports a contact's key package for later use.
    ///
    /// Security (SEC-M5): the caller-supplied `user_id` becomes both the
    /// storage key and — at session creation — the identity this key
    /// package is trusted for. Reject storage-hostile ids (the id is a raw
    /// `key_id`), cryptographically validate the key package, and require
    /// the embedded credential identity to equal `user_id` so a key
    /// package generated by one user can never be imported under
    /// another's name.
    ///
    /// The identity claim is then *proved* rather than trusted: see
    /// `Self::verify_address_binding`. No Authentication Service verdict
    /// travels with the call any more, because there is nothing for the caller
    /// to know — the key package carries its own proof.
    pub fn import_key_package(&self, user_id: &str, key_package_data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
        offline_protocol_core::validate_id_chars(user_id, "User ID")
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidUserId(e.to_string()))?;

        let key_package_in = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(key_package_data)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;
        let key_package = key_package_in
            .validate(self.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;

        Self::verify_credential_identity(&key_package, user_id)?;
        Self::verify_address_binding(&key_package, user_id)?;
        Self::verify_lifetime_bound(&key_package)?;

        let key_type = StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str();
        self.storage.store(key_type, user_id, key_package_data)?;

        debug!(user_id = %user_id, "Imported key package for contact");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Gets a contact's key package.
    fn get_contact_key_package(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<KeyPackage> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str();
        let data = self
            .storage
            .load(key_type, user_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::NoKeyPackage(user_id.to_string()))?;

        let key_package_in = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&data)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;

        // Validate using the crypto backend
        let key_package = key_package_in
            .validate(self.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;

        // Defense in depth: entries written to storage out-of-band must not
        // come back attributed to the wrong user. Both checks run again here
        // rather than only at import, because a cached package is re-read long
        // after the receive-time gate that admitted it — which is exactly the
        // window a container write aims at.
        Self::verify_credential_identity(&key_package, user_id)?;
        Self::verify_address_binding(&key_package, user_id)?;
        Self::verify_lifetime_bound(&key_package)?;

        Ok(key_package)
    }

    /// Requires a key package's validity window to be no wider than this
    /// install admits.
    ///
    /// RFC 9420 puts this on the application: define a maximum total lifetime
    /// and reject any leaf node claiming more. Nothing here did until issue
    /// 396. OpenMLS looks like it does the job and does not: it declares
    /// `MAX_LEAF_NODE_LIFETIME_RANGE_SECONDS` and ships
    /// `Lifetime::has_acceptable_range`, and `KeyPackageIn::validate` calls
    /// neither. What `validate` checks is `Lifetime::is_valid`, which asks only
    /// whether *now* falls between the two ends. A package claiming a century
    /// satisfies that on every day of the century.
    ///
    /// # Why the window is the thing that expires a key package
    ///
    /// An imported package is cached in the install-scoped protocol-state store
    /// and re-read for as long as it validates, so nothing but the window ever
    /// ages it out. Left unbounded, one leaked init key stays a working way to
    /// open a session as its owner forever, and bounding the packages we mint
    /// bounds nothing about the ones we accept.
    ///
    /// # Why this runs on the cache read too
    ///
    /// For the same reason [`Self::verify_address_binding`] does: an entry
    /// written to the store out of band never passed the import gate. Checking
    /// only at import would leave the widest window in the system reachable by
    /// whoever can write that store.
    ///
    /// An inverted window (`not_after` below `not_before`) saturates to zero
    /// here and passes, which is correct rather than an oversight: it cannot
    /// contain *now*, so `validate` has already refused it before this runs.
    fn verify_lifetime_bound(key_package: &KeyPackage) -> Result<()> {
        let lifetime = key_package.life_time();
        let width = lifetime.not_after().saturating_sub(lifetime.not_before());
        let cap = MAX_ACCEPTED_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME.as_secs();

        if width > cap {
            return Err(MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(format!(
                "key package validity window is {} seconds, wider than the {} \
                 seconds this install admits",
                width, cap
            )));
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Requires the key package's leaf signature key to derive to the address
    /// in `user_id`.
    ///
    /// This is the check that makes a key package's identity claim mean
    /// something. [`Self::verify_credential_identity`] compares the leaf's
    /// *basic credential*, which per RFC 9420 is "a bare assertion of an
    /// identity" — self-asserted, so an attacker who generates their own
    /// signature keypair and writes someone else's address into the credential
    /// passes it. The leaf signature key is not self-asserted relative to an
    /// address: the address *is* its hash, so re-deriving it either reproduces
    /// the claim or refutes it.
    ///
    /// This matters because a validated key package is not necessarily a
    /// *freshly received* one. Packages are cached in the install-scoped
    /// protocol-state store and re-read later, and the receive-time signature
    /// gate does not travel with them. Without this comparison, anyone able to
    /// write that store could swap in their own package and have the local node
    /// build the session — and encrypt to — their leaf instead of the peer's.
    ///
    /// # Why a non-address `user_id` is an error, not a skip
    ///
    /// Answering `Ok(())` for an id that does not parse as an [`Address`] would
    /// hand every attacker the bypass: claim a nickname and the check that
    /// distinguishes you from its owner never runs. The predecessor of this
    /// function *was* conditional — it checked only when the caller held a pin
    /// — and that conditionality is precisely what an unpinned peer exploited.
    /// It is unconditional here, which is what makes it the whole trust
    /// mechanism rather than a supplement to one.
    fn verify_address_binding(key_package: &KeyPackage, user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let claimed = user_id.parse::<Address>().map_err(|e| {
            MlsError::InvalidUserId(format!("'{}' is not an address: {}", user_id, e))
        })?;

        let derived = Self::derive_address(key_package.leaf_node().signature_key().as_slice())?;
        if derived != claimed {
            return Err(MlsError::KeyPackageAddressMismatch {
                claimed: claimed.to_string(),
                derived: derived.to_string(),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Requires the key package's leaf credential identity to equal
    /// `user_id`. Credentials in this SDK are basic credentials carrying
    /// the owner's user id as raw bytes (see `IdentityManager`).
    fn verify_credential_identity(key_package: &KeyPackage, user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let identity = key_package.leaf_node().credential().serialized_content();
        if identity != user_id.as_bytes() {
            return Err(MlsError::CredentialIdentityMismatch {
                expected: user_id.to_string(),
                found: String::from_utf8_lossy(identity).into_owned(),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Gets pending key packages.
    pub fn get_pending_key_packages(&self) -> Result<Vec<KeyPackageBundle>> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let package_ids = self.storage.list_keys(key_type)?;

        let mut bundles = Vec::new();
        for package_id in package_ids {
            if let Some(bundle) = self.load_stored_key_package(&package_id)? {
                bundles.push(bundle);
            }
        }

        Ok(bundles)
    }

    /// Marks a key package as synced.
    pub fn mark_key_package_synced(&self, package_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        self.storage.delete(key_type, package_id)?;
        debug!(package_id = %package_id, "Marked key package as synced");
        Ok(())
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // 1:1 ENCRYPTED MESSAGING
    // ========================================================================

    /// Checks if a session exists with another user.
    pub fn has_session(&self, other_user_id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
        self.session_manager.has_session(other_user_id)
    }

    /// Creates a new 1:1 session with another user.
    pub fn create_session(&self, other_user_id: &str) -> Result<WelcomeMessage> {
        let their_key_package = self.get_contact_key_package(other_user_id)?;
        let credential = self.get_credential()?;
        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;

        let welcome = self.session_manager.create_session(
            other_user_id,
            their_key_package,
            &credential,
            &signature_keys,
        )?;

        let key_type = StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str();
        self.storage.delete(key_type, other_user_id)?;

        Ok(welcome)
    }

    /// Joins a session using a Welcome message.
    pub fn join_session(&self, welcome: &WelcomeMessage) -> Result<GroupInfo> {
        self.session_manager.join_session(welcome)
    }

    /// Replaces an existing session with an incoming Welcome message.
    ///
    /// This implements the "welcome-wins" strategy for race condition resolution.
    /// When both peers simultaneously create a session, this method allows one peer
    /// to replace their own session with the other peer's Welcome, ensuring both
    /// end up with the same cryptographic state.
    pub fn replace_session_with_welcome(&self, welcome: &WelcomeMessage) -> Result<GroupInfo> {
        let other_user_id = &welcome.inviter_id;

        // Security: `inviter_id` arrives on the wire and is used below as a
        // raw storage key for deletes — reject storage-hostile values just
        // like `import_key_package` does for its user id.
        offline_protocol_core::validate_id_chars(other_user_id, "User ID")
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidUserId(e.to_string()))?;

        // SEC-M6: reject a mismatched session slot BEFORE the best-effort
        // deletes below, so a forged Welcome that squats a third party's slot
        // performs no mutation. `join_session` re-checks this as its own
        // boundary; hoisting it here keeps the reject side effect-free.
        self.session_manager.verify_welcome_slot(welcome)?;

        // Clear any pending welcome we were about to send
        let _ = self.clear_pending_welcome(other_user_id);

        // Delete conflicting contact key package (we no longer need it)
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str();
        let _ = self.storage.delete(key_type, other_user_id);

        // Join using their Welcome. `join_session` adopts non-destructively
        // (stage-then-swap), so a retransmitted Welcome that re-stages is a safe
        // no-op rather than deleting and re-creating our existing session.
        self.session_manager.join_session(welcome)
    }

    /// Encrypts a message for a 1:1 session.
    pub fn encrypt_for_user(
        &self,
        other_user_id: &str,
        plaintext: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<EncryptedMessage> {
        if !self.has_session(other_user_id)? {
            let welcome = self.create_session(other_user_id)?;
            warn!(
                other_user_id = %other_user_id,
                "Created new session - Welcome message needs to be sent"
            );
            let key_type = StorageKeyType::PendingWelcome.as_str();
            let welcome_data =
                serde_json::to_vec(&welcome).map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
            self.storage.store(key_type, other_user_id, &welcome_data)?;
        }

        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;
        self.session_manager
            .encrypt_message(other_user_id, plaintext, &signature_keys)
    }

    /// Encrypts a message for a 1:1 session that is known to exist.
    ///
    /// Unlike `encrypt_for_user`, this skips the `has_session()` storage check
    /// and goes directly to `encrypt_message()`. The caller must guarantee the
    /// session exists (e.g., via an in-memory cache). If the session was deleted
    /// externally, `SessionNotFound` is returned.
    pub fn encrypt_for_existing_session(
        &self,
        other_user_id: &str,
        plaintext: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<EncryptedMessage> {
        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;
        self.session_manager
            .encrypt_message(other_user_id, plaintext, &signature_keys)
    }

    /// Gets a pending Welcome message.
    pub fn get_pending_welcome(&self, other_user_id: &str) -> Result<Option<WelcomeMessage>> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::PendingWelcome.as_str();
        match self.storage.load(key_type, other_user_id)? {
            Some(data) => {
                let welcome: WelcomeMessage = serde_json::from_slice(&data)
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))?;
                Ok(Some(welcome))
            }
            None => Ok(None),
        }
    }

    /// Clears a pending Welcome message.
    pub fn clear_pending_welcome(&self, other_user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::PendingWelcome.as_str();
        self.storage.delete(key_type, other_user_id)?;
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Decrypts a message from a 1:1 session.
    ///
    /// `claimed_sender` is the transport-level sender this message will be
    /// attributed to; decryption fails with
    /// [`MlsError::SenderIdentityMismatch`] if it does not match the
    /// MLS-authenticated credential (SEC-M1).
    pub fn decrypt_from_user(
        &self,
        encrypted: &EncryptedMessage,
        claimed_sender: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
        self.session_manager
            .decrypt_message(encrypted, claimed_sender)
    }

    /// Lists all active 1:1 sessions.
    pub fn list_sessions(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
        self.session_manager.list_sessions()
    }

    /// Deletes a 1:1 session.
    pub fn delete_session(&self, other_user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        self.session_manager.delete_session(other_user_id)
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // GROUP MESSAGING
    // ========================================================================

    /// Creates a new group.
    pub fn create_group(&self, group_name: &str) -> Result<GroupInfo> {
        let group_id = GroupId::new(format!("group:{}", Uuid::new_v4()))?;
        let credential = self.get_credential()?;
        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;

        let group = self
            .group_manager
            .create_group(&group_id, &credential, &signature_keys)?;

        // Store group metadata with creator as admin
        let metadata = GroupMetadata::new_with_creator(Some(group_name.to_string()), &self.user_id);
        self.save_group_metadata(&group_id, &metadata)?;

        let mut info = self.group_manager.get_group_info(&group, &group_id);
        info.name = metadata.name;
        info.created_at_ms = metadata.created_at_ms;
        info.last_activity_ms = metadata.last_activity_ms;

        info!(group_id = %group_id, name = %group_name, "Created new group");
        Ok(info)
    }

    /// Adds a member to a group.
    ///
    /// Returns a tuple of (WelcomeMessage, EncryptedMessage) where the
    /// WelcomeMessage should be sent to the invitee and the EncryptedMessage
    /// (Commit) should be distributed to all existing group members so they
    /// can advance their MLS epoch.
    ///
    /// `invitee_user_id` binds the package to the identity it is being added
    /// under. This path previously ran neither check — not even the
    /// credential-identity one `import_key_package` has always had — so a
    /// package could be admitted to a group under a roster label that had
    /// nothing to do with it. The 1:1 path and the group path apply the same
    /// three checks.
    ///
    /// The third is the validity-window cap, and it belongs here for the
    /// reason it belongs anywhere: this is a third route by which a key
    /// package this install did not mint is admitted, it takes its bytes
    /// straight off the wire out of `pending_key_packages`, and a bound
    /// applied on two routes of three is not a bound. What differs from the
    /// 1:1 path is only how long the damage lasts, since a package spent on a
    /// commit is not also cached for re-use.
    pub fn add_group_member(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        invitee_user_id: &str,
        member_key_package: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<(WelcomeMessage, EncryptedMessage)> {
        let key_package = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(member_key_package)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?
            .validate(self.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;

        Self::verify_credential_identity(&key_package, invitee_user_id)?;
        Self::verify_address_binding(&key_package, invitee_user_id)?;
        Self::verify_lifetime_bound(&key_package)?;

        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(group_id.to_string()))?;

        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;
        let (commit, welcome) =
            self.group_manager
                .add_member(&mut group, key_package, &signature_keys)?;

        self.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group)?;

        let welcome_bytes = welcome
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        let commit_bytes = commit
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        // Include group name in welcome for the invitee
        let group_name = self.load_group_metadata(group_id)?.and_then(|m| m.name);

        let now_ms = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis() as u64;

        let welcome_msg = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            welcome_data: welcome_bytes,
            inviter_id: self.user_id.clone(),
            group_name,
            timestamp_ms: now_ms,
        };

        let commit_msg = EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Commit,
            epoch: group.epoch().as_u64(),
            ciphertext: commit_bytes,
            sender_id: self.user_id.clone(),
            timestamp_ms: now_ms,
        };

        Ok((welcome_msg, commit_msg))
    }

    /// Removes a member from a group.
    ///
    /// Removes **every** leaf whose credential names `member_id`, in one
    /// commit, rather than the first one found.
    ///
    /// Two leaves cannot name one identity in a tree whose leaves all passed
    /// the binding, and the reason is worth writing down because it is not
    /// obvious: RFC 9420 requires signature keys to be unique across a group
    /// (OpenMLS enforces it — "Duplicate signature key in proposals and
    /// group"), and since `verify_leaf_binding` ties a credential to the hash
    /// of its own signature key, two leaves with the same credential would have
    /// to carry the same key. So through the wire gates the duplicate case is
    /// refused one layer down, twice over.
    ///
    /// That argument covers the gates, not the tree. It says nothing about the
    /// case `verify_sender_leaf` and the `get_group_info` filter exist for — a
    /// leaf written straight into the install-scoped provider store. A forged
    /// leaf claiming a peer's address carries the *attacker's* signature key,
    /// so it violates no uniqueness rule and sits alongside that peer's real
    /// leaf quite happily. There the loop is doing real work: first-match would
    /// remove one of the two and leave the other in the group holding live
    /// keys, while every roster read shows the member gone — an
    /// access-revocation failure that would surface as nothing at all.
    ///
    /// Removing every match costs one `Vec` and cannot have that failure
    /// mode.
    pub fn remove_group_member(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        member_id: &str,
    ) -> Result<EncryptedMessage> {
        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(group_id.to_string()))?;

        let member_indices: Vec<LeafNodeIndex> = group
            .members()
            .filter(|m| m.credential.serialized_content() == member_id.as_bytes())
            .map(|m| m.index)
            .collect();

        if member_indices.is_empty() {
            return Err(MlsError::UserNotInGroup(member_id.to_string()));
        }

        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;
        let commit =
            self.group_manager
                .remove_member(&mut group, &member_indices, &signature_keys)?;

        self.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group)?;

        let ciphertext = commit
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        Ok(EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Commit,
            epoch: group.epoch().as_u64(),
            ciphertext,
            sender_id: self.user_id.clone(),
            timestamp_ms: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis() as u64,
        })
    }

    /// Leaves a group.
    pub fn leave_group(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<()> {
        self.group_manager.delete_group(group_id)?;
        info!(group_id = %group_id, "Left group");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Encrypts a message for a group.
    pub fn encrypt_for_group(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        plaintext: &[u8],
    ) -> Result<EncryptedMessage> {
        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(group_id.to_string()))?;

        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;
        let mls_message =
            self.group_manager
                .encrypt_message(&mut group, plaintext, &signature_keys)?;

        self.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group)?;

        let ciphertext = mls_message
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        Ok(EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Application,
            epoch: group.epoch().as_u64(),
            ciphertext,
            sender_id: self.user_id.clone(),
            timestamp_ms: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis() as u64,
        })
    }

    /// Decrypts a message from a group.
    ///
    /// `claimed_sender` is the transport-level sender this message will be
    /// attributed to; decryption fails with
    /// [`MlsError::SenderIdentityMismatch`] if it does not match the
    /// MLS-authenticated credential (SEC-M1). The check runs before any
    /// commit is merged, so a spoofed commit cannot advance group state.
    pub fn decrypt_from_group(
        &self,
        encrypted: &EncryptedMessage,
        claimed_sender: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(&encrypted.group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(encrypted.group_id.to_string()))?;

        let mls_message = MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&encrypted.ciphertext)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))?;

        let result = self.group_manager.decrypt_message(
            &mut group,
            &encrypted.group_id,
            mls_message,
            claimed_sender,
        )?;

        self.group_manager.save_group(&encrypted.group_id, &group)?;

        Ok(result)
    }

    /// Joins a group using a Welcome message.
    pub fn join_group(&self, welcome: &WelcomeMessage) -> Result<GroupInfo> {
        // SEC-M6 (group-Welcome side): the `session:` namespace is owned
        // exclusively by identity-bound 1:1 sessions installed via
        // `join_session`. A group Welcome carries an attacker-controllable
        // `group_id` with no (self, inviter) binding and writes the same
        // storage/OpenMLS keyspace, so one naming a `session:*` slot would seed
        // or overwrite a third party's 1:1 session and hijack the victim's
        // outbound encryption — the exact hijack SEC-M6 blocks on the
        // session-Welcome path. Reject before staging. Enforced here (rather
        // than only in the mesh handler) so *every* caller of `join_group` is
        // covered. Legitimate mesh groups are always `group:<uuid>`
        // (see `create_group`), so this rejects only forged Welcomes.
        if welcome.group_id.as_str().starts_with("session:") {
            return Err(MlsError::ReservedSessionNamespace {
                group_id: welcome.group_id.to_string(),
            });
        }

        let mls_msg = MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&welcome.welcome_data)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))?;

        let welcome_msg = match mls_msg.extract() {
            MlsMessageBodyIn::Welcome(w) => w,
            _ => {
                return Err(MlsError::WelcomeProcessing(
                    "Not a Welcome message".to_string(),
                ))
            }
        };

        let group = self
            .group_manager
            .join_group(welcome_msg, &welcome.group_id)?;
        let mut info = self.group_manager.get_group_info(&group, &welcome.group_id);
        info.name = welcome.group_name.clone();

        info!(group_id = %welcome.group_id, "Joined group");
        Ok(info)
    }

    /// Lists all groups.
    pub fn list_groups(&self) -> Result<Vec<GroupId>> {
        let all_groups = self.group_manager.list_groups()?;
        Ok(all_groups
            .into_iter()
            .filter(|g| !g.as_str().starts_with("session:"))
            .collect())
    }

    /// Gets information about a group.
    pub fn get_group_info(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<Option<GroupInfo>> {
        let group = match self.group_manager.load_group(group_id)? {
            Some(g) => g,
            None => return Ok(None),
        };

        let mut info = self.group_manager.get_group_info(&group, group_id);

        // Merge stored metadata
        if let Some(metadata) = self.load_group_metadata(group_id)? {
            info.name = metadata.name;
            info.created_at_ms = metadata.created_at_ms;
            info.last_activity_ms = metadata.last_activity_ms;
        }

        Ok(Some(info))
    }

    /// Returns `true` if local MLS group state exists for `group_id`.
    ///
    /// This is the authoritative test for "do we actually participate in this
    /// group via MLS" — it gates on the stored group marker, not the member
    /// send-cache (which relay reconciliation can populate without any MLS
    /// state). Callers use it to distinguish a genuine legacy relay-only
    /// (unencrypted) group, which has no MLS state, from an unauthenticated
    /// plaintext frame spoofed against a group the node secures with MLS.
    pub fn has_group(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<bool> {
        Ok(self.group_manager.load_group(group_id)?.is_some())
    }

    /// Updates the group name.
    pub fn set_group_name(&self, group_id: &GroupId, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        metadata.name = Some(name.to_string());
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    /// Gets group metadata.
    pub fn get_group_metadata(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<Option<GroupMetadata>> {
        self.load_group_metadata(group_id)
    }

    /// Sets custom metadata for a group.
    pub fn set_group_custom_metadata(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        key: &str,
        value: &str,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        metadata.custom.insert(key.to_string(), value.to_string());
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    /// Removes a custom metadata key for a group.
    pub fn remove_group_custom_metadata(&self, group_id: &GroupId, key: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        metadata.custom.remove(key);
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    /// Sets a member's role in a group.
    pub fn set_member_role(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        user_id: &str,
        role: GroupRole,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        metadata.set_role(user_id, role);
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    /// Enables or disables receive-side authorization of group membership
    /// commits. See [`crate::group::GroupManager::set_enforce_admin_commits`]
    /// for the fork consequence — this is off by default and enabling it is a
    /// deployment decision, not a hardening toggle.
    ///
    /// Applies to group commits only. The session manager owns a separate
    /// group manager and is left untouched, so 1:1 sessions are unaffected
    /// regardless of this setting.
    pub fn set_enforce_admin_commits(&mut self, enforce: bool) {
        self.group_manager.set_enforce_admin_commits(enforce);
    }

    /// Records the group's creator, **only if none is on record yet**.
    ///
    /// `created_by` is the fallback [`GroupMetadata`] consults when no admin
    /// role is stored (see the protocol layer's `check_is_admin`), so it must
    /// behave monotonically: a device that created the group, or already
    /// adopted a creator from the Welcome that admitted it, keeps what it has.
    /// Only the "no information" state is fillable. That makes the write
    /// idempotent under duplicate Welcomes and stops a later invite — from an
    /// inviter whose own metadata disagrees — from rewriting an established
    /// admin fallback.
    ///
    /// Returns `Ok(())` whether or not the value was adopted; use
    /// [`Self::get_group_metadata`] to observe the result.
    pub fn set_group_creator(&self, group_id: &GroupId, creator_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        if metadata.created_by.is_some() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        metadata.created_by = Some(creator_id.to_string());
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    /// Removes a member's role metadata from a group.
    pub fn remove_member_role(&self, group_id: &GroupId, user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
        let mut metadata = self
            .load_group_metadata(group_id)?
            .unwrap_or_else(|| GroupMetadata::new(None));
        metadata.remove_role(user_id);
        metadata.touch();
        self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // GENERIC MESSAGE HANDLING
    // ========================================================================

    /// Decrypts any incoming encrypted message.
    ///
    /// `claimed_sender` is the transport-level sender this message will be
    /// attributed to; it must match the MLS-authenticated credential
    /// (SEC-M1).
    pub fn decrypt(
        &self,
        encrypted: &EncryptedMessage,
        claimed_sender: &str,
    ) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
        if encrypted.group_id.as_str().starts_with("session:") {
            self.decrypt_from_user(encrypted, claimed_sender)
        } else {
            self.decrypt_from_group(encrypted, claimed_sender)
        }
    }

    /// Processes a Welcome message.
    pub fn process_welcome(&self, welcome: &WelcomeMessage) -> Result<GroupInfo> {
        if welcome.group_id.as_str().starts_with("session:") {
            self.join_session(welcome)
        } else {
            self.join_group(welcome)
        }
    }
}

impl MlsManager {
    /// Loads a stored key package bundle, handling legacy raw storage and expiration.
    ///
    /// Also validates that the key package's private key still exists in the
    /// OpenMLS provider storage. Key packages whose private keys have been
    /// consumed (e.g. by a previous Welcome processing) are pruned.
    fn load_stored_key_package(&self, package_id: &str) -> Result<Option<KeyPackageBundle>> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let data = match self.storage.load(key_type, package_id)? {
            Some(data) => data,
            None => return Ok(None),
        };

        let mut bundle = match serde_json::from_slice::<KeyPackageBundle>(&data) {
            Ok(bundle) => bundle,
            Err(_) => {
                let legacy_bundle = KeyPackageBundle::new(
                    package_id.to_string(),
                    self.user_id.clone(),
                    data,
                    DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS,
                );
                let serialized = serde_json::to_vec(&legacy_bundle)
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
                self.storage.store(key_type, package_id, &serialized)?;
                legacy_bundle
            }
        };

        if bundle.is_expired() {
            // Expiry and key destruction are separate moments on purpose. A
            // peer handed this package shortly before it expired may still
            // Welcome us, and that Welcome is only processable while the init
            // key is resident — so the record is kept (invisible to every
            // caller, since they all read through here) until the grace window
            // closes, and only then is the material destroyed.
            if bundle.expired_past_grace(KEY_PACKAGE_PURGE_GRACE_SECS) {
                self.purge_key_package_material(package_id, &bundle)?;
            }
            return Ok(None);
        }

        // Usability means the private init key is still in provider storage.
        // The lookup key is cached on the record; deriving it instead is the
        // expensive path (a parse plus a signature validation), paid once for
        // records written before the cache existed and stamped back below so
        // their next load is cheap.
        let needs_backfill = bundle.provider_hash_ref.is_none();
        let Some(hash_ref) = self.bundle_hash_ref(&bundle) else {
            warn!(
                package_id = %package_id,
                "Key package bytes no longer parse as a key package, pruning stale entry"
            );
            self.storage.delete(key_type, package_id)?;
            return Ok(None);
        };
        if !self.provider_has_init_key(&hash_ref) {
            warn!(
                package_id = %package_id,
                "Key package private key no longer in provider storage, pruning stale entry"
            );
            self.storage.delete(key_type, package_id)?;
            return Ok(None);
        }

        if needs_backfill {
            if let Ok(bytes) = hash_ref.tls_serialize_detached() {
                bundle.provider_hash_ref = Some(bytes);
                let serialized = serde_json::to_vec(&bundle)
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
                self.storage.store(key_type, package_id, &serialized)?;
            }
        }

        Ok(Some(bundle))
    }

    /// Destroys a key package: its bundle record *and* the private init key
    /// OpenMLS holds for it.
    ///
    /// Deleting the record alone — which is all this crate used to do — leaves
    /// the init key resident forever, because the only other thing that removes
    /// one is OpenMLS consuming it to process a Welcome. That turns every
    /// expired or reclaimed package into permanently retained key material,
    /// which is exactly the property the lifetime was supposed to bound.
    ///
    /// The provider key goes first: if that fails, the record is deliberately
    /// left in place so the next scan retries rather than orphaning key
    /// material no record points at any more. The package is already out of
    /// every caller's reach by the time this runs, so a retained record costs
    /// one storage read per scan and nothing else.
    fn purge_key_package_material(
        &self,
        package_id: &str,
        bundle: &KeyPackageBundle,
    ) -> Result<()> {
        if let Some(hash_ref) = self.bundle_hash_ref(bundle) {
            use openmls_traits::storage::StorageProvider;
            if let Err(e) = self.provider.storage().delete_key_package(&hash_ref) {
                warn!(
                    package_id = %package_id,
                    error = %e,
                    "Failed to delete a key package's private init key; keeping the record to retry"
                );
                return Ok(());
            }
        }

        self.storage
            .delete(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), package_id)?;
        debug!(package_id = %package_id, "Purged key package and its init key");
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Computes the OpenMLS hash reference a key package's private material is
    /// stored under, or `None` if the bytes no longer parse as a key package.
    ///
    /// This is the expensive path — a TLS parse plus a signature validation —
    /// that [`KeyPackageBundle::provider_hash_ref`] caches the result of; go
    /// through [`Self::bundle_hash_ref`] when a bundle is in hand.
    fn key_package_hash_ref(&self, key_package_data: &[u8]) -> Option<KeyPackageRef> {
        let kp_in = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(key_package_data).ok()?;
        let kp: KeyPackage = kp_in
            .validate(self.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .ok()?;
        kp.hash_ref(self.provider.crypto()).ok()
    }

    /// Resolves the provider hash reference for one of this device's bundles:
    /// the copy cached at mint time when present and decodable, else derived
    /// from the serialized package bytes.
    fn bundle_hash_ref(&self, bundle: &KeyPackageBundle) -> Option<KeyPackageRef> {
        bundle
            .provider_hash_ref
            .as_deref()
            .and_then(|bytes| KeyPackageRef::tls_deserialize_exact(bytes).ok())
            .or_else(|| self.key_package_hash_ref(&bundle.key_package_data))
    }

    /// Whether the private init key `hash_ref` names is still in the OpenMLS
    /// provider storage. Absent means consumed (a Welcome was processed
    /// against it) or never stored.
    fn provider_has_init_key(&self, hash_ref: &KeyPackageRef) -> bool {
        use openmls_traits::storage::StorageProvider;
        let found: std::result::Result<Option<openmls::key_packages::KeyPackageBundle>, _> =
            self.provider.storage().key_package(hash_ref);
        matches!(found, Ok(Some(_)))
    }

    /// Ground-truth usability check from the serialized package bytes alone,
    /// bypassing the cached provider ref. Test-only so tests observe the
    /// provider directly rather than a cache they may be manipulating;
    /// production reads go through [`Self::bundle_hash_ref`].
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn is_key_package_usable(&self, key_package_data: &[u8]) -> bool {
        self.key_package_hash_ref(key_package_data)
            .map(|hash_ref| self.provider_has_init_key(&hash_ref))
            .unwrap_or(false)
    }

    /// Loads group metadata from storage.
    fn load_group_metadata(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<Option<GroupMetadata>> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::GroupMetadata.as_str();
        match self.storage.load(key_type, group_id.as_str())? {
            Some(data) => {
                let mut metadata: GroupMetadata = serde_json::from_slice(&data)
                    .map_err(|e| MlsError::Deserialization(e.to_string()))?;
                // Migrate legacy "role:*" keys from `custom` into `roles`
                if metadata.roles.is_empty()
                    && metadata
                        .custom
                        .keys()
                        .any(|k| k.starts_with(GroupMetadata::LEGACY_ROLE_KEY_PREFIX))
                {
                    metadata.migrate_legacy_roles();
                    // Persist the migration so it only runs once
                    if let Err(e) = self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata) {
                        warn!(group_id = %group_id.as_str(), error = %e, "Failed to persist legacy role migration");
                    }
                }
                Ok(Some(metadata))
            }
            None => Ok(None),
        }
    }

    /// Saves group metadata to storage.
    fn save_group_metadata(&self, group_id: &GroupId, metadata: &GroupMetadata) -> Result<()> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::GroupMetadata.as_str();
        let data =
            serde_json::to_vec(metadata).map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;
        self.storage.store(key_type, group_id.as_str(), &data)?;
        Ok(())
    }
}

// ============================================================================
// KEY ROTATION AND KEY PACKAGE MANAGEMENT
// ============================================================================

impl MlsManager {
    /// Updates the cryptographic keys for a group (triggers MLS self-update).
    ///
    /// This provides post-compromise security by rotating keys. The returned
    /// commit message must be sent to all other group members.
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns the commit message that must be distributed to all group members.
    pub fn update_keys(&self, group_id: &GroupId) -> Result<EncryptedMessage> {
        use openmls::treesync::LeafNodeParameters;

        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(group_id.to_string()))?;

        let signature_keys = self.get_signer()?;

        let bundle = group
            .self_update(
                &self.provider,
                &signature_keys,
                LeafNodeParameters::default(),
            )
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::OpenMls(format!("Self-update failed: {}", e)))?;

        let (commit, _welcome, _group_info) = bundle.into_contents();

        group
            .merge_pending_commit(&self.provider)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::OpenMls(format!("Failed to merge self-update commit: {}", e)))?;

        self.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group)?;

        // Update metadata last activity
        if let Some(mut metadata) = self.load_group_metadata(group_id)? {
            metadata.touch();
            self.save_group_metadata(group_id, &metadata)?;
        }

        let ciphertext = commit
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        debug!(group_id = %group_id, epoch = %group.epoch().as_u64(), "Updated group keys");

        Ok(EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Commit,
            epoch: group.epoch().as_u64(),
            ciphertext,
            sender_id: self.user_id.clone(),
            timestamp_ms: chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis() as u64,
        })
    }

    /// Ensures at least `min` valid key packages are available.
    ///
    /// Generates new key packages if the current count is below the minimum.
    /// This is useful for offline scenarios where multiple key packages should
    /// be pre-generated for distribution.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `min` - Minimum number of key packages to maintain, capped at
    ///   [`MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES`]. The packages this mints are unclaimed, so
    ///   [`Self::take_push_key_package`] draws them down one per peer; asking
    ///   for more than the pool ceiling would only mint key material that
    ///   ceiling stops it ever handing out, while holding the pool at capacity
    ///   so every peer past the last claim is advertised a shared package.
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns the total number of valid key packages after ensuring minimum.
    pub fn ensure_min_key_packages(&self, min: usize) -> Result<usize> {
        let min = min.min(MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES);
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let package_ids = self.storage.list_keys(key_type)?;

        // Count valid (non-expired) packages
        let mut valid_count = 0;
        for package_id in &package_ids {
            if self.load_stored_key_package(package_id)?.is_some() {
                valid_count += 1;
            }
        }

        // Generate more if needed
        let to_generate = min.saturating_sub(valid_count);
        for _ in 0..to_generate {
            self.generate_key_package()?;
            valid_count += 1;
        }

        debug!(
            valid_count = valid_count,
            generated = to_generate,
            "Ensured minimum key packages"
        );

        Ok(valid_count)
    }

    /// Returns the number of valid (non-expired) key packages available.
    pub fn count_valid_key_packages(&self) -> Result<usize> {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let package_ids = self.storage.list_keys(key_type)?;

        let mut count = 0;
        for package_id in package_ids {
            if self.load_stored_key_package(&package_id)?.is_some() {
                count += 1;
            }
        }

        Ok(count)
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // IDENTITY AND SIGNING OPERATIONS
    // ========================================================================

    /// Returns the identity public key as raw bytes.
    ///
    /// This is the Ed25519 public key used for MLS operations. It can be shared
    /// with others to establish your identity and verify signatures.
    pub fn get_identity_public_key(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        let credential = self.get_credential()?;
        Ok(credential.signature_key.as_slice().to_vec())
    }

    /// Signs arbitrary data with the identity private key.
    ///
    /// Uses Ed25519 signatures (the same algorithm used for MLS operations).
    /// The signature can be verified by anyone with the corresponding public key.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `data` - The data to sign
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns the signature as raw bytes.
    pub fn sign_data(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        use openmls_traits::signatures::Signer;

        let signer = self.get_signer()?;
        let signature = signer
            .sign(data)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Signing(format!("Failed to sign data: {:?}", e)))?;
        Ok(signature.as_slice().to_vec())
    }

    /// Verifies a signature against a public key.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `public_key` - The Ed25519 public key bytes (32 bytes)
    /// * `data` - The original data that was signed
    /// * `signature` - The signature to verify (64 bytes)
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise.
    pub fn verify_signature(public_key: &[u8], data: &[u8], signature: &[u8]) -> Result<bool> {
        use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Verifier, VerifyingKey};

        // Parse the public key (Ed25519 public keys are 32 bytes)
        let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::try_from(public_key).map_err(|e| {
            MlsError::InvalidPublicKey(format!("Invalid Ed25519 public key: {}", e))
        })?;

        // Parse the signature (Ed25519 signatures are 64 bytes)
        let sig = Signature::try_from(signature).map_err(|e| {
            MlsError::VerificationFailed(format!("Invalid signature format: {}", e))
        })?;

        // Verify the signature
        match verifying_key.verify(data, &sig) {
            Ok(()) => Ok(true),
            Err(_) => Ok(false),
        }
    }

    /// Derives the canonical self-certifying address of an Ed25519 identity
    /// key: `off1…`, the bech32m encoding of
    /// `0x01 ‖ SHA-256(public_key)[..20]`.
    ///
    /// This is the only address derivation in the SDK. It is implemented once,
    /// in [`offline_protocol_sealed::derive_address`], where a bare-metal leaf
    /// node can reach it as well; this method, the `derive_address` FFI
    /// function the bridges and apps call, and the interop harness are all
    /// delegations to that one function, so every platform agrees byte for
    /// byte.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `public_key` - The Ed25519 public key bytes (exactly 32)
    ///
    /// # Errors
    ///
    /// Returns [`MlsError::InvalidPublicKey`] if `public_key` is not 32 bytes.
    /// The length is part of the format contract: hashing a differently-sized
    /// input would yield a different address for the same identity. The bytes
    /// are deliberately *not* checked against the curve. An address is defined
    /// over key bytes, and what proves ownership is the signature verification
    /// that accompanies it (see [`Self::verify_signature`]), so binding the
    /// address format to a signature library's parsing strictness would only
    /// risk the derivation drifting between versions.
    pub fn derive_address(public_key: &[u8]) -> Result<Address> {
        offline_protocol_sealed::derive_address(public_key).map_err(MlsError::from)
    }

    /// Derives a deterministic user ID from a public key.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `public_key` - The Ed25519 public key bytes
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns the derived address in its canonical `off1…` string form.
    /// Unlike [`Self::derive_address`] this accepts any input length, which
    /// It is also the one place that still spells the derivation out
    /// instead of delegating to [`offline_protocol_sealed::derive_address`],
    /// because it deliberately does not do the length check that function
    /// starts with. `deprecated_derive_agrees_with_derive_address` pins the
    /// two together for the inputs where both are defined; the copy goes
    /// away with the method at the next breaking release.
    /// is precisely why it is deprecated: a caller passing a truncated or
    /// padded key gets a plausible-looking address for an identity that
    /// cannot exist.
    #[deprecated(
        note = "use derive_address; this returns the self-certifying off1… address, no longer base58"
    )]
    pub fn derive_user_id_from_public_key(public_key: &[u8]) -> String {
        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

        let hash = Sha256::digest(public_key);
        let mut truncated = [0u8; Address::HASH_LEN];
        truncated.copy_from_slice(&hash[..Address::HASH_LEN]);
        Address::from_hash_bytes(truncated).to_string()
    }
}

/// Adversarial fixtures for tests in other crates.
///
/// Forging a leaf needs raw OpenMLS, which the protocol crate deliberately does
/// not depend on, and needs to go *past* `add_group_member`'s binding check —
/// which is the whole point, since the attacker runs their own build and that
/// check is theirs to delete. Feature-gated so no release build in this
/// workspace enables it — a downstream consumer could still turn the feature on
/// for itself — and kept in this module because it touches private state.
#[cfg(feature = "test-utils")]
impl MlsManager {
    /// Seats a leaf in `group_id` whose credential claims `impersonated` but
    /// whose signature key is minted here — an identity nobody can prove.
    ///
    /// The group must already exist and this manager must be able to commit to
    /// it. Every later Welcome for that group carries the forged leaf in its
    /// ratchet tree, which is what a receiver must refuse.
    ///
    /// Returns the Add commit, TLS-serialized. That is the *other* half of the
    /// attack and needs to be reachable from the protocol crate: a receiver
    /// already in the group is attacked by the commit, not by a Welcome, and
    /// what it must do with one differs — refuse it **permanently**, since a
    /// refusal parked on the retry path is re-decrypted until it expires and is
    /// then misread as an epoch fork.
    pub fn seat_forged_leaf_for_testing(
        &self,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        impersonated: &str,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
        let forged_storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(crate::storage::InMemoryStorage::new());
        let forged_provider = MlsProvider::new(MlsStorageAdapter::new(forged_storage));
        let forged_keys = SignatureKeyPair::new(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm())
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::CryptoGeneration(format!("{:?}", e)))?;
        forged_keys
            .store(forged_provider.storage())
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::CryptoGeneration(format!("storing forged key: {:?}", e)))?;

        let credential = CredentialWithKey {
            credential: Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, impersonated.as_bytes().to_vec()),
            signature_key: forged_keys.public().into(),
        };
        let key_package = KeyPackage::builder()
            .build(
                DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE,
                &forged_provider,
                &forged_keys,
                credential,
            )
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::KeyPackageCreation(e.to_string()))?
            .key_package()
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))?;

        let validated = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&key_package)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?
            .validate(self.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(e.to_string()))?;

        let mut group = self
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)?
            .ok_or_else(|| MlsError::GroupNotFound(group_id.to_string()))?;
        let signer = self.get_signer()?;
        let (commit, _welcome) = self
            .group_manager
            .add_member(&mut group, validated, &signer)?;
        self.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group)?;

        commit
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .map_err(|e| MlsError::Serialization(e.to_string()))
    }
}

/// Returns `true` when `bytes` parse as a well-formed MLS wire message
/// (`MlsMessageIn` TLS framing, consuming the input exactly).
///
/// Inbound routing uses this to distinguish MLS ciphertext from legacy
/// plaintext that merely happens to be valid base64: the strict TLS framing
/// (protocol version, wire format, exact-length body) makes an accidental
/// match against non-MLS bytes vanishingly unlikely. This is a framing
/// check only — it says nothing about whether the message can be decrypted.
pub fn is_mls_framed(bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
    MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(bytes).is_ok()
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::storage::InMemoryStorage;

    /// A manager running as `label`, at the address `label`'s identity key
    /// derives to.
    ///
    /// Takes the production bootstrap, not a nickname: every peer id that
    /// crosses `import_key_package` or `add_group_member` is now checked
    /// against the key that signed the package, and a nickname has no
    /// derivation to check — so a fixture at `"bob"` would exercise a
    /// configuration that cannot exist.
    fn create_test_manager(label: &str) -> MlsManager {
        create_addressed_manager(label).0
    }

    /// The address the identity behind `label` derives to, as a wire string.
    fn addr(label: &str) -> String {
        test_identity(label).1.to_string()
    }

    /// The 1:1 session slot shared by `a` and `b`.
    ///
    /// Computed, never written out: the slot orders its halves by `Address`
    /// bytes, and the bech32 charset is not ASCII-monotonic, so a hand-written
    /// `session:<a>:<b>` literal is right only by accident.
    fn slot(a: &str, b: &str) -> GroupId {
        GroupId::for_session(&addr(a), &addr(b)).unwrap()
    }

    /// A deterministic identity keypair for `label`, plus the address it
    /// derives to.
    ///
    /// Seeded from the label rather than generated so a test can name the same
    /// identity twice, and so the address in a failure message is stable across
    /// runs. Only the *derivation* is being pinned here — the seed is a test
    /// convenience, not a key-generation scheme anything ships.
    pub(crate) fn test_identity(label: &str) -> (SignatureKeyPair, Address) {
        use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

        let seed: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(label.as_bytes()).into();
        let signing = ed25519_dalek::SigningKey::from_bytes(&seed);
        let public = signing.verifying_key().to_bytes().to_vec();
        let address = MlsManager::derive_address(&public).unwrap();
        let keys = SignatureKeyPair::from_raw(
            DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm(),
            signing.to_bytes().to_vec(),
            public,
        );
        (keys, address)
    }

    /// Writes `keys` where [`MlsManager::load_or_create_identity`] will find
    /// them, standing in for a previous run of this profile.
    pub(crate) fn seed_identity(storage: &Arc<dyn MlsStorage>, keys: &SignatureKeyPair) {
        storage
            .store(
                StorageKeyType::Identity.as_str(),
                "key_pair",
                &serde_json::to_vec(keys).unwrap(),
            )
            .unwrap();
    }

    /// A manager bootstrapped the way production does it: mint/load the
    /// identity first, then construct at the address it derives to.
    fn create_addressed_manager(label: &str) -> (MlsManager, Address) {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (keys, address) = test_identity(label);
        seed_identity(&storage, &keys);
        let manager = MlsManager::new(address.to_string(), storage).unwrap();
        (manager, address)
    }

    /// Same, but keeps a handle on the storage so a test can age a package in
    /// place — the only way to reach the expiry and purge paths without either
    /// waiting 30 days or making the clock injectable.
    fn create_test_manager_with_storage(user_id: &str) -> (MlsManager, Arc<InMemoryStorage>) {
        let storage = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let manager = MlsManager::new(user_id, storage.clone()).unwrap();
        (manager, storage)
    }

    /// Rewrites a stored package's expiry to `secs_ago` seconds in the past.
    fn expire_package(storage: &InMemoryStorage, package_id: &str, secs_ago: u64) {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let data = storage
            .load(key_type, package_id)
            .unwrap()
            .expect("package to age is not in storage");
        let mut bundle: KeyPackageBundle = serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap();
        let now_ms = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis() as u64;
        bundle.expires_at_ms = now_ms - (secs_ago * 1000);
        storage
            .store(key_type, package_id, &serde_json::to_vec(&bundle).unwrap())
            .unwrap();
    }

    /// Whether the private init key for `bundle` is still in provider storage.
    fn init_key_present(manager: &MlsManager, bundle: &KeyPackageBundle) -> bool {
        manager.is_key_package_usable(&bundle.key_package_data)
    }

    /// Rewrites a stored package's record without its cached provider hash
    /// ref, the way a build predating the cache would have written it.
    fn strip_cached_ref(storage: &InMemoryStorage, package_id: &str) {
        let key_type = StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str();
        let data = storage
            .load(key_type, package_id)
            .unwrap()
            .expect("package to strip is not in storage");
        let mut bundle: KeyPackageBundle = serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap();
        bundle.provider_hash_ref = None;
        storage
            .store(key_type, package_id, &serde_json::to_vec(&bundle).unwrap())
            .unwrap();
    }

    /// The provider hash ref is stamped at mint so the pool scan never pays a
    /// TLS parse plus a signature validation per stored package per push —
    /// unstamped, a scan-heavy path (many peers, full pool) costs tens of
    /// debug-build seconds.
    #[test]
    fn test_minted_package_carries_its_provider_hash_ref() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bundle = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;

        let cached = bundle
            .provider_hash_ref
            .as_deref()
            .expect("mint must stamp the provider hash ref");
        let derived = manager
            .key_package_hash_ref(&bundle.key_package_data)
            .expect("freshly minted package bytes must parse")
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            cached,
            &derived[..],
            "cached ref disagrees with the one derived from the package bytes"
        );
    }

    /// Records written before the cache existed take the derive path once and
    /// are stamped back, so every later load is cheap.
    #[test]
    fn test_record_without_cached_ref_is_backfilled_on_first_load() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        let minted = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;
        strip_cached_ref(&storage, &minted.package_id);

        let loaded = manager
            .key_package_by_id(&minted.package_id)
            .unwrap()
            .expect("a record without a cached ref must still load");
        assert_eq!(
            loaded.provider_hash_ref, minted.provider_hash_ref,
            "load must hand back a bundle stamped with the same ref the mint computed"
        );

        let stored: KeyPackageBundle = serde_json::from_slice(
            &storage
                .load(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), &minted.package_id)
                .unwrap()
                .unwrap(),
        )
        .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            stored.provider_hash_ref, minted.provider_hash_ref,
            "the backfilled ref must be persisted, not only returned"
        );
    }

    /// The purge destroys key material for pre-cache records too, deriving
    /// the ref they never carried.
    #[test]
    fn test_purge_destroys_init_key_for_a_record_without_cached_ref() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        let bundle = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;
        strip_cached_ref(&storage, &bundle.package_id);
        expire_package(
            &storage,
            &bundle.package_id,
            KEY_PACKAGE_PURGE_GRACE_SECS + 60,
        );

        assert!(manager
            .key_package_by_id(&bundle.package_id)
            .unwrap()
            .is_none());
        assert!(
            !init_key_present(&manager, &bundle),
            "the private init key outlived a pre-cache package"
        );
    }

    /// An expired package stops being advertised immediately, but its init key
    /// has to outlive the last advertisement: a peer handed it just before
    /// expiry may still Welcome us, and that Welcome is only processable while
    /// the key is resident.
    #[test]
    fn test_expired_package_is_withdrawn_but_its_init_key_survives_the_grace_window() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        let bundle = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;

        expire_package(&storage, &bundle.package_id, 60);

        assert!(
            manager
                .key_package_by_id(&bundle.package_id)
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "an expired package must not be handed out"
        );
        assert!(
            init_key_present(&manager, &bundle),
            "the init key was destroyed on the expiry edge, breaking a late Welcome"
        );

        // The next push to that peer mints a replacement rather than reviving it.
        let replacement = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;
        assert_ne!(replacement.package_id, bundle.package_id);
    }

    /// Past the grace window the key material is genuinely destroyed. Without
    /// this, every package this device ever minted keeps its init key for the
    /// life of the install — deleting the bundle record, which is all this
    /// crate used to do, never touched the key OpenMLS holds.
    #[test]
    fn test_package_past_the_grace_window_has_its_init_key_destroyed() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        let bundle = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;
        assert!(init_key_present(&manager, &bundle));

        expire_package(
            &storage,
            &bundle.package_id,
            KEY_PACKAGE_PURGE_GRACE_SECS + 60,
        );

        // The purge runs as a side effect of the scan that reads it.
        assert!(manager
            .key_package_by_id(&bundle.package_id)
            .unwrap()
            .is_none());

        assert!(
            !init_key_present(&manager, &bundle),
            "the private init key outlived its package"
        );
        assert!(
            storage
                .load(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), &bundle.package_id)
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "the bundle record outlived its key material"
        );
    }

    /// Reclaiming an unpublished package has to reclaim the key too, for the
    /// same reason — the publication path mints one per failed refresh, and a
    /// record-only delete would strand fresh key material every time.
    #[test]
    fn test_delete_key_package_destroys_the_init_key() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bundle = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();
        assert!(init_key_present(&manager, &bundle));

        manager.delete_key_package(&bundle.package_id).unwrap();

        assert!(
            !init_key_present(&manager, &bundle),
            "delete_key_package left the private init key in provider storage"
        );
    }

    /// A legacy record — raw key package bytes rather than a serialized bundle,
    /// which `load_stored_key_package` still upgrades in place — must have its
    /// init key destroyed too. Reading the record as unparseable and deleting
    /// only the record is what strands key material.
    #[test]
    fn test_delete_key_package_destroys_the_init_key_of_a_legacy_record() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        let bundle = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();
        // Rewrite the record the way a build predating the bundle wrote it.
        storage
            .store(
                StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(),
                &bundle.package_id,
                &bundle.key_package_data,
            )
            .unwrap();

        manager.delete_key_package(&bundle.package_id).unwrap();

        assert!(
            !init_key_present(&manager, &bundle),
            "a legacy record's private init key survived its deletion"
        );
        assert!(
            storage
                .load(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), &bundle.package_id)
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "the legacy record outlived its key material"
        );
    }

    /// A record whose bytes name no key package at all still gets deleted —
    /// there is no material to destroy, and leaving it would make the pool scan
    /// carry it forever.
    #[test]
    fn test_delete_key_package_removes_an_unreadable_record() {
        let (manager, storage) = create_test_manager_with_storage("alice");
        storage
            .store(
                StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(),
                "junk",
                b"not a package",
            )
            .unwrap();

        manager.delete_key_package("junk").unwrap();

        assert!(storage
            .load(StorageKeyType::KeyPackage.as_str(), "junk")
            .unwrap()
            .is_none());
    }

    /// `ensure_min_key_packages` mints *unclaimed* packages, which the push
    /// path draws down one per peer. Minting past the pool ceiling would put
    /// material in storage that the ceiling then stops it ever handing out,
    /// while pinning the pool at capacity so every peer past the last claim is
    /// advertised a shared init key.
    #[test]
    fn test_ensure_min_key_packages_is_capped_at_the_pool_ceiling() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");

        let count = manager
            .ensure_min_key_packages(MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES + 50)
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(count, MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES);
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES,
            "pre-filling minted past the ceiling the push path enforces"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_manager_creation() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        assert_eq!(manager.user_id(), addr("alice"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_key_package_generation() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let package = manager.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        assert_eq!(package.user_id, addr("alice"));
        assert!(!package.key_package_data.is_empty());
        assert!(!package.is_expired());
    }

    /// The push path must never hand out a package standing in a published
    /// slot. If it did, the pushed-to peer and a stranger who fetched the
    /// record would race for the same single-use init key, and the loser's
    /// Welcome is unprocessable.
    #[test]
    fn test_get_or_create_never_returns_a_publication_package() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let reserved = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();
        assert!(reserved.reserved_for_publication);

        let pushed = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_ne!(
            pushed.package_id, reserved.package_id,
            "the push path took the package a published record is standing on"
        );
        assert!(!pushed.reserved_for_publication);

        // And it stays stable across calls — the reserved one is skipped every
        // time, not just minted around once.
        let pushed_again = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pushed.package_id, pushed_again.package_id);
    }

    /// `key_package_by_id` returning `None` is the consumption signal the
    /// publication slots run on, so it must distinguish a package this device
    /// still holds from one it does not.
    #[test]
    fn test_key_package_by_id_reports_presence() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bundle = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();

        let found = manager.key_package_by_id(&bundle.package_id).unwrap();
        assert!(found.is_some());
        assert_eq!(found.unwrap().package_id, bundle.package_id);

        assert!(manager
            .key_package_by_id("no-such-package")
            .unwrap()
            .is_none());
    }

    /// Publication slots are independent: two slots must never end up holding
    /// the same package, or one Welcome consumes both.
    #[test]
    fn test_publication_packages_are_distinct_per_slot() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let a = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();
        let b = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_ne!(a.package_id, b.package_id);
        assert_ne!(a.key_package_data, b.key_package_data);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_get_or_create_key_package() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let pkg1 = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        let pkg2 = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        // Since we are now properly persisting keys, pkg2 should be the same as pkg1
        // IF the logic reuses existing key packages.
        // get_or_create_key_package logic iterates list_keys.
        assert_eq!(pkg1.package_id, pkg2.package_id);
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // PUSH-PATH KEY PACKAGE POOL
    // ========================================================================

    /// The property the whole per-peer pool exists for: two peers must never be
    /// advertised the same init key. Sharing one weakens forward secrecy at
    /// session establishment (a single compromised init key opens every Welcome
    /// built against it) and is the LastResort-style reuse RFC 9420 §16.8
    /// permits only as a denial-of-service fallback.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_path_gives_each_peer_its_own_key_package() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");

        let for_bob = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        let for_carol = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("carol")).unwrap();

        assert_ne!(
            for_bob.bundle.package_id, for_carol.bundle.package_id,
            "two peers were advertised the same key package"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            for_bob.bundle.key_package_data, for_carol.bundle.key_package_data,
            "two peers were advertised the same init key"
        );
        assert!(!for_bob.pool_exhausted && !for_carol.pool_exhausted);
        assert_eq!(
            for_bob.bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref(),
            Some(addr("bob").as_str())
        );
        assert_eq!(
            for_carol.bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref(),
            Some(addr("carol").as_str())
        );
    }

    /// The other half of the property: a repeat push to one peer must NOT mint
    /// fresh key material. Pushes to the same peer are routine (rediscovery,
    /// session establishment, group invites), and minting per push would grow
    /// the pool without bound and hit the ceiling within days.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_path_reuses_one_package_for_repeat_pushes_to_a_peer() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");

        let first = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        let second = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        let third = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(first.bundle.package_id, second.bundle.package_id);
        assert_eq!(first.bundle.package_id, third.bundle.package_id);
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            1,
            "repeat pushes to one peer minted extra key material"
        );
    }

    /// A peer's package is rotated by *consumption*, not by time: once a
    /// Welcome built against it has been processed the init key is gone, and
    /// the next push to that peer must mint a fresh one rather than re-handing
    /// a package nobody can use.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_path_mints_a_fresh_package_after_the_peer_consumed_one() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        let advertised = alice.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;
        bob.import_key_package(&addr("alice"), &advertised.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let welcome = bob.create_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap();
        alice.join_session(&welcome).unwrap();

        let next = alice.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(
            next.bundle.package_id, advertised.package_id,
            "a consumed package was advertised again"
        );
        assert!(!next.pool_exhausted);
    }

    /// The race the old shape created, end to end: one package handed to two
    /// peers means the second Welcome is built against an init key the first
    /// has already consumed, and it can never be processed. Nothing re-drives
    /// the exchange, so that peer is stuck.
    #[test]
    fn test_two_peers_can_both_establish_sessions_after_being_pushed_to() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let carol = create_test_manager("carol");

        for (peer, manager) in [(addr("bob"), &bob), (addr("carol"), &carol)] {
            let advertised = alice.take_push_key_package(&peer).unwrap().bundle;
            manager
                .import_key_package(&addr("alice"), &advertised.key_package_data)
                .unwrap();
        }

        // Both Welcomes are built before either is processed — the interleaving
        // that makes shared init keys fail.
        let from_bob = bob.create_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap();
        let from_carol = carol.create_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap();

        alice.join_session(&from_bob).unwrap();
        alice
            .join_session(&from_carol)
            .expect("second peer's Welcome must still be processable");

        assert!(alice.has_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap());
        assert!(alice.has_session(&addr("carol")).unwrap());
    }

    /// Publication slots stay off-limits to the push path for the same
    /// single-use reason, now via the peer-keyed entry point.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_path_never_takes_a_publication_package() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let reserved = manager.generate_publication_key_package().unwrap();

        for peer in [addr("bob"), addr("carol"), addr("dave")] {
            let taken = manager.take_push_key_package(&peer).unwrap();
            assert_ne!(
                taken.bundle.package_id, reserved.package_id,
                "the push path took the package a published record stands on"
            );
        }
    }

    /// The peer-less entry point (the FFI surface and tests) must not hand out
    /// a package a peer is expected to use, or it re-opens the cross-peer
    /// sharing the pool prevents.
    #[test]
    fn test_get_or_create_never_returns_a_peer_assigned_package() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let for_bob = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap().bundle;

        let unclaimed = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_ne!(unclaimed.package_id, for_bob.package_id);
        assert!(unclaimed.assigned_peer.is_none());
    }

    /// An unclaimed package — minted by the peer-less entry point, or by a
    /// build predating assignment — is claimed rather than left behind, so
    /// upgrading does not strand the package already in storage.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_path_claims_an_unclaimed_package_instead_of_stranding_it() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let legacy = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        assert!(legacy.assigned_peer.is_none());

        let taken = manager.take_push_key_package(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            taken.bundle.package_id, legacy.package_id,
            "the pre-existing package was stranded instead of claimed"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            taken.bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref(),
            Some(addr("bob").as_str())
        );
        assert_eq!(manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(), 1);
    }

    /// At the ceiling the pool stops growing and shares a package, which is the
    /// old behaviour — deliberately, since refusing to advertise would cost
    /// session establishment. It must say so, because that is the one condition
    /// under which the reuse this pool removes is back.
    #[test]
    fn test_push_pool_ceiling_shares_a_package_and_reports_it() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");

        for i in 0..MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES {
            let taken = manager.take_push_key_package(&format!("peer{i}")).unwrap();
            assert!(
                !taken.pool_exhausted,
                "pool reported exhausted at {i}, below the ceiling"
            );
        }
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES
        );

        let over = manager.take_push_key_package("one-peer-too-many").unwrap();
        assert!(over.pool_exhausted, "ceiling breach was not reported");
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES,
            "the pool grew past its ceiling"
        );

        // A peer that already holds a package keeps getting its own, even with
        // the pool at capacity — the ceiling must not downgrade existing peers.
        let established = manager.take_push_key_package("peer0").unwrap();
        assert!(!established.pool_exhausted);
        assert_eq!(established.bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref(), Some("peer0"));
    }

    /// The ceiling bounds how many packages *exist*, so it must gate minting
    /// and nothing else. A full pool holding an unclaimed package has one to
    /// give: claiming it relabels a package rather than adding one, and
    /// degrading to a shared init key while it sat idle would weaken forward
    /// secrecy to stay under a bound the claim never approaches.
    #[test]
    fn test_ceiling_claims_an_unclaimed_package_rather_than_sharing() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");

        for i in 0..(MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES - 1) {
            manager.take_push_key_package(&format!("peer{i}")).unwrap();
        }
        // The last live slot is an unclaimed package — as the peer-less entry
        // point, `ensure_min_key_packages`, or a pre-upgrade record leaves one.
        let unclaimed = manager.get_or_create_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES,
            "test premise: the pool is at the ceiling"
        );

        let taken = manager.take_push_key_package("late-arrival").unwrap();
        assert!(
            !taken.pool_exhausted,
            "shared a package while a claimable one was in the pool"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            taken.bundle.package_id, unclaimed.package_id,
            "the claimable package was passed over"
        );
        assert_eq!(taken.bundle.assigned_peer.as_deref(), Some("late-arrival"));
        assert_eq!(
            manager.count_valid_key_packages().unwrap(),
            MAX_PUSH_KEY_PACKAGES,
            "claiming grew the pool"
        );

        // With the last unclaimed package now spoken for, the next new peer has
        // nothing left to claim and does take the shared-package degradation.
        let over = manager.take_push_key_package("one-peer-too-many").unwrap();
        assert!(over.pool_exhausted);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_import_key_package_binds_credential_identity() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let mallory_kp = mallory.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        // Importing mallory's key package under "bob" must be rejected —
        // otherwise a session "with bob" would encrypt to mallory's keys.
        let err = alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &mallory_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::CredentialIdentityMismatch { .. }));

        // Importing under the matching identity succeeds.
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("mallory"), &mallory_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
    }

    /// A key package whose basic credential claims `claimed` but whose leaf
    /// signature key is `keys`.
    ///
    /// Built against raw OpenMLS on purpose: [`MlsManager::new`] refuses to
    /// construct at an address its stored key does not derive to, so an
    /// impostor is no longer expressible through this crate's own API. That
    /// refusal is the point — but it means the substitution has to be forged
    /// one layer down to be tested at all, the same way the `SenderIdentityMismatch`
    /// tests do.
    fn substituted_key_package(claimed: &str, keys: &SignatureKeyPair) -> Vec<u8> {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let provider = MlsProvider::new(MlsStorageAdapter::new(storage));
        keys.store(provider.storage()).unwrap();

        let credential = CredentialWithKey {
            credential: Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, claimed.as_bytes().to_vec()),
            signature_key: keys.public().into(),
        };

        KeyPackage::builder()
            .build(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE, &provider, keys, credential)
            .unwrap()
            .key_package()
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .unwrap()
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_credential_identity_check_alone_does_not_stop_a_substitution() {
        // The premise for the derivation check below, stated as a test so it
        // cannot quietly stop being true. `verify_credential_identity` compares
        // a self-asserted string, so an impostor who writes bob's address into
        // their own credential sails through *that* check on its own.
        let (mallorys_keys, _) = test_identity("mallory");
        let forged = substituted_key_package(&addr("bob"), &mallorys_keys);

        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let provider = MlsProvider::new(MlsStorageAdapter::new(storage));
        let key_package = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&forged)
            .unwrap()
            .validate(provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .unwrap();

        MlsManager::verify_credential_identity(&key_package, &addr("bob"))
            .expect("the identity check cannot tell the two bobs apart");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_substituted_key_package_is_refused_by_the_derivation() {
        // The same substitution, refused — and refused on *first contact*,
        // which the pin it replaced could not do. There is nothing to have
        // learned about bob beforehand: his address is the hash of his key, so
        // a package signed by anyone else re-derives to a different address.
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let real_bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let (mallorys_keys, _) = test_identity("mallory");

        let forged = substituted_key_package(&addr("bob"), &mallorys_keys);
        let err = alice.import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &forged).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::KeyPackageAddressMismatch { ref claimed, .. } if *claimed == addr("bob")
            ),
            "expected an address mismatch, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // The genuine article still imports, with no prior contact either.
        let real_kp = real_bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &real_kp.key_package_data)
            .expect("the real peer's key package derives to its own address");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_a_nickname_peer_id_is_refused_rather_than_skipping_the_check() {
        // The bypass this check must not have. If a non-address id answered
        // "nothing to derive, pass", an attacker would simply claim one — so a
        // peer id that is not an address is an error, not a waiver.
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob_kp = create_test_manager("bob").generate_key_package().unwrap();

        let err = alice
            .import_key_package("bob", &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::CredentialIdentityMismatch { .. } | MlsError::InvalidUserId(_)
            ),
            "a nickname must be refused, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_add_group_member_binds_identity_and_derivation() {
        // The group path ran neither check before — not even the credential
        // identity one — so a package could join a group under a roster label
        // that had nothing to do with it.
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");

        let group_id = alice.create_group("Test Group").unwrap().group_id;

        // Wrong identity outright.
        let mallory_kp = mallory.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let err = alice
            .add_group_member(&group_id, &addr("bob"), &mallory_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::CredentialIdentityMismatch { .. }));

        // Right address in the credential, wrong key behind it.
        let (mallorys_keys, _) = test_identity("mallory");
        let forged = substituted_key_package(&addr("bob"), &mallorys_keys);
        let err = alice
            .add_group_member(&group_id, &addr("bob"), &forged)
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::KeyPackageAddressMismatch { .. }));

        // The genuine invitee joins.
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .add_group_member(&group_id, &addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .expect("the real invitee is admitted");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_import_key_package_rejects_hostile_user_id() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        for hostile in ["", "..", "bob/evil", "bob\\evil", "bob\0evil"] {
            let err = alice
                .import_key_package(hostile, &bob_kp.key_package_data)
                .unwrap_err();
            assert!(
                matches!(err, MlsError::InvalidUserId(_)),
                "expected InvalidUserId for {:?}, got {:?}",
                hostile,
                err
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_get_contact_key_package_rejects_poisoned_store() {
        // A key package written to storage out-of-band (bypassing import
        // validation, e.g. persisted before this fix) under the wrong user
        // id must fail identity verification at use time.
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (alice_keys, alice_address) = test_identity("alice");
        seed_identity(&storage, &alice_keys);
        let alice = MlsManager::new(alice_address.to_string(), storage.clone()).unwrap();
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let mallory_kp = mallory.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        storage
            .store(
                StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str(),
                &addr("bob"),
                &mallory_kp.key_package_data,
            )
            .unwrap();

        // create_session(bob) loads the poisoned package and must refuse.
        let err = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::CredentialIdentityMismatch { .. }));
    }

    /// The *derivation* half of the cached-read check, which the poisoned-store
    /// test above cannot reach.
    ///
    /// That test stores mallory's own genuine package under bob's key, so the
    /// credential identity check ([`MlsManager::verify_credential_identity`])
    /// refuses it first and
    /// [`MlsManager::verify_address_binding`] never runs. A *substituted*
    /// package — credential claiming bob's address, leaf key mallory's — sails
    /// past the credential check by construction and can only be caught by
    /// re-deriving the address from the key.
    ///
    /// This is the call site the re-check exists for. Import-time validation
    /// does not travel with a cached package: it is re-read from the
    /// install-scoped store long after the receive-time gate admitted it, which
    /// is exactly the window a container write aims at. Deleting the
    /// `verify_address_binding` line from `get_contact_key_package` leaves
    /// every other test in this workspace green, so without this one the
    /// second call site could be dropped by a refactor in silence.
    #[test]
    fn test_get_contact_key_package_rejects_a_substituted_package() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (alice_keys, alice_address) = test_identity("alice");
        seed_identity(&storage, &alice_keys);
        let alice = MlsManager::new(alice_address.to_string(), storage.clone()).unwrap();

        // Claims bob's address, signed by mallory's key.
        let (mallorys_keys, _) = test_identity("mallory");
        let forged = substituted_key_package(&addr("bob"), &mallorys_keys);

        storage
            .store(
                StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str(),
                &addr("bob"),
                &forged,
            )
            .unwrap();

        let err = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::KeyPackageAddressMismatch { ref claimed, .. } if *claimed == addr("bob")
            ),
            "a substituted cached package must be refused at use time, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // And no session was built against mallory's leaf.
        assert!(!alice.has_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_replace_session_with_welcome_rejects_hostile_inviter_id() {
        // `inviter_id` arrives on the wire and is used as a raw storage key
        // for deletes — hostile values must be rejected before any storage
        // operation runs.
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let welcome = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: slot("alice", "bob"),
            welcome_data: vec![],
            inviter_id: "../../etc".to_string(),
            group_name: None,
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };
        let err = alice.replace_session_with_welcome(&welcome).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::InvalidUserId(_)));
    }

    /// Builds a converged alice/bob 1:1 session for sender-binding tests.
    fn create_test_session() -> (MlsManager, MlsManager) {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let welcome = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        bob.join_session(&welcome).unwrap();
        (alice, bob)
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_session_decrypt_rejects_spoofed_sender() {
        let (alice, bob) = create_test_session();

        // A message from alice's session must not be attributable to a
        // different wire sender. The envelope names `session:alice:bob`, which
        // is not the slot bob shares with "mallory", so the slot binding
        // rejects it *before* the group is loaded — strictly earlier than the
        // SEC-M1 credential check, which cannot run until a decrypt succeeds.
        let ct = alice.encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), b"hello").unwrap();
        let err = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("mallory")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::SessionIdentityMismatch { .. }),
            "spoofed sender must be rejected by the slot binding, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // Rejecting pre-decrypt also means the forgery does not consume the
        // ratchet generation it named, so the *same* generation still decrypts
        // for the legitimate sender. (Before the binding, a spoofed frame
        // burned the generation and the genuine message was lost.)
        let pt = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("alice")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"hello"[..]));

        // SEC-M1 itself (correct slot, wrong credential) stays reachable and is
        // covered by `test_group_decrypt_rejects_spoofed_sender`, where a group
        // has enough members for the two identities to differ.
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_epoch_fork_classifies_as_session_desync() {
        // An established session that forks (one side advances its epoch without
        // the other merging the commit) must surface as the *recoverable*
        // `SessionDesync`, not an opaque `Decryption` — that is what lets the
        // protocol layer re-key instead of silently dropping.
        let (alice, bob) = create_test_session();

        // Alice self-updates and merges locally, advancing only her epoch; bob
        // never sees the commit, so the two sides are now one epoch apart.
        let group_id = slot("alice", "bob");
        alice.update_keys(&group_id).unwrap();

        // A message alice encrypts at her new epoch cannot decrypt at bob's old
        // epoch → OpenMLS `WrongEpoch` → `MlsError::SessionDesync`.
        let ct = alice.encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), b"after-fork").unwrap();
        let err = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("alice")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::SessionDesync(_)),
            "epoch fork must classify as SessionDesync, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    /// Serializes an `MlsMessage(PrivateMessage)` from scratch — no group, no
    /// keys, no captured ciphertext. Wire format per RFC 9420:
    /// `version(u16) || wire_format(u16) || group_id<V> || epoch(u64) ||
    /// content_type(u8) || authenticated_data<V> || encrypted_sender_data<V> ||
    /// ciphertext<V>`, where `<V>` is a QUIC varint length (single byte below
    /// 64). Used to demonstrate what an off-path attacker can actually build.
    /// Appends `len` as a QUIC variable-length integer.
    ///
    /// Two-byte encoding is not optional here: a 1:1 slot over two `off1…`
    /// addresses is ~96 bytes, well past the 63-byte ceiling a single byte can
    /// express. Hardcoding one byte was fine while ids were nicknames and
    /// silently produced an unparseable frame the moment they stopped being.
    fn push_varint(out: &mut Vec<u8>, len: usize) {
        match len {
            0..=63 => out.push(len as u8),
            64..=16_383 => {
                out.push(0x40 | (len >> 8) as u8);
                out.push((len & 0xff) as u8);
            }
            _ => panic!("test payloads stay under the 2-byte varint ceiling"),
        }
    }

    fn forge_private_message(group_id: &str, epoch: u64) -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        out.extend_from_slice(&1u16.to_be_bytes()); // ProtocolVersion::Mls10
        out.extend_from_slice(&2u16.to_be_bytes()); // WireFormat::PrivateMessage
        push_varint(&mut out, group_id.len());
        out.extend_from_slice(group_id.as_bytes());
        out.extend_from_slice(&epoch.to_be_bytes());
        out.push(1); // ContentType::Application
        out.push(0); // authenticated_data: empty
        out.push(8); // encrypted_sender_data: 8 bytes of nothing
        out.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]);
        out.push(16); // ciphertext: 16 bytes of nothing
        out.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 16]);
        out
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_forged_frame_reaches_session_desync_without_any_key_material() {
        // Honest statement of the residual threat model. OpenMLS validates the
        // framing header (group id, then epoch) *before* any AEAD, sender-data
        // decryption, or signature check, and a 1:1 slot id is derivable from
        // two public user ids. So an attacker with no key material, no captured
        // ciphertext and no session can hand-serialize a frame that classifies
        // as the recoverable `SessionDesync` — the classification that drives a
        // re-key. This is inherent to MLS framing, not an OpenMLS bug.
        //
        // The mitigation is NOT that this is unreachable (it is reachable, as
        // asserted here) but that everything hung off it is bounded and
        // non-destructive: the slot binding below, the per-peer re-key floor,
        // and a heal that no longer discards queued plaintext.
        let (_alice, bob) = create_test_session();

        let forged = EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: slot("alice", "bob"),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Application,
            epoch: 9_999,
            ciphertext: forge_private_message(slot("alice", "bob").as_str(), 9_999),
            sender_id: addr("alice"),
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };

        let err = bob.decrypt_from_user(&forged, &addr("alice")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::SessionDesync(_)),
            "a forged future-epoch frame reaches the desync classification pre-AEAD, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_forged_frame_naming_a_foreign_slot_is_rejected_before_desync() {
        // The slot binding is what stops the forgery above from being pointed
        // at *any* session while naming *any* sender. Without it the claimed
        // sender and the targeted group are independent, so one derivable slot
        // id yields a re-key (and a peer-keyed map entry, and a key-package
        // send) for arbitrary attacker-chosen identities.
        let (_alice, bob) = create_test_session();

        let forged = EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: slot("alice", "bob"),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Application,
            epoch: 9_999,
            ciphertext: forge_private_message(slot("alice", "bob").as_str(), 9_999),
            sender_id: addr("mallory"),
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };

        let err = bob
            .decrypt_from_user(&forged, &addr("mallory"))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::SessionIdentityMismatch { .. }),
            "a frame naming another pair's slot must not classify as recoverable, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_corrupt_ciphertext_is_not_classified_as_session_desync() {
        // A malformed frame must stay a plain decrypt failure, which the
        // protocol layer fails closed on. Note this covers only *malformed*
        // input — it never reaches the framing validation, so it is not
        // evidence that forged frames cannot reach `SessionDesync`. They can:
        // see `test_forged_frame_reaches_session_desync_without_any_key_material`.
        let (alice, bob) = create_test_session();
        let mut ct = alice.encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), b"hello").unwrap();
        // Corrupt the AEAD-protected body.
        for b in ct.ciphertext.iter_mut() {
            *b ^= 0xFF;
        }
        let err = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("alice")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            !matches!(err, MlsError::SessionDesync(_)),
            "corrupt ciphertext must not be treated as a recoverable desync, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_join_session_binds_slot_to_inviter() {
        // Regression (session-hijack): a Welcome from an authenticated inviter
        // may only install the 1:1 session slot for (self, inviter). An inviter
        // that names a *third* party's slot must be rejected before any group
        // state is touched — otherwise the inviter overwrites/seeds the
        // victim's session with that third party, so the victim's outbound
        // messages to that party encrypt to the attacker's group.
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        // mallory, authenticating honestly as herself, sends bob a Welcome whose
        // group_id squats alice+bob's session slot.
        let hijack = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: slot("alice", "bob"),
            welcome_data: vec![], // rejected before deserialization
            inviter_id: addr("mallory"),
            group_name: None,
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };

        // Both join entry points must reject the mismatched slot.
        let err = bob.join_session(&hijack).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::WelcomeIdentityMismatch { .. }),
            "join_session: expected WelcomeIdentityMismatch, got {:?}",
            err
        );
        let err = bob.replace_session_with_welcome(&hijack).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::WelcomeIdentityMismatch { .. }),
            "replace_session_with_welcome: expected WelcomeIdentityMismatch, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // Nothing was installed: bob has no session with either identity.
        assert!(!bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());
        assert!(!bob.has_session(&addr("mallory")).unwrap());

        // The check is precise, not over-broad: a correctly-slotted Welcome from
        // mallory (group_id == session:bob:mallory, inviter_id == mallory) still
        // joins normally.
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        mallory
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let legit = mallory.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        bob.join_session(&legit).unwrap();
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("mallory")).unwrap());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_join_group_rejects_session_namespace() {
        // Regression (session-hijack via the group-Welcome path): the identity
        // binding on `join_session` only guards the session-Welcome path. A
        // group Welcome carries an attacker-controllable `group_id` and writes
        // the SAME storage/OpenMLS keyspace, so `join_group` must refuse the
        // reserved `session:` namespace outright — otherwise an authenticated
        // peer could seed/overwrite a third party's 1:1 session slot and
        // hijack the victim's outbound encryption.
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        let squat = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: slot("alice", "bob"),
            welcome_data: vec![], // rejected before deserialization
            inviter_id: addr("mallory"),
            group_name: None,
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };

        let err = bob.join_group(&squat).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::ReservedSessionNamespace { .. }),
            "join_group: expected ReservedSessionNamespace, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // The squatted 1:1 slot was never installed.
        assert!(!bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());

        // Precision: a legitimately-namespaced group Welcome is not caught by
        // this guard (it fails later at deserialization of the empty blob, not
        // with ReservedSessionNamespace).
        let legit_ns = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: GroupId::new("group:0bd6e5f2-3a70-4a4e-9c3f-1c1f2a3b4c5d").unwrap(),
            welcome_data: vec![],
            inviter_id: addr("mallory"),
            group_name: None,
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };
        let err = bob.join_group(&legit_ns).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            !matches!(err, MlsError::ReservedSessionNamespace { .. }),
            "a group:-namespaced Welcome must not trip the session-namespace guard, got {:?}",
            err
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_join_group_rejects_embedded_group_id_mismatch() {
        // Regression (HIGH-1): OpenMLS persists a joined group under the group
        // id embedded in the Welcome's GroupContext — a value the inviter picks
        // freely at creation (`new_with_group_id`) — while our storage marker
        // and every load/delete lookup key off the *wire* `group_id`, which is
        // all the SEC-M5/M6 bindings validate. If the two diverge, `into_group`
        // would install the group under the attacker's embedded id: an
        // arbitrary slot the wire-id checks never inspected. The join must bind
        // embedded == wire and reject before any state is written.
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");

        // Mallory builds a real group whose EMBEDDED id is one value...
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let embedded = GroupId::new("group:11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111").unwrap();
        let cred = mallory.get_credential().unwrap();
        let signer = mallory.get_signer().unwrap();
        mallory
            .group_manager
            .create_group(&embedded, &cred, &signer)
            .unwrap();
        let (welcome, _commit) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&embedded, &addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(welcome.group_id, embedded);

        // ...but presents it under a DIFFERENT wire group_id. The wire id clears
        // the reserved-namespace guard (not `session:`), so only the embedded-id
        // binding stands between the attacker and an arbitrary slot.
        let wire = GroupId::new("group:22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222").unwrap();
        let tampered = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: wire.clone(),
            ..welcome
        };

        let err = bob.join_group(&tampered).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::WelcomeGroupIdMismatch { .. }),
            "expected WelcomeGroupIdMismatch, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // Nothing was installed under EITHER id — the reject precedes into_group.
        assert!(bob.group_manager.load_group(&wire).unwrap().is_none());
        assert!(bob.group_manager.load_group(&embedded).unwrap().is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_welcome_embedded_id_cannot_hijack_session_slot() {
        // Regression (HIGH-1, the SEC-M6 hijack reached through the embedded id).
        // Bob has a live 1:1 session with Alice at `session:alice:bob`. Mallory,
        // authenticating honestly as herself with a wire `group_id` that PASSES
        // `verify_welcome_slot` (`session:bob:mallory`), sends a Welcome whose
        // *embedded* GroupContext id squats `session:alice:bob`. Without the
        // embedded-id binding, `into_group` overwrites Bob's Alice session so his
        // next `encrypt_for_user("alice")` encrypts to Mallory's group. The
        // binding must reject it and leave Bob's Alice session intact.
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let welcome = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        bob.join_session(&welcome).unwrap();
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());

        // Mallory crafts a group whose embedded id squats bob's alice slot.
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let bob_kp2 = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let squat = slot("alice", "bob");
        let cred = mallory.get_credential().unwrap();
        let signer = mallory.get_signer().unwrap();
        mallory
            .group_manager
            .create_group(&squat, &cred, &signer)
            .unwrap();
        let (mal_welcome, _commit) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&squat, &addr("bob"), &bob_kp2.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        // Present it under a wire slot that passes verify_welcome_slot for mallory.
        let attack = WelcomeMessage {
            group_id: slot("bob", "mallory"),
            welcome_data: mal_welcome.welcome_data,
            inviter_id: addr("mallory"),
            group_name: None,
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        };

        let err = bob.join_session(&attack).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::WelcomeGroupIdMismatch { .. }),
            "expected WelcomeGroupIdMismatch, got {:?}",
            err
        );

        // Bob's Alice session survived and still encrypts to Alice's group.
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());
        let ct = bob
            .encrypt_for_user(&addr("alice"), b"still private")
            .unwrap();
        let pt = alice.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("bob")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"still private"[..]));
    }

    /// Builds a two-member group (alice admin, bob member) for group
    /// sender-binding tests. Returns (alice, bob, group_id).
    fn create_test_group_with_bob() -> (MlsManager, MlsManager, GroupId) {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let info = alice.create_group("Test Group").unwrap();
        let gid = info.group_id.clone();
        let (welcome, _commit) = alice
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        bob.join_group(&welcome).unwrap();
        (alice, bob, gid)
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_decrypt_rejects_spoofed_sender() {
        let (alice, bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        let ct = alice.encrypt_for_group(&gid, b"group message").unwrap();
        let err = bob.decrypt_from_group(&ct, &addr("mallory")).unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::SenderIdentityMismatch { .. }));

        let ct2 = alice.encrypt_for_group(&gid, b"another one").unwrap();
        let pt = bob.decrypt_from_group(&ct2, &addr("alice")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"another one"[..]));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_commit_with_spoofed_sender_rejected_before_merge() {
        let (alice, bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        // Alice issues a key-update commit; bob receives it with a spoofed
        // wire sender. The mismatch must be detected BEFORE the staged
        // commit is merged — bob's epoch must not advance.
        let commit = alice.update_keys(&gid).unwrap();
        let epoch_before = bob.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap().epoch;

        let err = bob
            .decrypt_from_group(&commit, &addr("mallory"))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::SenderIdentityMismatch { .. }));

        let epoch_after = bob.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap().epoch;
        assert_eq!(
            epoch_before, epoch_after,
            "spoofed commit must not advance group state"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_no_session_initially() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        assert!(!manager.has_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap());
        assert!(manager.list_sessions().unwrap().is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_no_groups_initially() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        assert!(manager.list_groups().unwrap().is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_creation() {
        let manager = create_test_manager("alice");
        let info = manager.create_group("Test Group").unwrap();

        assert_eq!(info.name, Some("Test Group".to_string()));
        assert!(!info.is_session);
        assert_eq!(info.members.len(), 1);

        let groups = manager.list_groups().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(groups.len(), 1);
    }

    /// Regression test for the both-create split-brain re-brick.
    ///
    /// With auto key exchange, both peers create a `session:a:b` group and the
    /// higher-id peer adopts the lower-id "owner"'s Welcome. The owner keeps
    /// retransmitting its Welcome until it sees a group-aware proof, so the
    /// adopter receives the SAME Welcome again *after* it already adopted. MLS
    /// key packages are one-time, so re-staging that Welcome must fail — but it
    /// must fail NON-DESTRUCTIVELY, leaving the converged group intact. The old
    /// delete-then-stage path deleted the good group first and then could not
    /// re-stage, permanently bricking a working session.
    #[test]
    fn test_both_create_adopt_is_non_destructive_on_welcome_retransmit() {
        // alice = lexicographically-lower "owner"; bob = higher "adopter".
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        // Exchange key packages both ways (both sides will auto-create).
        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        bob.import_key_package(&addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        // Both-create race: each peer creates its own session group + Welcome.
        let alice_welcome = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap(); // owner's Welcome
        let _bob_welcome = bob.create_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap(); // adopter's own group
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());

        // Adopter adopts the owner's Welcome (first delivery): replaces its own
        // group with alice's, consuming bob's one-time key package.
        bob.join_session(&alice_welcome).unwrap();
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());

        // Convergence: alice encrypts and bob decrypts on the shared group.
        let ct = alice
            .encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), b"hello over the converged group")
            .unwrap();
        let pt = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("alice")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"hello over the converged group"[..]));

        // Owner retransmits the SAME Welcome (its periodic retry). Re-staging
        // MUST fail (bob's key package is consumed) but MUST be non-destructive.
        let retransmit = bob.join_session(&alice_welcome);
        assert!(
            retransmit.is_err(),
            "re-staging a consumed key package should fail"
        );

        // The converged group MUST survive the failed retransmit. This is the
        // regression: the old delete-then-stage path left bob with no session.
        assert!(
            bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap(),
            "duplicate Welcome must not brick the converged session"
        );

        // ...and it must still be functional after the failed retransmit.
        let ct2 = alice
            .encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), b"still converged after retransmit")
            .unwrap();
        let pt2 = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ct2, &addr("alice")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            pt2.as_deref(),
            Some(&b"still converged after retransmit"[..])
        );
    }

    /// Windowed media transfers keep up to 8 encrypted chunks in flight
    /// (interleaved with text on the same session ratchet), so a delayed chunk
    /// can arrive many generations behind the newest decrypted message. The
    /// OpenMLS default tolerance (5) would delete its key and permanently stall
    /// the transfer; `SENDER_RATCHET_OUT_OF_ORDER_TOLERANCE` (32) must cover it.
    #[test]
    fn test_out_of_order_decryption_within_sender_ratchet_tolerance() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        let welcome = alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap();
        bob.join_session(&welcome).unwrap();

        let ciphertexts: Vec<_> = (0..40)
            .map(|i| {
                alice
                    .encrypt_for_user(&addr("bob"), format!("chunk {}", i).as_bytes())
                    .unwrap()
            })
            .collect();

        // Decrypt the newest message first, ratcheting bob's receive state far
        // ahead of every earlier generation.
        let pt = bob
            .decrypt_from_user(&ciphertexts[39], &addr("alice"))
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"chunk 39"[..]));

        // 29 generations behind: far beyond the OpenMLS default of 5, but
        // within our tolerance of 32 — must still decrypt.
        let pt = bob
            .decrypt_from_user(&ciphertexts[10], &addr("alice"))
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pt.as_deref(), Some(&b"chunk 10"[..]));

        // 39 generations behind: beyond the tolerance, the key is deleted and
        // the message must NOT decrypt (proves the configured bound applies).
        let res = bob.decrypt_from_user(&ciphertexts[0], &addr("alice"));
        assert!(
            !matches!(res, Ok(Some(_))),
            "generation beyond the tolerance must not decrypt"
        );
    }

    /// RFC 8032 §7.1 TEST 1 Ed25519 public key.
    const RFC8032_TV1_PK: [u8; 32] = [
        0xd7, 0x5a, 0x98, 0x01, 0x82, 0xb1, 0x0a, 0xb7, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0xc9, 0x64, 0x07,
        0x3a, 0x0e, 0xe1, 0x72, 0xf3, 0xda, 0xa6, 0x23, 0x25, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x68, 0xf7, 0x07,
        0x51, 0x1a,
    ];

    /// The address of that key, from the BIP-350 reference implementation.
    /// This literal is the cross-platform contract: bridges and apps must all
    /// produce it for this key. Re-derive it from the reference implementation
    /// if it ever needs to change — never edit it to match new code output.
    const RFC8032_TV1_ADDRESS: &str = "off1qysluvwl5922yctzd0u9gpr06gn3k7ldfvgtwgvn";

    /// The same vector `offline-protocol-sealed` pins, asserted through this
    /// crate's public path.
    ///
    /// Keeping it after the derivation moved is the point: the sealed crate's
    /// copy proves the function is right, and this one proves the delegation
    /// still reaches it. A delegating wrapper that started returning something
    /// else would pass every test over there.
    #[test]
    fn derive_address_matches_the_pinned_vector() {
        let address = MlsManager::derive_address(&RFC8032_TV1_PK).expect("32-byte key derives");
        assert_eq!(address.to_string(), RFC8032_TV1_ADDRESS);
        // Self-certifying: the rendered form parses back to the same address,
        // so a peer can check a claimed address against a presented key.
        assert_eq!(
            RFC8032_TV1_ADDRESS.parse::<Address>().expect("parses"),
            address
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn derive_address_rejects_wrong_key_lengths() {
        for len in [0usize, 31, 33, 64] {
            let key = vec![0u8; len];
            assert!(
                matches!(
                    MlsManager::derive_address(&key),
                    Err(MlsError::InvalidPublicKey(_))
                ),
                "{len}-byte key must be rejected"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn deprecated_derive_agrees_with_derive_address() {
        // The deprecated entry point must not become a second addressing
        // format while it still exists.
        #[allow(deprecated)]
        let legacy = MlsManager::derive_user_id_from_public_key(&RFC8032_TV1_PK);
        assert_eq!(legacy, RFC8032_TV1_ADDRESS);
        assert_eq!(
            legacy,
            MlsManager::derive_address(&RFC8032_TV1_PK)
                .expect("derives")
                .to_string()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn load_or_create_identity_mints_once_and_is_idempotent() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());

        let (first_keys, first_address) = MlsManager::load_or_create_identity(&storage).unwrap();
        let (second_keys, second_address) = MlsManager::load_or_create_identity(&storage).unwrap();

        // Second call loads, never mints: same key, therefore same address.
        assert_eq!(first_keys.public(), second_keys.public());
        assert_eq!(first_address, second_address);
        assert_eq!(
            MlsManager::derive_address(first_keys.public()).unwrap(),
            first_address,
            "the returned address must be the stored key's derivation"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn load_or_create_identity_adopts_an_existing_key() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (keys, address) = test_identity("alice");
        seed_identity(&storage, &keys);

        let (loaded, loaded_address) = MlsManager::load_or_create_identity(&storage).unwrap();

        assert_eq!(loaded.public(), keys.public());
        assert_eq!(loaded_address, address);
    }

    #[test]
    fn manager_bootstrapped_at_its_derived_address_loads_that_identity() {
        let (manager, address) = create_addressed_manager("alice");

        assert_eq!(manager.user_id(), address.to_string());
        assert_eq!(
            MlsManager::derive_address(&manager.get_identity_public_key().unwrap()).unwrap(),
            address,
            "the manager's identity key must derive to the address it claims"
        );
    }

    /// The address is the identity key's hash, so a manager pointed at storage
    /// holding a *different* identity is a broken bootstrap — the wrong
    /// namespace for this profile, or a replaced key. It must fail loudly
    /// rather than build a credential claiming an address it cannot prove.
    #[test]
    fn manager_refuses_an_address_whose_key_is_not_the_stored_one() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (alice_keys, alice_address) = test_identity("alice");
        let (_, bob_address) = test_identity("bob");
        seed_identity(&storage, &alice_keys);

        let Err(err) = MlsManager::new(bob_address.to_string(), storage) else {
            panic!("a manager must not claim an address it holds no key for");
        };

        match err {
            MlsError::IdentityAddressMismatch { expected, derived } => {
                assert_eq!(expected, bob_address.to_string());
                assert_eq!(derived, alice_address.to_string());
            }
            other => panic!("expected IdentityAddressMismatch, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    /// Empty storage plus an address id means the caller skipped the bootstrap:
    /// a freshly minted key derives to a different address, so claiming this
    /// one would be unprovable. Refused before anything is persisted.
    #[test]
    fn manager_refuses_to_claim_an_address_with_no_stored_identity() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (_, address) = test_identity("alice");

        let Err(err) = MlsManager::new(address.to_string(), storage.clone()) else {
            panic!("a manager must not mint a key and claim a different address");
        };
        assert!(matches!(err, MlsError::IdentityAddressMismatch { .. }));

        assert!(
            storage
                .load(StorageKeyType::Identity.as_str(), "key_pair")
                .unwrap()
                .is_none(),
            "a refused bootstrap must not leave a key behind"
        );
    }

    /// Nickname ids have no derivation to check, so a manager can still be
    /// *constructed* at one — [`MlsManager::verify_identity_binding`] is about
    /// catching a broken self-certifying identity, not about forcing every id
    /// to be an address.
    ///
    /// Note the asymmetry with [`MlsManager::verify_address_binding`], which
    /// refuses a nickname outright. The two are different questions: this one
    /// asks whether *our own* stored key matches the id we were handed, where a
    /// nickname means "nothing was claimed"; that one asks whether a *peer* owns
    /// the id they claim, where a nickname means "the claim is unprovable" — and
    /// answering "pass" there would be the bypass the whole check exists to close.
    #[test]
    fn manager_with_a_non_address_id_skips_the_binding_check() {
        let manager = MlsManager::new("alice", Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new())).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(manager.user_id(), "alice");
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // LEAF IDENTITY BINDING (the Authentication Service, RFC 9420 §5.3.1/§7.3)
    // ========================================================================

    /// An impostor holding a leaf that claims someone else's address.
    ///
    /// [`substituted_key_package`] throws its provider away, which is enough to
    /// test a key package being *refused* but not to test what a forged leaf
    /// does once it is in a tree: processing the Welcome addressed to that leaf
    /// needs the private init key, so the provider has to outlive the key
    /// package. This keeps it, and is otherwise the same forgery — a fresh
    /// keypair with a credential naming a victim.
    struct Impostor {
        provider: MlsProvider,
        keys: SignatureKeyPair,
        key_package: Vec<u8>,
        group: Option<MlsGroup>,
    }

    impl Impostor {
        /// Mints a leaf whose credential claims `claimed` and whose signature
        /// key is `key_label`'s — i.e. the attacker's own.
        fn claiming(claimed: &str, key_label: &str) -> Self {
            let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
            let provider = MlsProvider::new(MlsStorageAdapter::new(storage));
            let (keys, _) = test_identity(key_label);
            keys.store(provider.storage()).unwrap();

            let credential = CredentialWithKey {
                credential: Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, claimed.as_bytes().to_vec()),
                signature_key: keys.public().into(),
            };
            let key_package = KeyPackage::builder()
                .build(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE, &provider, &keys, credential)
                .unwrap()
                .key_package()
                .tls_serialize_detached()
                .unwrap();

            Self {
                provider,
                keys,
                key_package,
                group: None,
            }
        }

        /// Joins the group via the Welcome minted against this leaf.
        fn join(&mut self, welcome: &MlsMessageOut) {
            let bytes = welcome.tls_serialize_detached().unwrap();
            let welcome = match MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&bytes)
                .unwrap()
                .extract()
            {
                MlsMessageBodyIn::Welcome(w) => w,
                _ => panic!("not a welcome"),
            };
            let cfg = MlsGroupJoinConfig::builder()
                .use_ratchet_tree_extension(true)
                .build();
            self.group = Some(
                StagedWelcome::new_from_welcome(&self.provider, &cfg, welcome, None)
                    .unwrap()
                    .into_group(&self.provider)
                    .unwrap(),
            );
        }

        /// Merges a commit so the forged leaf tracks the group's epoch.
        ///
        /// Needed because a message is only decryptable at the epoch it was
        /// sealed in: without this the forgery fails as a stale generation and
        /// the test would pass for the wrong reason.
        fn merge_commit(&mut self, commit_bytes: &[u8]) {
            let group = self.group.as_mut().expect("join first");
            let message = MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(commit_bytes)
                .unwrap()
                .try_into_protocol_message()
                .unwrap();
            let processed = group.process_message(&self.provider, message).unwrap();
            match processed.into_content() {
                ProcessedMessageContent::StagedCommitMessage(staged) => {
                    group.merge_staged_commit(&self.provider, *staged).unwrap();
                }
                _ => panic!("not a commit"),
            }
        }

        /// Speaks from the forged leaf.
        fn encrypt(&mut self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
            self.group
                .as_mut()
                .expect("join first")
                .create_message(&self.provider, &self.keys, plaintext)
                .unwrap()
                .tls_serialize_detached()
                .unwrap()
        }
    }

    /// Adds `key_package_bytes` to `group_id` the way an attacker would: past
    /// `add_group_member`, which refuses it.
    ///
    /// The attacker runs their own build, so the send-side check is theirs to
    /// delete. Every test here that plants a forged leaf goes through this, so
    /// none of them are accidentally testing the send-side check instead of the
    /// receive-side one.
    fn add_member_bypassing_checks(
        manager: &MlsManager,
        group_id: &GroupId,
        key_package_bytes: &[u8],
    ) -> (MlsMessageOut, MlsMessageOut) {
        let mut group = manager
            .group_manager
            .load_group(group_id)
            .unwrap()
            .expect("group exists");
        let key_package = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(key_package_bytes)
            .unwrap()
            .validate(
                manager.group_manager.provider().crypto(),
                ProtocolVersion::Mls10,
            )
            .unwrap();
        let signer = manager.get_signer().unwrap();
        let (commit, welcome) = manager
            .group_manager
            .add_member(&mut group, key_package, &signer)
            .unwrap();
        manager.group_manager.save_group(group_id, &group).unwrap();
        (commit, welcome)
    }

    fn commit_message(
        group_id: &GroupId,
        commit: &MlsMessageOut,
        sender: &str,
    ) -> EncryptedMessage {
        EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Commit,
            epoch: 0,
            ciphertext: commit.tls_serialize_detached().unwrap(),
            sender_id: sender.to_string(),
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        }
    }

    fn app_message(group_id: &GroupId, ciphertext: Vec<u8>, sender: &str) -> EncryptedMessage {
        EncryptedMessage {
            group_id: group_id.clone(),
            message_type: MlsMessageType::Application,
            epoch: 0,
            ciphertext,
            sender_id: sender.to_string(),
            timestamp_ms: 0,
        }
    }

    /// The whole vulnerability, end to end, as a rejection.
    ///
    /// Mallory is in a group with Alice. She commits a leaf whose credential
    /// says "bob" but whose key is hers, then speaks from it as bob. Before the
    /// binding existed this reached Alice's app: the commit merged, bob showed
    /// up in her roster, and SEC-M1 waved the message through because the wire
    /// sender and the credential agreed — both being strings Mallory chose.
    #[test]
    fn test_committed_forged_leaf_is_refused_and_cannot_speak_as_its_victim() {
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        let gid = mallory.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;
        let (welcome, _) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        alice.join_group(&welcome).unwrap();
        let epoch_before = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap().epoch;

        // The send-side check refuses the forgery, so Mallory goes around it.
        let mut impostor = Impostor::claiming(&addr("bob"), "mallorys-second-key");
        assert!(matches!(
            mallory
                .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("bob"), &impostor.key_package)
                .unwrap_err(),
            MlsError::KeyPackageAddressMismatch { .. }
        ));
        let (commit, forged_welcome) =
            add_member_bypassing_checks(&mallory, &gid, &impostor.key_package);

        // Alice refuses the commit, pre-merge.
        let err = alice
            .decrypt_from_group(
                &commit_message(&gid, &commit, &addr("mallory")),
                &addr("mallory"),
            )
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref claimed, ref context, .. }
                    if *claimed == addr("bob") && *context == crate::error::LeafSource::CommitAdd
            ),
            "expected a CommitAdd binding refusal, got {err:?}"
        );

        // Nothing moved: the epoch is unchanged and bob is not in the roster.
        let after = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            after.epoch, epoch_before,
            "a refused commit advanced the epoch"
        );
        assert!(
            !after.members.contains(&addr("bob")),
            "roster: {:?}",
            after.members
        );

        // And the leaf cannot speak. Note the mechanism here is epoch
        // divergence, not the sender-leaf check: Alice refused the commit, so
        // she never advanced to the epoch the impostor is sealing at. That is
        // the honest consequence of refusing, and it is what a real victim
        // experiences — the identity seam itself, on a leaf that *did* reach
        // the tree, is covered by
        // `test_forged_leaf_seated_behind_the_gates_still_cannot_speak`.
        impostor.join(&forged_welcome);
        let forged = impostor.encrypt(b"send me the recovery phrase");
        assert!(
            alice
                .decrypt_from_group(&app_message(&gid, forged, &addr("bob")), &addr("bob"))
                .is_err(),
            "a forged leaf's message was delivered"
        );
    }

    /// The same forgery placed in a Welcome's ratchet tree, which is the
    /// cheaper attack: it needs no existing group, only that the victim accept
    /// one invite from anyone.
    #[test]
    fn test_welcome_carrying_a_forged_leaf_is_refused() {
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");

        let gid = mallory.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;
        let impostor = Impostor::claiming(&addr("bob"), "mallorys-second-key");
        add_member_bypassing_checks(&mallory, &gid, &impostor.key_package);

        // Now invite Alice into the poisoned room.
        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let (welcome, _) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        let err = alice.join_group(&welcome).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref claimed, ref context, .. }
                    if *claimed == addr("bob") && *context == crate::error::LeafSource::WelcomeTree
            ),
            "expected a WelcomeTree binding refusal, got {err:?}"
        );

        // The refusal precedes `into_group`, so nothing was installed.
        assert!(alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().is_none());
    }

    /// A forged leaf in a *session* Welcome, refused on the same path.
    ///
    /// `join_session` routes through `join_group_replacing`, whose reject must
    /// also leave any pre-existing session at that slot untouched.
    #[test]
    fn test_session_welcome_carrying_a_forged_leaf_is_refused_non_destructively() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");

        // Bob has a real session with Alice.
        let bob_kp = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .import_key_package(&addr("bob"), &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        bob.join_session(&alice.create_session(&addr("bob")).unwrap())
            .unwrap();
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());

        // Mallory builds a session slot with Bob, then splices a third leaf
        // claiming carol into it before sending the Welcome.
        let bob_kp2 = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let slot_id = slot("bob", "mallory");
        let cred = mallory.get_credential().unwrap();
        let signer = mallory.get_signer().unwrap();
        mallory
            .group_manager
            .create_group(&slot_id, &cred, &signer)
            .unwrap();
        let impostor = Impostor::claiming(&addr("carol"), "mallorys-second-key");
        add_member_bypassing_checks(&mallory, &slot_id, &impostor.key_package);
        let (welcome, _) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&slot_id, &addr("bob"), &bob_kp2.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        let err = bob.join_session(&welcome).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref context, .. }
                if *context == crate::error::LeafSource::WelcomeTree),
            "expected a WelcomeTree binding refusal, got {err:?}"
        );

        // Bob's real session with Alice is intact and still works.
        assert!(bob.has_session(&addr("alice")).unwrap());
        let ct = bob
            .encrypt_for_user(&addr("alice"), b"still private")
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            alice
                .decrypt_from_user(&ct, &addr("bob"))
                .unwrap()
                .as_deref(),
            Some(&b"still private"[..])
        );
    }

    /// The use-time half, which is the only one that covers a leaf the entry
    /// gates never saw.
    ///
    /// Installs the poisoned group by staging the Welcome straight into the
    /// provider — the shape a direct write to the install-scoped store leaves,
    /// and the reason the binding is re-checked at decrypt rather than trusted
    /// from join time.
    #[test]
    fn test_forged_leaf_seated_behind_the_gates_still_cannot_speak() {
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");

        let gid = mallory.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;
        let mut impostor = Impostor::claiming(&addr("bob"), "mallorys-second-key");
        let (_, forged_welcome) =
            add_member_bypassing_checks(&mallory, &gid, &impostor.key_package);
        impostor.join(&forged_welcome);

        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let (welcome, add_alice_commit) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();
        // The forged leaf has to follow the group to Alice's epoch, or its
        // message fails as a stale generation instead of on its identity.
        impostor.merge_commit(&add_alice_commit.ciphertext);

        // Bypass `join_group` entirely: stage and install directly, as a
        // tampered store (or a build predating the gates) would leave things.
        let bytes = welcome.welcome_data.clone();
        let staged_welcome = match MlsMessageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&bytes)
            .unwrap()
            .extract()
        {
            MlsMessageBodyIn::Welcome(w) => w,
            _ => panic!("not a welcome"),
        };
        let cfg = MlsGroupJoinConfig::builder()
            .use_ratchet_tree_extension(true)
            .build();
        let group = StagedWelcome::new_from_welcome(&alice.provider, &cfg, staged_welcome, None)
            .unwrap()
            .into_group(&alice.provider)
            .unwrap();
        alice.group_manager.save_group(&gid, &group).unwrap();

        // Premise: the forged leaf really is seated in Alice's tree.
        assert!(
            group
                .members()
                .any(|m| m.credential.serialized_content() == addr("bob").as_bytes()),
            "test premise: the forged leaf must be installed"
        );

        // The message is still refused, at the sender-leaf seam.
        let forged = impostor.encrypt(b"send me the recovery phrase");
        let err = alice
            .decrypt_from_group(&app_message(&gid, forged, &addr("bob")), &addr("bob"))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref context, .. }
                if *context == crate::error::LeafSource::MessageSender),
            "expected a MessageSender binding refusal, got {err:?}"
        );

        // And the roster read skips it rather than reporting a member that
        // proved nothing.
        let info = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert!(
            !info.members.contains(&addr("bob")),
            "roster surfaced an unproven member: {:?}",
            info.members
        );
        assert!(
            info.members.contains(&addr("mallory")),
            "{:?}",
            info.members
        );
    }

    /// A member renaming *their own* leaf to someone else's address, refused.
    ///
    /// The cheapest form of the attack, and the one an Add-only reading of the
    /// fix would have missed entirely: no new leaf, no key package, no invite.
    /// A member already in the group commits a self-update whose new credential
    /// names a different member, and from then on every message from their leaf
    /// is attributed to that member. MLS permits the credential change — RFC
    /// 9420 §5.3.1 says an Update may carry a new credential and leaves the
    /// verdict to the Authentication Service, which is this.
    ///
    /// This is the `CommitPath` source, the first entry in OpenMLS's own
    /// `credentials_to_verify` and the reason the commit walk follows that
    /// enumeration rather than the book's shorter "add & update proposals".
    #[test]
    fn test_member_renaming_their_own_leaf_to_a_peers_address_is_refused() {
        // `create_test_group_with_bob` seats alice as creator and bob as
        // member; bob is the insider here, renaming his own leaf to alice's
        // address.
        let (alice, bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();
        let epoch_before = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap().epoch;

        let mut group = bob.group_manager.load_group(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        let signer = bob.get_signer().unwrap();
        let forged = CredentialWithKey {
            // Claims alice, signed by bob's own key — which is the whole point:
            // the leaf is genuinely his, the name on it is not.
            credential: Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, addr("alice").as_bytes().to_vec()),
            signature_key: signer.public().into(),
        };
        let params = LeafNodeParameters::builder()
            .with_credential_with_key(forged)
            .build();
        let bundle = group
            .self_update(&bob.provider, &signer, params)
            .expect("MLS permits a credential change; the AS is what refuses it");
        group.merge_pending_commit(&bob.provider).unwrap();
        bob.group_manager.save_group(&gid, &group).unwrap();
        let (commit, _, _) = bundle.into_contents();

        let err = alice
            .decrypt_from_group(&commit_message(&gid, &commit, &addr("bob")), &addr("bob"))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(
                err,
                MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref claimed, ref context, .. }
                    if *claimed == addr("alice") && *context == crate::error::LeafSource::CommitPath
            ),
            "expected a CommitPath binding refusal, got {err:?}"
        );

        // Not merged: alice's epoch is untouched and her roster still names bob
        // as bob.
        let after = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(after.epoch, epoch_before);
        assert!(after.members.contains(&addr("bob")), "{:?}", after.members);
        assert_eq!(
            after
                .members
                .iter()
                .filter(|m| **m == addr("alice"))
                .count(),
            1,
            "alice must appear once, as herself: {:?}",
            after.members
        );
    }

    /// A nickname credential must be refused, not waved through for having no
    /// derivation to check — the bypass every other gate in this SDK names.
    #[test]
    fn test_leaf_with_a_nickname_credential_is_refused() {
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();

        let gid = mallory.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;
        let impostor = Impostor::claiming("bob", "mallorys-second-key");
        add_member_bypassing_checks(&mallory, &gid, &impostor.key_package);
        let (welcome, _) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        let err = alice.join_group(&welcome).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::LeafAddressMismatch { ref claimed, .. } if claimed == "bob"),
            "a nickname credential was accepted or misreported: {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// The honest paths this check could plausibly break, pinned.
    ///
    /// `update_keys` rotates the leaf's HPKE keys through the commit's update
    /// path but keeps the signature key and credential
    /// (`LeafNodeParameters::default()`). If that ever changed — or if someone
    /// reached for `self_update_with_new_signer` — every member would start
    /// refusing every honest key rotation, and this is what says so.
    #[test]
    fn test_key_rotation_and_ordinary_traffic_still_pass_the_binding() {
        let (alice, bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        let commit = alice.update_keys(&gid).unwrap();
        bob.decrypt_from_group(&commit, &addr("alice"))
            .expect("an honest key rotation must still merge");

        let ct = alice.encrypt_for_group(&gid, b"after rotation").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            bob.decrypt_from_group(&ct, &addr("alice"))
                .unwrap()
                .as_deref(),
            Some(&b"after rotation"[..])
        );

        // And a member added the ordinary way is in both rosters.
        assert!(bob
            .get_group_info(&gid)
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap()
            .members
            .contains(&addr("bob")));
    }

    /// The Welcome-side mirror of the `ExternalSenders` refusal.
    ///
    /// The commit gate refuses a proposal that would *add* the extension; a
    /// group created with one already in its context arrives this way instead,
    /// and the two entry gates should not differ by which route the inviter
    /// took. Mallory merges the extension into her own group first, so the
    /// Welcome she then sends carries it in the group context.
    #[test]
    fn test_welcome_whose_group_context_has_external_senders_is_refused() {
        let mallory = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");

        let gid = mallory.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;

        // Merge an ExternalSenders extension into mallory's own group context.
        {
            let mut group = mallory.group_manager.load_group(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
            let signer = mallory.get_signer().unwrap();
            let outsider =
                SignatureKeyPair::new(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm()).unwrap();
            let external = ExternalSender::new(
                outsider.public().into(),
                Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, b"off1outsider".to_vec()),
            );
            group
                .commit_builder()
                .propose_group_context_extensions(Extensions::single(Extension::ExternalSenders(
                    vec![external],
                )))
                .load_psks(mallory.provider.storage())
                .unwrap()
                .build(
                    mallory.provider.rand(),
                    mallory.provider.crypto(),
                    &signer,
                    |_| true,
                )
                .unwrap()
                .stage_commit(&mallory.provider)
                .unwrap();
            group.merge_pending_commit(&mallory.provider).unwrap();
            mallory.group_manager.save_group(&gid, &group).unwrap();
        }

        let alice_kp = alice.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let (welcome, _) = mallory
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("alice"), &alice_kp.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        let err = alice.join_group(&welcome).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::UnsupportedSender { ref detail, .. }
                if detail.contains("ExternalSenders")),
            "expected the invite to be declined for its ExternalSenders context, got {err:?}"
        );
        assert!(
            alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().is_none(),
            "a declined Welcome must not install the group"
        );
    }

    /// Source 4 of the commit walk: a commit proposing an `ExternalSenders`
    /// group-context extension is refused.
    ///
    /// Not a leaf, so there is no binding to check — which is exactly why it
    /// needs its own arm rather than falling off the end of the walk. The
    /// extension authorizes a non-member to send into the group, and its
    /// credential would never be judged by any of the three leaf seams.
    /// Untested, this arm survives deletion.
    #[test]
    fn test_commit_proposing_external_senders_is_refused() {
        let (alice, mallory, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        let mut group = mallory.group_manager.load_group(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        let signer = mallory.get_signer().unwrap();

        // An ExternalSenders extension naming a party that is in no leaf.
        let outsider = SignatureKeyPair::new(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE.signature_algorithm()).unwrap();
        let external = ExternalSender::new(
            outsider.public().into(),
            Credential::new(CredentialType::Basic, b"off1outsider".to_vec()),
        );
        let extensions = Extensions::single(Extension::ExternalSenders(vec![external]));

        let bundle = group
            .commit_builder()
            .propose_group_context_extensions(extensions)
            .load_psks(mallory.provider.storage())
            .unwrap()
            .build(
                mallory.provider.rand(),
                mallory.provider.crypto(),
                &signer,
                |_| true,
            )
            .unwrap()
            .stage_commit(&mallory.provider)
            .unwrap();
        let (commit, _, _) = bundle.into_contents();

        let err = alice
            .decrypt_from_group(&commit_message(&gid, &commit, &addr("bob")), &addr("bob"))
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::UnsupportedSender { ref detail, .. }
                if detail.contains("ExternalSenders")),
            "expected an ExternalSenders refusal, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// Why `remove_group_member`'s loop can never find a second leaf — and why
    /// it is a loop anyway.
    ///
    /// The duplicate it would guard against is refused a layer down: RFC 9420
    /// requires unique signature keys across a group, so seating one identity
    /// twice is rejected by OpenMLS before the roster ever sees it. Pinned as a
    /// test because the *removal* code's correctness rests on it, and it is an
    /// invariant enforced in another crate — exactly the kind that changes
    /// without anyone here noticing.
    #[test]
    fn test_one_identity_cannot_hold_two_leaves_in_a_group() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let bob = create_test_manager("bob");

        let gid = alice.create_group("Team").unwrap().group_id;
        let first = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("bob"), &first.key_package_data)
            .unwrap();

        // A second, distinct key package for the same identity: different init
        // key, same signature key, because the signature key *is* the identity.
        let second = bob.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        assert_ne!(first.package_id, second.package_id);
        let err = alice
            .add_group_member(&gid, &addr("bob"), &second.key_package_data)
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::AddMember(ref m) if m.contains("Duplicate signature key")),
            "expected MLS to refuse a duplicate signature key, got {err:?}"
        );

        // One leaf, and removing it removes the member.
        alice.remove_group_member(&gid, &addr("bob")).unwrap();
        assert!(!alice
            .get_group_info(&gid)
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap()
            .members
            .contains(&addr("bob")));
    }

    /// A non-`Member` sender is refused, not ignored.
    ///
    /// `verify_sender_leaf` covers four sender shapes and only one of them —
    /// `Sender::Member` — resolves to a leaf that can be bound. The other three
    /// take the `UnsupportedSender` arm, and this is the one of them that is
    /// cheap to build: an external join proposal, authenticated to
    /// `Sender::NewMemberProposal`, whose leaf is by definition in no tree yet.
    ///
    /// Worth its own test because the arm *changed disposition* in this change.
    /// It used to fall through to `ProcessedMessageContent::
    /// ExternalJoinProposalMessage` and be tolerated as `Ok(None)`; the same
    /// tolerance applied to a `NewMemberCommit` would have *merged* a commit
    /// from a party holding an unjudged leaf. Nothing else pins that the
    /// tolerance is gone — the surviving `ExternalJoinProposalMessage` arm still
    /// reads like the policy, and its comment says it is not.
    #[test]
    fn test_external_join_proposal_is_refused_as_an_unsupported_sender() {
        let (alice, _bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        // An outsider asks to join. The proposal is well-formed and correctly
        // signed by its own key — it is refused for its *sender role*, not for
        // anything malformed, which is the point.
        let outsider = create_test_manager("mallory");
        let kp_bytes = outsider.generate_key_package().unwrap().key_package_data;
        let key_package = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(&kp_bytes)
            .unwrap()
            .validate(alice.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .unwrap();
        let signer = outsider.get_signer().unwrap();

        let (mls_group_id, epoch) = {
            let group = alice.group_manager.load_group(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
            (group.group_id().clone(), group.epoch())
        };
        let proposal =
            JoinProposal::new::<MlsStorageAdapter>(key_package, mls_group_id, epoch, &signer)
                .expect(
                    "an external join proposal is well-formed; the SDK just declines to honour it",
                );

        let err = alice
            .decrypt_from_group(
                &app_message(
                    &gid,
                    proposal.tls_serialize_detached().unwrap(),
                    &addr("mallory"),
                ),
                &addr("mallory"),
            )
            .unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            matches!(err, MlsError::UnsupportedSender { ref detail, .. }
                if detail.contains("not a group member")),
            "expected an UnsupportedSender refusal, got {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// A leaf seated behind the gates is *counted*, not merely hidden.
    ///
    /// The roster filter is the only seam at which a leaf already in local
    /// group state surfaces, and a `warn!` reaches no app. The count is what
    /// the protocol layer turns into `GroupLeafIdentityUnproven`, so a filter
    /// that silently returned the same shortened roster would look identical
    /// here without it.
    ///
    /// Built with the in-module fixture rather than
    /// `seat_forged_leaf_for_testing`, which is behind the `test-utils` feature
    /// for the *protocol* crate's benefit: workspace feature unification turns
    /// it on for `cargo test --workspace`, but `cargo test -p
    /// offline-protocol-mls` would then not compile.
    #[test]
    fn test_roster_read_counts_the_leaves_it_skips() {
        let (alice, _bob, gid) = create_test_group_with_bob();

        let before = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            before.unproven_members, 0,
            "an honest group must report no unproven members: {:?}",
            before.members
        );
        let honest_members = before.members.len();

        // Seat a leaf claiming carol, bypassing the gates as a tampered store
        // would. Alice commits it into her own group, so it is in *her* tree.
        let impostor = Impostor::claiming(&addr("carol"), "an-attackers-key");
        add_member_bypassing_checks(&alice, &gid, &impostor.key_package);

        let after = alice.get_group_info(&gid).unwrap().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            after.unproven_members, 1,
            "the skipped leaf must be counted, not only dropped"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            after.members.len(),
            honest_members,
            "the roster must be unchanged: {:?}",
            after.members
        );
        assert!(
            !after.members.contains(&addr("carol")),
            "roster surfaced the unproven member: {:?}",
            after.members
        );
    }

    // ========================================================================
    // KEY PACKAGE VALIDITY WINDOWS (issue 396)
    // ========================================================================

    /// Mints a key package for a real identity with a chosen validity window.
    ///
    /// Everything but the window is honest: the credential names the address
    /// the signature key derives to, so the identity gates pass and a refusal
    /// can only have come from [`MlsManager::verify_lifetime_bound`].
    fn key_package_with_window(label: &str, lifetime: Lifetime) -> (String, Vec<u8>) {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let provider = MlsProvider::new(MlsStorageAdapter::new(storage));
        let (keys, address) = test_identity(label);
        keys.store(provider.storage()).unwrap();

        let credential = CredentialWithKey {
            credential: Credential::new(
                CredentialType::Basic,
                address.to_string().as_bytes().to_vec(),
            ),
            signature_key: keys.public().into(),
        };
        let bytes = KeyPackage::builder()
            .key_package_lifetime(lifetime)
            .build(DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITE, &provider, &keys, credential)
            .unwrap()
            .key_package()
            .tls_serialize_detached()
            .unwrap();

        (address.to_string(), bytes)
    }

    fn now_secs() -> u64 {
        std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .unwrap()
            .as_secs()
    }

    /// The case the issue was filed on: mls-rs hands out a year by default, and
    /// OpenMLS validation admits it because it never applies its own cap.
    #[test]
    fn a_year_long_validity_window_is_refused_at_import() {
        let (manager, _) = create_addressed_manager("alice");

        let (peer, bytes) = key_package_with_window("bob", Lifetime::new(365 * 24 * 60 * 60));

        let err = manager
            .import_key_package(&peer, &bytes)
            .expect_err("a year-long window must be refused");
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(m) if m.contains("wider than")),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// The same package, and the same refusal, on the path that never sees the
    /// import gate. A contact entry written straight into the store models the
    /// container write [`MlsManager::verify_address_binding`] is also written
    /// against; without the check here the widest window in the system is
    /// reachable by whoever can write that store.
    #[test]
    fn a_wide_window_written_straight_into_the_store_is_refused_on_read() {
        let storage: Arc<dyn MlsStorage> = Arc::new(InMemoryStorage::new());
        let (keys, address) = test_identity("alice");
        seed_identity(&storage, &keys);
        let manager = MlsManager::new(address.to_string(), Arc::clone(&storage)).unwrap();

        let (peer, bytes) = key_package_with_window("bob", Lifetime::new(365 * 24 * 60 * 60));
        storage
            .store(StorageKeyType::ContactKeyPackage.as_str(), &peer, &bytes)
            .unwrap();

        let err = manager
            .get_contact_key_package(&peer)
            .expect_err("a cached year-long window must be refused too");
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(m) if m.contains("wider than")),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {err:?}"
        );
    }

    /// What this install puts on the wire is what it documents.
    ///
    /// Before issue 396 nothing set the window and OpenMLS applied its own
    /// default of three months plus an hour, so this asserted 84 days while
    /// `DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS` said 30. The two numbers are the
    /// same fact and this is where they are held to it.
    #[test]
    fn our_own_key_package_states_the_lifetime_we_document() {
        let (manager, _) = create_addressed_manager("alice");

        let bundle = manager.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        let key_package = KeyPackageIn::tls_deserialize_exact(bundle.key_package_data.as_slice())
            .unwrap()
            .validate(manager.provider.crypto(), ProtocolVersion::Mls10)
            .unwrap();

        let window = key_package.life_time();
        assert_eq!(
            window.not_after() - window.not_before(),
            DEFAULT_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME_SECS + LIFETIME_SKEW_MARGIN_SECS,
            "the window on the wire is not the lifetime this crate declares"
        );
        assert!(
            MlsManager::verify_lifetime_bound(&key_package).is_ok(),
            "this install mints a package it would refuse from a peer"
        );
    }

    /// The third route a package this install did not mint is admitted by.
    ///
    /// A group invite reads its bytes out of `pending_key_packages`, which
    /// holds what arrived on the wire, and the cap it is judged against has to
    /// be the same one the 1:1 paths apply. A bound on two routes of three is
    /// not a bound, and this is the route with no cache read behind it to
    /// catch what the import missed.
    #[test]
    fn a_year_long_validity_window_is_refused_by_a_group_invite() {
        let alice = create_test_manager("alice");
        let group_id = alice.create_group("Test Group").unwrap().group_id;

        let (bob, wide) = key_package_with_window("bob", Lifetime::new(365 * 24 * 60 * 60));
        let err = alice
            .add_group_member(&group_id, &bob, &wide)
            .expect_err("a year-long window must be refused by the group path too");
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(m) if m.contains("wider than")),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {err:?}"
        );

        // And the genuine invitee still joins, so the cap is what refused the
        // package above rather than anything about this group.
        let bob_manager = create_test_manager("bob");
        let bob_kp = bob_manager.generate_key_package().unwrap();
        alice
            .add_group_member(&group_id, &bob, &bob_kp.key_package_data)
            .expect("a package inside the cap is admitted");
    }

    /// The boundary, from both sides. A cap tested only with a year-long
    /// package would pass with the comparison written backwards.
    #[test]
    fn a_window_exactly_at_the_cap_is_admitted_and_one_second_over_is_not() {
        let cap = MAX_ACCEPTED_KEY_PACKAGE_LIFETIME.as_secs();
        let (manager, _) = create_addressed_manager("alice");

        // Backdated by 10s so `now` sits inside both windows and OpenMLS's own
        // `is_valid` is not what does the refusing.
        let start = now_secs() - 10;

        let (at_cap, bytes) = key_package_with_window("bob", Lifetime::init(start, start + cap));
        manager
            .import_key_package(&at_cap, &bytes)
            .expect("a window exactly at the cap is admitted");

        let (over_cap, bytes) =
            key_package_with_window("carol", Lifetime::init(start, start + cap + 1));
        let err = manager
            .import_key_package(&over_cap, &bytes)
            .expect_err("one second over the cap must be refused");
        assert!(
            matches!(&err, MlsError::InvalidKeyPackage(m) if m.contains("wider than")),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {err:?}"
        );
    }
}