ms-icpr 0.1.2

MS-ICPR / MS-WCCE client for AD CS enrollment with an ESC1 CSR SubjectAltName UPN-injection primitive
Documentation

ms-icpr

Crates.io Docs.rs License: MIT

MS-ICPR (ICertPassage) / MS-WCCE client for AD CS enrollment, in Rust — with a first-class ESC1 primitive: build a PKCS#10 CSR that carries a SubjectAltName{otherName, userPrincipalName} bound to an arbitrary UPN.

Status

0.1.0-dev — pre-alpha, offline skeleton. Network transport wiring is stubbed pending a live-DC iteration. API is unstable; expect breaks before 0.1.0. Part of the icedracon Rust offensive AD ecosystem.

What it does

Submits certificate requests to an Enterprise CA over MS-WCCE / MS-ICPR RPC and, once the network layer is wired, retrieves the issued cert. The offensive path exercised here is ESC1: against a template that sets CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + a client-auth EKU, a low-privileged user requests a certificate carrying UPN=administrator@corp.local and then Kerberos-authenticates as that user via PKINIT.

Consumes ms-crtd::CertTemplate for offline pre-flight, so submitting against an obviously-non-abusable template fails locally before any RPC round-trip.

Usage

use ms_icpr::{build_csr_with_upn_san, IcprClient};

// The ESC1 primitive: subject CN + UPN otherName in one CSR
let csr = build_csr_with_upn_san(
    "recon",
    "administrator@corp.local",
    &std::fs::read("./key.pem")?,
)?;

// Offline pre-flight (schema >= 1, no RA sigs, DER-well-formed);
// StubTransport returns Error::LiveDcOnly today.
let mut client = IcprClient::stub("corp-CA");
match client.submit_request(&template, &csr) {
    Ok(cert) => std::fs::write("./issued.pem", &cert.pem)?,
    Err(e)   => eprintln!("submit failed (expected offline): {e}"),
}
# Ok::<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>>(())

What works / what does not (this version)

  • Working:
    • build_csr_with_upn_san(subject, upn, key_pem) -> Vec<u8> — valid PKCS#10 CSR, SHA256-RSA signed, carrying SubjectAltName{otherName(UPN)}. Deterministic, offline, round-trip-tested with x509-cert.
    • parse_rsa_private_key_pem — accepts both PKCS#8 and PKCS#1 PEM.
    • IcprClient::submit_request — offline pre-flight (schema_version >= 1, min_ra_signatures <= 0, CSR is DER SEQUENCE) then dispatches through an IcprTransport trait — bring your own for testing.
  • Stubbed / deferred:
    • NDR marshalling of CertServerRequest [in]/[out] parameters — needs live-DC iteration for pointee ordering
    • SMB \PIPE\cert and DCOM ncacn_ip_tcp sealed-bind wiring
    • Certificate-response parsing (CERTTRANSBLOB -> PEM)
    • Only single-RDN subjects (CN=<subject>), only RSA keys, exactly one otherName per SAN — mechanical extensions

Related icedracon crates

Part of a 4-crate ADCS attack chain — template parsing all the way to a live PKINIT-derived TGT:

  • ms-crtd — parse pKICertificateTemplate LDAP attrs, emit ESC findings
  • ms-icpr (this crate) — submit ESC1 CSRs to the CA over MS-ICPR / MS-WCCE
  • ms-pkca — PKINIT the issued cert into a Kerberos TGT + UnPAC-the-hash
  • ms-kile-fast — RFC 6113 FAST armor for the AS-REQ / TGS-REQ

Together they aim for [popular ADCS clients](https://github.com/ly4k/popular ADCS clients) parity in pure Rust with an S-tier dep tree.

Dependencies

Deliberately narrow: rsa, sha2, x509-cert (structural round-trip only), thiserror, plus the workspace crates dcerpc, ms-ndr, ms-crtd. Zero serde_json, zero macro-heavy frameworks. The DER encoder is hand-rolled (~200 LOC) — same posture as hashglass.

The network feature (on by default) pulls dcerpc, smb2-client, and tokio. Disable for pure offline builds that only need the CSR builder and wire-format encoder.

License

MIT (C) 2026 zevs