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matter_kit/
messaging.rs

1//! Message processing: a datagram in, a protocol message out (Core §4.7).
2//!
3//! Everything below this module is sans-I/O and, until now, unconnected. [`msg`](crate::msg)
4//! frames and encrypts, [`session`](crate::session) holds the keys, [`exchange`](crate::exchange)
5//! holds the conversations and their reliability state — and nothing put the three together.
6//! This is that seam, and it is the whole of §4.7.1 "Message Transmission" and §4.7.2 "Message
7//! Reception".
8//!
9//! # Why it is a type and not a function
10//!
11//! Reception is not a pure decode. Three pieces of state change on the way through, and all
12//! three are security-relevant:
13//!
14//! * the **session's** replay window (§4.6.5), which decides whether a counter is new;
15//! * the **exchange's** MRP state (§4.12), which decides whether an acknowledgement is owed
16//!   and whether a retransmission is still outstanding;
17//! * the **exchange table** itself, since a message may open an exchange the peer initiated.
18//!
19//! A receiver that decoded without updating them would accept replays. One that updated them
20//! before authenticating would let an unauthenticated sender move a window it has no key for
21//! — which is why the order here is fixed: find the session, **decrypt**, and only then touch
22//! any counter.
23//!
24//! # A duplicate is acknowledged and dropped
25//!
26//! §4.12.2.2 is emphatic, and it is the rule most easily got wrong in the direction that
27//! looks like it works:
28//!
29//! > The receiver SHALL send an acknowledgment message to the sender for each instance of an
30//! > authenticated, reliable message, including duplicates. The reliability layer SHALL only
31//! > propagate the first instance of a message to the next higher layer.
32//!
33//! Drop a duplicate silently and the sender retransmits until it gives up; deliver it twice
34//! and the application acts on it twice. [`Received::Duplicate`] is neither.
35
36use crate::config::Config;
37use crate::error::{Error, ErrorCode, Result, bail};
38use crate::exchange::{EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT, ExchangeKey, ExchangeTable, MrpParams, OnTimeout};
39use crate::msg::{CounterKind, CounterWindow, MessageCounter, Verdict};
40use crate::msg::{
41    Destination, MessageHeader, NonceSource, ProtocolHeader, ProtocolId, SessionId, SessionType,
42    preview, protect, unprotect,
43};
44use crate::platform::{Instant, Peer};
45use crate::session::{SecureSession, SessionKind, SessionTable};
46
47/// The largest a Protocol Header can be (§4.4.3): the exchange flags, the opcode, the
48/// exchange id, a 32-bit protocol id and an acknowledged counter.
49///
50/// Only [`Messaging::acknowledge`] needs it: a standalone acknowledgement has no payload, so
51/// the body it frames is the header on its own.
52const PROTOCOL_HEADER_MAX: usize = 16;
53
54/// What arrived, once the message has been authenticated and routed.
55#[derive(Debug)]
56#[non_exhaustive]
57pub enum Received<'a> {
58    /// A group datagram (§4.16), which belongs to the group key store rather than here.
59    ///
60    /// Nothing about it has been decrypted or authenticated: a group message is keyed by an
61    /// operational group key, and which key it is has to be found by trying every installed
62    /// one whose session id matches (§4.17.3.6). Hand `buf` — unchanged — to
63    /// [`group::wire::receive`](crate::group::wire::receive), which does that and returns the
64    /// payload; a node that holds no group keys drops it.
65    Group {
66        /// The Group Session Id from the header, which selects the candidate keys.
67        session_id: SessionId,
68        /// Where it came from.
69        from: Peer,
70    },
71    /// The peer closed the session, and this node has done the same (§4.11.1.4).
72    ///
73    /// The session, its keys and its exchanges are gone by the time this is returned — that
74    /// is what "SHALL remove all state associated with the session" means, and it is done
75    /// here rather than left to the caller because none of that state is the caller's.
76    ///
77    /// What *is* the caller's is everything keyed on a session above this layer: §8.5's
78    /// subscriptions above all, which report on a session and have nowhere to go once it has
79    /// gone, and the §5.5 commissioning channel, which a closed PASE session releases.
80    SessionClosed {
81        /// The session that was closed.
82        session: SessionId,
83    },
84    /// A protocol message for the layer above.
85    Message {
86        /// The exchange it belongs to.
87        exchange: ExchangeKey,
88        /// The protocol header it carried.
89        header: ProtocolHeader,
90        /// Whether an acknowledgement is owed, which [`Messaging::acknowledge`] sends.
91        needs_ack: bool,
92        /// The application payload, decrypted in place.
93        payload: &'a [u8],
94    },
95    /// An authenticated message this node has already seen (§4.12.2.2).
96    ///
97    /// Not delivered upward. Still acknowledged, because the sender's retransmission means
98    /// its last acknowledgement was lost, not that its message was.
99    Duplicate {
100        /// The exchange it belongs to.
101        exchange: ExchangeKey,
102        /// Whether an acknowledgement is owed.
103        needs_ack: bool,
104    },
105    /// A standalone acknowledgement, consumed entirely by the reliability layer.
106    Acknowledged {
107        /// The exchange it acknowledged.
108        exchange: ExchangeKey,
109    },
110}
111
112/// What a timer expiry asks the caller to do.
113#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
114pub enum Due {
115    /// Retransmit the message with this counter on this exchange (§4.12.2.1).
116    ///
117    /// "Logical retransmission is of a given message as identified by its message counter",
118    /// so the caller resends the *same bytes*, not a re-encoding: a new counter would be a
119    /// new message and would reuse a nonce.
120    Retransmit {
121        /// Which exchange.
122        exchange: ExchangeKey,
123        /// The counter of the message to resend.
124        counter: u32,
125    },
126    /// An acknowledgement has waited long enough for a message to ride on (§4.12.5.2.2).
127    ///
128    /// [`Messaging::acknowledge`] writes it.
129    Acknowledge {
130        /// Which exchange owes it.
131        exchange: ExchangeKey,
132    },
133    /// `MRP_MAX_TRANSMISSIONS` passed with no acknowledgement; the exchange is closed.
134    Abandoned {
135        /// Which exchange was given up on.
136        exchange: ExchangeKey,
137    },
138}
139
140/// Which protocols the upper layer will accept (§4.10.3.1).
141///
142/// "The Interaction Model layer indicates to the Exchange Layer which Protocols it will accept.
143/// Any message for a Protocol ID that is not registered with the Exchange Layer SHALL be
144/// dropped."
145///
146/// This is not bookkeeping. §4.10.5.2 opens an exchange for any unsolicited message with the
147/// **I** flag, and on the unsecured session that is any datagram at all — so the set of
148/// protocols a node answers is also the set an attacker can make it allocate for. A node that
149/// registers only what it serves refuses the rest before the exchange table is touched.
150#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
151pub struct Protocols(u8);
152
153impl Protocols {
154    const fn bit(protocol: ProtocolId) -> Option<u8> {
155        if protocol.vendor.0 != crate::msg::VendorId::COMMON.0 {
156            return None;
157        }
158        match protocol.id {
159            0x0000..=0x0004 => Some(1u8 << protocol.id),
160            _ => None,
161        }
162    }
163
164    /// Nothing registered — every unsolicited message is dropped.
165    pub const NONE: Self = Self(0);
166
167    /// Secure Channel (§4.11). Every node needs it: it is how sessions are established.
168    pub const SECURE_CHANNEL: Self = Self(1 << 0);
169    /// The Interaction Model (ch. 8) — what a node that serves clusters registers.
170    pub const INTERACTION_MODEL: Self = Self(1 << 1);
171    /// BDX (§11.22), for a node that transfers files.
172    pub const BDX: Self = Self(1 << 2);
173    /// User Directed Commissioning (§5.3).
174    pub const USER_DIRECTED_COMMISSIONING: Self = Self(1 << 3);
175    /// The range reserved for testing.
176    pub const FOR_TESTING: Self = Self(1 << 4);
177
178    /// What an ordinary device registers: Secure Channel and the Interaction Model.
179    pub const DEVICE: Self = Self(Self::SECURE_CHANNEL.0 | Self::INTERACTION_MODEL.0);
180
181    /// Both of these, registered.
182    #[must_use]
183    pub const fn with(self, other: Self) -> Self {
184        Self(self.0 | other.0)
185    }
186
187    /// Whether `protocol` is registered.
188    ///
189    /// A vendor-specific protocol id is never registered: §4.10.3.1's registration is by
190    /// identity, and this node serves none.
191    #[must_use]
192    pub const fn contains(self, protocol: ProtocolId) -> bool {
193        match Self::bit(protocol) {
194            Some(bit) => self.0 & bit != 0,
195            None => false,
196        }
197    }
198}
199
200/// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context, reduced to what framing needs.
201#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
202struct UnsecuredPeer {
203    /// The Ephemeral Initiator Node ID, whichever end chose it.
204    ephemeral_initiator: crate::msg::NodeId,
205    /// Whether *this* node is the initiator, which decides which header field carries it.
206    we_initiated: bool,
207}
208
209/// A session that was evicted to make room for a new one (§4.11.1.1).
210///
211/// The session and its exchanges are already gone. What is left is the `CLOSE_SESSION`
212/// status report the specification owes the evicted peer, framed and ready in the caller's
213/// output buffer.
214#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
215#[must_use = "§4.11.1.1 step 2a owes the evicted peer a CloseSession status report"]
216pub struct Evicted {
217    /// The session that was removed.
218    pub session: SessionId,
219    /// Where its peer was, if the session knew — nothing to send to if it did not.
220    pub peer: Option<Peer>,
221    /// How many octets of the output buffer the report occupies. Zero if it could not be
222    /// framed, which is not a reason to abandon the eviction.
223    pub len: usize,
224}
225
226/// A node's message processing: sessions, exchanges, and the framing between them.
227///
228/// `S` sizes the session table and `X` the exchange table. Both default to a device-sized
229/// node that satisfies every specification minimum for five fabrics, and
230/// [`SessionTable::CHECK`](crate::session::SessionTable::CHECK) refuses an `S` that cannot.
231#[derive(Debug)]
232pub struct Messaging<C: Config, const S: usize = 16, const X: usize = 64> {
233    sessions: SessionTable<C, S>,
234    exchanges: ExchangeTable<C, X>,
235    /// The counter for messages sent on the unsecured session (§4.6.1.2).
236    unsecured_counter: MessageCounter,
237    /// Duplicate detection for the unsecured session.
238    ///
239    /// §4.6.5 applies to unencrypted messages too, and this is the window that makes a PASE
240    /// handshake replay-resistant before any key exists.
241    unsecured_window: CounterWindow,
242    /// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context: the **Ephemeral Initiator Node ID**, and which
243    /// end of it this node is.
244    ///
245    /// "Randomly selected for each session by the initiator from the Operational Node ID range
246    /// and enclosed by initiator as Source Node ID and responder as Destination Node ID."
247    ///
248    /// One context, not a table. §4.13.2.1 allows several, keyed by ephemeral id, but a device
249    /// answers one session establishment at a time — which
250    /// [`PaseAdmission`](crate::commissioning::PaseAdmission) now enforces — and a controller
251    /// commissions one device at a time.
252    unsecured_peer: Option<UnsecuredPeer>,
253    /// Whether to apply §4.9's privacy processing to outgoing secure unicast messages.
254    privacy: bool,
255    /// §4.10.3.1's registered protocols.
256    protocols: Protocols,
257}
258
259impl<C: Config, const S: usize, const X: usize> Messaging<C, S, X> {
260    /// A node with no sessions and no exchanges.
261    ///
262    /// `first_session_id`, `first_exchange_id` and `initial_counter` should all come from
263    /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng). §4.6.1.1 requires the counter to start at random: one
264    /// that always starts at zero leaks how many times a device has rebooted and makes nonce
265    /// reuse across a factory reset far too easy. A full-width random number is what to pass —
266    /// [`MessageCounter::new`](crate::msg::MessageCounter::new) narrows it to the twenty-eight
267    /// bits §4.6.1.1 allows, so the caller does not have to know that it must.
268    #[must_use]
269    pub fn new(first_session_id: u16, first_exchange_id: u16, initial_counter: u32) -> Self {
270        Self {
271            sessions: SessionTable::new(first_session_id),
272            exchanges: ExchangeTable::new(first_exchange_id),
273            unsecured_counter: MessageCounter::new(initial_counter),
274            unsecured_window: CounterWindow::new(CounterKind::Rollover),
275            unsecured_peer: None,
276            privacy: false,
277            protocols: Protocols::DEVICE,
278        }
279    }
280
281    /// Registers the protocols this node's upper layer will accept (§4.10.3.1).
282    ///
283    /// Defaults to [`Protocols::DEVICE`] — Secure Channel and the Interaction Model — which is
284    /// what a node that serves clusters needs. A node that also transfers files registers
285    /// [`Protocols::BDX`] on top; one that does neither registers less.
286    pub const fn register(&mut self, protocols: Protocols) {
287        self.protocols = protocols;
288    }
289
290    /// Which protocols are registered.
291    #[must_use]
292    pub const fn protocols(&self) -> Protocols {
293        self.protocols
294    }
295
296    /// Applies §4.9's privacy processing to outgoing secure unicast messages.
297    ///
298    /// Off by default, and deliberately. The **P** flag is only *required* on group messages
299    /// (§4.16.2 step 2c, §4.18): on a secure unicast session it is the sender's choice, and what it
300    /// buys is hiding the message counter from a passive observer on the link — the counter
301    /// is already authenticated, and anyone with the key can read it either way. What it
302    /// costs is depending on every peer having exercised its deobfuscation path, which is
303    /// not a bet worth making by default for a property this small.
304    ///
305    /// Receiving a private message never needs this: the flag is in the message, and
306    /// [`Messaging::receive`] honours it whatever this is set to.
307    pub const fn set_privacy(&mut self, privacy: bool) {
308        self.privacy = privacy;
309    }
310
311    /// Opens §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context as the **initiator**.
312    ///
313    /// `ephemeral` is the Ephemeral Initiator Node ID this node encloses as the Source Node ID
314    /// of every unsecured message it sends, and which the responder will echo back as the
315    /// Destination Node ID. §4.13.2.1: "Initiators SHALL select a new random ephemeral node ID
316    /// for each unsecured session", from the Operational Node ID range — so it comes from
317    /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng) and is *not* the node's operational identity. A node that
318    /// reused one identity across sessions would let a passive observer link them.
319    ///
320    /// # Errors
321    ///
322    /// [`ErrorCode::InvalidArgument`] unless `ephemeral` is in the Operational Node ID range.
323    pub fn open_unsecured_as_initiator(&mut self, ephemeral: crate::msg::NodeId) -> Result<()> {
324        if !ephemeral.is_operational() {
325            bail!(InvalidArgument)
326        }
327        self.unsecured_peer = Some(UnsecuredPeer {
328            ephemeral_initiator: ephemeral,
329            we_initiated: true,
330        });
331        Ok(())
332    }
333
334    /// Opens an unsecured exchange as the initiator, establishing §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session
335    /// Context in the same call.
336    ///
337    /// This is how a commissioner starts PASE, and how any node starts CASE: both handshakes
338    /// run on the unsecured session before there is a key. The context is not optional —
339    /// §4.13.2.1 has the initiator "enclose" its Ephemeral Initiator Node ID as the Source Node
340    /// ID of every message, and a message with neither a Source nor a Destination is one the
341    /// specification tells the responder to discard.
342    ///
343    /// `randomness` comes from the caller's [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng) and becomes the
344    /// ephemeral id, which is a *new* one for each unsecured session by §4.13.2.1.
345    pub fn open_unsecured(
346        &mut self,
347        protocol: ProtocolId,
348        now: Instant,
349        randomness: u64,
350    ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
351        self.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId::ephemeral(randomness))?;
352        let params = self.mrp_params(SessionId::UNSECURED);
353        self.exchanges
354            .open_initiator(SessionId::UNSECURED, protocol, params, None, now)
355    }
356
357    /// Forgets the Unsecured Session Context, so the next handshake starts a new one.
358    ///
359    /// §4.13.2.1 requires a *new* ephemeral id per unsecured session, so a node that runs PASE
360    /// and then CASE against the same peer closes the first context before opening the second.
361    pub const fn close_unsecured(&mut self) {
362        self.unsecured_peer = None;
363    }
364
365    /// The Ephemeral Initiator Node ID of the current Unsecured Session Context, if there is one.
366    #[must_use]
367    pub const fn unsecured_ephemeral_id(&self) -> Option<crate::msg::NodeId> {
368        match self.unsecured_peer {
369            Some(peer) => Some(peer.ephemeral_initiator),
370            None => None,
371        }
372    }
373
374    /// The session table.
375    pub const fn sessions(&self) -> &SessionTable<C, S> {
376        &self.sessions
377    }
378
379    /// The session table, mutably — for the fields a completed handshake fills in
380    /// afterwards, such as §11.18.6.8 step 10a's accessing fabric.
381    ///
382    /// Installing a session goes through [`Messaging::install_session`] instead: a session
383    /// and its exchanges are one lifetime, and this reference only reaches one of them.
384    pub const fn sessions_mut(&mut self) -> &mut SessionTable<C, S> {
385        &mut self.sessions
386    }
387
388    /// Installs the session a handshake produced, evicting one if there is no room
389    /// (§4.11.1.1).
390    ///
391    /// A session table that answers `NoSpace` is a node that can be commissioned exactly
392    /// as many times as the session table is long and then never again — and the failure appears at the
393    /// *next* administrator, not at the one who filled it. §4.11.1.1 is explicit about the
394    /// alternative and about its three steps, in order:
395    ///
396    /// 1. the least recently used session, by `SessionTimestamp`;
397    /// 2. a `StatusReport(SUCCESS, SECURE_CHANNEL, CLOSE_SESSION)` **to that peer**, and
398    ///    only then "remove all state associated with the session";
399    /// 3. the new session's own establishment message, which the caller was sending anyway.
400    ///
401    /// Step 2's two halves are why this takes buffers and returns an [`Evicted`]: the report
402    /// has to be framed while the session that encrypts it still exists, and put on the wire
403    /// by whoever owns the socket. The removal has already happened when this returns; what
404    /// is left is a datagram the caller sends to [`Evicted::peer`]. Dropping it costs the
405    /// peer nothing worse than a session it believes in until its next message fails, which
406    /// is why this is `must_use` rather than an error.
407    ///
408    /// `Ok(None)` is the ordinary case: there was room and nothing was evicted.
409    pub fn install_session(
410        &mut self,
411        session: SecureSession,
412        now: Instant,
413        randomness: u32,
414        scratch: &mut [u8],
415        out: &mut [u8],
416    ) -> Result<Option<Evicted>> {
417        if self.sessions.len() < S {
418            self.sessions.insert(session)?;
419            return Ok(None);
420        }
421        let Some(victim) = self.sessions.least_recently_used() else {
422            // No room and nothing to evict means `S == 0`, which `AssertValid` forbids.
423            bail!(NoSpace)
424        };
425        let peer = self.sessions.find(victim).and_then(|s| s.peer);
426        // Framed before the removal, because it is encrypted under the evicted session's own
427        // keys: a report built afterwards has nothing to encrypt it with.
428        let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
429            general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
430            protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
431            protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
432            data: &[],
433        };
434        let mut body = [0u8; 16];
435        let len = report.encode(&mut body)?;
436        let Some(body) = body.get(..len) else {
437            bail!(BufferTooSmall)
438        };
439        let exchange = self.open(victim, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, now)?;
440        let framed = self
441            .send(
442                exchange,
443                crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
444                false,
445                body,
446                now,
447                randomness,
448                scratch,
449                out,
450            )
451            .map(|(n, _)| n);
452        // §4.13.3.1: "remove all state associated with the session" — the exchanges on it
453        // included, and including the one just used to say goodbye.
454        self.close_session(victim);
455        self.sessions.insert(session)?;
456        Ok(Some(Evicted {
457            session: victim,
458            peer,
459            len: framed.unwrap_or(0),
460        }))
461    }
462
463    /// Removes a session and everything associated with it (§4.13.3.1).
464    ///
465    /// Returns whether there was one. The exchanges on that session go with it: an exchange
466    /// outlives its session only as an entry nothing can ever answer on, holding a slot in a
467    /// fixed-capacity table until it times out.
468    pub fn close_session(&mut self, session: SessionId) -> bool {
469        self.exchanges.close_session(session);
470        self.sessions.remove(session)
471    }
472
473    /// Removes every session on a fabric, and their exchanges — what `RemoveFabric`
474    /// (§11.18.6.12) owes at the message layer.
475    ///
476    /// Returns how many sessions went. The clusters' half of the same command is
477    /// [`Lifecycle::FabricRemoved`](crate::im::Lifecycle::FabricRemoved).
478    pub fn remove_fabric(&mut self, fabric: crate::msg::FabricIndex) -> usize {
479        let doomed: heapless::Vec<SessionId, S> = self
480            .sessions
481            .iter()
482            .filter(|s| s.fabric_index == fabric)
483            .map(|s| s.local_session_id)
484            .collect();
485        for session in &doomed {
486            self.exchanges.close_session(*session);
487        }
488        self.sessions.remove_fabric(fabric)
489    }
490
491    /// The exchange table.
492    pub const fn exchanges(&self) -> &ExchangeTable<C, X> {
493        &self.exchanges
494    }
495
496    /// The exchange table, mutably.
497    pub const fn exchanges_mut(&mut self) -> &mut ExchangeTable<C, X> {
498        &mut self.exchanges
499    }
500
501    /// Opens an exchange this node initiates, to a peer it has not named yet.
502    ///
503    /// The peer is learned from the first message that comes back. Prefer
504    /// [`Messaging::open_to`] where it is already known: until it is, this node assumes UDP
505    /// and runs MRP, which is right for UDP and one wasted round trip on BTP.
506    pub fn open(
507        &mut self,
508        session: SessionId,
509        protocol: ProtocolId,
510        now: Instant,
511    ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
512        // §4.13.2.1 gives an unsecured initiator one obligation before it sends anything: an
513        // Unsecured Session Context, whose Ephemeral Initiator Node ID it "encloses as Source
514        // Node ID". Without one, [`Messaging::send`] has no id to put in the header and emits a
515        // message carrying neither a Source nor a Destination — which the specification tells
516        // the receiver to discard, and which the CHIP SDK does. The message is built, counted
517        // and dropped, and nothing anywhere says so.
518        //
519        // So an unsecured exchange is opened through [`Messaging::open_unsecured`], which
520        // establishes the context in the same call, and this door is closed rather than left
521        // to be remembered.
522        if session == SessionId::UNSECURED && self.unsecured_peer.is_none() {
523            bail!(InvalidState)
524        }
525        let params = self.mrp_params(session);
526        // Where the peer last was, which is the only answer available and the right one: a
527        // session exists because that peer authenticated itself from there. Opening with no
528        // peer produces an exchange that cannot send — [`Stack::send`] builds the message and
529        // [`Stack::peer`] then has no address to give the caller, so the message is built,
530        // counted, and dropped, with no error anywhere. Use [`Stack::open_to`] to name a
531        // different address, for a peer just rediscovered at a new one.
532        let peer = self.sessions.find(session).and_then(|s| s.peer);
533        self.exchanges
534            .open_initiator(session, protocol, params, peer, now)
535    }
536
537    /// Opens an exchange to a peer this node has already found.
538    ///
539    /// Naming the transport is what lets §4.12.4 be honoured: a BLE peer's exchange never
540    /// sets the **R** flag, because BTP has already delivered the message or closed the
541    /// session trying.
542    pub fn open_to(
543        &mut self,
544        session: SessionId,
545        protocol: ProtocolId,
546        peer: Peer,
547        now: Instant,
548    ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
549        // The same obligation as [`Messaging::open`]: an unsecured initiator has to have
550        // §4.13.2.1's context before it sends, or its message carries no Source Node ID and the
551        // responder is told to discard it. [`Messaging::open_unsecured_to`] does both.
552        if session == SessionId::UNSECURED && self.unsecured_peer.is_none() {
553            bail!(InvalidState)
554        }
555        let params = self.mrp_params(session);
556        self.exchanges
557            .open_initiator(session, protocol, params, Some(peer), now)
558    }
559
560    /// [`Messaging::open_unsecured`], to a peer whose address is already known.
561    ///
562    /// What a commissioner uses: it found the device over BLE or mDNS, so it has somewhere to
563    /// send before any session exists.
564    pub fn open_unsecured_to(
565        &mut self,
566        protocol: ProtocolId,
567        peer: Peer,
568        now: Instant,
569        randomness: u64,
570    ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
571        self.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId::ephemeral(randomness))?;
572        let params = self.mrp_params(SessionId::UNSECURED);
573        self.exchanges
574            .open_initiator(SessionId::UNSECURED, protocol, params, Some(peer), now)
575    }
576
577    /// Where an exchange's peer is, once it is known.
578    #[must_use]
579    pub fn peer(&self, exchange: ExchangeKey) -> Option<Peer> {
580        self.exchanges.find(exchange).and_then(|e| e.peer)
581    }
582
583    fn mrp_params(&self, session: SessionId) -> MrpParams {
584        self.sessions
585            .find(session)
586            .map_or_else(MrpParams::default, |s| s.mrp)
587    }
588
589    /// Closes an exchange.
590    pub fn close(&mut self, exchange: ExchangeKey) -> bool {
591        self.exchanges.close(exchange)
592    }
593
594    /// Processes one arriving datagram, in place (§4.7.2).
595    ///
596    /// `buf` is decrypted in place, so the returned payload borrows it. On any failure the
597    /// contents of `buf` are unspecified — §3.6.2 says a failed tag check leaves the payload
598    /// undefined — and nothing in this node's state has moved.
599    pub fn receive<'b>(
600        &mut self,
601        buf: &'b mut [u8],
602        from: Peer,
603        now: Instant,
604    ) -> Result<Received<'b>> {
605        let head = preview(buf)?;
606        if matches!(head.session_type, SessionType::Group) {
607            // §4.16: a group message is keyed by an *operational group key* and belongs to no
608            // session, so none of this function's machinery applies to it — there is no
609            // session to find, no replay window of a session's to move, and no exchange, since
610            // §4.16.2 step 2c sets only the P flag, so a group message is never
611            // reliable and never acknowledged.
612            //
613            // It is handed back rather than refused. A device with a group key store routes it
614            // to [`group::wire::receive`](crate::group::wire::receive), which is the same layer
615            // as this one for keys it holds rather than sessions; a device without one drops
616            // it. Answering `Unsupported` here made the two halves look like one missing one.
617            return Ok(Received::Group {
618                session_id: head.session_id,
619                from,
620            });
621        }
622
623        let (header, range) = if head.session_id == SessionId::UNSECURED {
624            let (header, rest) = MessageHeader::decode(buf)?;
625            if !header.is_unsecured() {
626                bail!(MessageReserved)
627            }
628            let start = buf.len().saturating_sub(rest.len());
629            (header, start..buf.len())
630        } else {
631            let session = self
632                .sessions
633                .find(head.session_id)
634                .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
635            // §4.8.1.1's nonce depends on how the session was established, and getting it
636            // wrong fails the tag rather than silently mis-decrypting — but naming it here
637            // keeps the two readings from ever being confused.
638            let nonce_source = match session.kind {
639                SessionKind::Pase => NonceSource::Pase,
640                SessionKind::Case => NonceSource::Case(session.peer_node_id),
641            };
642            let keys = session.keys.receiving(session.role).clone();
643            unprotect(buf, &keys, nonce_source)?
644        };
645
646        // Authenticated. Only now may any counter move.
647        let verdict = if header.is_unsecured() {
648            self.unsecured_window.accept(header.message_counter)
649        } else {
650            let session = self
651                .sessions
652                .find_mut(head.session_id)
653                .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
654            // Authenticated, so it is the peer and this is where it is. A node that opens an
655            // exchange of its own — §8.5.3's subscription reports above all — has no other way
656            // to learn the address, and an exchange with no peer sends nothing.
657            session.peer = Some(from);
658            session.accept_counter(header.message_counter, now)
659        };
660
661        let Some(payload) = buf.get(range) else {
662            bail!(MessageTruncated)
663        };
664        let (protocol_header, body) = ProtocolHeader::decode(payload)?;
665
666        // §4.13.2.1's context matching: "Else if the message carries a Source Node ID … Set
667        // Session Role to responder … Record the incoming message's Source Node ID as Ephemeral
668        // Initiator Node ID." Recorded here, before the exchange is routed, so that the very
669        // first reply carries it back as the Destination Node ID.
670        // §4.13.2.1 step 1c: "Else discard the message." A message that matches no context and
671        // carries no Source Node ID belongs to no session, and accepting it is what let this
672        // crate's own initiator get away with sending one — the two halves agreed with each
673        // other and disagreed with the specification.
674        if header.is_unsecured() && header.source.is_none() {
675            let addressed_to_our_context = matches!(
676                (self.unsecured_peer, header.destination),
677                (Some(peer), Destination::Node(id)) if peer.ephemeral_initiator == id
678            );
679            if !addressed_to_our_context {
680                bail!(NoSession)
681            }
682        }
683        if header.is_unsecured()
684            && let Some(source) = header.source
685            && self
686                .unsecured_peer
687                .is_none_or(|peer| peer.ephemeral_initiator != source)
688        {
689            // §4.13.2.1 matches a context by Ephemeral Initiator Node ID and creates a *new*
690            // one when no context matches. A different id is a different session — a second
691            // commissioner, or the same one returning for CASE after PASE — so the context is
692            // replaced rather than kept. Keeping the first would address every reply to a peer
693            // that has gone, which the CHIP SDK drops as belonging to no session of its own.
694            //
695            // One context at a time is the simplification here; the specification allows
696            // several. What makes it safe is that the *contents* are two header fields and a
697            // replay window, and admitting a second handshake at all is refused a layer up by
698            // `PaseAdmission`.
699            self.unsecured_peer = Some(UnsecuredPeer {
700                ephemeral_initiator: source,
701                we_initiated: false,
702            });
703        }
704
705        let duplicate = matches!(verdict, Verdict::Duplicate);
706        let key = self.route(header.session_id, &protocol_header, duplicate, now)?;
707        let Some(exchange) = self.exchanges.find_mut(key) else {
708            bail!(NoExchange)
709        };
710        exchange.touch(now);
711        // Where the reply goes, and — §4.12.4 — whether MRP runs on this exchange. A peer
712        // that moved (a Thread node changing address, say) is followed here.
713        exchange.peer = Some(from);
714        exchange.mrp.note_peer_activity(now);
715
716        // §4.12.1: an acknowledgement may ride on any message, so it is taken before the
717        // message's own kind is considered.
718        if let Some(acknowledged) = protocol_header.acknowledged_counter {
719            exchange.mrp.on_ack(acknowledged, now);
720        }
721
722        if protocol_header.reliability {
723            exchange
724                .mrp
725                .on_reliable_received(header.message_counter, now, duplicate);
726        }
727        let needs_ack = protocol_header.reliability;
728
729        if duplicate {
730            return Ok(Received::Duplicate {
731                exchange: key,
732                needs_ack,
733            });
734        }
735        if protocol_header.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
736            && protocol_header.opcode == crate::sc::opcode::MRP_STANDALONE_ACK
737        {
738            // A standalone acknowledgement carries nothing above the reliability layer.
739            return Ok(Received::Acknowledged { exchange: key });
740        }
741
742        // §4.11.1.4: "If a Node has either sent or received a CloseSession StatusReport, that
743        // Node SHALL remove all state associated with the session." Both halves are the
744        // message layer's, and this is the half a node is most likely to leave out — sending
745        // one is a decision it makes, receiving one is something that happens to it.
746        //
747        // Handled here rather than handed upward because the rule is about *this* layer's
748        // state: the session, its keys, its counters and its exchanges, including the exchange
749        // this message arrived on. A node that passed it up would answer on a session the
750        // specification says is already gone.
751        if !header.is_unsecured()
752            && protocol_header.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
753            && protocol_header.opcode == crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT
754            && matches!(
755                crate::sc::status::StatusReport::decode(body),
756                Ok(report)
757                    if report.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
758                        && report.protocol_code
759                            == crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16
760            )
761        {
762            let session = header.session_id;
763            self.close_session(session);
764            return Ok(Received::SessionClosed { session });
765        }
766
767        Ok(Received::Message {
768            exchange: key,
769            header: protocol_header,
770            needs_ack,
771            payload: body,
772        })
773    }
774
775    /// Finds or opens the exchange a message belongs to (§4.10.5.2).
776    ///
777    /// The three rules are in order, and the order is what bounds the table:
778    ///
779    /// 1. "If the unsolicited message is not marked as having a duplicate message counter,
780    ///    **has a registered Protocol ID**, and the I Flag is set: create a new exchange."
781    /// 2. "Otherwise, if the message has the R Flag set: create an *ephemeral* exchange … and
782    ///    send an immediate standalone acknowledgement. The message SHALL NOT be forwarded to
783    ///    the upper layer."
784    /// 3. "Otherwise, processing of the message SHALL stop."
785    ///
786    /// Rule 3 is the one that matters most and is the easiest to leave out: a message this
787    /// node will never act on, and which is not even asking for an acknowledgement, must not
788    /// cost a table entry. Without it every datagram that reaches the port allocates.
789    fn route(
790        &mut self,
791        session: SessionId,
792        header: &ProtocolHeader,
793        duplicate: bool,
794        now: Instant,
795    ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
796        if let Some(exchange) =
797            self.exchanges
798                .find_for_message(session, header.exchange_id, header.initiator)
799        {
800            return Ok(exchange.key);
801        }
802        // Only a message *from* an initiator may open an exchange. One claiming to be from a
803        // responder with no exchange to respond to is answering a question nobody asked.
804        if !header.initiator {
805            bail!(NoExchange)
806        }
807        let params = self.mrp_params(session);
808        if !duplicate && self.protocols.contains(header.protocol) {
809            return self.exchanges.open_responder(
810                session,
811                header.exchange_id,
812                header.protocol,
813                params,
814                now,
815            );
816        }
817        if header.reliability {
818            // Rule 2. The sender is owed an acknowledgement even though nothing here will
819            // read its message — withholding it costs five retransmissions — but the entry
820            // that carries it is closed as soon as it has been sent.
821            return self.exchanges.open_ephemeral(
822                session,
823                header.exchange_id,
824                header.protocol,
825                params,
826                now,
827            );
828        }
829        // Rule 3.
830        bail!(NoExchange)
831    }
832
833    /// Builds an outgoing message on an exchange (§4.7.1).
834    ///
835    /// `reliable` sets the MRP **R** flag; a reliable message is remembered for
836    /// retransmission until it is acknowledged, and [`Messaging::poll`] is what resends it.
837    /// `randomness` is the jitter draw of §4.12.2.1 and should come from
838    /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng).
839    ///
840    /// Returns how many octets of `out` the datagram occupies, and the counter it was sent
841    /// with — which is what a retransmission is identified by.
842    #[expect(
843        clippy::too_many_arguments,
844        reason = "every one is a distinct fact about the message; bundling them into a \
845                  struct would only move the same list one line up"
846    )]
847    pub fn send(
848        &mut self,
849        exchange: ExchangeKey,
850        opcode: u8,
851        reliable: bool,
852        payload: &[u8],
853        now: Instant,
854        randomness: u32,
855        scratch: &mut [u8],
856        out: &mut [u8],
857    ) -> Result<(usize, u32)> {
858        let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find(exchange) else {
859            bail!(NoExchange)
860        };
861        let protocol = open.protocol;
862        // §4.12.4: "Reliable messages sent over TCP, PAFTP, or BTP SHALL utilize the
863        // underlying reliability mechanisms of those transports and SHOULD NOT set the R
864        // Flag." Running MRP on top of BTP would retransmit a message BTP has already
865        // guaranteed, and BTP would carry the duplicate faithfully.
866        let reliable = reliable && !open.is_transport_reliable();
867        let piggyback = self
868            .exchanges
869            .find_mut(exchange)
870            .and_then(|e| e.mrp.take_piggyback());
871
872        let protocol_header = ProtocolHeader {
873            initiator: exchange.role.is_initiator(),
874            acknowledged_counter: piggyback,
875            reliability: reliable,
876            exchange_id: exchange.id,
877            protocol,
878            opcode,
879        };
880
881        let counter = self.next_counter(exchange.session, now)?;
882        let written = self.frame(
883            exchange.session,
884            counter,
885            &protocol_header,
886            payload,
887            scratch,
888            out,
889        )?;
890
891        if reliable && let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find_mut(exchange) {
892            open.mrp.on_send(counter, now, randomness)?;
893        }
894        Ok((written, counter))
895    }
896
897    /// Sends the standalone acknowledgement a [`Received`] said was owed (§4.12.1).
898    ///
899    /// A standalone ack is *not* reliable — acknowledging an acknowledgement would never
900    /// terminate — and carries no payload.
901    pub fn acknowledge(
902        &mut self,
903        exchange: ExchangeKey,
904        now: Instant,
905        out: &mut [u8],
906    ) -> Result<usize> {
907        let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find_mut(exchange) else {
908            bail!(NoExchange)
909        };
910        let ephemeral = open.ephemeral;
911        let Some(acknowledged) = open.mrp.take_piggyback() else {
912            // Nothing owed: the acknowledgement was already carried by an earlier message.
913            if ephemeral {
914                self.exchanges.close(exchange);
915            }
916            return Ok(0);
917        };
918        let protocol_header = ProtocolHeader {
919            initiator: exchange.role.is_initiator(),
920            acknowledged_counter: Some(acknowledged),
921            reliability: false,
922            exchange_id: exchange.id,
923            // §4.12.7.1: "The Protocol ID SHALL be set to PROTOCOL_ID_SECURE_CHANNEL."
924            //
925            // Not the exchange's protocol, which is the natural thing to write and what this
926            // did: the opcode is Secure Channel's, so sending it under the exchange's protocol
927            // id produces a message that decodes as, say, Interaction Model opcode 0x10 — an
928            // opcode the Interaction Model does not define. The CHIP SDK prints it as
929            // `IM:----` and answers `Invalid message type`, which ends the interaction the
930            // acknowledgement was supposed to keep alive.
931            //
932            // MRP is a property of the *exchange layer*, below the protocol running on it, and
933            // this is where that shows on the wire.
934            protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
935            opcode: crate::sc::opcode::MRP_STANDALONE_ACK,
936        };
937        let counter = self.next_counter(exchange.session, now)?;
938        // A standalone acknowledgement carries no payload, so the body being joined is the
939        // protocol header alone and the scratch never needs to be larger than one.
940        let mut scratch = [0u8; PROTOCOL_HEADER_MAX];
941        let written = self.frame(
942            exchange.session,
943            counter,
944            &protocol_header,
945            &[],
946            &mut scratch,
947            out,
948        )?;
949        // §4.12.5.2.2: "If the Exchange is marked as an ephemeral exchange the Exchange SHALL
950        // be closed." It existed only to carry this acknowledgement, and holding it open is
951        // what would make answering a stranger politely cost a table entry.
952        if ephemeral {
953            self.exchanges.close(exchange);
954        }
955        Ok(written)
956    }
957
958    /// Takes the next message counter for a session (§4.6.1).
959    fn next_counter(&mut self, session: SessionId, now: Instant) -> Result<u32> {
960        if session == SessionId::UNSECURED {
961            self.unsecured_counter.take()
962        } else {
963            self.sessions
964                .find_mut(session)
965                .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?
966                .next_counter(now)
967        }
968    }
969
970    /// Frames, and encrypts when the session is secure.
971    fn frame(
972        &self,
973        session: SessionId,
974        counter: u32,
975        protocol_header: &ProtocolHeader,
976        payload: &[u8],
977        scratch: &mut [u8],
978        out: &mut [u8],
979    ) -> Result<usize> {
980        // §4.8's AEAD needs the protocol header and the payload contiguous before it can
981        // encrypt them, and this is where they are joined. The buffer is the caller's
982        // because its size is the *transport's*: a datagram node needs
983        // [`MAX_UDP_MESSAGE`](crate::config::MAX_UDP_MESSAGE) and nothing more, and a node on
984        // TCP needs the framer's own `N` — §4.15.2.3's Maximum Message Size, which is the whole
985        // reason §4.15 exists and is far too much to put on the stack of every node that
986        // never opens a connection.
987        let header_len = protocol_header.encode(scratch)?;
988        let end = header_len
989            .checked_add(payload.len())
990            .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::BufferTooSmall))?;
991        let Some(slot) = scratch.get_mut(header_len..end) else {
992            bail!(BufferTooSmall)
993        };
994        slot.copy_from_slice(payload);
995        let Some(body) = scratch.get(..end) else {
996            bail!(BufferTooSmall)
997        };
998
999        if session == SessionId::UNSECURED {
1000            // §4.13.2.1: the Ephemeral Initiator Node ID is "enclosed by initiator as Source
1001            // Node ID and responder as Destination Node ID". Which field it goes in is decided
1002            // by which end of the context this node is, and a message carrying neither is one
1003            // the peer cannot associate with any session — the CHIP SDK drops it outright.
1004            let (source, destination) = match self.unsecured_peer {
1005                Some(peer) if peer.we_initiated => {
1006                    (Some(peer.ephemeral_initiator), Destination::None)
1007                }
1008                Some(peer) => (None, Destination::Node(peer.ephemeral_initiator)),
1009                None => (None, Destination::None),
1010            };
1011            let header = MessageHeader {
1012                session_id: SessionId::UNSECURED,
1013                message_counter: counter,
1014                source,
1015                destination,
1016                ..MessageHeader::default()
1017            };
1018            let header_len = header.encode(out)?;
1019            let total = header_len
1020                .checked_add(body.len())
1021                .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::BufferTooSmall))?;
1022            let Some(slot) = out.get_mut(header_len..total) else {
1023                bail!(BufferTooSmall)
1024            };
1025            slot.copy_from_slice(body);
1026            return Ok(total);
1027        }
1028
1029        let found = self
1030            .sessions
1031            .find(session)
1032            .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
1033        let header = MessageHeader {
1034            session_id: found.peer_session_id,
1035            message_counter: counter,
1036            // §4.4.1.5: the Source Node ID is elided on a secure unicast session, where the
1037            // session itself already says who is speaking.
1038            source: None,
1039            destination: Destination::None,
1040            // §4.9 is the sender's choice on a unicast session; see
1041            // [`Messaging::set_privacy`]. A PASE session is never private: it has no
1042            // operational identity to correlate, so there would be nothing to hide.
1043            privacy: self.privacy && matches!(found.kind, SessionKind::Case),
1044            ..MessageHeader::default()
1045        };
1046        let nonce_source = match found.kind {
1047            SessionKind::Pase => NonceSource::Pase,
1048            SessionKind::Case => NonceSource::Case(found.local_node_id),
1049        };
1050        let keys = found.keys.sending(found.role);
1051        protect(&header, nonce_source, body, keys, out)
1052    }
1053
1054    /// When [`Messaging::poll`] next needs to be called.
1055    ///
1056    /// The earlier of a reliability deadline and the next moment an abandoned exchange could
1057    /// be reclaimed, so a node that honours this wake-up gets §4.10.5.3's cleanup without
1058    /// scheduling anything of its own.
1059    #[must_use]
1060    pub fn wake_at(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
1061        let reap = self.exchanges.reap_deadline(EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
1062        match (self.exchanges.poll_deadline(), reap) {
1063            (Some(a), Some(b)) => Some(if a <= b { a } else { b }),
1064            (Some(a), None) => Some(a),
1065            (None, b) => b,
1066        }
1067    }
1068
1069    /// Drives the reliability timers (§4.12.2.1) and reclaims abandoned exchanges (§4.10.5.3).
1070    ///
1071    /// Returns one action at a time; call until it returns `None`.
1072    ///
1073    /// Reaping happens here rather than in a method a node has to remember to call, because an
1074    /// exchange table reclaimed only on request is one an attacker fills at leisure: every
1075    /// unsecured datagram with the **I** flag opens an entry (§4.10.5.2), and `X` of them
1076    /// would otherwise deny every later session establishment for the node's whole uptime.
1077    pub fn poll(&mut self, now: Instant, randomness: u32) -> Option<Due> {
1078        self.exchanges.reap(now, EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
1079        let expired = self
1080            .exchanges
1081            .iter()
1082            .find(|e| e.mrp.poll_deadline().is_some_and(|at| at <= now))
1083            .map(|e| e.key)?;
1084        let open = self.exchanges.find_mut(expired)?;
1085        match open.mrp.on_timeout(now, randomness) {
1086            OnTimeout::Retransmit { counter, .. } => Some(Due::Retransmit {
1087                exchange: expired,
1088                counter,
1089            }),
1090            // §4.12.5.2.2: nothing to piggyback on, so the acknowledgement goes on its own.
1091            OnTimeout::SendStandaloneAck { .. } => Some(Due::Acknowledge { exchange: expired }),
1092            OnTimeout::GiveUp { .. } => {
1093                self.exchanges.close(expired);
1094                Some(Due::Abandoned { exchange: expired })
1095            }
1096            OnTimeout::Nothing => None,
1097        }
1098    }
1099}
1100
1101#[cfg(test)]
1102mod tests {
1103    use super::*;
1104    use crate::config::{Capacity, DefaultConfig};
1105    use crate::exchange::Role;
1106
1107    type Node = Messaging<DefaultConfig>;
1108
1109    fn at(ms: u64) -> Instant {
1110        Instant::from_micros(ms.saturating_mul(1000))
1111    }
1112
1113    const PEER: Peer = Peer::Udp(crate::platform::PeerAddr::new([
1114        0xFE, 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1115    ]));
1116
1117    fn keys() -> crate::session::EstablishedKeys {
1118        crate::session::EstablishedKeys::derive(b"shared secret", &[]).expect("derive")
1119    }
1120
1121    fn session_on(id: u16, fabric: u8, now: Instant) -> SecureSession {
1122        let mut s = SecureSession::new(
1123            SessionId(id),
1124            SessionId(id.wrapping_add(100)),
1125            SessionKind::Case,
1126            crate::session::Role::Responder,
1127            keys(),
1128            1,
1129            now,
1130        );
1131        s.fabric_index = crate::msg::FabricIndex(fabric);
1132        s.peer = Some(PEER);
1133        s
1134    }
1135
1136    /// §4.11.1.4: "The CloseSession StatusReport SHALL only be sent encrypted within an
1137    /// exchange associated with a PASE or CASE session." So one that arrives on the *unsecured*
1138    /// session closes nothing — otherwise anybody who can reach the port could end a
1139    /// commissioned node's sessions with a datagram costing them nothing to send.
1140    #[test]
1141    fn an_unsecured_close_session_report_closes_nothing() {
1142        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1143        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1144        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1145        node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1146            .expect("install");
1147
1148        // A stranger's unsecured datagram carrying exactly the report a peer would send.
1149        let mut attacker = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1150        let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
1151            general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
1152            protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1153            protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
1154            data: &[],
1155        };
1156        let mut body = [0u8; 16];
1157        let len = report.encode(&mut body).expect("encode");
1158        let exchange = attacker
1159            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1160            .expect("open");
1161        let (sent, _) = attacker
1162            .send(
1163                exchange,
1164                crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
1165                false,
1166                body.get(..len).expect("body"),
1167                at(0),
1168                0,
1169                &mut scratch,
1170                &mut wire,
1171            )
1172            .expect("send");
1173
1174        let received = node.receive(wire.get_mut(..sent).expect("wire"), PEER, at(1));
1175        assert!(
1176            matches!(received, Ok(Received::Message { .. })),
1177            "an unsecured status report is an ordinary message, got {received:?}"
1178        );
1179        assert!(
1180            node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_some(),
1181            "no unauthenticated datagram may close a session"
1182        );
1183    }
1184
1185    /// §4.16: a group datagram belongs to the group key store, and this layer says so rather
1186    /// than refusing it. Refusing made a node that holds group keys look like a node that
1187    /// cannot receive groupcast at all.
1188    #[test]
1189    fn a_group_datagram_is_handed_back_rather_than_refused() {
1190        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1191        // §4.4.1.2's session type bits: a group message names its Group Session Id and carries
1192        // the session type in the low bits of the security flags.
1193        let mut datagram = [0u8; 32];
1194        datagram[0] = 0b0000_0000; // message flags: no source, no destination
1195        datagram[1..3].copy_from_slice(&0x1234u16.to_le_bytes()); // group session id
1196        datagram[3] = 0b0000_0001; // security flags: session type = group
1197        datagram[4..8].copy_from_slice(&7u32.to_le_bytes()); // message counter
1198
1199        let received = node.receive(&mut datagram, PEER, at(0));
1200        assert!(
1201            matches!(
1202                received,
1203                Ok(Received::Group { session_id, from })
1204                    if session_id == SessionId(0x1234) && from == PEER
1205            ),
1206            "expected a group hand-off, got {received:?}"
1207        );
1208        assert_eq!(
1209            node.exchanges().len(),
1210            0,
1211            "a group message opens nothing: §4.16.2 step 2c sets only the P flag"
1212        );
1213    }
1214
1215    /// §4.11.1.4: "If a Node has either sent or received a CloseSession StatusReport, that
1216    /// Node SHALL remove all state associated with the session." The receiving half is the
1217    /// one a node leaves out, because sending one is a decision and receiving one is not.
1218    #[test]
1219    fn a_close_session_report_from_the_peer_closes_the_session_here_too() {
1220        let mut a = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1221        let mut b = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1222        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1223        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1224
1225        // The same keys at both ends, with opposite roles, is a session the two share.
1226        let mut left = SecureSession::new(
1227            SessionId(1),
1228            SessionId(2),
1229            SessionKind::Case,
1230            crate::session::Role::Initiator,
1231            keys(),
1232            1,
1233            at(0),
1234        );
1235        left.peer = Some(PEER);
1236        let mut right = SecureSession::new(
1237            SessionId(2),
1238            SessionId(1),
1239            SessionKind::Case,
1240            crate::session::Role::Responder,
1241            keys(),
1242            1,
1243            at(0),
1244        );
1245        right.peer = Some(PEER);
1246        a.install_session(left, at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1247            .expect("install");
1248        b.install_session(right, at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1249            .expect("install");
1250        b.open(SessionId(2), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1251            .expect("an exchange that the close has to take with it");
1252
1253        // A closes its end, which frames the report §4.11.1.4 owes the peer: a new exchange,
1254        // and no R flag.
1255        let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
1256            general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
1257            protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1258            protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
1259            data: &[],
1260        };
1261        let mut body = [0u8; 16];
1262        let len = report.encode(&mut body).expect("encode");
1263        let exchange = a
1264            .open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1265            .expect("open");
1266        let (sent, _) = a
1267            .send(
1268                exchange,
1269                crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
1270                false,
1271                body.get(..len).expect("body"),
1272                at(0),
1273                0,
1274                &mut scratch,
1275                &mut wire,
1276            )
1277            .expect("send");
1278
1279        let received = b.receive(wire.get_mut(..sent).expect("wire"), PEER, at(1));
1280        assert!(
1281            matches!(received, Ok(Received::SessionClosed { session }) if session == SessionId(2)),
1282            "expected the session to be closed, got {received:?}"
1283        );
1284        assert!(b.sessions().find(SessionId(2)).is_none());
1285        assert_eq!(
1286            b.exchanges().len(),
1287            0,
1288            "§4.13.3.1: all state associated with the session"
1289        );
1290    }
1291
1292    /// §4.11.1.1: a full session table evicts the least recently used session rather than
1293    /// refusing the handshake. Refusing it is a node that can be commissioned
1294    /// as many times as its session table is long, and never again.
1295    #[test]
1296    fn a_full_session_table_evicts_the_least_recently_used_session() {
1297        // Filled from the table's own capacity, so the test stays about *fullness* rather than
1298        // about a number that used to be the capacity.
1299        const CAP: u16 = SessionTable::<DefaultConfig, 16>::TOTAL as u16;
1300        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1301        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1302        let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1303        for i in 0..CAP {
1304            let evicted = node
1305                .install_session(
1306                    session_on(i + 1, 1, at(u64::from(i))),
1307                    at(u64::from(i)),
1308                    0,
1309                    &mut scratch,
1310                    &mut out,
1311                )
1312                .expect("install");
1313            assert!(evicted.is_none(), "there was room for session {i}");
1314        }
1315        assert_eq!(node.sessions().len(), usize::from(CAP));
1316
1317        let evicted = node
1318            .install_session(
1319                session_on(CAP + 1, 1, at(u64::from(CAP) + 1)),
1320                at(u64::from(CAP) + 1),
1321                0,
1322                &mut scratch,
1323                &mut out,
1324            )
1325            .expect("install")
1326            .expect("the table was full, so one had to go");
1327
1328        // Step 1: the least recently used, which is the one installed first.
1329        assert_eq!(evicted.session, SessionId(1));
1330        // Step 2a: a datagram for its peer, framed before the session went away.
1331        assert_eq!(evicted.peer, Some(PEER));
1332        assert!(evicted.len > 0, "the CloseSession report was framed");
1333        // Step 2b: and the session itself is gone, with the new one in its place.
1334        assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1335        assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(CAP + 1)).is_some());
1336        assert_eq!(node.sessions().len(), usize::from(CAP));
1337    }
1338
1339    /// §4.13.3.1: closing a session removes "all state associated with" it, which includes
1340    /// the exchanges on it. An exchange that outlives its session can never be answered on,
1341    /// and holds a slot in a fixed-capacity table until it times out.
1342    #[test]
1343    fn closing_a_session_closes_its_exchanges() {
1344        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1345        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1346        let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1347        node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1348            .expect("install");
1349        node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1350            .expect("open");
1351        node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1352            .expect("open");
1353        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 2);
1354
1355        assert!(node.close_session(SessionId(1)));
1356        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "the exchanges went with it");
1357        assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1358    }
1359
1360    /// §11.18.6.12: `RemoveFabric` takes the fabric's sessions — and their exchanges — while
1361    /// leaving every other fabric's alone.
1362    #[test]
1363    fn removing_a_fabric_takes_its_sessions_and_their_exchanges() {
1364        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1365        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1366        let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1367        node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1368            .expect("install");
1369        node.install_session(session_on(2, 2, at(1)), at(1), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1370            .expect("install");
1371        node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1372            .expect("open");
1373        node.open(SessionId(2), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1374            .expect("open");
1375
1376        assert_eq!(node.remove_fabric(crate::msg::FabricIndex(1)), 1);
1377        assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1378        assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(2)).is_some());
1379        assert_eq!(
1380            node.exchanges().len(),
1381            1,
1382            "only the removed fabric's exchange went"
1383        );
1384    }
1385
1386    /// The unsecured session is what PASE runs over before any key exists.
1387    #[test]
1388    fn an_unsecured_message_round_trips_through_a_new_exchange() {
1389        let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1390        let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1391
1392        let key = initiator
1393            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1394            .expect("open");
1395        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1396        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1397        let (len, counter) = initiator
1398            .send(
1399                key,
1400                0x20,
1401                true,
1402                b"pbkdf-param-request",
1403                at(0),
1404                0,
1405                &mut scratch,
1406                &mut wire,
1407            )
1408            .expect("send");
1409
1410        let received = responder
1411            .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1412            .expect("receive");
1413        let Received::Message {
1414            exchange,
1415            header,
1416            needs_ack,
1417            payload,
1418        } = received
1419        else {
1420            panic!("expected a message, got {received:?}");
1421        };
1422        assert_eq!(payload, b"pbkdf-param-request");
1423        assert_eq!(header.opcode, 0x20);
1424        assert!(needs_ack, "a reliable message owes an acknowledgement");
1425        // The responder opened its own half of the exchange, with the peer's id.
1426        assert_eq!(exchange.role, Role::Responder);
1427        assert_eq!(exchange.id, key.id);
1428
1429        // ...and the acknowledgement it sends clears the initiator's retransmission.
1430        let mut ack = [0u8; 512];
1431        let ack_len = responder
1432            .acknowledge(exchange, at(1), &mut ack)
1433            .expect("ack");
1434        assert!(ack_len > 0);
1435        assert!(initiator.wake_at().is_some(), "waiting for the ack");
1436        let back = initiator
1437            .receive(&mut ack[..ack_len], PEER, at(2))
1438            .expect("receive ack");
1439        assert!(matches!(back, Received::Acknowledged { .. }));
1440        assert!(
1441            !initiator
1442                .exchanges()
1443                .find(key)
1444                .expect("still open")
1445                .mrp
1446                .is_awaiting_ack(),
1447            "acknowledged, so no retransmission is outstanding"
1448        );
1449        let _ = counter;
1450    }
1451
1452    /// Builds one unsecured datagram from a stranger, with the exchange id and protocol of
1453    /// its choosing — which is everything an off-path attacker controls before any key exists.
1454    fn stranger_datagram(
1455        exchange_id: u16,
1456        protocol: ProtocolId,
1457        reliable: bool,
1458        counter: u32,
1459        out: &mut [u8],
1460    ) -> usize {
1461        let mut sender = Node::new(1, exchange_id, counter);
1462        sender.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL.with(Protocols::INTERACTION_MODEL));
1463        let key = sender
1464            .open_unsecured(protocol, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1465            .expect("open");
1466        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1467        let (len, _) = sender
1468            .send(key, 0x20, reliable, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, out)
1469            .expect("send");
1470        len
1471    }
1472
1473    /// The exhaustion attack, and the shape CVE-2024-3297 had: every unsecured message with
1474    /// the **I** flag opens an exchange (§4.10.5.2), so a stranger who varies the exchange id
1475    /// fills the table. Without reclamation the node can never open another exchange — which
1476    /// means it can never establish another session, PASE or CASE, for the rest of its uptime.
1477    #[test]
1478    fn a_stranger_cannot_fill_the_exchange_table_for_good() {
1479        let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1480        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1481
1482        // The whole table, from the table rather than from a literal.
1483        const CAP: u16 = ExchangeTable::<DefaultConfig, 64>::TOTAL as u16;
1484        for id in 0..CAP {
1485            let len = stranger_datagram(
1486                id,
1487                ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1488                true,
1489                u32::from(id) + 1,
1490                &mut wire,
1491            );
1492            let _ = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0));
1493        }
1494        assert_eq!(
1495            node.exchanges().len(),
1496            usize::from(CAP),
1497            "the table is full"
1498        );
1499
1500        // A legitimate peer arrives while the attacker's entries are still fresh, and is
1501        // refused — which is correct, and is why the entries must not be permanent.
1502        let len = stranger_datagram(CAP + 1, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, true, 900, &mut wire);
1503        assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1)).is_err());
1504
1505        // A minute later nothing has happened on any of them, so they go.
1506        assert!(
1507            node.wake_at().is_some(),
1508            "the node knows it has something to reclaim"
1509        );
1510        node.poll(at(61_000), 0);
1511        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "every abandoned entry reclaimed");
1512
1513        // ...and the node answers again.
1514        let len = stranger_datagram(901, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, true, 901, &mut wire);
1515        assert!(
1516            node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(62_000)).is_ok(),
1517            "a node that cannot open an exchange can never establish a session again"
1518        );
1519    }
1520
1521    /// Reclaiming on the timer is not enough on its own: a node whose timers are slow, or
1522    /// which is simply busy, must still not be refusing legitimate peers on behalf of entries
1523    /// that expired long ago.
1524    #[test]
1525    fn a_full_table_reclaims_before_refusing() {
1526        const FULL: usize = ExchangeTable::<DefaultConfig, 64>::TOTAL;
1527        let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1528        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1529        for id in 0..FULL as u16 {
1530            let len = stranger_datagram(
1531                id,
1532                ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1533                true,
1534                u32::from(id) + 1,
1535                &mut wire,
1536            );
1537            let _ = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0));
1538        }
1539        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), FULL);
1540
1541        // No `poll` in between — the pressure itself is the trigger.
1542        let len = stranger_datagram(
1543            FULL as u16 + 1,
1544            ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1545            true,
1546            900,
1547            &mut wire,
1548        );
1549        assert!(
1550            node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(61_000)).is_ok(),
1551            "the entry that would have refused this one had been idle for a minute"
1552        );
1553    }
1554
1555    /// §4.10.5.2 rule 1: "has a registered Protocol ID". An unregistered protocol is not
1556    /// something this node will ever act on, so it must not cost a table entry.
1557    #[test]
1558    fn an_unregistered_protocol_opens_no_exchange() {
1559        let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1560        node.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL);
1561        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1562
1563        // The Interaction Model is not registered on this node.
1564        let len = stranger_datagram(5, ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, false, 5, &mut wire);
1565        assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).is_err());
1566        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "rule 3: processing SHALL stop");
1567
1568        // Secure Channel is, so that one is answered.
1569        let len = stranger_datagram(6, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, false, 6, &mut wire);
1570        assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).is_ok());
1571        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 1);
1572    }
1573
1574    /// §4.10.5.2 rule 2: an unregistered protocol that *asks* for an acknowledgement still
1575    /// gets one — withholding it costs the sender five retransmissions — but on an ephemeral
1576    /// exchange that §4.12.5.2.2 closes as soon as the acknowledgement is sent.
1577    #[test]
1578    fn an_unregistered_reliable_message_is_acknowledged_on_an_ephemeral_exchange() {
1579        let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1580        node.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL);
1581        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1582        let len = stranger_datagram(7, ProtocolId::BDX, true, 7, &mut wire);
1583
1584        let received = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).expect("routed");
1585        let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1586            panic!("expected the ephemeral exchange, got {received:?}")
1587        };
1588        assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 1);
1589        assert!(
1590            node.exchanges().find(exchange).is_some_and(|e| e.ephemeral),
1591            "it is ephemeral"
1592        );
1593
1594        let mut ack = [0u8; 512];
1595        assert!(node.acknowledge(exchange, at(0), &mut ack).expect("ack") > 0);
1596        assert_eq!(
1597            node.exchanges().len(),
1598            0,
1599            "§4.12.5.2.2: the ephemeral exchange SHALL be closed once it has acknowledged"
1600        );
1601    }
1602
1603    /// An exchange that is still trying to deliver something is not abandoned, however quiet
1604    /// the peer has been — §4.10.5.3 step 2b.
1605    #[test]
1606    fn an_exchange_with_a_pending_retransmission_is_never_reaped() {
1607        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1608        let key = node
1609            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1610            .expect("open");
1611        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1612        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1613        let _ = node
1614            .send(key, 0x20, true, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1615            .expect("send");
1616
1617        // Far past the idle timeout, and never acknowledged.
1618        node.exchanges_mut()
1619            .reap(at(600_000), EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
1620        assert_eq!(
1621            node.exchanges().len(),
1622            1,
1623            "a retransmission still pending keeps the exchange open"
1624        );
1625    }
1626
1627    /// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context, and the rule that no test of this crate against
1628    /// itself could catch.
1629    ///
1630    /// > Ephemeral Initiator Node ID: Randomly selected for each session by the initiator from
1631    /// > the Operational Node ID range and **enclosed by initiator as Source Node ID and
1632    /// > responder as Destination Node ID.**
1633    ///
1634    /// Both halves have to hold, and a stack that encloses *neither* is self-consistent: two
1635    /// nodes built from it commission each other perfectly. The CHIP SDK drops such a message
1636    /// before it reaches any protocol — "Received malformed unsecure packet with source 0x0
1637    /// destination 0x0" — so the symptom is a device no certified controller can pair with,
1638    /// while every test passes.
1639    #[test]
1640    fn an_unsecured_response_carries_the_initiators_ephemeral_node_id() {
1641        const EPHEMERAL: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x0102_0304_0506_0708);
1642
1643        let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1644        initiator
1645            .open_unsecured_as_initiator(EPHEMERAL)
1646            .expect("an operational node id");
1647        let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1648
1649        // `open` rather than `open_unsecured`, because the context is the one this test named.
1650        let key = initiator
1651            .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1652            .expect("open");
1653        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1654        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1655        let (len, _) = initiator
1656            .send(
1657                key,
1658                0x20,
1659                true,
1660                b"request",
1661                at(0),
1662                0,
1663                &mut scratch,
1664                &mut wire,
1665            )
1666            .expect("send");
1667
1668        // The initiator encloses it as the Source Node ID: flag bit 2 of octet 0, then eight
1669        // octets little-endian after the four-octet counter.
1670        assert_eq!(wire[0] & 0x04, 0x04, "S flag set");
1671        assert_eq!(
1672            u64::from_le_bytes(wire[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1673            EPHEMERAL.0,
1674            "and it is the ephemeral id"
1675        );
1676
1677        let received = responder
1678            .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1679            .expect("receive");
1680        let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1681            panic!("expected a message, got {received:?}")
1682        };
1683        assert_eq!(
1684            responder.unsecured_ephemeral_id(),
1685            Some(EPHEMERAL),
1686            "the responder recorded it as the context's ephemeral initiator id"
1687        );
1688
1689        // ...and encloses it as the *Destination* Node ID on the way back.
1690        let mut back = [0u8; 512];
1691        let (len, _) = responder
1692            .send(
1693                exchange,
1694                0x21,
1695                true,
1696                b"response",
1697                at(1),
1698                0,
1699                &mut scratch,
1700                &mut back,
1701            )
1702            .expect("send");
1703        assert_eq!(back[0] & 0x04, 0, "no S flag on the responder's message");
1704        assert_eq!(back[0] & 0x03, 0x01, "DSIZ = 1, a 64-bit Node ID");
1705        assert_eq!(
1706            u64::from_le_bytes(back[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1707            EPHEMERAL.0,
1708            "the destination is the initiator's ephemeral id"
1709        );
1710
1711        // The initiator accepts what comes back.
1712        let round = initiator
1713            .receive(&mut back[..len], PEER, at(2))
1714            .expect("the initiator accepts its own ephemeral id as the destination");
1715        assert!(matches!(round, Received::Message { .. }));
1716    }
1717
1718    /// §4.13.2.1 matches a context by Ephemeral Initiator Node ID and creates a new one when
1719    /// none matches. A node that kept the first would answer a second initiator — the same
1720    /// commissioner coming back for CASE after PASE, most of the time — with replies addressed
1721    /// to a peer that has gone, which the CHIP SDK drops before any protocol sees them.
1722    #[test]
1723    fn a_second_initiator_replaces_the_unsecured_context() {
1724        const FIRST: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x1111_1111_1111_1111);
1725        const SECOND: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x2222_2222_2222_2222);
1726
1727        let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1728        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1729        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1730
1731        for (n, (ephemeral, counter)) in [(FIRST, 1u32), (SECOND, 2u32)].into_iter().enumerate() {
1732            let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100 + u16::try_from(n).expect("fits"), counter);
1733            initiator
1734                .open_unsecured_as_initiator(ephemeral)
1735                .expect("operational");
1736            let key = initiator
1737                .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1738                .expect("open");
1739            let (len, _) = initiator
1740                .send(key, 0x20, true, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1741                .expect("send");
1742            let received = responder
1743                .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1744                .expect("receive");
1745            let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1746                panic!("expected a message")
1747            };
1748            assert_eq!(
1749                responder.unsecured_ephemeral_id(),
1750                Some(ephemeral),
1751                "the newest initiator owns the context"
1752            );
1753
1754            let mut back = [0u8; 512];
1755            let _ = responder
1756                .send(
1757                    exchange,
1758                    0x21,
1759                    true,
1760                    b"y",
1761                    at(1),
1762                    0,
1763                    &mut scratch,
1764                    &mut back,
1765                )
1766                .expect("send");
1767            assert_eq!(
1768                u64::from_le_bytes(back[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1769                ephemeral.0,
1770                "and the reply is addressed to it"
1771            );
1772        }
1773    }
1774
1775    /// §4.13.2.1 constrains the ephemeral id to the Operational Node ID range, because it is
1776    /// what the responder will put in a Destination Node ID field.
1777    #[test]
1778    fn an_ephemeral_id_outside_the_operational_range_is_refused() {
1779        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1780        assert!(
1781            node.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId::UNSPECIFIED)
1782                .is_err()
1783        );
1784        assert!(
1785            node.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId(1))
1786                .is_ok()
1787        );
1788    }
1789
1790    /// §4.12.2.2: a duplicate is acknowledged and not delivered.
1791    #[test]
1792    fn a_duplicate_is_acknowledged_and_not_delivered_twice() {
1793        let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1794        let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1795        let key = initiator
1796            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1797            .expect("open");
1798
1799        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1800        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1801        let (len, _) = initiator
1802            .send(key, 0x20, true, b"once", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1803            .expect("send");
1804        let copy = wire;
1805
1806        let first = responder
1807            .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1808            .expect("first");
1809        assert!(matches!(first, Received::Message { .. }));
1810
1811        let mut again = copy;
1812        let second = responder
1813            .receive(&mut again[..len], PEER, at(2))
1814            .expect("second");
1815        match second {
1816            Received::Duplicate { needs_ack, .. } => {
1817                assert!(needs_ack, "still acknowledged — the sender's ack was lost");
1818            }
1819            other => panic!("a repeat must not reach the application: {other:?}"),
1820        }
1821    }
1822
1823    /// A message for a session this node does not have is refused, not guessed at.
1824    #[test]
1825    fn a_message_for_an_unknown_session_is_refused() {
1826        let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1827        let mut wire = [0u8; 64];
1828        // Flags: version 0, no source/destination. Session id 0x1234, unicast.
1829        wire[0] = 0x00;
1830        wire[1] = 0x34;
1831        wire[2] = 0x12;
1832        wire[3] = 0x00;
1833        let err = node
1834            .receive(&mut wire, PEER, at(0))
1835            .expect_err("no session");
1836        assert_eq!(err.code(), ErrorCode::NoSession);
1837    }
1838
1839    /// A response to an exchange that was never opened is refused (§4.4.3.1).
1840    #[test]
1841    fn a_message_from_a_responder_cannot_open_an_exchange() {
1842        let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1843        let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1844        let key = initiator
1845            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1846            .expect("open");
1847        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1848        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1849        let (len, _) = initiator
1850            .send(
1851                key,
1852                0x20,
1853                false,
1854                b"hello",
1855                at(0),
1856                0,
1857                &mut scratch,
1858                &mut wire,
1859            )
1860            .expect("send");
1861        // Clear the I flag in the protocol header: now it claims to be a *response*.
1862        //
1863        // The offset is the *message* header's real length, which is not a constant: an
1864        // unsecured initiator encloses its Ephemeral Initiator Node ID (§4.13.2.1), so the
1865        // header is eight octets longer than a bare one. Decoding it is the only way to know.
1866        let (sent_header, _) = MessageHeader::decode(&wire[..len]).expect("decode");
1867        let header_len = sent_header.encoded_len();
1868        wire[header_len] &= !0x01;
1869
1870        let err = responder
1871            .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1872            .expect_err("a response answers a question nobody asked");
1873        assert_eq!(err.code(), ErrorCode::NoExchange);
1874    }
1875
1876    /// The retransmission timer fires, and names the counter to resend (§4.12.2.1).
1877    #[test]
1878    fn an_unacknowledged_message_is_retransmitted_with_its_own_counter() {
1879        let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1880        let key = initiator
1881            .open_unsecured(ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0), 0xE0E0_1234_5678_9ABC)
1882            .expect("open");
1883        let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1884        let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1885        let (_, counter) = initiator
1886            .send(key, 0x20, true, b"lost", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1887            .expect("send");
1888
1889        let deadline = initiator.wake_at().expect("a reliable send arms a timer");
1890        match initiator.poll(deadline, 0) {
1891            Some(Due::Retransmit {
1892                exchange,
1893                counter: again,
1894            }) => {
1895                assert_eq!(exchange, key);
1896                assert_eq!(
1897                    again, counter,
1898                    "the same counter: a new one would be a new message and a reused nonce"
1899                );
1900            }
1901            other => panic!("expected a retransmission, got {other:?}"),
1902        }
1903    }
1904}