mid-verify 0.2.1

mID JWT verifier — RP-side. Runs the four-step verification (genesis self-sig → roster chain → head VM → JWS signature) entirely locally per ADR 0005 Decision 1. Zero runtime calls to MATA infrastructure. Phase 0 of the mID Mission.
Documentation

mid-verify

RP-side mID verifier. Start here if you are adding "Sign in with MATA" to your backend.

Takes a JWS compact-form mID token plus your local policy (VerifyConfig) and runs the four-step verification entirely locally — pure Rust, no I/O, no clock reads, and zero runtime calls to MATA infrastructure under any code path. The token carries everything needed to verify it: the DID is the genesis public key.

Implements ADR 0005 Decision 1. Licensed MIT OR Apache-2.0.

Building a website sign-in? You probably want mid-signin — the drop-in kit that wraps this verifier with the stateful RP duties (single-use nonces, genesis anchoring, rollback detection) plus ready-made axum routes. This crate is the cryptographic core it composes.

[dependencies]

mid-verify = "0.1"

Verifying a sign-in

use mid_verify::{verify_mid_response, VerifyConfig};

let config = VerifyConfig {
    expected_audience: "https://acme.com".into(), // your rpOrigin, exactly
    expected_nonce: nonce_you_issued,             // echoed in the token
    max_iat_skew_secs: 120,
    now_unix_secs: now(),                         // you supply the clock
};

let verified = verify_mid_response(&jwt, &config)?;
// verified.did                  — the user's stable identifier
// verified.claims               — disclosed claims (all self-attested in v1)
// verified.current_version      — head roster version (persist for rollback checks)
// verified.genesis_roster_hash  — persist on first sight; must never change

The four checks

  1. Genesis self-signature — decode the genesis public key from the DID string itself and verify the embedded genesis roster's self-signature against it. No registry, no resolver.
  2. Roster chain — every roster mutation is signed by a key present in the prior roster; versions strictly increase. Proves the current roster legitimately descends from genesis.
  3. Head-roster membership — the device key that signed this token is in the current roster (revoked devices fail here).
  4. JWS signature — standard ES256 verification of the token against that device key, plus audience, nonce, iat skew, and expiry checks.

What stays your job (or mid-signin's)

This function is stateless on purpose. Cross-sign-in defenses need your storage:

  • Single-use nonces — equality is checked here; issuance + one-time consumption is yours.
  • Anchor on first sight — record (did, genesis_roster_hash); reject any future sign-in whose genesis differs.
  • Rollback detection — record the highest current_version seen per DID and call VerifiedMid::check_rollback(last_seen) (or compare yourself); a lower version is a stolen device presenting a pre-revocation roster.

Errors

VerifyError is a 16-variant enum with structured fields (AudienceMismatch, NonceMismatch, Expired, ChainVersionNotMonotonic, RollbackDetected { current, last_seen }, …) — match on it; don't parse messages.

Who calls it

  • Any relying party backend, directly or through mid-signin.
  • mata-sign — reuses the same four checks for document/post signatures.
  • The @matanetwork/sovereign-id-verify npm package wraps this crate for Node/Deno/Bun backends.