mod-rand 0.9.5

//! # Tier 3 — OS-backed cryptographic random
//!
//! Random values pulled directly from the operating system's secure
//! random source. Suitable for tokens, API keys, password salts,
//! session IDs, nonces — anything an attacker would benefit from
//! predicting.
//!
//! ## Source per platform
//!
//! | Platform | Source                                      |
//! |----------|---------------------------------------------|
//! | Linux    | `getrandom(2)` syscall (via libc symbol)    |
//! | macOS    | `getentropy(3)` from libSystem              |
//! | Windows  | `BCryptGenRandom` from `bcrypt.dll`         |
//! | Other Unix | `/dev/urandom` read                       |
//!
//! On Linux, if `getrandom` is unavailable (kernel older than 3.17,
//! which is older than every supported Rust target), the
//! implementation falls back to reading `/dev/urandom`. **`/dev/urandom`
//! is a fully-supported cryptographic source on all listed platforms
//! — the fallback is not a security downgrade.** It is never used as
//! a fallback from a *failed* syscall, only from an *unavailable* one.
//!
//! On every platform, if the OS RNG cannot service the request, the
//! call returns `io::Error`. This module will **never** fall back to
//! a non-cryptographic source.
//!
//! ## Failure modes
//!
//! - On sandboxed processes (Linux seccomp, macOS sandbox) where the
//!   syscall is filtered, you receive `io::Error`.
//! - On Linux at very early boot before the entropy pool has been
//!   seeded, `getrandom` blocks (does not fail). This is the desired
//!   behaviour — predictable boot-time random is the classic
//!   real-world weakness this tier prevents.
//! - On Windows, BCryptGenRandom failures surface the NTSTATUS code
//!   in the returned `io::Error`.
//!
//! ## Thread safety
//!
//! All functions in this module are thread-safe. The underlying
//! syscalls (`getrandom`, `getentropy`, `BCryptGenRandom`) are
//! documented thread-safe by their respective platforms, and the
//! Rust-side wrappers hold no shared mutable state.
//!
//! ## Performance
//!
//! One syscall worth of overhead per call (typically 100–500ns).
//! Amortize by reading 32 or 64 bytes at a time for token generation
//! rather than one byte at a time.

use core::ops::{Range, RangeInclusive};
use std::io;

mod sys {
    //! Platform-specific entropy primitives.
    //!
    //! Each platform module exposes a single `fill(buf)` function that
    //! either fills the buffer completely or returns `io::Error`.

    use std::io;

    /// Fill `buf` with cryptographically secure random bytes.
    ///
    /// Dispatches to the platform-specific implementation.
    pub fn fill(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
        platform::fill(buf)
    }

    #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
    mod platform {
        use std::io;
        use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU8, Ordering};

        // getrandom(2) — present in glibc >= 2.25 and musl >= 1.1.20.
        // The symbol is resolved at link time; on systems lacking it
        // we'd fail to link, but every supported Rust target ships a
        // libc new enough to provide it.
        //
        // EINTR retry is required because getrandom can be interrupted
        // by signal delivery when buflen > 256.
        extern "C" {
            fn getrandom(buf: *mut u8, buflen: usize, flags: u32) -> isize;
            fn __errno_location() -> *mut i32;
        }

        const EINTR: i32 = 4;
        const ENOSYS: i32 = 38;

        // 0 = unknown, 1 = available, 2 = unavailable (use /dev/urandom).
        static STATE: AtomicU8 = AtomicU8::new(0);

        fn errno() -> i32 {
            // SAFETY: __errno_location returns a valid pointer into
            // thread-local storage in every supported libc. The
            // pointer remains valid for the lifetime of the thread.
            unsafe { *__errno_location() }
        }

        pub fn fill(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            if STATE.load(Ordering::Relaxed) == 2 {
                return urandom_fallback(buf);
            }

            let mut pos = 0;
            while pos < buf.len() {
                // SAFETY: buf is a valid &mut [u8]; the pointer and
                // length describe the unfilled tail. flags = 0 selects
                // blocking, /dev/urandom-style behaviour.
                let r = unsafe { getrandom(buf.as_mut_ptr().add(pos), buf.len() - pos, 0) };
                if r > 0 {
                    pos += r as usize;
                    continue;
                }
                let e = errno();
                if e == EINTR {
                    continue;
                }
                if e == ENOSYS {
                    STATE.store(2, Ordering::Relaxed);
                    // Re-attempt the whole fill via /dev/urandom from
                    // the start of the unfilled region.
                    return urandom_fallback(&mut buf[pos..]);
                }
                return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(e));
            }
            STATE.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
            Ok(())
        }

        fn urandom_fallback(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            use std::fs::File;
            use std::io::Read;
            let mut f = File::open("/dev/urandom")?;
            f.read_exact(buf)
        }
    }

    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    mod platform {
        use std::io;

        // getentropy(3) — present in macOS 10.12+ via libSystem.
        // Capped at 256 bytes per call.
        extern "C" {
            fn getentropy(buf: *mut u8, buflen: usize) -> i32;
            fn __error() -> *mut i32;
        }

        const EINTR: i32 = 4;
        const MAX_PER_CALL: usize = 256;

        fn errno() -> i32 {
            // SAFETY: __error returns a pointer into thread-local
            // storage; valid for the thread's lifetime.
            unsafe { *__error() }
        }

        pub fn fill(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            for chunk in buf.chunks_mut(MAX_PER_CALL) {
                loop {
                    // SAFETY: chunk is a valid &mut [u8] of length
                    // <= MAX_PER_CALL, satisfying getentropy's
                    // contract.
                    let r = unsafe { getentropy(chunk.as_mut_ptr(), chunk.len()) };
                    if r == 0 {
                        break;
                    }
                    let e = errno();
                    if e == EINTR {
                        continue;
                    }
                    return Err(io::Error::from_raw_os_error(e));
                }
            }
            Ok(())
        }
    }

    #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
    mod platform {
        use std::io;

        // BCryptGenRandom from bcrypt.dll. With a NULL algorithm
        // handle plus BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG, the call uses
        // the system's preferred CSPRNG without any caller setup. The
        // call is documented thread-safe and reentrant.
        //
        // BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG is the only flag that
        // permits a NULL algorithm handle. Available since
        // Windows Vista / Server 2008.
        #[link(name = "bcrypt")]
        extern "system" {
            fn BCryptGenRandom(
                hAlgorithm: *mut core::ffi::c_void,
                pbBuffer: *mut u8,
                cbBuffer: u32,
                dwFlags: u32,
            ) -> i32;
        }

        const BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG: u32 = 0x0000_0002;
        // STATUS_SUCCESS — every other NTSTATUS is an error in this API.
        const STATUS_SUCCESS: i32 = 0;

        pub fn fill(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            // cbBuffer is u32; if `buf` somehow exceeds u32::MAX, chunk it.
            // In practice no caller approaches this limit; we handle it
            // for safety rather than out of expected need.
            for chunk in buf.chunks_mut(u32::MAX as usize) {
                // SAFETY: chunk is a valid &mut [u8]; cbBuffer fits in
                // u32 by construction.
                let status = unsafe {
                    BCryptGenRandom(
                        core::ptr::null_mut(),
                        chunk.as_mut_ptr(),
                        chunk.len() as u32,
                        BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG,
                    )
                };
                if status != STATUS_SUCCESS {
                    return Err(io::Error::other(format!(
                        "BCryptGenRandom failed: NTSTATUS 0x{:08X}",
                        status as u32
                    )));
                }
            }
            Ok(())
        }
    }

    // Other Unix-like targets (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, illumos,
    // etc.): /dev/urandom is universally available and is a
    // cryptographic source on every one of these. Not a "fallback"
    // from a stronger primitive — it IS the platform primitive here.
    #[cfg(all(unix, not(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "macos"))))]
    mod platform {
        use std::fs::File;
        use std::io::{self, Read};

        pub fn fill(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            let mut f = File::open("/dev/urandom")?;
            f.read_exact(buf)
        }
    }

    #[cfg(not(any(unix, target_os = "windows")))]
    mod platform {
        use std::io;

        pub fn fill(_buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
            Err(io::Error::new(
                io::ErrorKind::Unsupported,
                "mod-rand tier3 has no entropy source on this platform",
            ))
        }
    }
}

/// Fill the given buffer with cryptographically secure random bytes.
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` only if the entire buffer was filled from the
/// platform's secure random source. Returns `io::Error` if the OS
/// random source is unavailable (sandbox, seccomp filter, missing
/// device) — never falls back to a weaker source.
///
/// An empty buffer succeeds without making any syscall.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
/// tier3::fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();
/// ```
pub fn fill_bytes(buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<()> {
    if buf.is_empty() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    sys::fill(buf)
}

/// Return a cryptographically secure random `u64`.
///
/// Convenience wrapper around [`fill_bytes`]. Uses little-endian byte
/// order; consumers should not rely on this — for randomness, byte
/// order is immaterial.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let n: u64 = tier3::random_u64().unwrap();
/// # let _ = n;
/// ```
pub fn random_u64() -> io::Result<u64> {
    let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
    fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
    Ok(u64::from_le_bytes(buf))
}

/// Return a cryptographically secure random `u32`.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let n: u32 = tier3::random_u32().unwrap();
/// # let _ = n;
/// ```
pub fn random_u32() -> io::Result<u32> {
    let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
    fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
    Ok(u32::from_le_bytes(buf))
}

/// Return a `Vec<u8>` of cryptographically secure random bytes.
///
/// Convenience for callers who don't already have a buffer.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let bytes = tier3::random_bytes(32).unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(bytes.len(), 32);
/// ```
pub fn random_bytes(len: usize) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut v = vec![0u8; len];
    fill_bytes(&mut v)?;
    Ok(v)
}

/// Return a hex-encoded cryptographically secure random token.
///
/// `bytes` is the number of raw random bytes drawn; the resulting
/// string is exactly `bytes * 2` lowercase hex characters long.
///
/// Common sizes:
/// - 16 bytes (32 hex chars) — session tokens
/// - 32 bytes (64 hex chars) — API keys, password reset tokens
/// - 64 bytes (128 hex chars) — long-lived secrets
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let token = tier3::random_hex(16).unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(token.len(), 32);
/// assert!(token.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
/// ```
pub fn random_hex(bytes: usize) -> io::Result<String> {
    const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
    let mut buf = vec![0u8; bytes];
    fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes * 2);
    for b in buf {
        out.push(HEX[(b >> 4) as usize] as char);
        out.push(HEX[(b & 0xF) as usize] as char);
    }
    Ok(out)
}

/// Return a Crockford base32-encoded cryptographically secure random
/// token of exactly `chars` characters.
///
/// Each character contributes 5 bits of entropy; the function draws
/// `ceil(chars * 5 / 8)` random bytes and encodes them. Suitable for
/// case-insensitive secrets and filesystem-safe identifiers.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let s = tier3::random_base32(24).unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(s.len(), 24);
/// ```
pub fn random_base32(chars: usize) -> io::Result<String> {
    const ALPHABET: &[u8; 32] = b"0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ";
    let byte_count = (chars * 5).div_ceil(8);
    let mut buf = vec![0u8; byte_count.max(1)];
    fill_bytes(&mut buf)?;
    let mut out = String::with_capacity(chars);
    let mut acc: u64 = 0;
    let mut bits: u32 = 0;
    let mut idx = 0;
    while out.len() < chars {
        if bits < 5 {
            acc |= (buf[idx] as u64) << bits;
            bits += 8;
            idx += 1;
            if idx == buf.len() && bits < 5 && out.len() < chars {
                // Should not happen with our byte_count math; guard
                // defensively rather than panic.
                let mut extra = [0u8; 8];
                fill_bytes(&mut extra)?;
                for &b in &extra {
                    acc |= (b as u64) << bits;
                    bits += 8;
                    if bits >= 5 + 56 {
                        break;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        out.push(ALPHABET[(acc & 0x1F) as usize] as char);
        acc >>= 5;
        bits -= 5;
    }
    Ok(out)
}

// ------------------------------------------------------------
// Bounded-range API
//
// Every bounded function below pulls a fresh `u64` from the OS CSPRNG
// and reduces it with Lemire's "Nearly Divisionless" rejection
// sampling. The result is uniformly distributed over the requested
// range with no modulo bias.
//
// Each rejected draw is a fresh syscall (or a fresh `/dev/urandom`
// read on the Linux ENOSYS fallback path). The rejection rate is
// approximately `n / 2^64` per draw, so for any range smaller than
// half the u64 space, the expected syscall count per call is
// effectively 1.
//
// Invalid ranges (empty / reversed) return
// `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` rather than panicking,
// matching the rest of the Tier 3 fallible API.
// ------------------------------------------------------------

/// Produce a uniformly-distributed `u64` in `[0, n)`.
///
/// Internal helper. `n` MUST be greater than zero; the public wrappers
/// enforce this. Returns `io::Error` only if the underlying
/// `random_u64()` call fails.
#[inline]
fn bounded_u64(n: u64) -> io::Result<u64> {
    debug_assert!(n != 0, "bounded_u64 requires n > 0");
    let mut x = random_u64()?;
    let mut m: u128 = (x as u128).wrapping_mul(n as u128);
    let mut l: u64 = m as u64;
    if l < n {
        let t: u64 = n.wrapping_neg() % n;
        while l < t {
            x = random_u64()?;
            m = (x as u128).wrapping_mul(n as u128);
            l = m as u64;
        }
    }
    Ok((m >> 64) as u64)
}

/// Helper: build an `InvalidInput` error for empty ranges.
#[inline]
fn empty_range_error(msg: &'static str) -> io::Error {
    io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, msg)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `u64` in
/// the half-open range `[range.start, range.end)`.
///
/// Uses Lemire's "Nearly Divisionless" rejection sampling so the
/// output is genuinely uniform — there is no modulo bias.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty (`range.start >= range.end`).
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let n = tier3::random_range_u64(10..20)?;
/// assert!((10..20).contains(&n));
/// # Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
/// ```
pub fn random_range_u64(range: Range<u64>) -> io::Result<u64> {
    let Range { start, end } = range;
    if start >= end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_u64: empty range"));
    }
    let span = end - start;
    Ok(start + bounded_u64(span)?)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `u64` in
/// the closed range `[range.start(), range.end()]`.
///
/// The full-width inclusive range `0..=u64::MAX` is supported and is
/// equivalent to a raw `random_u64()` call.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty (`*range.start() > *range.end()`).
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let d = tier3::random_range_inclusive_u64(1..=6)?;
/// assert!((1..=6).contains(&d));
/// # Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
/// ```
pub fn random_range_inclusive_u64(range: RangeInclusive<u64>) -> io::Result<u64> {
    let (start, end) = range.into_inner();
    if start > end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_inclusive_u64: empty range"));
    }
    if start == 0 && end == u64::MAX {
        return random_u64();
    }
    let span = end - start + 1;
    Ok(start + bounded_u64(span)?)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `u32` in
/// the half-open range `[range.start, range.end)`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let pct = tier3::random_range_u32(0..100)?;
/// assert!(pct < 100);
/// # Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
/// ```
pub fn random_range_u32(range: Range<u32>) -> io::Result<u32> {
    let Range { start, end } = range;
    if start >= end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_u32: empty range"));
    }
    let span = (end - start) as u64;
    Ok((start as u64 + bounded_u64(span)?) as u32)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `u32` in
/// the closed range `[range.start(), range.end()]`.
///
/// The full-width inclusive range `0..=u32::MAX` is supported.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
pub fn random_range_inclusive_u32(range: RangeInclusive<u32>) -> io::Result<u32> {
    let (start, end) = range.into_inner();
    if start > end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_inclusive_u32: empty range"));
    }
    let span = (end as u64) - (start as u64) + 1;
    Ok((start as u64 + bounded_u64(span)?) as u32)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `i64` in
/// the half-open range `[range.start, range.end)`.
///
/// Negative bounds and mixed-sign ranges are supported.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use mod_rand::tier3;
///
/// let n = tier3::random_range_i64(-50..50)?;
/// assert!((-50..50).contains(&n));
/// # Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
/// ```
pub fn random_range_i64(range: Range<i64>) -> io::Result<i64> {
    let Range { start, end } = range;
    if start >= end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_i64: empty range"));
    }
    let span = (end as i128 - start as i128) as u64;
    let offset = bounded_u64(span)?;
    Ok(((start as i128) + (offset as i128)) as i64)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `i64` in
/// the closed range `[range.start(), range.end()]`.
///
/// The full-width inclusive range `i64::MIN..=i64::MAX` is supported
/// and is equivalent to reinterpreting a raw `random_u64()` draw as
/// `i64`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
pub fn random_range_inclusive_i64(range: RangeInclusive<i64>) -> io::Result<i64> {
    let (start, end) = range.into_inner();
    if start > end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_inclusive_i64: empty range"));
    }
    if start == i64::MIN && end == i64::MAX {
        return random_u64().map(|u| u as i64);
    }
    let span = ((end as i128) - (start as i128) + 1) as u64;
    let offset = bounded_u64(span)?;
    Ok(((start as i128) + (offset as i128)) as i64)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `i32` in
/// the half-open range `[range.start, range.end)`.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
pub fn random_range_i32(range: Range<i32>) -> io::Result<i32> {
    let Range { start, end } = range;
    if start >= end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_i32: empty range"));
    }
    let span = (end as i64 - start as i64) as u64;
    let offset = bounded_u64(span)?;
    Ok(((start as i64) + (offset as i64)) as i32)
}

/// Generate a cryptographically-secure uniformly-distributed `i32` in
/// the closed range `[range.start(), range.end()]`.
///
/// The full-width inclusive range `i32::MIN..=i32::MAX` is supported.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// - Returns `io::Error` with `ErrorKind::InvalidInput` if the range
///   is empty.
/// - Returns `io::Error` if the OS CSPRNG is unavailable.
pub fn random_range_inclusive_i32(range: RangeInclusive<i32>) -> io::Result<i32> {
    let (start, end) = range.into_inner();
    if start > end {
        return Err(empty_range_error("random_range_inclusive_i32: empty range"));
    }
    let span = ((end as i64) - (start as i64) + 1) as u64;
    let offset = bounded_u64(span)?;
    Ok(((start as i64) + (offset as i64)) as i32)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::collections::HashSet;

    #[test]
    fn fill_bytes_produces_output() {
        let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
        fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();
        assert!(buf.iter().any(|&b| b != 0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_buffer_succeeds_without_syscall() {
        let mut buf: [u8; 0] = [];
        fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_u64_varies_within_small_sample() {
        let mut seen = HashSet::with_capacity(16);
        for _ in 0..16 {
            seen.insert(random_u64().unwrap());
        }
        assert!(seen.len() > 1, "u64 output appears constant in sample");
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_u32_varies_within_small_sample() {
        let mut seen = HashSet::with_capacity(32);
        for _ in 0..32 {
            seen.insert(random_u32().unwrap());
        }
        assert!(seen.len() > 1, "u32 output appears constant in sample");
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_hex_correct_length_and_alphabet() {
        let h = random_hex(16).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(h.len(), 32);
        assert!(h.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
        assert!(h.chars().all(|c| !c.is_ascii_uppercase()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_hex_zero_length() {
        let h = random_hex(0).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(h, "");
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_base32_correct_length_and_alphabet() {
        const ALPHABET: &[u8; 32] = b"0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ";
        for len in [1, 5, 8, 16, 24, 32, 64] {
            let s = random_base32(len).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(s.len(), len, "length {len}");
            assert!(
                s.bytes().all(|b| ALPHABET.contains(&b)),
                "alphabet violation in {s}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_bytes_is_correct_length() {
        let b = random_bytes(48).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(b.len(), 48);
    }

    #[test]
    fn large_buffer_fill_succeeds() {
        // A buffer larger than macOS's 256-byte getentropy cap and
        // larger than typical syscall short-read thresholds. Verifies
        // the looping/chunking logic on every platform.
        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
        fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();
        // The probability all 4096 bytes are zero is 2^-32768 — any
        // observation of that is a bug.
        assert!(buf.iter().any(|&b| b != 0));
    }

    #[test]
    fn stress_many_small_calls() {
        // 1000 calls of 32 bytes each. Exercises syscall stability.
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let mut buf = [0u8; 32];
            fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn byte_frequency_chi_squared() {
        // 1 048 576 bytes — 256 buckets, expected ~4096 per bucket.
        // Chi-squared critical value (255 d.f., alpha = 0.001) is
        // about 330. We use 500 to keep flake rate negligible.
        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1 << 20];
        fill_bytes(&mut buf).unwrap();

        let mut counts = [0u32; 256];
        for &b in &buf {
            counts[b as usize] += 1;
        }
        let n = buf.len() as f64;
        let expected = n / 256.0;
        let chi: f64 = counts
            .iter()
            .map(|&c| {
                let diff = c as f64 - expected;
                diff * diff / expected
            })
            .sum();
        assert!(chi < 500.0, "byte-frequency chi-squared {chi} too high");
    }

    // ------------------------------------------------------------
    // Bounded-range tests
    // ------------------------------------------------------------

    #[test]
    fn random_range_u64_bounds() {
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let n = random_range_u64(100..200).unwrap();
            assert!((100..200).contains(&n));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_u64_single_value_window() {
        // [start, start+1) — every draw lands on start. No syscalls
        // wasted on rejection in this case (span=1, l=0 is never < n).
        for _ in 0..100 {
            assert_eq!(random_range_u64(7..8).unwrap(), 7);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_u64_die_roll_visits_all_faces() {
        // 1000 cryptographic die rolls — all six faces must appear.
        let mut faces = [0u32; 6];
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let d = random_range_inclusive_u64(1..=6).unwrap();
            assert!((1..=6).contains(&d));
            faces[(d - 1) as usize] += 1;
        }
        for (i, &c) in faces.iter().enumerate() {
            assert!(c > 0, "face {} never appeared in 1000 rolls", i + 1);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_u64_single_value() {
        for _ in 0..100 {
            assert_eq!(random_range_inclusive_u64(42..=42).unwrap(), 42);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_u64_full_width() {
        // 0..=u64::MAX — full-width path. Two draws differ.
        let a = random_range_inclusive_u64(0..=u64::MAX).unwrap();
        let b = random_range_inclusive_u64(0..=u64::MAX).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(a, b);
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_u32_bounds() {
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let n = random_range_u32(0..256).unwrap();
            assert!(n < 256);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_u32_full_width() {
        for _ in 0..100 {
            let _ = random_range_inclusive_u32(0..=u32::MAX).unwrap();
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_i64_negative() {
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let n = random_range_i64(-100..-50).unwrap();
            assert!((-100..-50).contains(&n));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_i64_mixed_sign() {
        let mut saw_neg = false;
        let mut saw_pos = false;
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let n = random_range_i64(-100..100).unwrap();
            assert!((-100..100).contains(&n));
            if n < 0 {
                saw_neg = true;
            }
            if n >= 0 {
                saw_pos = true;
            }
        }
        assert!(saw_neg && saw_pos);
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_i64_full_width() {
        let _ = random_range_inclusive_i64(i64::MIN..=i64::MAX).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_i32_bounds() {
        for _ in 0..1000 {
            let n = random_range_i32(-1000..1000).unwrap();
            assert!((-1000..1000).contains(&n));
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_inclusive_i32_full_width() {
        for _ in 0..100 {
            let _ = random_range_inclusive_i32(i32::MIN..=i32::MAX).unwrap();
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_u64_empty_returns_invalid_input() {
        let err = random_range_u64(10..10).unwrap_err();
        assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(clippy::reversed_empty_ranges)]
    fn random_range_u64_reverse_returns_invalid_input() {
        let err = random_range_u64(10..5).unwrap_err();
        assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(clippy::reversed_empty_ranges)]
    fn random_range_inclusive_u64_reverse_returns_invalid_input() {
        let err = random_range_inclusive_u64(10..=5).unwrap_err();
        assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(clippy::reversed_empty_ranges)]
    fn random_range_i64_reverse_returns_invalid_input() {
        let err = random_range_i64(5..-5).unwrap_err();
        assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
    }

    #[test]
    fn random_range_uniformity_chi_squared() {
        // 50 000 cryptographic draws over 50 buckets. Expected count
        // per bucket: 1000. Chi-squared critical value (49 d.f.,
        // alpha=0.001) is ~85; we use 200 to keep flake rate
        // negligible. This is fewer draws than tier1/tier2 because
        // each draw is a syscall.
        let mut counts = [0u32; 50];
        for _ in 0..50_000 {
            let v = random_range_u32(0..50).unwrap();
            counts[v as usize] += 1;
        }
        let expected = 50_000.0 / 50.0;
        let chi: f64 = counts
            .iter()
            .map(|&c| {
                let diff = c as f64 - expected;
                diff * diff / expected
            })
            .sum();
        assert!(
            chi < 200.0,
            "tier3 chi-squared {chi} too high — bounded-range output is biased"
        );
    }
}