mecha-core 0.1.16

//! Tools: the things an agent can actually do.
//!
//! A tool is a name, a description, a JSON Schema, and an async function. The
//! registry holds them; MCP servers and native Rust functions both land here as
//! the same trait object, so the agent loop never learns the difference.

pub mod ask;
pub mod builtin;
pub mod recall;
pub mod skill;
pub mod todo;

use crate::config::{PermissionMode, SecurityConfig, ToolsConfig};
use crate::message::ToolSpec;
use anyhow::Result;
use async_trait::async_trait;
use serde_json::Value;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;

#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ToolOutput {
    pub content: String,
    /// Returned to the model as `is_error: true` so it can recover rather than
    /// treating the failure as a result.
    pub is_error: bool,
    /// True when this content actually came from outside the machine.
    ///
    /// Distinct from the tool's declared `untrusted_input` capability, which
    /// says what the tool *can* return. A refusal generated by mecha's own
    /// guards is not third-party content, and labelling it as such makes the
    /// model invent explanations for its own harness's behaviour.
    pub external: bool,
    /// This error is mecha's own in-process guard refusing the call, not
    /// the tool failing — the harness working. The loop reads it into the
    /// trace's `denied`, so it lands on the same side of the failure
    /// accounting as an approver or hook denial: excluded from
    /// `ended_on_failed_call` and the tool-error rate `doctor` thresholds,
    /// exactly as the loop's own comment on that split demands. Only
    /// trusted in-process wrappers set it; nothing constructed from an MCP
    /// wire ever does — `mcp.rs` builds its outputs with the field
    /// explicitly `false`, and no wire byte reaches it — so a third-party
    /// server cannot launder its failures into "the harness working".
    pub refusal: bool,
}

impl ToolOutput {
    pub fn ok(content: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        ToolOutput {
            content: content.into(),
            is_error: false,
            external: false,
            refusal: false,
        }
    }

    pub fn err(content: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        ToolOutput {
            content: content.into(),
            is_error: true,
            external: false,
            refusal: false,
        }
    }

    /// An expected failure that is the harness refusing, not the tool
    /// failing — see the `refusal` field for what that changes.
    pub fn refusal(content: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        ToolOutput {
            content: content.into(),
            is_error: true,
            external: false,
            refusal: true,
        }
    }

    /// Mark this content as having come from outside the machine.
    pub fn from_outside(mut self) -> Self {
        self.external = true;
        self
    }
}

/// What a tool can do — the vocabulary MCP standardized (`readOnly`,
/// `destructive`, `openWorld`) plus the two axes that decide whether an agent
/// can be turned into an exfiltration tool.
///
/// The *lethal trifecta* is private data + untrusted content + a way out. Any
/// agent holding all three can be instructed, by text hidden in the content it
/// reads, to take the private data and send it somewhere. Annotating tools on
/// these axes is what lets the loop refuse that combination structurally.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Capabilities {
    /// Returns data the user considers private.
    pub private_data: bool,
    /// Returns content a third party can influence — a web page, an email body,
    /// a calendar invite title. Treat everything it returns as hostile.
    pub untrusted_input: bool,
    /// Can transmit data outside the user's control. Note that a plain HTTP GET
    /// qualifies: the secret goes in the query string.
    pub external_send: bool,
    /// May destroy or overwrite data.
    pub destructive: bool,
}

impl Capabilities {
    pub fn private(mut self) -> Self {
        self.private_data = true;
        self
    }
    pub fn untrusted(mut self) -> Self {
        self.untrusted_input = true;
        self
    }
    pub fn sends(mut self) -> Self {
        self.external_send = true;
        self
    }
    pub fn destructive(mut self) -> Self {
        self.destructive = true;
        self
    }

    /// Everything either side declares.
    ///
    /// Union rather than assignment, because the only safe direction for an
    /// override is *wider*. Letting config narrow a tool's declared
    /// capabilities would disarm the interlock on the strength of a claim
    /// nothing enforces — the same mistake as a sandbox that silently degrades,
    /// and it would make the cheapest configuration the most dangerous one. A
    /// server that genuinely over-declares is what `TrifectaPolicy` is for: one
    /// deliberate, visible decision instead of a quiet per-server exemption.
    pub fn union(self, other: Capabilities) -> Self {
        Capabilities {
            private_data: self.private_data || other.private_data,
            untrusted_input: self.untrusted_input || other.untrusted_input,
            external_send: self.external_send || other.external_send,
            destructive: self.destructive || other.destructive,
        }
    }
}

#[async_trait]
pub trait Tool: Send + Sync {
    fn name(&self) -> &str;
    fn description(&self) -> &str;
    fn input_schema(&self) -> Value;

    /// Read-only tools skip the approval gate and are safe to run in parallel.
    fn read_only(&self) -> bool {
        false
    }

    /// Declared risk surface. The default is the conservative one for a tool
    /// nobody has classified: assume it does nothing special.
    fn capabilities(&self) -> Capabilities {
        Capabilities::default()
    }

    async fn call(&self, input: Value, ctx: &ToolCtx) -> Result<ToolOutput>;

    /// State this tool holds that a compaction must not lose.
    ///
    /// Compaction replaces the middle of a transcript with prose, and the
    /// measured failure mode is that a summariser preserves *what is true* and
    /// drops *how far you got*. Some of "how far you got" does not live in the
    /// messages at all — it lives in a tool — and for that state a summary is
    /// the wrong mechanism twice over: it is lossy, and the tool already has
    /// the exact current answer.
    ///
    /// So a tool may hand its state to the compaction to be carried across
    /// **verbatim**. Three rules make this safe rather than a second source of
    /// truth:
    ///
    /// - It is read at compaction time, so it is current by construction. A
    ///   stale copy is impossible because nothing stores one.
    /// - Exactly one copy survives: the carried block replaces the previous
    ///   one rather than accumulating beside it, or an old list would sit in
    ///   the prompt contradicting the new one.
    /// - It is for state the tool *owns*, not a summary of what happened. A
    ///   tool that returned prose here would be smuggling a second summariser
    ///   into the loop, unvalidated.
    ///
    /// `None` — the default — means "nothing worth carrying", which is the
    /// honest answer for every stateless tool.
    fn carried_state(&self, ctx: &ToolCtx) -> Option<CarriedState> {
        let _ = ctx;
        None
    }

    /// How the *operator* could make a call like the one just refused safe —
    /// one sentence appended to a trifecta denial, or `None` when nothing
    /// short of policy would change the answer.
    ///
    /// The interlock's refusal message has to route somewhere, and the loop
    /// cannot write that route: it sees capability bits, and the same
    /// `external_send: true` means "this is HTTP" on one tool and "the shell
    /// is unconfined" on another, with completely different fixes. The tool is
    /// the only party that knows which condition set the bit, so the tool
    /// carries the remedy — same division of labour as
    /// [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state) and
    /// [`fixed_workspace`](Tool::fixed_workspace): the loop learns that a
    /// remedy exists, never what kind of tool it is talking to.
    ///
    /// This is the difference between a security posture that redirects work
    /// and one that dead-ends it. A refusal that names no exit teaches the
    /// operator to weaken policy (`trifecta = "allow"`), which is the worst
    /// possible outcome of a control that was working correctly. The measured
    /// case: `shell` denials in the TUI advised delegating to subagents, none
    /// of which had a shell — advice that could not work, for a call whose
    /// real fix (`[sandbox]`, one config section) went unmentioned.
    ///
    /// Addressed to the person, relayed by the model. It must not be an
    /// instruction the model could act on itself — "enable X in config.toml"
    /// is for hands on a keyboard, and a model that tried to do it would find
    /// config edits are not among its tools.
    fn denial_remedy(&self) -> Option<String> {
        None
    }

    /// The root this tool's relative paths actually resolve against, when the
    /// tool was constructed over a fixed directory rather than following the
    /// per-run [`ToolCtx`] workspace.
    ///
    /// Most tools return `None` — the default — because they resolve paths
    /// through the context they are called with. But a tool backed by a
    /// process spawned once for many runs (an MCP server) resolves relative
    /// paths against the directory it was spawned in, whatever workspace the
    /// current run carries. A staged (deferred) call records a jail so its
    /// release can rebuild the tool surface where the paths mean what they
    /// meant at drafting time — and for these tools that jail must be the
    /// spawn root, not the narrower per-run workspace, or every relative path
    /// in the draft resolves outside the release jail forever.
    ///
    /// Like [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state), the loop learns only that
    /// some tools have a fixed root, never which kind of tool they are.
    fn fixed_workspace(&self) -> Option<PathBuf> {
        None
    }

    /// Tool names this tool is currently restricting the surface to, if it is
    /// restricting it at all.
    ///
    /// The third method in the family with [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state)
    /// and [`fixed_workspace`](Tool::fixed_workspace), and it exists for the
    /// same reason: the loop learns that *some* tool may narrow the surface,
    /// never which kind of tool or why. A `skill` whose frontmatter names the
    /// tools its procedure needs is the first caller, and the loop stays
    /// unable to tell a skill from an MCP server.
    ///
    /// **Narrow only, never widen.** [`Registry::specs_for`] intersects the
    /// restriction with what it already holds, so a name here that matches no
    /// registered tool adds nothing — the same one-way rule as a config
    /// capability override, and for the same reason: a mechanism that could
    /// widen the surface by declaring a name would make the cheapest
    /// configuration the most dangerous one.
    ///
    /// `None` — the default — is "no opinion", which is what every stateless
    /// tool honestly has. Note that it is *not* the same as an empty list:
    /// nothing may restrict the surface to nothing, and the parser refuses an
    /// empty list upstream rather than leaving a run with no way to act.
    fn narrows_surface_to(&self) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
        None
    }

    /// Does this tool do its work in a conversation of its own?
    ///
    /// The fourth method in the family with
    /// [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state),
    /// [`fixed_workspace`](Tool::fixed_workspace) and
    /// [`narrows_surface_to`](Tool::narrows_surface_to), and it exists for the
    /// same reason: the loop learns that *some* tool starts clean, never that
    /// subagents are a thing.
    ///
    /// One caller — boredom (`docs/GOAL-SYSTEM-DESIGN.md` §9.1 rung 3), where
    /// a fresh `Conversation` is the strongest available escape from a context
    /// that has talked itself into a corner. Nothing else could answer it: a
    /// delegate's *name* is whatever the user called it in config, and its
    /// capabilities are derived from its child's tools, so neither the
    /// registry nor the capability signature distinguishes it from an ordinary
    /// tool that happens to read the web. Naming one from the loop by string
    /// is the alternative, and is what this family exists to avoid.
    ///
    /// Not a security property and must never become one. It says where the
    /// work happens, not that anything is safer for happening there — the
    /// child's own taint, jail and approver decide that, and they are the
    /// parent's rules inherited rather than relaxed.
    fn runs_a_fresh_conversation(&self) -> bool {
        false
    }

    /// Drop state that belonged to the conversation that just ended.
    ///
    /// Most tools are stateless and the default no-op is honest for them. A
    /// tool that *is* stateful has a scope problem the registry cannot see:
    /// the registry belongs to the **agent**, and an agent can outlive a
    /// conversation — a batch item, a `/clear`, a Slack thread. State scoped
    /// to the conversation therefore has to be told when one ends, or it
    /// leaks into the next.
    ///
    /// The leak is not merely untidy where the state gates the tool surface:
    /// a `skill` narrowing that survived would constrain a task nobody had
    /// started yet. Same family as [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state) —
    /// the loop learns that some tools have conversation-scoped state, never
    /// which ones or what it is.
    ///
    /// Note what this is *not*: an unload verb. Nothing calls it mid-run, and
    /// a procedure that has been read cannot be un-read.
    fn forget_conversation_state(&self) {}

    /// Does this handle refuse task closures (`status: done|dropped`) on the
    /// model's behalf?
    ///
    /// `false` for every ordinary tool — the default an MCP-wrapped tool can
    /// never override, which is the point: the closure guard's presence
    /// check used to read the tool's *description*, a string the guarded
    /// MCP server itself supplies, so a server whose description happened to
    /// end with the guard's own sentence was left unwrapped and still passed
    /// the startup verification — a fail-open keyed to data from the side
    /// being guarded. The answer lives in the type instead, where this
    /// repo's structural properties live; only the in-process wrapper
    /// returns `true`. Same family as [`carried_state`](Tool::carried_state):
    /// the loop and the verifier learn that some handle guards, never which
    /// kind of tool it is. The layering is deliberate and acknowledged: no
    /// `mecha-core` code reads this, and "task closure" is a CLI-domain
    /// concept — but the trait is the only channel a wire-supplied tool
    /// cannot fake, which is the property the check exists for, and
    /// [`Capabilities`] already carries domain concepts (`external_send`)
    /// into this trait on the same argument.
    fn guards_closures(&self) -> bool {
        false
    }

    fn spec(&self) -> ToolSpec {
        ToolSpec {
            name: self.name().to_string(),
            description: self.description().to_string(),
            input_schema: self.input_schema(),
        }
    }
}

/// A tool's own state, on its way across a compaction.
///
/// `label` names it in the rebuilt prompt (the tool's name is the obvious
/// choice); `body` is reproduced exactly, because verbatim is the whole point.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CarriedState {
    pub label: String,
    pub body: String,
}

/// What a tool is allowed to touch.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ToolCtx {
    /// Filesystem tools refuse paths outside this root.
    pub workspace: PathBuf,
    pub shell_timeout: std::time::Duration,
    pub security: SecurityConfig,
    /// The byte budget one *turn's* tool results share, divided equally
    /// across the calls in the batch so one runaway tool cannot starve its
    /// siblings (mecha executes a turn's calls concurrently, so they land
    /// together). The old per-tool cap was 200 KB — ~50k tokens, 1.5× the
    /// whole local context window, which is not a cap so much as a promise
    /// to overflow.
    pub output_budget_bytes: usize,
    /// Where an oversized result is saved in full before its transcript copy
    /// is cut. `None` disables spilling — the cut then names what was lost
    /// instead of where to find it. Per-context on purpose: two eval cases
    /// sharing one spill directory could read each other's output through it.
    pub spill_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
    /// The run's event channel, so a tool that *contains* a run — a subagent —
    /// can surface its progress instead of going dark until it returns.
    ///
    /// Display-only, and treat it that way: any tool (including a third-party
    /// MCP server's) can send fabricated events down this channel, so nothing
    /// that matters may key off it. Conversation state, taint, and run
    /// completion all come from the loop and the caller's join handle, never
    /// from events. Stamped by [`Agent::run_in`] per run; `None` everywhere
    /// nobody is watching (batch, eval).
    ///
    /// [`Agent::run_in`]: crate::agent::Agent::run_in
    pub events: Option<tokio::sync::mpsc::UnboundedSender<crate::agent::AgentEvent>>,
    /// The run's cancellation token. A tool that contains a run passes it on,
    /// so cancelling the parent actually cancels the child instead of politely
    /// waiting out its entire run. Stamped by `Agent::run_in`, like `events`.
    pub cancel: Option<tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken>,
    /// The run's phase. A tool that contains a run passes it on, so delegation
    /// is not the way to get a write executed from a planning run. Stamped by
    /// `Agent::run_in`, like `events`.
    pub phase: crate::agent::Phase,
    /// Tools the run this call belongs to may not dispatch, carried here so a
    /// tool that *contains* a run — a subagent — inherits the withholding
    /// instead of becoming the way around it. Same reasoning as `phase`
    /// directly above: delegating from a narrowed run must not widen it.
    pub withheld: std::sync::Arc<[String]>,
    /// The `tool_use` id of the call this context was built for. Stamped per
    /// dispatch (only when `events` is watched), so a tool that contains a
    /// run can tag its forwarded events with the call that spawned it — two
    /// subagents running in parallel are otherwise indistinguishable to a
    /// renderer.
    pub call_id: Option<String>,
    /// The conversation's taint as of this turn, stamped per dispatch when a
    /// mailbox is attached. The conservative pre-gate value — it includes
    /// what the *batch* can return, so a read and a `message_send` in one
    /// turn cannot stamp a clean label on the outgoing message. `None` means
    /// nobody stamped it, and a consumer must fail closed (treat it as fully
    /// tainted): a subagent's context, or any run wired outside the loop,
    /// must never pass as a clean sender by omission.
    pub taint: Option<crate::agent::Taint>,
    /// What the next request is predicted to cost, as of this turn.
    ///
    /// Run-scoped state a tool may read, like `taint` and `call_id` — and like
    /// them, the loop stamps it without knowing which tool cares. Only `todo`
    /// reads it today, because a plan is the one place a headroom number
    /// changes a decision; §4.3's rule is that most state belongs to the
    /// harness and never reaches the model at all.
    ///
    /// **Never the system prompt.** Render order is tools → system → messages
    /// with the cache breakpoint on the last system block, so a per-turn value
    /// there would re-pay the entire prefix, tools included, on every request.
    /// A tool result is where a changing reading is affordable.
    pub context: Option<crate::pressure::Forecast>,
    /// What this run has actually done, as of this call — the substrate step
    /// appraisal differences (`docs/GOAL-SYSTEM-DESIGN.md` §5.5).
    ///
    /// Stamped like `context` directly above and read by the same one tool,
    /// for a reason that generalises past `todo`: the loop owns the trace and
    /// a tool cannot see it, but only the tool holding a plan knows *which
    /// span* a number belongs to. So the loop supplies the counters and the
    /// tool supplies the boundaries.
    ///
    /// `None` means nobody stamped it — a subagent's context, a tool called
    /// outside the loop, a test — and a consumer must make no claim rather
    /// than read it as a run that did nothing. Zero work and no measurement
    /// are the opposite findings doctor's dash exists to keep apart.
    pub work: Option<crate::step::Work>,
    /// Set by the `compact` tool; read and cleared by the loop between turns.
    ///
    /// Shared rather than returned, on `cancel`'s precedent one field up: a
    /// tool cannot rewrite the transcript — it has no access to it — so what
    /// it can do is ask, and the loop is what acts. `None` where nothing
    /// registered the tool.
    pub compact_requested: Option<std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool>>,
    /// Set by the `todo` tool when a just-completed step is an escalation
    /// candidate (`docs/GOAL-SYSTEM-DESIGN.md` §5.5); read and cleared by the
    /// loop between turns, which makes the one quarantined call and folds a
    /// nudge into the turn if it says to.
    ///
    /// `compact_requested`'s exact shape, for the exact same reason: `todo`
    /// cannot rewrite the transcript or reach a provider, so what it can do
    /// is ask. `None` — not merely an empty slot — is what "this run has the
    /// feature off" means; presence is the enablement, like
    /// `compact_requested`'s own absence-is-the-off-switch.
    pub step_escalation:
        Option<std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<crate::step::StepEscalation>>>>,
}

impl Default for ToolCtx {
    fn default() -> Self {
        ToolCtx {
            workspace: std::env::current_dir().unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from(".")),
            shell_timeout: std::time::Duration::from_secs(120),
            security: SecurityConfig::default(),
            output_budget_bytes: 24_000,
            spill_dir: fresh_spill_dir(),
            events: None,
            cancel: None,
            phase: crate::agent::Phase::default(),
            withheld: std::sync::Arc::from(Vec::new()),
            call_id: None,
            taint: None,
            context: None,
            work: None,
            compact_requested: None,
            step_escalation: None,
        }
    }
}

/// A spill directory no other context shares. Not created until first used.
fn fresh_spill_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
    Some(std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("mecha-spill-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4())))
}

impl ToolCtx {
    /// The same policy pointed at a different root. Used to give one run — an
    /// eval case, a batch item — its own isolated copy of a workspace without
    /// rebuilding the agent around it. The spill directory is re-derived too:
    /// a re-rooted context is a new isolation domain, and inheriting the old
    /// one would let its runs read each other's spilled output.
    pub fn with_workspace(&self, workspace: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        ToolCtx {
            workspace: workspace.into(),
            spill_dir: fresh_spill_dir(),
            ..self.clone()
        }
    }

    /// Resolve a model-supplied path against the workspace and prove it stays
    /// inside. The path is untrusted input: `..`, symlinks, and absolute paths
    /// all have to be checked after canonicalization, not before.
    pub fn resolve(&self, raw: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
        let candidate = {
            let p = Path::new(raw);
            if p.is_absolute() {
                p.to_path_buf()
            } else {
                self.workspace.join(p)
            }
        };

        // The file may not exist yet (a write), so canonicalize the nearest
        // existing ancestor and re-append the rest.
        let mut existing = candidate.as_path();
        let mut trailing = Vec::new();
        let canonical_root = loop {
            match existing.canonicalize() {
                Ok(c) => break c,
                Err(_) => match existing.parent() {
                    Some(parent) => {
                        if let Some(name) = existing.file_name() {
                            trailing.push(name.to_owned());
                        }
                        existing = parent;
                    }
                    None => anyhow::bail!("cannot resolve path {raw:?}"),
                },
            }
        };
        let mut resolved = canonical_root;
        for part in trailing.iter().rev() {
            resolved.push(part);
        }

        let root = self
            .workspace
            .canonicalize()
            .unwrap_or_else(|_| self.workspace.clone());
        if resolved.starts_with(&root) {
            return Ok(resolved);
        }
        // The spill directory is the one sanctioned exception: oversized tool
        // output is saved there, and the truncation marker tells the model to
        // read the rest from exactly that path. Its contents are this
        // context's own tool results, so nothing new becomes reachable.
        if let Some(spill) = &self.spill_dir {
            let spill_root = spill.canonicalize().unwrap_or_else(|_| spill.clone());
            if resolved.starts_with(&spill_root) {
                return Ok(resolved);
            }
        }
        anyhow::bail!(
            "path {raw:?} resolves outside the workspace ({})",
            root.display()
        )
    }
}

/// Floor under a result's share of the turn budget. A wide batch must not
/// starve every result down to a marker with no content: below this, the
/// division stops and the total budget is allowed to overrun instead.
pub const SPILL_FLOOR_BYTES: usize = 4_096;

/// Cut an oversized tool result down to `cap` bytes, saving the full output
/// where the model can get it back.
///
/// The marker is written for the model, and it names the recovery — a
/// truncation notice that only says "gone" leaves the model to conclude the
/// rest never existed, and the elision line number is what makes the recovery
/// a single call instead of a scan. A failed spill degrades to a plain cut
/// that says the output was *not* saved; losing the tail must never lose the
/// run.
pub fn cap_result(
    content: String,
    cap: usize,
    spill_dir: Option<&Path>,
    tool: &str,
    id: &str,
) -> String {
    if content.len() <= cap {
        return content;
    }
    // Cut on a char boundary, never mid-codepoint.
    let mut cut = cap;
    while cut > 0 && !content.is_char_boundary(cut) {
        cut -= 1;
    }
    let head = &content[..cut];
    // The line the elision starts on. A cut mid-line means that same line —
    // re-reading from it overlaps a little, which is the right direction.
    let line = head.matches('\n').count() + 1;
    let total = content.len();

    let saved = spill_dir.and_then(|dir| {
        // Owner-only: spilled output is tool results in full — the same
        // sensitivity as the transcript, sitting in the shared temp dir.
        crate::create_private_dir(dir).ok()?;
        // A random component, because the call id alone can collide: batch
        // items and non-sandboxed eval cases share one context, and a local
        // server under a pinned seed can hand identical requests identical
        // call ids. A collision would silently overwrite, leaving one
        // conversation's marker pointing at another conversation's content.
        let tag = &uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()[..8];
        let file = dir.join(format!("{}-{}-{tag}.txt", safe_name(tool), safe_name(id)));
        std::fs::write(&file, &content).ok()?;
        Some(file)
    });

    match saved {
        Some(path) => format!(
            "{head}\n\n[truncated by the harness: showing the first {cut} of {total} bytes; \
             the rest begins on line {line}. The full output is saved at {path} — continue \
             with fs_read {{\"path\": \"{path}\", \"offset\": {line}}}, or search it with \
             grep.]",
            path = path.display()
        ),
        None => format!(
            "{head}\n\n[truncated by the harness: {omitted} of {total} bytes were dropped \
             from line {line} on, and the full output could not be saved. Narrow the \
             request and re-run the tool if the rest is needed.]",
            omitted = total - cut
        ),
    }
}

/// Tool names and call ids become file names; anything else becomes `-`.
fn safe_name(s: &str) -> String {
    s.chars()
        .map(|c| {
            if c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_' {
                c
            } else {
                '-'
            }
        })
        .collect()
}

/// The decision an approver hands back for one pending call.
///
/// Two ways to say no, and the difference is load-bearing rather than
/// cosmetic. The learning miner keys on the exact string `"Denied by the
/// user:"` to find corrections worth learning from, so **a refusal that no
/// human made must not wear that label**. `Blocked` is the machine's no — a
/// permission mode, a policy, a remote prompt nobody answered — and the loop
/// renders it as `"Blocked by policy:"`, joining `"Blocked by a hook:"` in
/// the family of refusals the miner ignores.
///
/// Without the split, a read-only run's refusals and a 2am approval nobody was
/// awake to answer both become training data attributed to a user who never
/// spoke. It is the same mistake as mining a publish's changed path as a voice
/// correction, and it was live in `ModeApprover` until a Slack approver needed
/// to express "nobody answered" and found there was no way to.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Decision {
    Allow,
    /// A human said no. The reason is passed to the model so it can pick
    /// another approach — and it is mined as a correction.
    Deny(String),
    /// Machine policy said no, and no human was consulted. Never mined.
    Blocked(String),
}

/// Gates tool calls that aren't read-only. The CLI implements this with a
/// terminal prompt; a headless caller can auto-allow or auto-deny.
#[async_trait]
pub trait Approver: Send + Sync {
    async fn approve(&self, tool: &dyn Tool, input: &Value) -> Decision;
}

/// Answers from the configured [`PermissionMode`] without asking anyone.
pub struct ModeApprover {
    pub mode: PermissionMode,
}

#[async_trait]
impl Approver for ModeApprover {
    async fn approve(&self, tool: &dyn Tool, _input: &Value) -> Decision {
        match self.mode {
            PermissionMode::Allow => Decision::Allow,
            PermissionMode::ReadOnly if tool.read_only() => Decision::Allow,
            // `Blocked`, not `Deny`: a permission mode is policy this run was
            // started with, not a correction anybody made.
            PermissionMode::ReadOnly => Decision::Blocked(format!(
                "`{}` modifies state and this run is read-only",
                tool.name()
            )),
            // Nothing is watching to answer, so the safe reading of "ask" is no.
            PermissionMode::Ask => Decision::Blocked(format!(
                "`{}` needs approval and this run is non-interactive (use --yes to allow)",
                tool.name()
            )),
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Default)]
pub struct Registry {
    tools: BTreeMap<String, Arc<dyn Tool>>,
}

impl Registry {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self::default()
    }

    /// Register a tool. A later registration with the same name replaces the
    /// earlier one, so MCP servers can shadow built-ins deliberately.
    pub fn insert(&mut self, tool: Arc<dyn Tool>) {
        self.tools.insert(tool.name().to_string(), tool);
    }

    /// Take a tool back off the surface, by its exact registered name.
    ///
    /// For a run that must not be *able* to do something, as distinct from one
    /// asked not to. `tasks work` withholds `kg_task_update` this way: a run
    /// that can close its own assignment is a lane promoting itself, which is
    /// `ladder.rs`'s oldest rule and the same reason no `kg_accept` exists on
    /// the tool surface at all. A prompt saying "do not mark it done" is not
    /// the same control — it is advice to the party under test.
    pub fn remove(&mut self, name: &str) -> Option<Arc<dyn Tool>> {
        self.tools.remove(name)
    }

    pub fn get(&self, name: &str) -> Option<&Arc<dyn Tool>> {
        self.tools.get(name)
    }

    /// The tool a call may actually reach: registered **and** inside whatever
    /// restriction is currently active.
    ///
    /// Dispatch goes through this rather than [`get`](Registry::get), because
    /// a restriction that only shortened the spec list would be advisory. A
    /// model that saw `fs_write` three turns ago can still name it, and a
    /// narrowing enforced only in the list is one the model routes around by
    /// remembering — the same reason the phase filter makes tools genuinely
    /// absent rather than merely refused.
    pub fn available(&self, name: &str) -> Option<&Arc<dyn Tool>> {
        let tool = self.tools.get(name)?;
        match self.surface_restriction() {
            Some(allowed) if !allowed.contains(name) => None,
            _ => Some(tool),
        }
    }

    /// Names a call may reach right now, for the message that says so.
    pub fn available_names(&self) -> Vec<&str> {
        let restriction = self.surface_restriction();
        self.tools
            .values()
            .map(|t| t.name())
            .filter(|n| {
                restriction
                    .as_ref()
                    .is_none_or(|allowed| allowed.contains(*n))
            })
            .collect()
    }

    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        self.tools.is_empty()
    }

    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
        self.tools.len()
    }

    pub fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &Arc<dyn Tool>> {
        self.tools.values()
    }

    /// Everything the registered tools want carried across a compaction.
    ///
    /// In the registry's stable order, so a compaction does not reorder the
    /// prompt for a reason nobody can see. Asked of every tool, including an
    /// MCP server's — the loop does not learn which tools have state, only
    /// that some do, which is the same reason it never learns where a tool
    /// came from.
    ///
    /// The context is passed because one agent serves many conversations and a
    /// tool's state may be per-run: the compaction happening is *this* run's,
    /// so the state carried across it must be too. The loop still learns
    /// nothing about which tools those are — it hands over the run it is
    /// compacting and asks.
    pub fn carried_state(&self, ctx: &ToolCtx) -> Vec<CarriedState> {
        self.tools
            .values()
            .filter_map(|t| t.carried_state(ctx))
            .collect()
    }

    /// Specs in a stable order — the tool list is the very front of the prompt
    /// prefix, so reordering it would invalidate the cache on every request.
    pub fn specs(&self) -> Vec<ToolSpec> {
        self.tools.values().map(|t| t.spec()).collect()
    }

    /// Specs a given phase permits, in the same stable order.
    ///
    /// Note what this does to the prompt cache: planning sends a shorter tool
    /// list, so switching phase changes the front of the prefix and the next
    /// turn re-pays for it. That is the price of the tools being genuinely
    /// absent rather than merely refused, and it is the right trade.
    pub fn specs_for(&self, phase: crate::agent::Phase) -> Vec<ToolSpec> {
        let restriction = self.surface_restriction();
        self.tools
            .values()
            .filter(|t| phase.allows(t.read_only()))
            .filter(|t| {
                restriction
                    .as_ref()
                    .is_none_or(|allowed| allowed.contains(t.name()))
            })
            .map(|t| t.spec())
            .collect()
    }

    /// The names the surface is currently narrowed to, if anything is
    /// narrowing it.
    ///
    /// The **union** across everything that has an opinion, which is the only
    /// composition that lets two restrictions coexist: each names the tools
    /// its own procedure needs, and intersecting them would strand a run that
    /// loaded two skills. The invariant that matters is not "smallest" but
    /// "never larger than the unrestricted surface", and a union of subsets is
    /// still a subset — [`specs_for`](Registry::specs_for) intersects with
    /// what is registered, so a name nothing matches adds nothing.
    ///
    /// A tool that is *itself* restricting stays in the surface whatever it
    /// declared. Otherwise the first `skill` call could remove `skill`, and a
    /// procedure that says "then load the follow-up skill" would name a tool
    /// that had just been taken away — a restriction that eats its own
    /// mechanism is a trap rather than a policy.
    /// Tell every tool the conversation ended. See
    /// [`Tool::forget_conversation_state`].
    pub fn forget_conversation_state(&self) {
        for tool in self.tools.values() {
            tool.forget_conversation_state();
        }
    }

    pub fn surface_restriction(&self) -> Option<BTreeSet<String>> {
        let mut allowed: Option<BTreeSet<String>> = None;
        for tool in self.tools.values() {
            let Some(names) = tool.narrows_surface_to() else {
                continue;
            };
            let set = allowed.get_or_insert_with(BTreeSet::new);
            set.extend(names);
            set.insert(tool.name().to_string());
        }
        allowed
    }

    /// Register the built-ins permitted by config.
    ///
    /// The sandbox is passed in rather than read from config here because it
    /// changes what `shell` *is* — an unconfined shell and a confined one
    /// declare different capabilities, and the loop's interlock reads them.
    pub fn with_builtins(
        mut self,
        cfg: &ToolsConfig,
        sandbox: Arc<crate::sandbox::Sandbox>,
    ) -> Self {
        for tool in builtin::all(sandbox) {
            let name = tool.name();
            let allowed = cfg.enabled.is_empty() || cfg.enabled.iter().any(|e| e == name);
            let blocked = cfg.disabled.iter().any(|d| d == name);
            if allowed && !blocked {
                self.insert(tool);
            }
        }
        self
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod cap_tests {
    use super::*;
    use serde_json::json;

    fn scratch(name: &str) -> PathBuf {
        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("mecha-cap-{name}-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
        dir
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_result_under_the_cap_is_untouched() {
        let out = cap_result("short".into(), 100, None, "shell", "t1");
        assert_eq!(out, "short");
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_oversized_result_is_spilled_whole_and_the_marker_names_the_recovery() {
        let dir = scratch("spill");
        let body: String = (1..=100).map(|i| format!("line {i}\n")).collect();

        let out = cap_result(body.clone(), 200, Some(&dir), "shell", "t1");

        // The transcript copy is bounded...
        assert!(out.len() < body.len());
        assert!(out.starts_with("line 1\n"));
        // ...the disk copy is not: byte-identical, so nothing was lost. The
        // name carries a random tag, so it is discovered rather than assumed.
        let file = std::fs::read_dir(&dir)
            .unwrap()
            .next()
            .unwrap()
            .unwrap()
            .path();
        assert!(file
            .file_name()
            .unwrap()
            .to_str()
            .unwrap()
            .starts_with("shell-t1-"));
        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&file).unwrap(), body);

        // The marker gives the model a single call back to the rest: the
        // path, and the line the elision starts on.
        let line = body[..200].matches('\n').count() + 1;
        assert!(out.contains(&file.display().to_string()), "{out}");
        assert!(out.contains(&format!("\"offset\": {line}")), "{out}");
        assert!(out.contains("fs_read"), "the recovery must be named: {out}");

        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).ok();
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_failed_spill_degrades_to_a_cut_that_admits_the_loss() {
        // A directory that cannot exist: spilling fails, the run must not.
        let impossible = PathBuf::from("/dev/null/not-a-dir");
        let body = "x".repeat(1000);
        let out = cap_result(body, 100, Some(&impossible), "shell", "t1");

        assert!(out.contains("could not be saved"), "{out}");
        assert!(
            out.contains("re-run the tool"),
            "the fallback still names a recovery: {out}"
        );
        assert!(
            !out.contains("/dev/null"),
            "no path is promised that does not exist"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_cut_lands_on_a_char_boundary() {
        // A cap that falls mid-codepoint must back up, not panic.
        let body = "é".repeat(100); // 2 bytes per char
        let out = cap_result(body, 33, None, "shell", "t1");
        assert!(out.starts_with(&"é".repeat(16)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_jail_admits_the_spill_directory_and_nothing_else_new() {
        let workspace = scratch("ws");
        let spill = scratch("spilldir");
        let ctx = ToolCtx {
            workspace: workspace.clone(),
            spill_dir: Some(spill.clone()),
            ..ToolCtx::default()
        };

        // The marker names an absolute spill path; fs_read must be able to
        // follow it, or the recovery the model was promised is a lie.
        std::fs::write(spill.join("shell-t1.txt"), "spilled").unwrap();
        let resolved = ctx
            .resolve(&spill.join("shell-t1.txt").display().to_string())
            .unwrap();
        assert!(resolved.ends_with("shell-t1.txt"));

        // The exception is the spill directory, not the temp dir around it.
        let elsewhere = std::env::temp_dir().join("mecha-cap-elsewhere.txt");
        std::fs::write(&elsewhere, "no").unwrap();
        assert!(ctx.resolve(&elsewhere.display().to_string()).is_err());

        // And with spilling disabled there is no exception at all.
        let no_spill = ToolCtx {
            workspace,
            spill_dir: None,
            ..ToolCtx::default()
        };
        assert!(no_spill
            .resolve(&spill.join("shell-t1.txt").display().to_string())
            .is_err());

        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&spill).ok();
        std::fs::remove_file(&elsewhere).ok();
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_rerooted_context_gets_its_own_spill_directory() {
        // Two eval cases sharing one spill directory could read each other's
        // output through it — the same isolation rule as the workspace copy.
        let ctx = ToolCtx::default();
        let rerooted = ctx.with_workspace(std::env::temp_dir());
        assert_ne!(ctx.spill_dir, rerooted.spill_dir);
    }

    /// A tool that declares a restriction, so the registry rules can be tested
    /// without a skill store on disk.
    struct Narrowing(&'static str, Option<Vec<String>>);

    #[async_trait]
    impl Tool for Narrowing {
        fn name(&self) -> &str {
            self.0
        }
        fn description(&self) -> &str {
            "test"
        }
        fn input_schema(&self) -> Value {
            json!({"type": "object"})
        }
        fn read_only(&self) -> bool {
            true
        }
        fn narrows_surface_to(&self) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
            self.1.clone()
        }
        async fn call(&self, _i: Value, _c: &ToolCtx) -> Result<ToolOutput> {
            Ok(ToolOutput::ok(""))
        }
    }

    fn registry_with(tools: Vec<Arc<dyn Tool>>) -> Registry {
        let mut r = Registry::new();
        for t in tools {
            r.insert(t);
        }
        r
    }

    #[test]
    fn nothing_narrows_until_something_says_so() {
        let r = registry_with(vec![
            Arc::new(Narrowing("a", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("b", None)),
        ]);
        assert!(r.surface_restriction().is_none());
        assert_eq!(r.specs_for(crate::agent::Phase::Execute).len(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_restriction_can_never_widen_the_surface() {
        // The invariant the whole mechanism rests on. `gate` names a tool that
        // is not registered; naming it must not conjure it, or a mechanism
        // that declares a name could add capability rather than remove it.
        let r = registry_with(vec![
            Arc::new(Narrowing("a", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("b", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing(
                "gate",
                Some(vec!["a".into(), "not_registered".into()]),
            )),
        ]);
        let names: Vec<String> = r
            .specs_for(crate::agent::Phase::Execute)
            .into_iter()
            .map(|s| s.name)
            .collect();
        assert!(names.contains(&"a".to_string()));
        assert!(!names.contains(&"b".to_string()), "b was narrowed away");
        assert!(
            !names.iter().any(|n| n == "not_registered"),
            "a name nothing matches adds nothing: {names:?}"
        );
        assert!(
            names.contains(&"gate".to_string()),
            "the tool doing the narrowing stays reachable, or it eats its own mechanism"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_narrowed_tool_is_out_of_reach_for_dispatch_and_not_merely_unlisted() {
        // A shorter spec list alone would be advisory: a model that saw `b`
        // three turns ago can still name it.
        let r = registry_with(vec![
            Arc::new(Narrowing("a", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("b", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("gate", Some(vec!["a".into()]))),
        ]);
        assert!(r.available("a").is_some());
        assert!(r.available("b").is_none(), "narrowed away, so unreachable");
        assert!(
            r.get("b").is_some(),
            "still registered — `get` is a lookup, `available` is the gate"
        );
        assert!(!r.available_names().contains(&"b"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn two_restrictions_union_rather_than_intersect() {
        // Intersecting would strand a run that loaded two skills, each naming
        // what its own procedure needs. The union is still a subset of the
        // registered surface, which is the property that matters.
        let r = registry_with(vec![
            Arc::new(Narrowing("a", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("b", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("c", None)),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("g1", Some(vec!["a".into()]))),
            Arc::new(Narrowing("g2", Some(vec!["b".into()]))),
        ]);
        let allowed = r.surface_restriction().unwrap();
        assert!(allowed.contains("a") && allowed.contains("b"));
        assert!(!allowed.contains("c"), "still a subset: {allowed:?}");
    }
}