noble-babe 2.0.1

Consensus extension module for Tetcore BABE consensus. Collects on-chain randomness from VRF outputs and manages epoch transitions.
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// This file is part of Tetcore.

// Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// 	http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.

//! Consensus extension module tests for BABE consensus.

use super::{Call, *};
use fabric_support::{
	assert_err, assert_ok,
	traits::{Currency, OnFinalize},
	weights::{GetDispatchInfo, Pays},
};
use mock::*;
use noble_session::ShouldEndSession;
use tp_consensus_babe::{AllowedSlots, Slot};
use tet_core::crypto::Pair;

const EMPTY_RANDOMNESS: [u8; 32] = [
	74, 25, 49, 128, 53, 97, 244, 49,
	222, 202, 176, 2, 231, 66, 95, 10,
	133, 49, 213, 228, 86, 161, 164, 127,
	217, 153, 138, 37, 48, 192, 248, 0,
];

#[test]
fn empty_randomness_is_correct() {
	let s = compute_randomness([0; RANDOMNESS_LENGTH], 0, std::iter::empty(), None);
	assert_eq!(s, EMPTY_RANDOMNESS);
}

#[test]
fn initial_values() {
	new_test_ext(4).execute_with(|| {
		assert_eq!(Babe::authorities().len(), 4)
	})
}

#[test]
fn check_module() {
	new_test_ext(4).execute_with(|| {
		assert!(!Babe::should_end_session(0), "Genesis does not change sessions");
		assert!(!Babe::should_end_session(200000),
			"BABE does not include the block number in epoch calculations");
	})
}

#[test]
fn first_block_epoch_zero_start() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(4);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		let genesis_slot = Slot::from(100);
		let (vrf_output, vrf_proof, vrf_randomness) = make_vrf_output(genesis_slot, &pairs[0]);

		let first_vrf = vrf_output;
		let pre_digest = make_primary_pre_digest(
			0,
			genesis_slot,
			first_vrf.clone(),
			vrf_proof,
		);

		assert_eq!(Babe::genesis_slot(), Slot::from(0));
		System::initialize(
			&1,
			&Default::default(),
			&pre_digest,
			Default::default(),
		);

		// see implementation of the function for details why: we issue an
		// epoch-change digest but don't do it via the normal session mechanism.
		assert!(!Babe::should_end_session(1));
		assert_eq!(Babe::genesis_slot(), genesis_slot);
		assert_eq!(Babe::current_slot(), genesis_slot);
		assert_eq!(Babe::epoch_index(), 0);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), Some(vrf_randomness));

		Babe::on_finalize(1);
		let header = System::finalize();

		assert_eq!(SegmentIndex::get(), 0);
		assert_eq!(UnderConstruction::get(0), vec![vrf_randomness]);
		assert_eq!(Babe::randomness(), [0; 32]);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);
		assert_eq!(NextRandomness::get(), [0; 32]);

		assert_eq!(header.digest.logs.len(), 2);
		assert_eq!(pre_digest.logs.len(), 1);
		assert_eq!(header.digest.logs[0], pre_digest.logs[0]);

		let consensus_log = tp_consensus_babe::ConsensusLog::NextEpochData(
			tp_consensus_babe::digests::NextEpochDescriptor {
				authorities: Babe::authorities(),
				randomness: Babe::randomness(),
			}
		);
		let consensus_digest = DigestItem::Consensus(BABE_ENGINE_ID, consensus_log.encode());

		// first epoch descriptor has same info as last.
		assert_eq!(header.digest.logs[1], consensus_digest.clone())
	})
}

#[test]
fn author_vrf_output_for_primary() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(1);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		let genesis_slot = Slot::from(10);
		let (vrf_output, vrf_proof, vrf_randomness) = make_vrf_output(genesis_slot, &pairs[0]);
		let primary_pre_digest = make_primary_pre_digest(0, genesis_slot, vrf_output, vrf_proof);

		System::initialize(
			&1,
			&Default::default(),
			&primary_pre_digest,
			Default::default(),
		);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);

		Babe::do_initialize(1);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), Some(vrf_randomness));

		Babe::on_finalize(1);
		System::finalize();
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);
	})
}

#[test]
fn author_vrf_output_for_secondary_vrf() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(1);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		let genesis_slot = Slot::from(10);
		let (vrf_output, vrf_proof, vrf_randomness) = make_vrf_output(genesis_slot, &pairs[0]);
		let secondary_vrf_pre_digest = make_secondary_vrf_pre_digest(0, genesis_slot, vrf_output, vrf_proof);

		System::initialize(
			&1,
			&Default::default(),
			&secondary_vrf_pre_digest,
			Default::default(),
		);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);

		Babe::do_initialize(1);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), Some(vrf_randomness));

		Babe::on_finalize(1);
		System::finalize();
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);
	})
}

#[test]
fn no_author_vrf_output_for_secondary_plain() {
	new_test_ext(1).execute_with(|| {
		let genesis_slot = Slot::from(10);
		let secondary_plain_pre_digest = make_secondary_plain_pre_digest(0, genesis_slot);

		System::initialize(
			&1,
			&Default::default(),
			&secondary_plain_pre_digest,
			Default::default(),
		);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);

		Babe::do_initialize(1);
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);

		Babe::on_finalize(1);
		System::finalize();
		assert_eq!(Babe::author_vrf_randomness(), None);
	})
}

#[test]
fn authority_index() {
	new_test_ext(4).execute_with(|| {
		assert_eq!(
			Babe::find_author((&[(BABE_ENGINE_ID, &[][..])]).into_iter().cloned()), None,
			"Trivially invalid authorities are ignored")
	})
}

#[test]
fn can_predict_next_epoch_change() {
	new_test_ext(1).execute_with(|| {
		assert_eq!(<Test as Config>::EpochDuration::get(), 3);
		// this sets the genesis slot to 6;
		go_to_block(1, 6);
		assert_eq!(*Babe::genesis_slot(), 6);
		assert_eq!(*Babe::current_slot(), 6);
		assert_eq!(Babe::epoch_index(), 0);

		progress_to_block(5);

		assert_eq!(Babe::epoch_index(), 5 / 3);
		assert_eq!(*Babe::current_slot(), 10);

		// next epoch change will be at
		assert_eq!(*Babe::current_epoch_start(), 9); // next change will be 12, 2 slots from now
		assert_eq!(Babe::next_expected_epoch_change(System::block_number()), Some(5 + 2));
	})
}

#[test]
fn can_enact_next_config() {
	new_test_ext(1).execute_with(|| {
		assert_eq!(<Test as Config>::EpochDuration::get(), 3);
		// this sets the genesis slot to 6;
		go_to_block(1, 6);
		assert_eq!(*Babe::genesis_slot(), 6);
		assert_eq!(*Babe::current_slot(), 6);
		assert_eq!(Babe::epoch_index(), 0);
		go_to_block(2, 7);

		Babe::plan_config_change(NextConfigDescriptor::V1 {
			c: (1, 4),
			allowed_slots: AllowedSlots::PrimarySlots,
		});

		progress_to_block(4);
		Babe::on_finalize(9);
		let header = System::finalize();

		let consensus_log = tp_consensus_babe::ConsensusLog::NextConfigData(
			tp_consensus_babe::digests::NextConfigDescriptor::V1 {
				c: (1, 4),
				allowed_slots: AllowedSlots::PrimarySlots,
			}
		);
		let consensus_digest = DigestItem::Consensus(BABE_ENGINE_ID, consensus_log.encode());

		assert_eq!(header.digest.logs[2], consensus_digest.clone())
	});
}

#[test]
fn can_fetch_current_and_next_epoch_data() {
	new_test_ext(5).execute_with(|| {
		// genesis authorities should be used for the first and second epoch
		assert_eq!(
			Babe::current_epoch().authorities,
			Babe::next_epoch().authorities,
		);

		// 1 era = 3 epochs
		// 1 epoch = 3 slots
		// Eras start from 0.
		// Therefore at era 1 we should be starting epoch 3 with slot 10.
		start_era(1);

		let current_epoch = Babe::current_epoch();
		assert_eq!(current_epoch.epoch_index, 3);
		assert_eq!(*current_epoch.start_slot, 10);
		assert_eq!(current_epoch.authorities.len(), 5);

		let next_epoch = Babe::next_epoch();
		assert_eq!(next_epoch.epoch_index, 4);
		assert_eq!(*next_epoch.start_slot, 13);
		assert_eq!(next_epoch.authorities.len(), 5);

		// the on-chain randomness should always change across epochs
		assert!(current_epoch.randomness != next_epoch.randomness);

		// but in this case the authorities stay the same
		assert!(current_epoch.authorities == next_epoch.authorities);
	});
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_current_session_works() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let authorities = Babe::authorities();
		let validators = Session::validators();

		// make sure that all authorities have the same balance
		for validator in &validators {
			assert_eq!(Balances::total_balance(validator), 10_000_000);
			assert_eq!(Staking::slashable_balance_of(validator), 10_000);

			assert_eq!(
				Staking::eras_stakers(1, validator),
				noble_staking::Exposure {
					total: 10_000,
					own: 10_000,
					others: vec![],
				},
			);
		}

		// we will use the validator at index 0 as the offending authority
		let offending_validator_index = 0;
		let offending_validator_id = Session::validators()[offending_validator_index];
		let offending_authority_pair = pairs
			.into_iter()
			.find(|p| p.public() == authorities[offending_validator_index].0)
			.unwrap();

		// generate an equivocation proof. it creates two headers at the given
		// slot with different block hashes and signed by the given key
		let equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);

		// create the key ownership proof
		let key = (
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		);
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		// report the equivocation
		Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(Origin::none(), equivocation_proof, key_owner_proof)
			.unwrap();

		// start a new era so that the results of the offence report
		// are applied at era end
		start_era(2);

		// check that the balance of offending validator is slashed 100%.
		assert_eq!(
			Balances::total_balance(&offending_validator_id),
			10_000_000 - 10_000
		);
		assert_eq!(Staking::slashable_balance_of(&offending_validator_id), 0);
		assert_eq!(
			Staking::eras_stakers(2, offending_validator_id),
			noble_staking::Exposure {
				total: 0,
				own: 0,
				others: vec![],
			},
		);

		// check that the balances of all other validators are left intact.
		for validator in &validators {
			if *validator == offending_validator_id {
				continue;
			}

			assert_eq!(Balances::total_balance(validator), 10_000_000);
			assert_eq!(Staking::slashable_balance_of(validator), 10_000);
			assert_eq!(
				Staking::eras_stakers(2, validator),
				noble_staking::Exposure {
					total: 10_000,
					own: 10_000,
					others: vec![],
				},
			);
		}
	})
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_old_session_works() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let authorities = Babe::authorities();

		// we will use the validator at index 0 as the offending authority
		let offending_validator_index = 0;
		let offending_validator_id = Session::validators()[offending_validator_index];
		let offending_authority_pair = pairs
			.into_iter()
			.find(|p| p.public() == authorities[offending_validator_index].0)
			.unwrap();

		// generate an equivocation proof at the current slot
		let equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);

		// create the key ownership proof
		let key = (
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		);
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		// start a new era and report the equivocation
		// from the previous era
		start_era(2);

		// check the balance of the offending validator
		assert_eq!(Balances::total_balance(&offending_validator_id), 10_000_000);
		assert_eq!(
			Staking::slashable_balance_of(&offending_validator_id),
			10_000
		);

		// report the equivocation
		Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(Origin::none(), equivocation_proof, key_owner_proof)
			.unwrap();

		// start a new era so that the results of the offence report
		// are applied at era end
		start_era(3);

		// check that the balance of offending validator is slashed 100%.
		assert_eq!(
			Balances::total_balance(&offending_validator_id),
			10_000_000 - 10_000
		);
		assert_eq!(Staking::slashable_balance_of(&offending_validator_id), 0);
		assert_eq!(
			Staking::eras_stakers(3, offending_validator_id),
			noble_staking::Exposure {
				total: 0,
				own: 0,
				others: vec![],
			},
		);
	})
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_invalid_key_owner_proof() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let authorities = Babe::authorities();

		// we will use the validator at index 0 as the offending authority
		let offending_validator_index = 0;
		let offending_authority_pair = pairs
			.into_iter()
			.find(|p| p.public() == authorities[offending_validator_index].0)
			.unwrap();

		// generate an equivocation proof at the current slot
		let equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);

		// create the key ownership proof
		let key = (
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		);
		let mut key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		// we change the session index in the key ownership proof
		// which should make it invalid
		key_owner_proof.session = 0;
		assert_err!(
			Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(
				Origin::none(),
				equivocation_proof.clone(),
				key_owner_proof
			),
			Error::<Test>::InvalidKeyOwnershipProof,
		);

		// it should fail as well if we create a key owner proof
		// for a different authority than the offender
		let key = (tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE, &authorities[1].0);
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		// we need to progress to a new era to make sure that the key
		// ownership proof is properly checked, otherwise since the state
		// is still available the historical module will just check
		// against current session data.
		start_era(2);

		assert_err!(
			Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(Origin::none(), equivocation_proof, key_owner_proof),
			Error::<Test>::InvalidKeyOwnershipProof,
		);
	})
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_invalid_equivocation_proof() {
	use tp_runtime::traits::Header;

	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let authorities = Babe::authorities();

		// we will use the validator at index 0 as the offending authority
		let offending_validator_index = 0;
		let offending_authority_pair = pairs
			.into_iter()
			.find(|p| p.public() == authorities[offending_validator_index].0)
			.unwrap();

		// create the key ownership proof
		let key = (
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		);
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		let assert_invalid_equivocation = |equivocation_proof| {
			assert_err!(
				Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(
					Origin::none(),
					equivocation_proof,
					key_owner_proof.clone(),
				),
				Error::<Test>::InvalidEquivocationProof,
			)
		};

		// both headers have the same hash, no equivocation.
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);
		equivocation_proof.second_header = equivocation_proof.first_header.clone();
		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof);

		// missing preruntime digest from one header
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);
		equivocation_proof.first_header.digest_mut().logs.remove(0);
		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof);

		// missing seal from one header
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);
		equivocation_proof.first_header.digest_mut().logs.remove(1);
		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof);

		// invalid slot number in proof compared to runtime digest
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);
		equivocation_proof.slot = Slot::from(0);
		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof.clone());

		// different slot numbers in headers
		let h1 = equivocation_proof.first_header;
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get() + 1,
		);

		// use the header from the previous equivocation generated
		// at the previous slot
		equivocation_proof.first_header = h1.clone();

		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof.clone());

		// invalid seal signature
		let mut equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get() + 1,
		);

		// replace the seal digest with the digest from the
		// previous header at the previous slot
		equivocation_proof.first_header.digest_mut().pop();
		equivocation_proof
			.first_header
			.digest_mut()
			.push(h1.digest().logs().last().unwrap().clone());

		assert_invalid_equivocation(equivocation_proof.clone());
	})
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_validate_unsigned_prevents_duplicates() {
	use tp_runtime::transaction_validity::{
		InvalidTransaction, TransactionLongevity, TransactionPriority, TransactionSource,
		TransactionValidity, ValidTransaction,
	};

	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let authorities = Babe::authorities();

		// generate and report an equivocation for the validator at index 0
		let offending_validator_index = 0;
		let offending_authority_pair = pairs
			.into_iter()
			.find(|p| p.public() == authorities[offending_validator_index].0)
			.unwrap();

		let equivocation_proof = generate_equivocation_proof(
			offending_validator_index as u32,
			&offending_authority_pair,
			CurrentSlot::get(),
		);

		let key = (
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		);
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove(key).unwrap();

		let inner =
			Call::report_equivocation_unsigned(equivocation_proof.clone(), key_owner_proof.clone());

		// only local/inblock reports are allowed
		assert_eq!(
			<Babe as tp_runtime::traits::ValidateUnsigned>::validate_unsigned(
				TransactionSource::External,
				&inner,
			),
			InvalidTransaction::Call.into(),
		);

		// the transaction is valid when passed as local
		let tx_tag = (offending_authority_pair.public(), CurrentSlot::get());
		assert_eq!(
			<Babe as tp_runtime::traits::ValidateUnsigned>::validate_unsigned(
				TransactionSource::Local,
				&inner,
			),
			TransactionValidity::Ok(ValidTransaction {
				priority: TransactionPriority::max_value(),
				requires: vec![],
				provides: vec![("BabeEquivocation", tx_tag).encode()],
				longevity: TransactionLongevity::max_value(),
				propagate: false,
			})
		);

		// the pre dispatch checks should also pass
		assert_ok!(<Babe as tp_runtime::traits::ValidateUnsigned>::pre_dispatch(&inner));

		// we submit the report
		Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(Origin::none(), equivocation_proof, key_owner_proof)
			.unwrap();

		// the report should now be considered stale and the transaction is invalid
		assert_err!(
			<Babe as tp_runtime::traits::ValidateUnsigned>::pre_dispatch(&inner),
			InvalidTransaction::Stale,
		);
	});
}

#[test]
fn report_equivocation_has_valid_weight() {
	// the weight depends on the size of the validator set,
	// but there's a lower bound of 100 validators.
	assert!(
		(1..=100)
			.map(<Test as Config>::WeightInfo::report_equivocation)
			.collect::<Vec<_>>()
			.windows(2)
			.all(|w| w[0] == w[1])
	);

	// after 100 validators the weight should keep increasing
	// with every extra validator.
	assert!(
		(100..=1000)
			.map(<Test as Config>::WeightInfo::report_equivocation)
			.collect::<Vec<_>>()
			.windows(2)
			.all(|w| w[0] < w[1])
	);
}

#[test]
fn valid_equivocation_reports_dont_pay_fees() {
	let (pairs, mut ext) = new_test_ext_with_pairs(3);

	ext.execute_with(|| {
		start_era(1);

		let offending_authority_pair = &pairs[0];

		// generate an equivocation proof.
		let equivocation_proof =
			generate_equivocation_proof(0, &offending_authority_pair, CurrentSlot::get());

		// create the key ownership proof.
		let key_owner_proof = Historical::prove((
			tp_consensus_babe::KEY_TYPE,
			&offending_authority_pair.public(),
		))
		.unwrap();

		// check the dispatch info for the call.
		let info = Call::<Test>::report_equivocation_unsigned(
			equivocation_proof.clone(),
			key_owner_proof.clone(),
		)
		.get_dispatch_info();

		// it should have non-zero weight and the fee has to be paid.
		assert!(info.weight > 0);
		assert_eq!(info.pays_fee, Pays::Yes);

		// report the equivocation.
		let post_info = Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(
			Origin::none(),
			equivocation_proof.clone(),
			key_owner_proof.clone(),
		)
		.unwrap();

		// the original weight should be kept, but given that the report
		// is valid the fee is waived.
		assert!(post_info.actual_weight.is_none());
		assert_eq!(post_info.pays_fee, Pays::No);

		// report the equivocation again which is invalid now since it is
		// duplicate.
		let post_info =
			Babe::report_equivocation_unsigned(Origin::none(), equivocation_proof, key_owner_proof)
				.err()
				.unwrap()
				.post_info;

		// the fee is not waived and the original weight is kept.
		assert!(post_info.actual_weight.is_none());
		assert_eq!(post_info.pays_fee, Pays::Yes);
	})
}