metamorphic-crypto
Zero-knowledge end-to-end encryption library with post-quantum hybrid KEM.
Built for Metamorphic and Mosslet — privacy-first apps by Moss Piglet Corporation where all user data is encrypted client-side and the server only stores opaque ciphertext.
What this provides
- Secretbox (XSalsa20-Poly1305) — symmetric authenticated encryption
- Sealed box (X25519) — anonymous public-key encryption (libsodium-compatible)
- Hybrid PQ KEM (ML-KEM-768 + X25519) — NIST Cat-3 post-quantum key encapsulation (default)
- Hybrid PQ KEM (ML-KEM-1024 + X25519) — NIST Cat-5 post-quantum key encapsulation (opt-in)
- Argon2id KDF — password-based key derivation (libsodium INTERACTIVE parameters)
- Hashing (SHA3-512/256, SHA-256/512) — public, one-shot digest functions (e.g. for key fingerprints / safety numbers)
- WASM bindings — browser-ready via
wasm-pack - Recovery keys — human-readable base32 encoding for key backup
Security levels
| Level | ML-KEM | NIST Category | Equivalent | Version Tag | Default |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cat-3 | 768 | 3 | ~AES-192 | 0x02 |
Yes |
| Cat-5 | 1024 | 5 | ~AES-256 | 0x03 |
No |
Both levels use the same combiner construction and X25519 classical fallback. hybrid_open auto-detects the level from the version tag byte — old and new ciphertext coexist seamlessly.
Security properties
#![forbid(unsafe_code)]— no unsafe anywhere in the crate- All secret key material zeroized after use
- Constant-time MAC comparison via RustCrypto
- OS CSPRNG via
getrandom(no userspace PRNG) - Hybrid construction: both ML-KEM AND X25519 must be broken to compromise a sealed key
Hybrid KEM construction
The hybrid combiner matches the format used by @noble/post-quantum's ml_kem768_x25519:
Seed expansion: SHAKE256(seed_32) → 96 bytes [ML-KEM seed (64) || X25519 sk (32)]
Combiner: SHA3-256(ss_mlkem || ss_x25519 || ct_x25519 || pk_x25519 || label)
Cat-3 (ML-KEM-768, default)
Public key: ML-KEM-768 ek (1184 B) || X25519 pk (32 B) = 1216 bytes
Ciphertext: 0x02 || ML-KEM-768 ct (1088 B) || X25519 eph pk (32 B) || nonce (24 B) || secretbox ct
Cat-5 (ML-KEM-1024, opt-in)
Public key: ML-KEM-1024 ek (1568 B) || X25519 pk (32 B) = 1600 bytes
Ciphertext: 0x03 || ML-KEM-1024 ct (1568 B) || X25519 eph pk (32 B) || nonce (24 B) || secretbox ct
Targets
| Target | Build | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| Native | cargo build |
Tests, CLI tools, Elixir NIF (metamorphic_crypto Hex package) |
| WASM | wasm-pack build --target web |
Browser (Phoenix LiveView, any SPA) |
| iOS | UniFFI (planned) | Native Swift apps |
| Android | UniFFI (planned) | Native Kotlin apps |
Usage
use ;
use ;
use ;
// Symmetric encryption
let key = generate_key;
let ciphertext = encrypt_secretbox_string.unwrap;
let plaintext = decrypt_secretbox_to_string.unwrap;
assert_eq!;
// Hybrid PQ seal (Cat-3, default)
let kp = generate_hybrid_keypair;
let sealed = hybrid_seal.unwrap;
let opened = hybrid_open.unwrap;
// Hybrid PQ seal (Cat-5)
let kp5 = generate_hybrid_keypair_1024;
let sealed5 = hybrid_seal_1024.unwrap;
let opened5 = hybrid_open.unwrap; // auto-detects level
Hashing
Public, one-shot digest functions over the already-present, audited sha3 and
sha2 dependencies. These are intended for public data only — key
fingerprints / safety numbers and key-transparency-log entries — where both the
input (e.g. a public key) and the output digest are meant to be public.
sha3_512 is the recommended default (NIST Cat-5, ~256-bit collision
resistance, consistent with the crate's Keccak-based combiner). sha3_256,
sha256, and sha512 are provided so integrators can match an existing format.
use ;
// Take raw bytes, return fixed-size byte arrays.
let digest: = sha3_512; // recommended default
let d256: = sha3_256;
let s256: = sha256; // SHA-2 interop
let s512: = sha512; // SHA-2 interop
// Encode the digest yourself when needed:
use b64;
let fingerprint_b64 = encode;
Domain separation (recommended for fingerprints / transparency logs)
For key fingerprints, safety numbers, and key-transparency-log entries, prefer
sha3_512_with_context, which binds the digest to a versioned context label so
the same bytes hashed for different purposes can never collide or be
reinterpreted across contexts. It is exactly as strong as sha3_512 — it is
SHA3-512, over an unambiguously framed message — and makes intent explicit:
use sha3_512_with_context;
let fp = sha3_512_with_context;
let log = sha3_512_with_context;
// fp and log are unrelated even if the byte inputs coincide.
Stable wire format (reproduce exactly for cross-language parity):
SHA3-512( u64_be(len(context_utf8)) || context_utf8 || data )
The 8-byte big-endian length prefix makes the (context, data) boundary
unambiguous (no boundary-confusion collisions). Use a versioned namespace label.
Encoding: the native functions take &[u8] and return raw byte arrays — encode
to base64 or hex at the call site. The WASM bindings take/return base64 to match
the rest of the WASM API (see below).
Do not hash secrets with these. A bare hash makes no guarantees about its
inputs, and (consistent with the rest of the crate) the hashing path adds no
zeroize/constant-time ceremony — wiping a transient copy of already-public data
would add cost without protection. If you need to process secret material
(passwords, private keys), use the right construction instead — this crate's
Argon2id derive_session_key for password-based derivation, or a dedicated
KDF/MAC. The encryption APIs that handle secrets already zeroize on drop.
WASM (browser)
import init from './pkg/metamorphic_crypto.js';
await ;
const key = ;
const ciphertext = ;
Hashing (WASM)
Digest exports take base64-encoded input and return the digest as base64. Decode or re-encode to hex on the JS side if a hex fingerprint is required.
import init from './pkg/metamorphic_crypto.js';
await ;
const dataB64 = ;
const digestB64 = ; // also: sha3_256, sha256, sha512
// Domain-separated (recommended for fingerprints / transparency logs):
const fp = ;
Tests
License
Dual-licensed under MIT or Apache-2.0 at your option.