mcpmesh_node/config.rs
1//! The `config.toml` model. Every table and key here is real, implemented surface —
2//! docs/config.md is the operator-facing reference for all of it.
3use figment::{
4 Figment,
5 providers::{Format, Toml},
6};
7use serde::Deserialize;
8use std::collections::BTreeMap;
9use std::path::PathBuf;
10
11#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
12#[serde(default)]
13pub struct Config {
14 pub identity: IdentityCfg,
15 pub network: NetworkCfg,
16 pub limits: LimitsCfg,
17 /// Roster-mode `[roster]` tunables: the degraded-expiry grace window, the roster URL +
18 /// poll interval, and the freshness bound — one `RosterState` machine consumes them all.
19 pub roster: RosterCfg,
20 /// `[blobs]` tunables. Today: the app-blob garbage-collection interval (#80).
21 pub blobs: BlobsCfg,
22 /// `[services.<name>]` registry — each entry is a served MCP server plus its allow
23 /// list. Peers do NOT live in config; they live in the daemon's state store, so
24 /// there is no `[peers]` table here.
25 pub services: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, ServiceCfg>,
26}
27
28/// A `[services.<name>]` entry: exactly one backend kind (`run` xor `socket`) plus the
29/// nicknames/groups admitted to it. The xor is validated at access time via
30/// [`ServiceCfg::backend_result`] rather than at parse time, so a malformed entry is a
31/// per-service error, not a whole-config load failure.
32#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
33#[serde(default)]
34pub struct ServiceCfg {
35 /// `run`: spawn this command per session (a stdio MCP server).
36 pub run: Option<Vec<String>>,
37 /// `socket`: dial this local UDS (an already-running MCP server).
38 pub socket: Option<String>,
39 /// STABLE principals admitted to this service (b64u:/eid:/roster names, #38 — never display nicknames).
40 pub allow: Vec<String>,
41 /// Per-service env vars for a `run` backend (#51). The `MCPMESH_PEER_*` identity vars win
42 /// over these. Ignored for a `socket` backend. Default empty.
43 pub env: BTreeMap<String, String>,
44 /// Working directory for a `run` backend (#51). Default: inherit the daemon's cwd.
45 pub cwd: Option<String>,
46 /// Per-service proxied-request rate (#63), falling back to `[limits].rate_limit_per_min`.
47 ///
48 /// Before #63 every service a peer could reach drew from ONE shared bucket, so an agent
49 /// hammering a browser or filesystem service starved the embedder's own low-rate control
50 /// traffic to a different service on the same node. Buckets are now per `(service, endpoint)`.
51 ///
52 /// **This can only LOWER the rate.** `[limits].rate_limit_per_min` is a hard ceiling; a larger
53 /// value here is clamped, not honoured. That is what keeps the limit from being raised by a
54 /// config edit or a `register_service` call.
55 pub rate_limit_per_min: Option<u32>,
56}
57
58/// The resolved backend kind of a [`ServiceCfg`], borrowing the config as slices (no
59/// clone). `&[String]`/`&str` rather than `&Vec`/`&String` — idiomatic and gives the
60/// daemon's backend builders the most flexible borrow.
61#[derive(Debug)]
62pub enum Backend<'a> {
63 Run(&'a [String]),
64 Socket(&'a str),
65}
66
67impl ServiceCfg {
68 /// Resolve the backend, enforcing exactly-one-of `run`/`socket`. Both or neither is an
69 /// error — surfaced to the operator, never a silent default.
70 #[allow(dead_code)] // consumed by the daemon service wiring
71 pub fn backend_result(&self) -> Result<Backend<'_>, String> {
72 match (&self.run, &self.socket) {
73 (Some(cmd), None) => Ok(Backend::Run(cmd.as_slice())),
74 (None, Some(p)) => Ok(Backend::Socket(p.as_str())),
75 (Some(_), Some(_)) => Err("service has both run and socket".into()),
76 (None, None) => Err("service has neither run nor socket".into()),
77 }
78 }
79}
80
81#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
82#[serde(default)]
83pub struct IdentityCfg {
84 pub device_key: Option<PathBuf>, // None → paths::default_device_key_path()
85 /// This device's suggested name for itself, carried in a minted pairing invite.
86 /// `None` → the daemon defaults to a short fingerprint of the endpoint id.
87 /// Additive (`#[serde(default)]` at the struct level).
88 pub nickname: Option<String>,
89 /// Roster mode: the org id this node joined (pinned at install/join).
90 pub org_id: Option<String>,
91 /// Roster mode: the pinned org-root public key, `b64u:`. The single trust anchor
92 /// roster signatures verify against. Pinned on first roster install / `join`.
93 pub org_root_pk: Option<String>,
94 /// Roster mode: this node's stable user_id in the org. Pinned at `join` (proposed)
95 /// and reconciled to the roster's authoritative value once installed.
96 pub user_id: Option<String>,
97 /// #85 ask 3: admit another DEVICE of a person this node already pairs with, when it presents a
98 /// binding signed by that person's user key — no fresh SAS ceremony.
99 ///
100 /// **OFF by default**, and #85 asks for it to be seamless. It changes what a pairing MEANS:
101 /// today a pairing admits a device, and with this on it admits a person and their future
102 /// devices. #38 arguably made that true of grants already — they are keyed on stable
103 /// principals, so a person's devices share authorization — but "arguably implied" is not a
104 /// reason to widen admission on somebody's node during an upgrade.
105 ///
106 /// **It does not resurrect a device you removed.** `peer_remove` deletes the row; it does not
107 /// stop the PERSON from attesting a device afterwards, because you still pair with them. If you
108 /// removed a device because it was compromised, REVOKE it — attestation checks the revocation
109 /// list first, which is why #85 ask 4 shipped before this.
110 ///
111 /// **It also keeps the pair ALPN's front door open.** That ALPN fast-closes when no invite is
112 /// live; an attestation needs no invite, so with this on the (rate-limited, binding-verified)
113 /// ceremony is reachable continuously. That is the cost of the feature, not a side effect.
114 #[serde(default)]
115 pub admit_attested_devices: bool,
116 /// Roster mode: path to this person's user key. Minted by `join`; binds this
117 /// person's devices. `None` → paths::default_user_key_path() when needed.
118 pub user_key: Option<PathBuf>,
119}
120
121/// `[network]`. The knobs are exactly what `daemon::net_plan` implements —
122/// no aspirational surface:
123/// - `relay_mode = "default" | "custom" | "disabled"`. `"custom"` requires `relay_urls`
124/// (self-hosted iroh relays); `"disabled"` is the HERMETIC mode — no relay AND no
125/// discovery (localhost/tests).
126/// - `discovery_mode = "default" | "custom"`. `"custom"` requires `discovery_urls` —
127/// self-hosted pkarr relay URLs (e.g. an iroh-dns-server), used for BOTH publishing and
128/// resolving peer addresses in place of n0's DNS/pkarr. Ignored (off) when
129/// `relay_mode = "disabled"`.
130///
131/// Unknown modes or a `custom` without URLs are startup ERRORS (`net_plan`), never a silent
132/// fallback — a metadata-privacy knob must not quietly revert to public infrastructure.
133#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
134#[serde(default)]
135pub struct NetworkCfg {
136 pub relay_mode: String,
137 /// Self-hosted relay URLs, required when `relay_mode = "custom"`.
138 pub relay_urls: Vec<String>,
139 pub discovery_mode: String,
140 /// Self-hosted pkarr relay URLs, required when `discovery_mode = "custom"`.
141 pub discovery_urls: Vec<String>,
142 /// TESTING ONLY (#116): force application data over the RELAY even when a direct path exists.
143 ///
144 /// Requires the `unstable-relay-only` cargo feature. Without it this field still PARSES — a
145 /// config must stay portable between a test build and a production one — but is ignored with a
146 /// `warn!`. It is never a startup error: a testing switch must not brick a node, and it must
147 /// never be ignored SILENTLY, because believing you tested the relay when you did not is the
148 /// exact failure #116 reports.
149 ///
150 /// Selects the relay path; it does NOT prevent hole-punching (that is socket-level behaviour a
151 /// `PathSelector` cannot reach). A direct path may still form — it simply never carries data,
152 /// and `status` reports `relay` because #64 derives the path from `is_selected()`.
153 pub relay_only: bool,
154 /// `[network].presence_mode` (#89) — who gets a reachability pong on `mcpmesh/ping/1`.
155 ///
156 /// - `"paired"` (default): any paired peer, today's behaviour.
157 /// - `"granted"`: only a caller currently holding at least one service grant. This is what
158 /// makes an embedder's per-peer sharing switch control presence too — revoking the last
159 /// service takes presence with it, live, with no restart and no new verb.
160 /// - `"off"`: never pong.
161 ///
162 /// The arm is gated by PAIRING alone otherwise, so `service_allow_revoke` has no effect on it:
163 /// a peer whose every service was revoked still learns you are online right now, your RTT, your
164 /// `stack_version` and your app metadata, on demand and forever. The only lever was a full
165 /// unpair — a relationship-destroying action to express a privacy preference (#89).
166 ///
167 /// A refusal under `"off"`/`"granted"` matches the trust gate's, so this arm does not
168 /// distinguish "not paired" from "hidden" from "no grants".
169 ///
170 /// **This is NOT "appear offline".** It withholds the pong payload (`stack_version`, app
171 /// metadata, the caller's services) and makes our own probe report you unreachable. It does not
172 /// hide that the node is running: a QUIC application close implies a completed handshake,
173 /// `mcpmesh/pair/1` answers any stranger by design, and a paired peer still gets a served
174 /// `mcpmesh/mcp/1` session. Do not describe it to users as invisibility (#89 gate).
175 ///
176 /// Read at BOOT — changing the mode needs a restart. The per-peer effect under `"granted"` is
177 /// live, because grants are.
178 pub presence_mode: String,
179 /// QUIC idle timeout in seconds (#56) — how long a connection survives with NO traffic and no
180 /// keepalive before the transport closes it. `None` = iroh's default, **30s** on iroh 1.0.3.
181 ///
182 /// This is not "how long an idle session lives". iroh keepalives every 5s by default, so a held
183 /// session survives indefinitely while the process runs; this is what detects a peer that
184 /// VANISHED.
185 ///
186 /// **It is NEGOTIATED, not imposed.** QUIC takes the MINIMUM of the two peers' advertised
187 /// values (RFC 9000 §10.1), so raising this on one node achieves nothing against a peer still
188 /// on the default — the connection still times out at 30s. Raising it is only meaningful when
189 /// every node is configured together; lowering it works one-sidedly.
190 ///
191 /// `0` means "no timeout" from THIS side, which likewise yields the peer's value; against a
192 /// default peer that is still 30s. Only if both sides say `0` does a vanished peer go
193 /// undetected at the transport layer.
194 #[serde(default)]
195 pub idle_timeout_secs: Option<u64>,
196 /// QUIC keepalive interval in seconds (#56) — how often the transport PINGs an otherwise idle
197 /// connection. `None` = iroh's default, **5s** on iroh 1.0.3.
198 ///
199 /// Sets BOTH the connection-level and the per-path keepalive — setting only the former would
200 /// leave every path pinging at iroh's 5s regardless.
201 ///
202 /// A transport keepalive carries no method-bearing frame, so it does NOT consume a
203 /// `[limits].rate_limit_per_min` token — unlike an application-level heartbeat, which does.
204 ///
205 /// Must be less than the EFFECTIVE idle timeout — `idle_timeout_secs` if set, otherwise iroh's
206 /// 30s — or boot fails. Note that effective timeout is the negotiated minimum, so a value that
207 /// passes this check locally can still be too slow for a peer with a shorter one.
208 ///
209 /// **This can only LOWER the ping rate.** iroh caps the per-path keepalive at 5s and silently
210 /// discards anything larger, so a value above 5 would leave every path pinging at 5s anyway —
211 /// boot refuses it rather than pretend it took effect. There is no supported way to reduce
212 /// keepalive traffic on a metered link with iroh 1.0.3.
213 #[serde(default)]
214 pub keep_alive_secs: Option<u64>,
215 /// `[network].local_discovery` (#68) — find peers on the LAN with **no internet at all**.
216 ///
217 /// - `"off"` (default): no multicast sent, none listened for.
218 /// - `"on"`: resolve peers on the link AND announce this node to it.
219 /// - `"resolve"`: learn where peers are without publishing this node's identity or addresses.
220 /// NOT silent: resolving over mDNS means asking, and the library asks on a fixed cadence, so
221 /// this mode multicasts a `_mcpmesh._udp.local` query roughly once a second for as long as
222 /// the node runs. Every device on the link can see that something here runs mcpmesh and is
223 /// up. If that matters, the mode is `"off"`.
224 ///
225 /// Peer resolution otherwise needs external infrastructure — the pkarr publisher a relay
226 /// provides, or an address someone already handed over — so two machines on the same LAN with
227 /// no uplink cannot find each other though the path between them is fine. That is the scenario
228 /// where "peer to peer" earns its keep, and the commoner weak version too: a LAN where the
229 /// internet is merely flaky, so peers that could talk directly fail to resolve because
230 /// resolution goes out first.
231 ///
232 /// **OFF by default, and #68 asked for on.** The two disclosures are not comparable. pkarr
233 /// publishes a signed record someone must already know your endpoint id to look up. mDNS
234 /// announces your endpoint id and addresses to EVERY device on the link, unprompted and
235 /// repeatedly, to machines that had no idea you existed — and that id is the one peers pin, so
236 /// it correlates you across networks. On a home LAN that is the point; on a café, hotel or
237 /// conference network it is a broadcast to strangers. A node cannot un-send a multicast packet:
238 /// turning this on is one line and reversible, turning it on for someone silently is not.
239 /// `"resolve"` is there for whoever wants the benefit without publishing their identity — with
240 /// the query caveat above, which is the honest limit of that mode.
241 ///
242 /// What `"on"` puts on the link is broader than "addresses" suggests: the LAN address, the
243 /// PUBLIC WAN IPv4, and global IPv6 addresses. A café LAN learns your home/ISP address.
244 ///
245 /// Read at BOOT. Like `relay_mode`/`presence_mode`, an unknown value is a startup ERROR.
246 #[serde(default = "default_local_discovery")]
247 pub local_discovery: String,
248}
249
250fn default_local_discovery() -> String {
251 "off".into()
252}
253impl Default for NetworkCfg {
254 fn default() -> Self {
255 Self {
256 relay_mode: "default".into(),
257 relay_urls: Vec::new(),
258 discovery_mode: "default".into(),
259 discovery_urls: Vec::new(),
260 relay_only: false,
261 presence_mode: "paired".into(),
262 idle_timeout_secs: None,
263 keep_alive_secs: None,
264 local_discovery: default_local_discovery(),
265 }
266 }
267}
268
269/// `[limits]`. NOTE — the frame cap is deliberately NOT here: the 16 MiB `max_frame`
270/// default is a fixed CONSTANT at each wire (`mcpmesh_net::endpoint` for the mesh,
271/// `ipc::MAX_FRAME_BYTES` for the control socket, `backends::MAX_FRAME_BYTES` for local MCP
272/// servers), not a config tunable. A `max_frame` config field existed historically but was never
273/// threaded into any `FrameReader` (dead surface); threading it into the mesh path would widen
274/// `mcpmesh-net`'s public API for no demonstrated need, so the field was removed instead (serde
275/// ignores an unknown `max_frame` key in existing configs).
276#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
277#[serde(default)]
278pub struct LimitsCfg {
279 pub rate_limit_per_min: u32,
280 pub max_inflight: u32,
281 pub max_sessions: u32,
282 /// Per-authenticated-endpoint app-blob BYTE budget, bytes per minute (#84a).
283 ///
284 /// **0 = unlimited, and that is the default**, so an existing deployment is unchanged on
285 /// upgrade. The pre-existing blob limiter counts CONNECTIONS, which cannot see one granted
286 /// peer re-pulling a 4 GB blob on each of 60 connections a minute; this bounds the bytes.
287 ///
288 /// A peer that exceeds it gets its transfer ABORTED (retryable), not paced — pacing holds the
289 /// request open and turns a bandwidth problem into an unbounded-concurrency one.
290 ///
291 /// **Use 0 or at least 32768** (two chunks); a value in `1..32768` is FLOORED to 32768.
292 ///
293 /// Admission reserves one chunk before any bytes and the transfer then meters its own chunks,
294 /// so a sub-floor budget does not fail closed — it silently caps every servable blob at
295 /// roughly `budget - 16384` bytes and truncates anything larger. Measured: 20480 serves a
296 /// 4 KiB blob and nothing bigger. Two earlier drafts of this comment got that wrong, first
297 /// recommending the bricking value and then claiming it failed closed.
298 ///
299 /// Requires a restart: the limiter and the provider's event mask are both built once at boot.
300 pub blob_bytes_per_min: u64,
301 /// Audit-log retention window in calendar months (#88). **0 = keep forever, and that is the
302 /// default** — flipping today's keep-everything behavior to auto-deletion is a product call,
303 /// deliberately not made here. When N > 0, boot deletes monthly audit files older than the
304 /// last N months (the current month counts as month 1). Boot-time only: a long-running
305 /// daemon prunes on its next start; the `audit_prune` verb covers live needs.
306 pub audit_retain_months: u32,
307}
308impl Default for LimitsCfg {
309 fn default() -> Self {
310 Self {
311 rate_limit_per_min: 120,
312 max_inflight: 16,
313 max_sessions: 4,
314 blob_bytes_per_min: 0, // unlimited: opt-in, no behaviour change on upgrade
315 audit_retain_months: 0, // keep forever: opt-in, no behaviour change on upgrade
316 }
317 }
318}
319
320/// The default degraded-expiry grace window (`[roster].grace_period` default "72h").
321/// A stale roster keeps serving for this window past `expires_at` (with a warning) before it
322/// stops granting roster identity. Kept here so [`RosterCfg::default`] and the parse fallback
323/// share one source; the gate mirrors it as `roster::gate::DEFAULT_GRACE_SECS`.
324const DEFAULT_GRACE_SECS: i64 = 72 * 3600;
325
326/// The default freshness bound (`[roster].max_staleness`, default "24h" = 86400s). A roster
327/// this node has not re-confirmed current within this window degrades on the SAME `RosterState`
328/// machine as expiry (warnings within `grace`, then serving stops) — bounding adversarial staleness at
329/// `max_staleness + grace` independent of `expires_at`. Shared by [`RosterCfg::default`] + the parse
330/// fallback.
331const DEFAULT_MAX_STALENESS_SECS: i64 = 24 * 3600;
332
333/// The `[roster]` config table. `grace_period` is the degraded-expiry grace window — how
334/// long a roster past `expires_at` keeps serving (degraded, warning) before it stops. Additive
335/// (`#[serde(default)]`): a config with no `[roster]` table gets the 72h default.
336#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
337#[serde(default)]
338pub struct RosterCfg {
339 /// Degraded-expiry grace window: `"72h"` / `"24h"` / plain seconds (default "72h").
340 pub grace_period: String,
341 /// The pinned roster URL for the HTTPS poll. Operator-managed static hosting; also how a
342 /// joiner bootstraps its FIRST roster. `None` → no URL poll (manual installs only).
343 /// Additive (`#[serde(default)]`): a config with no `url` key gets `None`.
344 pub url: Option<String>,
345 /// How often to poll `url` (default "1h"). Total-parse like `grace_period` — an
346 /// unparseable value falls back to the hourly default rather than disabling the poll.
347 pub poll_interval: String,
348 /// The freshness bound (default "24h"): how long this node may go without re-confirming
349 /// the installed roster current (via a TLS URL poll ≥ installed, a gossip install, or a
350 /// manual install) before it degrades on the SAME `RosterState` machine as expiry. Total-parse
351 /// like `grace_period` (an unparseable value falls back to the 24h default — a typo never disables
352 /// the bound). Additive (`#[serde(default)]`): a config with no `max_staleness` key gets 24h.
353 pub max_staleness: String,
354}
355impl Default for RosterCfg {
356 fn default() -> Self {
357 Self {
358 grace_period: "72h".into(),
359 url: None,
360 poll_interval: "1h".into(),
361 max_staleness: "24h".into(),
362 }
363 }
364}
365
366impl RosterCfg {
367 /// The grace window in SECONDS. An absent or unparseable `grace_period` falls back to the 72h
368 /// default rather than erroring — an operator typo must never disable degraded serving, and a
369 /// grace window is advisory, not a security bound (revocation is enforced regardless of
370 /// degraded state).
371 ///
372 /// Two paths degrade on the ONE `RosterState` machine (`RosterView::state`, Approved →
373 /// DegradedGrace → DegradedStopped): expiry (`expires_at` + THIS grace window) and freshness
374 /// (`last_confirmed` + `max_staleness`). Once DegradedStopped, the gate stops granting roster
375 /// identity (fail-closed — revocation is still enforced); within grace, serving continues
376 /// with a warning (`daemon::warn_if_degraded_grace`).
377 pub fn grace_seconds(&self) -> i64 {
378 parse_duration(&self.grace_period).unwrap_or(DEFAULT_GRACE_SECS)
379 }
380
381 /// The URL poll interval in SECONDS (default 3600). Like [`grace_seconds`](Self::grace_seconds)
382 /// it is TOTAL — an absent/unparseable value falls back to the hourly default rather than
383 /// erroring, so an operator typo slows the poll to hourly instead of disabling freshness.
384 pub fn poll_interval_seconds(&self) -> i64 {
385 parse_duration(&self.poll_interval).unwrap_or(3600)
386 }
387
388 /// The freshness bound in SECONDS (default 86400 = 24h). Like [`grace_seconds`](Self::grace_seconds)
389 /// it is TOTAL — an absent/unparseable value falls back to the 24h default rather than erroring, so
390 /// an operator typo tightens/loosens to 24h instead of disabling the freshness bound.
391 pub fn max_staleness_seconds(&self) -> i64 {
392 parse_duration(&self.max_staleness).unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_STALENESS_SECS)
393 }
394}
395
396/// The shortest `[blobs].gc_interval` that is honoured. Below this, collection stays OFF.
397///
398/// A sweep walks every blob in the store and deletes what the scope table does not name; running
399/// it every few seconds is all cost and no benefit, and `"1s"` is far more likely to be a mistake
400/// than an intent.
401pub const MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS: i64 = 60;
402
403/// The `[blobs]` table.
404#[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)]
405#[serde(default)]
406pub struct BlobsCfg {
407 /// How often to garbage-collect the app-blob store (#80), e.g. `"1h"`. **Absent means no
408 /// collection at all** — `<data_dir>/blobs/` grows monotonically, which is the behavior of
409 /// every release up to 0.42.0.
410 ///
411 /// Opt-in because a sweep deletes bytes the node holds but no scope names, which includes
412 /// every blob this node has FETCHED and not republished. Those are reclaimable — the fetch
413 /// already wrote the caller's `dest_path` and the store copy is a cache — but it means a
414 /// `blob_republish` of a hash fetched more than one interval ago fails. Silent background
415 /// deletion is the wrong default for a local-first tool, and that interaction makes it wrong
416 /// twice.
417 pub gc_interval: Option<String>,
418}
419
420impl BlobsCfg {
421 /// The GC interval in SECONDS, or `None` for "do not collect".
422 ///
423 /// **Deliberately NOT total, unlike every other duration accessor here.**
424 /// [`RosterCfg::grace_seconds`] and friends fall back to their default on a typo because a typo
425 /// must never disable a safety property. This one runs the other way: a value that fell back to
426 /// *some* interval would let `gc_interval = "1hh"` start deleting data the operator never
427 /// authorized. So an unparseable value — or one below [`MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS`] — leaves
428 /// collection OFF and warns.
429 ///
430 /// A below-floor value is refused rather than clamped UP: a clamped value reads back through
431 /// `status.storage.blobs_gc.interval_secs` as honoured, and is not.
432 pub fn gc_interval_seconds(&self) -> Option<u64> {
433 let raw = self.gc_interval.as_deref()?;
434 match parse_duration(raw) {
435 Ok(secs) if secs >= MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS => Some(secs as u64),
436 Ok(secs) => {
437 tracing::warn!(
438 value = raw,
439 secs,
440 min = MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS,
441 "[blobs].gc_interval is below the minimum; blob garbage collection is OFF"
442 );
443 None
444 }
445 Err(e) => {
446 tracing::warn!(
447 value = raw,
448 %e,
449 "[blobs].gc_interval is unparseable; blob garbage collection is OFF"
450 );
451 None
452 }
453 }
454 }
455}
456
457/// Parse a duration string to SECONDS: a `d`/`h`/`m`/`s` suffix (days/hours/minutes/seconds) or a
458/// bare number (seconds). Trim + suffix-strip + checked multiply; rejects a
459/// negative/overflowing/garbage value as `Err` (the caller supplies the
460/// default). `u64` parse then a checked `i64` conversion: a negative grace is meaningless, so `-1`
461/// fails the `u64` parse and falls back to the default rather than becoming a negative window.
462// Reached only by the accessors above and the `org create --expires` porcelain
463// (`enrollcmd`, the operator-managed validity window — now across the crate seam, hence
464// `pub`; still `#[doc(hidden)]` at the module level). Pure parser — no state.
465pub fn parse_duration(s: &str) -> Result<i64, String> {
466 let s = s.trim();
467 let (num, mult) = if let Some(n) = s.strip_suffix('d') {
468 (n, 24 * 3600)
469 } else if let Some(n) = s.strip_suffix('h') {
470 (n, 3600)
471 } else if let Some(n) = s.strip_suffix('m') {
472 (n, 60)
473 } else if let Some(n) = s.strip_suffix('s') {
474 (n, 1)
475 } else {
476 (s, 1)
477 };
478 num.trim()
479 .parse::<u64>()
480 .ok()
481 .and_then(|v| v.checked_mul(mult))
482 .and_then(|v| i64::try_from(v).ok())
483 .ok_or_else(|| format!("unparseable duration: {s}"))
484}
485
486// figment::Error is ~208 bytes; boxing it would churn the API for a cold path.
487#[allow(clippy::result_large_err)]
488impl Config {
489 #[allow(dead_code)] // exercised by unit tests; config-string entry point for later tooling
490 pub fn from_toml_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, figment::Error> {
491 Figment::new().merge(Toml::string(s)).extract()
492 }
493
494 /// Missing file → defaults (first run); malformed file → Err.
495 /// Callers must surface the Err — swallowing it silently reverts user choices.
496 pub fn load(path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<Self, figment::Error> {
497 Figment::new().merge(Toml::file(path)).extract()
498 }
499}
500
501#[cfg(test)]
502mod tests {
503 use super::*;
504
505 #[test]
506 fn empty_file_yields_spec_defaults() {
507 let c = Config::from_toml_str("").unwrap();
508 assert_eq!(c.network.relay_mode, "default");
509 assert_eq!(c.network.discovery_mode, "default");
510 assert_eq!(c.limits.rate_limit_per_min, 120);
511 assert_eq!(c.limits.max_inflight, 16);
512 assert_eq!(c.limits.max_sessions, 4);
513 }
514
515 #[test]
516 fn values_override_defaults() {
517 let c = Config::from_toml_str(
518 "[network]\nrelay_mode = \"disabled\"\n[limits]\nrate_limit_per_min = 60\n",
519 )
520 .unwrap();
521 assert_eq!(c.network.relay_mode, "disabled");
522 assert_eq!(c.limits.rate_limit_per_min, 60);
523 assert_eq!(c.limits.max_inflight, 16);
524 }
525
526 /// A legacy config carrying the removed `max_frame` key still loads (serde ignores unknown
527 /// fields) — the frame cap is a fixed constant now, not a tunable (see the `LimitsCfg` doc).
528 #[test]
529 fn legacy_max_frame_key_is_ignored_not_an_error() {
530 let c =
531 Config::from_toml_str("[limits]\nmax_frame = \"1MiB\"\nmax_sessions = 2\n").unwrap();
532 assert_eq!(c.limits.max_sessions, 2);
533 }
534
535 /// The self-hosting knobs parse: `custom` modes with their URL lists. (Validation —
536 /// custom-without-urls, unknown modes — lives in `daemon::net_plan`, tested there.)
537 #[test]
538 fn network_relay_and_discovery_urls_parse() {
539 let c = Config::from_toml_str(
540 "[network]\nrelay_mode = \"custom\"\nrelay_urls = [\"https://relay.acme.com\"]\n\
541 discovery_mode = \"custom\"\ndiscovery_urls = [\"https://dns.acme.com/pkarr\"]\n",
542 )
543 .unwrap();
544 assert_eq!(c.network.relay_mode, "custom");
545 assert_eq!(
546 c.network.relay_urls,
547 vec!["https://relay.acme.com".to_string()]
548 );
549 assert_eq!(c.network.discovery_mode, "custom");
550 assert_eq!(
551 c.network.discovery_urls,
552 vec!["https://dns.acme.com/pkarr".to_string()]
553 );
554 // Absent → empty lists (the defaults need no URLs).
555 let c = Config::from_toml_str("").unwrap();
556 assert!(c.network.relay_urls.is_empty() && c.network.discovery_urls.is_empty());
557 }
558
559 #[test]
560 fn missing_file_loads_defaults() {
561 let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
562 let c = Config::load(&dir.path().join("nope.toml")).unwrap();
563 assert_eq!(c.network.relay_mode, "default");
564 }
565
566 #[test]
567 fn roster_url_and_poll_interval_parse_with_defaults() {
568 // No [roster] table → url None, poll 1h default.
569 let c = Config::from_toml_str("").unwrap();
570 assert!(c.roster.url.is_none());
571 assert_eq!(c.roster.poll_interval_seconds(), 3600);
572 // A configured url + poll interval.
573 let c = Config::from_toml_str(
574 "[roster]\nurl = \"https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json\"\npoll_interval = \"30m\"\n",
575 )
576 .unwrap();
577 assert_eq!(
578 c.roster.url.as_deref(),
579 Some("https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json")
580 );
581 assert_eq!(c.roster.poll_interval_seconds(), 30 * 60);
582 // An unparseable poll_interval falls back to the hourly default (never disables the poll).
583 let c = Config::from_toml_str("[roster]\npoll_interval = \"never\"\n").unwrap();
584 assert_eq!(c.roster.poll_interval_seconds(), 3600);
585 // The url is additive: setting only grace_period keeps url None + the default poll.
586 let c = Config::from_toml_str("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"24h\"\n").unwrap();
587 assert!(c.roster.url.is_none());
588 assert_eq!(c.roster.poll_interval_seconds(), 3600);
589 }
590
591 #[test]
592 fn roster_max_staleness_defaults_to_24h_and_parses() {
593 // No [roster] table → the 24h freshness bound (the default).
594 let c = Config::from_toml_str("").unwrap();
595 assert_eq!(c.roster.max_staleness_seconds(), 24 * 3600);
596 // A configured value parses (units, like grace_period).
597 let c = Config::from_toml_str("[roster]\nmax_staleness = \"6h\"\n").unwrap();
598 assert_eq!(c.roster.max_staleness_seconds(), 6 * 3600);
599 // An unparseable value falls back to the 24h default (never disables the freshness bound).
600 let c = Config::from_toml_str("[roster]\nmax_staleness = \"forever\"\n").unwrap();
601 assert_eq!(c.roster.max_staleness_seconds(), 24 * 3600);
602 // Additive: setting only grace_period keeps the 24h max_staleness default.
603 let c = Config::from_toml_str("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"48h\"\n").unwrap();
604 assert_eq!(c.roster.max_staleness_seconds(), 24 * 3600);
605 }
606
607 #[test]
608 fn roster_grace_defaults_to_72h_and_parses_units() {
609 // Absent `[roster]` → the 72h default.
610 let c = Config::from_toml_str("").unwrap();
611 assert_eq!(c.roster.grace_seconds(), 72 * 3600);
612 // Hours / days / minutes / seconds / bare-seconds all resolve to seconds.
613 for (body, want) in [
614 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"24h\"\n", 24 * 3600),
615 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"72h\"\n", 72 * 3600),
616 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"1d\"\n", 24 * 3600),
617 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"30m\"\n", 30 * 60),
618 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"90s\"\n", 90),
619 ("[roster]\ngrace_period = \"3600\"\n", 3600), // bare seconds
620 ] {
621 assert_eq!(
622 Config::from_toml_str(body).unwrap().roster.grace_seconds(),
623 want,
624 "{body}"
625 );
626 }
627 }
628
629 #[test]
630 fn roster_grace_unparseable_or_negative_falls_back_to_default() {
631 // A garbage / negative / overflowing grace never disables degraded serving — it defaults.
632 for body in [
633 "[roster]\ngrace_period = \"seventy-two hours\"\n",
634 "[roster]\ngrace_period = \"-5h\"\n",
635 "[roster]\ngrace_period = \"18446744073709551615d\"\n", // overflows the checked_mul
636 "[roster]\ngrace_period = \"\"\n",
637 ] {
638 assert_eq!(
639 Config::from_toml_str(body).unwrap().roster.grace_seconds(),
640 72 * 3600,
641 "{body}"
642 );
643 }
644 }
645
646 #[test]
647 fn services_parse_run_and_socket() {
648 let c = Config::from_toml_str(concat!(
649 "[services.notes]\nrun = [\"npx\", \"server\"]\nallow = [\"bob\"]\n",
650 "[services.kb]\nsocket = \"/run/kb.sock\"\nallow = [\"team-eng\"]\n",
651 ))
652 .unwrap();
653 let notes = c.services.get("notes").unwrap();
654 assert!(
655 matches!(notes.backend_result(), Ok(Backend::Run(cmd)) if cmd == &["npx".to_string(), "server".to_string()][..])
656 );
657 assert_eq!(notes.allow, vec!["bob".to_string()]);
658 assert!(
659 matches!(c.services.get("kb").unwrap().backend_result(), Ok(Backend::Socket(p)) if p == "/run/kb.sock")
660 );
661 }
662
663 #[test]
664 fn service_with_both_run_and_socket_is_an_error() {
665 let e = Config::from_toml_str("[services.x]\nrun=[\"a\"]\nsocket=\"/s\"\nallow=[]\n");
666 // exactly one backend kind is required — validate at access time.
667 assert!(
668 e.unwrap()
669 .services
670 .get("x")
671 .unwrap()
672 .backend_result()
673 .is_err()
674 );
675 }
676
677 #[test]
678 fn identity_reads_user_id_and_user_key() {
679 let toml = "[identity]\n\
680 org_id = \"acme\"\n\
681 org_root_pk = \"b64u:AAAA\"\n\
682 user_id = \"alice\"\n\
683 user_key = \"/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key\"\n";
684 let cfg: Config = toml::from_str(toml).unwrap();
685 assert_eq!(cfg.identity.user_id.as_deref(), Some("alice"));
686 assert_eq!(
687 cfg.identity.user_key.as_deref(),
688 Some(std::path::Path::new("/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key"))
689 );
690 // Absent → None (pure-pairing / operator-only node).
691 let bare: Config = toml::from_str("[identity]\n").unwrap();
692 assert!(bare.identity.user_id.is_none() && bare.identity.user_key.is_none());
693 }
694
695 /// #80: `[blobs].gc_interval` must FAIL SAFE. A knob that deletes bytes gets the opposite
696 /// convention from every other duration here.
697 ///
698 /// `grace_period`/`poll_interval`/`max_staleness` fall back to their default on a typo, because
699 /// a typo must never disable a safety property. Here a fallback to *some* interval would let
700 /// `"1hh"` start deleting data the operator never authorized, so the fallback is OFF.
701 #[test]
702 fn a_bad_gc_interval_leaves_collection_off_rather_than_guessing_one() {
703 let off: Config = toml::from_str("[identity]\n").unwrap();
704 assert_eq!(
705 off.blobs.gc_interval_seconds(),
706 None,
707 "absent means no collection at all — the behavior of every release up to 0.42.0"
708 );
709
710 let on: Config = toml::from_str("[blobs]\ngc_interval = \"2h\"\n").unwrap();
711 assert_eq!(on.blobs.gc_interval_seconds(), Some(7200));
712
713 for bad in ["1hh", "", "soon", "-1", "0.5h"] {
714 let c: Config = toml::from_str(&format!("[blobs]\ngc_interval = \"{bad}\"\n")).unwrap();
715 assert_eq!(
716 c.blobs.gc_interval_seconds(),
717 None,
718 "an unparseable interval ({bad:?}) must leave collection OFF, never fall back to \
719 a default that deletes data"
720 );
721 }
722 }
723
724 /// Below the floor is REFUSED, not clamped up.
725 ///
726 /// A clamped value reads back through `status.storage.blobs_gc.interval_secs` as honoured and
727 /// is not. The boundary is pinned from both sides so a `>` / `>=` slip is visible.
728 #[test]
729 fn a_sub_minimum_gc_interval_is_refused_rather_than_clamped() {
730 let at: Config = toml::from_str(&format!(
731 "[blobs]\ngc_interval = \"{MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS}s\"\n"
732 ))
733 .unwrap();
734 assert_eq!(
735 at.blobs.gc_interval_seconds(),
736 Some(MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS as u64),
737 "exactly the floor is honoured"
738 );
739 for under in [MIN_GC_INTERVAL_SECS - 1, 1, 0] {
740 let c: Config =
741 toml::from_str(&format!("[blobs]\ngc_interval = \"{under}s\"\n")).unwrap();
742 assert_eq!(
743 c.blobs.gc_interval_seconds(),
744 None,
745 "{under}s is below the floor and must leave collection OFF, not be raised to it"
746 );
747 }
748 }
749}