mise 2026.8.15

//! The single place in mise that may elevate privileges.
//!
//! System package managers and declarative system mutations that require
//! root use this. Every elevated command logs its full argv before running,
//! never prompts for a password without a TTY, suspends the progress display
//! while it owns the terminal, and can be disabled entirely with
//! `system_packages.sudo = false`.

use std::io::Write;
use std::process::{Command, Output, Stdio};

use eyre::bail;

use crate::cmd::CmdLineRunner;
use crate::config::Settings;
use crate::result::Result;
use crate::ui::multi_progress_report::{MultiProgressReport, ProgressPauseGuard};

pub(crate) fn is_root() -> bool {
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        nix::unistd::geteuid().is_root()
    }
    #[cfg(not(unix))]
    {
        false
    }
}

/// The argv that [`run`] would execute, including the `sudo` prefix when
/// elevation would be used. For logging and `--dry-run`.
pub(crate) fn argv(program: &str, args: &[String]) -> Vec<String> {
    argv_with_env(program, args, &[])
}

pub(crate) fn argv_with_env(
    program: &str,
    args: &[String],
    envs: &[(String, String)],
) -> Vec<String> {
    let mut argv = vec![];
    if !is_root() && Settings::get().system_packages.sudo {
        argv.push("sudo".to_string());
        // sudo resets the environment by default; pass env vars through
        // `env` so they reach the elevated command
        if !envs.is_empty() {
            argv.push("env".to_string());
            argv.extend(envs.iter().map(|(k, v)| format!("{k}={v}")));
        }
    }
    argv.push(program.to_string());
    argv.extend(args.iter().cloned());
    argv
}

/// Elevation mode for helper subprocesses (e.g. the brew cask shim) that may
/// need sudo themselves. Mirrors [`run`]'s policy without running anything:
/// - `"interactive"`: sudo may prompt on the controlling TTY (also returned
///   when already root — the subprocess won't elevate at euid 0 anyway)
/// - `"noninteractive"`: no TTY; the subprocess must use `sudo -n` so it
///   fails instead of hanging on a password prompt
/// - `"deny"`: elevation is disabled or sudo is unavailable
#[cfg(unix)]
pub(crate) fn subprocess_mode() -> &'static str {
    if is_root() {
        "interactive"
    } else if !Settings::get().system_packages.sudo || crate::file::which("sudo").is_none() {
        "deny"
    } else if console::user_attended_stderr() {
        "interactive"
    } else {
        "noninteractive"
    }
}

/// Suspend the animated progress display for as long as the returned guard is
/// held, because the child about to be spawned owns the terminal.
///
/// Every elevated helper here inherits stdio so that sudo's `Password:` prompt
/// reaches the user. The progress renderer repaints on its own interval,
/// though, so without this it overwrites the prompt on the next frame and the
/// command reads as hung — stdin is connected and typing the password blind
/// works, but nothing on screen says mise is waiting.
///
/// Unconditional, and held for the child's whole lifetime rather than just the
/// prompt. Whether sudo will prompt is not the deciding question: the child has
/// the terminal either way, so its own output would corrupt the display too.
/// This is what `--raw` already achieves by disabling the renderer outright.
/// [`MultiProgressReport::pause_progress`] is reference-counted and already
/// no-ops when no renderer is animating, so there is nothing to pre-filter.
fn pause_progress_for_child() -> Option<ProgressPauseGuard> {
    MultiProgressReport::try_get().map(|report| report.pause_progress())
}

/// Run `program args...`, elevating with sudo when not running as root.
///
/// - root: runs the command directly (containers/CI)
/// - interactive TTY: runs `sudo program args...` with inherited stdio so
///   sudo can prompt for a password
/// - non-interactive: only proceeds if sudo works without a password
///   (`sudo -n`); otherwise errors with the exact command to run manually
/// - `system_packages.sudo = false`: never elevates; errors if not root
pub(crate) fn run(program: &str, args: &[String], envs: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<()> {
    let argv = argv_with_env(program, args, envs);
    // the copy-pasteable fallback must include the env vars the automated
    // path would have set (e.g. DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive)
    let mut manual = vec!["sudo".to_string()];
    if !envs.is_empty() {
        manual.push("env".to_string());
        manual.extend(envs.iter().map(|(k, v)| format!("{k}={v}")));
    }
    manual.push(program.to_string());
    manual.extend(args.iter().cloned());
    let manual_cmd = manual.join(" ");
    ensure_elevation_available(&manual_cmd)?;
    let _progress_pause = pause_progress_for_child();
    info!("$ {}", argv.join(" "));
    let mut cmd = CmdLineRunner::new(&argv[0]);
    for arg in &argv[1..] {
        cmd = cmd.arg(arg);
    }
    for (k, v) in envs {
        cmd = cmd.env(k, v);
    }
    // inherited stdio: sudo password prompts and apt progress go straight to
    // the user's terminal
    cmd.raw(true).execute()
}

/// Run `program args...` elevated, with the child's working directory bound to
/// `dir` via `fchdir` so relative arguments resolve from that exact directory
/// inode.
///
/// Elevation policy is identical to [`run`]. The difference is that callers can
/// pass *relative* names which cannot be redirected: a pathname handed to an
/// elevated recursive operation would be re-resolved by the child, so a
/// same-uid replacement of a component between validation and execution could
/// point it somewhere else. Binding the child's cwd to a descriptor the caller
/// already verified removes that window.
///
/// stdio is inherited so a sudo password prompt still reaches the terminal.
#[cfg(unix)]
pub(crate) fn run_in_dir<Fd: std::os::fd::AsFd>(
    program: &str,
    args: &[String],
    dir: Fd,
) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
    use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;

    use eyre::WrapErr;

    let argv = argv_with_env(program, args, &[]);
    let manual_cmd = std::iter::once("sudo".to_string())
        .chain(std::iter::once(program.to_string()))
        .chain(args.iter().cloned())
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(" ");
    ensure_elevation_available(&manual_cmd)?;
    let _progress_pause = pause_progress_for_child();
    info!("$ {}", argv.join(" "));
    let raw = dir.as_fd().as_raw_fd();
    let mut cmd = Command::new(&argv[0]);
    cmd.args(&argv[1..]);
    // SAFETY: `fchdir` is async-signal-safe and only alters the child's working
    // directory. `raw` stays open in the parent across the spawn, and CLOEXEC
    // (if set) only takes effect at exec, after pre_exec has run.
    unsafe {
        cmd.pre_exec(move || {
            if nix::libc::fchdir(raw) == -1 {
                return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error());
            }
            Ok(())
        });
    }
    let status = cmd
        .status()
        .wrap_err_with(|| format!("failed to run {}", argv.join(" ")))?;
    if !status.success() {
        bail!("{} failed", argv.join(" "));
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Run an elevated command and capture its output.
///
/// Interactive callers authenticate with an inherited `sudo -v` first so a
/// password prompt is never hidden inside captured stderr. Non-interactive
/// callers retain [`ensure_elevation_available`]'s fail-fast `sudo -n` check.
pub(crate) fn output(program: &str, args: &[String], envs: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Output> {
    let argv = argv_with_env(program, args, envs);
    let manual_cmd = std::iter::once("sudo".to_string())
        .chain((!envs.is_empty()).then_some("env".to_string()))
        .chain(envs.iter().map(|(key, value)| format!("{key}={value}")))
        .chain(std::iter::once(program.to_string()))
        .chain(args.iter().cloned())
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(" ");
    ensure_elevation_available(&manual_cmd)?;
    if !is_root() && Settings::get().system_packages.sudo && console::user_attended_stderr() {
        let _progress_pause = pause_progress_for_child();
        CmdLineRunner::new("sudo").arg("-v").raw(true).execute()?;
    }
    info!("$ {}", argv.join(" "));
    Ok(Command::new(&argv[0])
        .args(&argv[1..])
        .envs(envs.iter().map(|(key, value)| (key, value)))
        .output()?)
}

/// Run one elevated helper with its private payload on stdin.
///
/// Unlike [`run`], the payload is never included in argv, logs, or the manual
/// fallback. This is the transport used for typed privileged bootstrap plans.
pub(crate) fn run_with_input(program: &str, args: &[String], input: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
    let argv = argv(program, args);
    let manual_cmd = std::iter::once("sudo".to_string())
        .chain(std::iter::once(program.to_string()))
        .chain(args.iter().cloned())
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(" ");
    ensure_elevation_available(&manual_cmd)?;
    let _progress_pause = pause_progress_for_child();
    info!("$ {}", argv.join(" "));
    let mut child = Command::new(&argv[0])
        .args(&argv[1..])
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::inherit())
        .stderr(Stdio::inherit())
        .spawn()?;
    child
        .stdin
        .take()
        .expect("piped stdin is available")
        .write_all(input)?;
    let status = child.wait()?;
    if !status.success() {
        bail!("elevated bootstrap helper failed with {status}");
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Run one elevated helper with a private stdin payload and capture stdout.
/// Stderr remains attached to the terminal for sudo prompts and diagnostics.
pub(crate) fn run_with_input_output(
    program: &str,
    args: &[String],
    input: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let argv = argv(program, args);
    let manual_cmd = std::iter::once("sudo".to_string())
        .chain(std::iter::once(program.to_string()))
        .chain(args.iter().cloned())
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(" ");
    ensure_elevation_available(&manual_cmd)?;
    let _progress_pause = pause_progress_for_child();
    info!("$ {}", argv.join(" "));
    let mut child = Command::new(&argv[0])
        .args(&argv[1..])
        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
        .stdout(Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(Stdio::inherit())
        .spawn()?;
    child
        .stdin
        .take()
        .expect("piped stdin is available")
        .write_all(input)?;
    let output = child.wait_with_output()?;
    if !output.status.success() {
        bail!("elevated bootstrap helper failed with {}", output.status);
    }
    Ok(output.stdout)
}

fn ensure_elevation_available(manual_cmd: &str) -> Result<()> {
    if is_root() {
        return Ok(());
    }
    if !Settings::get().system_packages.sudo {
        bail!(
            "not running as root and system_packages.sudo is disabled. Run manually:\n  {manual_cmd}"
        );
    }
    if crate::file::which("sudo").is_none() {
        bail!(
            "sudo not found. Run as root:\n  {}",
            manual_cmd.trim_start_matches("sudo ")
        );
    }
    if !console::user_attended_stderr() {
        let ok = Command::new("sudo")
            .args(["-n", "true"])
            .stdin(Stdio::null())
            .stdout(Stdio::null())
            .stderr(Stdio::null())
            .status()
            .map(|status| status.success())
            .unwrap_or(false);
        if !ok {
            bail!(
                "sudo requires a password but no TTY is available. Run manually:\n  {manual_cmd}"
            );
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// Each elevated helper binds the guard for the rest of its body, so the
    /// renderer stays suspended until the child exits rather than only while
    /// the guard is constructed. Nested acquisitions — a `with_sudo_fallback`
    /// retry inside a flight step — must not resume it early either.
    #[test]
    fn pause_progress_for_child_suspends_until_every_guard_drops() {
        let report = MultiProgressReport::get();
        let baseline = report.progress_suspension_depth();

        let outer = pause_progress_for_child();
        assert!(outer.is_some(), "a live report must hand back a guard");
        assert_eq!(report.progress_suspension_depth(), baseline + 1);

        let inner = pause_progress_for_child();
        assert_eq!(report.progress_suspension_depth(), baseline + 2);

        drop(inner);
        assert_eq!(
            report.progress_suspension_depth(),
            baseline + 1,
            "the outer child still owns the terminal"
        );

        drop(outer);
        assert_eq!(report.progress_suspension_depth(), baseline);
    }
}