netget-tool 0.3.4

//! A bound on the largest MySQL packet a stranger can make this server buffer.
//!
//! # The defect
//!
//! `opensrv-mysql` 0.7.0 has no maximum-packet check anywhere. Its `PacketReader::next_async`
//! grows `self.bytes` by `max(1 MiB, len * 2)` until a whole *logical* packet has been
//! buffered, and `packet()` assembles that logical packet with
//! `nom::multi::fold_many0(fullpacket, …)` — an unbounded fold over 16 MiB continuation
//! packets, each of which extends a `Vec`. So the peer decides how much this process
//! allocates, and it decides before authentication and before any model call: the very first
//! thing a client sends is its handshake response, read through exactly this path.
//!
//! Worse, the server *publishes* a bound. `opensrv-mysql` answers
//! `SELECT @@max_allowed_packet` itself, with `67108864`, without ever consulting the shim —
//! and never compares an incoming packet against it. A published bound that is not enforced is
//! worse than no bound: a client sizes its writes by the number it was given.
//!
//! # The bound
//!
//! [`MAX_PACKET_BYTES`] is that same 67108864, so the number the server publishes and the
//! number it enforces are one number. The refusal is MySQL's own: error **1153
//! `ER_NET_PACKET_TOO_LARGE`**, SQLSTATE `08S01`, which is precisely what a real MySQL server
//! sends when `max_allowed_packet` is exceeded, carrying the message a real server carries.
//!
//! # Where it is enforced
//!
//! Here, in a reader that sits *beneath* `opensrv-mysql` and decides each packet from the
//! length the peer **declared** in its 4-byte header, before that packet's payload is read and
//! therefore before anything is allocated for it. Bounding what has already arrived would be
//! the NATS `HPUB` mistake — there the limit was applied to `total − header`, so `header ==
//! total` passed every check and thirty bytes on the wire bought a 4 GB buffer.
//!
//! For a chained packet the accumulation is what is bounded, not each fragment: a fragment
//! whose declared length is exactly [`FULL_PACKET_PAYLOAD`] means "more follows", so the
//! logical packet's declared size is the running sum, and it is that sum which is compared
//! against the bound at every header.

use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU8, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::task::{Context, Poll};

use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, ReadBuf};

/// Largest logical MySQL packet this server will read, in payload bytes.
///
/// Exactly the value `opensrv-mysql` answers `SELECT @@max_allowed_packet` with, and it is
/// chosen for that reason rather than for being a round number: the point of this bound is
/// that the server stops publishing a ceiling it does not apply. Enforcing anything *smaller*
/// than the published value would leave the same mismatch pointing the other way — a client
/// that sized a write by `@@max_allowed_packet` would be refused at a length the server had
/// told it was acceptable.
pub const MAX_PACKET_BYTES: usize = 67_108_864;

/// Payload length that means "this packet is a fragment; the next one continues it".
///
/// 2^24 − 1, the largest value the 3-byte little-endian length header can carry. A packet
/// declaring exactly this is never the end of a logical packet — that is the protocol's own
/// framing rule, and it is the construct that makes `fold_many0` unbounded.
pub const FULL_PACKET_PAYLOAD: usize = 0x00FF_FFFF;

/// What the limiting reader tells the connection task after it has refused.
///
/// A reader can only return an `io::Error`, and an `io::Error` is indistinguishable from a
/// read timeout or a reset by the time `run_on` has turned it into its own error type. The
/// connection task needs three things to answer in MySQL's vocabulary — that the bound was the
/// reason, the sequence id the refusal must carry, and the size to log — so they are recorded
/// here rather than parsed back out of an error string.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct PacketLimitTrip {
    tripped: AtomicBool,
    /// Sequence id of the header that crossed the bound. The ERR packet answering it must
    /// carry this plus one, or a conforming client discards the reply as out of order.
    sequence: AtomicU8,
    /// Declared size of the logical packet at the moment it crossed, for the log line.
    declared: AtomicUsize,
}

impl PacketLimitTrip {
    /// Whether the bound refused a packet on this connection.
    pub fn tripped(&self) -> bool {
        self.tripped.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
    }

    /// Sequence id the refusal must carry: one past the header that crossed the bound.
    pub fn reply_sequence(&self) -> u8 {
        self.sequence.load(Ordering::SeqCst).wrapping_add(1)
    }

    /// Declared size of the logical packet that crossed the bound.
    pub fn declared_bytes(&self) -> usize {
        self.declared.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
    }

    fn record(&self, sequence: u8, declared: usize) {
        self.sequence.store(sequence, Ordering::SeqCst);
        self.declared.store(declared, Ordering::SeqCst);
        self.tripped.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
    }
}

/// An `AsyncRead` that refuses a MySQL packet larger than its bound, before the payload is read.
///
/// It buffers nothing of its own beyond a four-byte header: bytes are handed straight through
/// to the caller and the framing is tracked alongside them. That is what makes it safe to put
/// beneath a crate that does its own buffering — the decision is taken on the header, so the
/// crate underneath never sees the payload it would have allocated for.
pub struct PacketLimitReader<R> {
    inner: R,
    limit: usize,
    trip: Arc<PacketLimitTrip>,
    /// Bytes of the current 4-byte packet header seen so far.
    header: [u8; 4],
    header_len: usize,
    /// Payload bytes still to pass through before the next header begins.
    payload_remaining: usize,
    /// Declared payload bytes accumulated so far for the logical packet being assembled.
    /// Non-zero only while a chain of [`FULL_PACKET_PAYLOAD`] fragments is in progress.
    logical_declared: usize,
}

impl<R> PacketLimitReader<R> {
    /// Wrap `inner` with the production bound.
    pub fn new(inner: R, trip: Arc<PacketLimitTrip>) -> Self {
        Self::with_limit(inner, MAX_PACKET_BYTES, trip)
    }

    /// Wrap `inner` with an arbitrary bound.
    ///
    /// Exists so a test can drive the framing decision at a size that fits in a test rather
    /// than having to move 64 MiB to reach the production ceiling. It is **not** a knob:
    /// nothing in `src/` calls this with anything but [`MAX_PACKET_BYTES`], because a bound
    /// decided by configuration is a bound decided by whoever writes the configuration.
    pub fn with_limit(inner: R, limit: usize, trip: Arc<PacketLimitTrip>) -> Self {
        Self {
            inner,
            limit,
            trip,
            header: [0u8; 4],
            header_len: 0,
            payload_remaining: 0,
            logical_declared: 0,
        }
    }

    /// Give the wrapped reader back, framing checks and all state dropped.
    ///
    /// Used for the lingering drain after a refusal: draining through the limiter would trip
    /// it again on the very bytes it is discarding.
    pub fn into_inner(self) -> R {
        self.inner
    }

    /// Track `bytes` through the framing, refusing at the first header that crosses the bound.
    ///
    /// Returns `Err(())` on refusal, having recorded the sequence id and the declared size.
    fn observe(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ()> {
        let mut i = 0usize;
        while i < bytes.len() {
            if self.payload_remaining > 0 {
                let take = self.payload_remaining.min(bytes.len() - i);
                self.payload_remaining -= take;
                i += take;
                continue;
            }

            let need = 4 - self.header_len;
            let take = need.min(bytes.len() - i);
            self.header[self.header_len..self.header_len + take]
                .copy_from_slice(&bytes[i..i + take]);
            self.header_len += take;
            i += take;
            if self.header_len < 4 {
                // A header split across two reads. Nothing is decided until all four bytes
                // are in hand — deciding on a partial length is how a bound comes to be
                // applied to the wrong number.
                break;
            }
            self.header_len = 0;

            let declared =
                u32::from_le_bytes([self.header[0], self.header[1], self.header[2], 0]) as usize;
            let sequence = self.header[3];
            let logical = self.logical_declared.saturating_add(declared);

            if logical > self.limit {
                self.trip.record(sequence, logical);
                return Err(());
            }

            self.payload_remaining = declared;
            // A fragment of exactly FULL_PACKET_PAYLOAD continues into the next packet, so the
            // logical size carries over. Anything shorter ends the logical packet.
            self.logical_declared = if declared == FULL_PACKET_PAYLOAD {
                logical
            } else {
                0
            };
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

impl<R: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for PacketLimitReader<R> {
    fn poll_read(
        self: Pin<&mut Self>,
        cx: &mut Context<'_>,
        buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>,
    ) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
        let this = self.get_mut();
        let before = buf.filled().len();
        match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, buf) {
            Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
                let filled = buf.filled().len();
                if filled > before {
                    // Copied rather than borrowed because `observe` takes `&mut self` while
                    // `buf` borrows from the caller; the slice is one read's worth, never a
                    // packet's worth, so this is bounded by the caller's buffer.
                    let fresh = buf.filled()[before..filled].to_vec();
                    if this.observe(&fresh).is_err() {
                        return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(
                            std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData,
                            "MySQL packet exceeds max_allowed_packet",
                        )));
                    }
                }
                Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
            }
            other => other,
        }
    }
}

/// The ERR packet a peer gets when its packet crosses [`MAX_PACKET_BYTES`].
///
/// Laid out by hand because it is a wire packet, and matching a real MySQL server byte for
/// byte is the whole point: 3-byte little-endian payload length, sequence id, `0xFF` marking
/// an ERR packet, error number 1153 little-endian, the `#` SQL-state marker, the five
/// characters of SQLSTATE `08S01`, and the message text MySQL itself uses. A client that
/// reads only the error number sees 1153; one that classifies by SQLSTATE sees the
/// communication-link-failure class; one that shows the operator a string sees the same
/// sentence it would see from mysqld.
///
/// `sequence` must be one past the header that was refused. MySQL numbers packets within a
/// command, and a reply whose sequence does not follow the request is discarded by a
/// conforming client as "packet out of order" — so getting this wrong turns a clear refusal
/// back into the silence this bound exists to replace.
pub fn packet_too_large_err(sequence: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
    const MESSAGE: &[u8] = b"Got a packet bigger than 'max_allowed_packet' bytes";
    const ER_NET_PACKET_TOO_LARGE: u16 = 1153;

    let mut payload = Vec::with_capacity(9 + MESSAGE.len());
    payload.push(0xFF);
    payload.extend_from_slice(&ER_NET_PACKET_TOO_LARGE.to_le_bytes());
    payload.push(b'#');
    payload.extend_from_slice(b"08S01");
    payload.extend_from_slice(MESSAGE);

    let len = payload.len();
    let mut packet = Vec::with_capacity(4 + len);
    packet.push((len & 0xFF) as u8);
    packet.push(((len >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8);
    packet.push(((len >> 16) & 0xFF) as u8);
    packet.push(sequence);
    packet.extend_from_slice(&payload);
    packet
}