matter_kit/messaging.rs
1//! Message processing: a datagram in, a protocol message out (Core §4.7).
2//!
3//! Everything below this module is sans-I/O and, until now, unconnected. [`msg`](crate::msg)
4//! frames and encrypts, [`session`](crate::session) holds the keys, [`exchange`](crate::exchange)
5//! holds the conversations and their reliability state — and nothing put the three together.
6//! This is that seam, and it is the whole of §4.7.1 "Message Transmission" and §4.7.2 "Message
7//! Reception".
8//!
9//! # Why it is a type and not a function
10//!
11//! Reception is not a pure decode. Three pieces of state change on the way through, and all
12//! three are security-relevant:
13//!
14//! * the **session's** replay window (§4.6.5), which decides whether a counter is new;
15//! * the **exchange's** MRP state (§4.12), which decides whether an acknowledgement is owed
16//! and whether a retransmission is still outstanding;
17//! * the **exchange table** itself, since a message may open an exchange the peer initiated.
18//!
19//! A receiver that decoded without updating them would accept replays. One that updated them
20//! before authenticating would let an unauthenticated sender move a window it has no key for
21//! — which is why the order here is fixed: find the session, **decrypt**, and only then touch
22//! any counter.
23//!
24//! # A duplicate is acknowledged and dropped
25//!
26//! §4.12.2.2 is emphatic, and it is the rule most easily got wrong in the direction that
27//! looks like it works:
28//!
29//! > The receiver SHALL send an acknowledgment message to the sender for each instance of an
30//! > authenticated, reliable message, including duplicates. The reliability layer SHALL only
31//! > propagate the first instance of a message to the next higher layer.
32//!
33//! Drop a duplicate silently and the sender retransmits until it gives up; deliver it twice
34//! and the application acts on it twice. [`Received::Duplicate`] is neither.
35
36use crate::config::Config;
37use crate::error::{Error, ErrorCode, Result, bail};
38use crate::exchange::{EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT, ExchangeKey, ExchangeTable, MrpParams, OnTimeout};
39use crate::msg::{CounterKind, CounterWindow, MessageCounter, Verdict};
40use crate::msg::{
41 Destination, MessageHeader, NonceSource, ProtocolHeader, ProtocolId, SessionId, SessionType,
42 preview, protect, unprotect,
43};
44use crate::platform::{Instant, Peer};
45use crate::session::{SecureSession, SessionKind, SessionTable};
46
47/// The largest a Protocol Header can be (§4.4.3): the exchange flags, the opcode, the
48/// exchange id, a 32-bit protocol id and an acknowledged counter.
49///
50/// Only [`Messaging::acknowledge`] needs it: a standalone acknowledgement has no payload, so
51/// the body it frames is the header on its own.
52const PROTOCOL_HEADER_MAX: usize = 16;
53
54/// What arrived, once the message has been authenticated and routed.
55#[derive(Debug)]
56#[non_exhaustive]
57pub enum Received<'a> {
58 /// A group datagram (§4.16), which belongs to the group key store rather than here.
59 ///
60 /// Nothing about it has been decrypted or authenticated: a group message is keyed by an
61 /// operational group key, and which key it is has to be found by trying every installed
62 /// one whose session id matches (§4.17.3.6). Hand `buf` — unchanged — to
63 /// [`group::wire::receive`](crate::group::wire::receive), which does that and returns the
64 /// payload; a node that holds no group keys drops it.
65 Group {
66 /// The Group Session Id from the header, which selects the candidate keys.
67 session_id: SessionId,
68 /// Where it came from.
69 from: Peer,
70 },
71 /// The peer closed the session, and this node has done the same (§4.11.1.4).
72 ///
73 /// The session, its keys and its exchanges are gone by the time this is returned — that
74 /// is what "SHALL remove all state associated with the session" means, and it is done
75 /// here rather than left to the caller because none of that state is the caller's.
76 ///
77 /// What *is* the caller's is everything keyed on a session above this layer: §8.5's
78 /// subscriptions above all, which report on a session and have nowhere to go once it has
79 /// gone, and the §5.5 commissioning channel, which a closed PASE session releases.
80 SessionClosed {
81 /// The session that was closed.
82 session: SessionId,
83 },
84 /// A protocol message for the layer above.
85 Message {
86 /// The exchange it belongs to.
87 exchange: ExchangeKey,
88 /// The protocol header it carried.
89 header: ProtocolHeader,
90 /// Whether an acknowledgement is owed, which [`Messaging::acknowledge`] sends.
91 needs_ack: bool,
92 /// The application payload, decrypted in place.
93 payload: &'a [u8],
94 },
95 /// An authenticated message this node has already seen (§4.12.2.2).
96 ///
97 /// Not delivered upward. Still acknowledged, because the sender's retransmission means
98 /// its last acknowledgement was lost, not that its message was.
99 Duplicate {
100 /// The exchange it belongs to.
101 exchange: ExchangeKey,
102 /// Whether an acknowledgement is owed.
103 needs_ack: bool,
104 },
105 /// A standalone acknowledgement, consumed entirely by the reliability layer.
106 Acknowledged {
107 /// The exchange it acknowledged.
108 exchange: ExchangeKey,
109 },
110}
111
112/// What a timer expiry asks the caller to do.
113#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
114pub enum Due {
115 /// Retransmit the message with this counter on this exchange (§4.12.2.1).
116 ///
117 /// "Logical retransmission is of a given message as identified by its message counter",
118 /// so the caller resends the *same bytes*, not a re-encoding: a new counter would be a
119 /// new message and would reuse a nonce.
120 Retransmit {
121 /// Which exchange.
122 exchange: ExchangeKey,
123 /// The counter of the message to resend.
124 counter: u32,
125 },
126 /// An acknowledgement has waited long enough for a message to ride on (§4.12.5.2.2).
127 ///
128 /// [`Messaging::acknowledge`] writes it.
129 Acknowledge {
130 /// Which exchange owes it.
131 exchange: ExchangeKey,
132 },
133 /// `MRP_MAX_TRANSMISSIONS` passed with no acknowledgement; the exchange is closed.
134 Abandoned {
135 /// Which exchange was given up on.
136 exchange: ExchangeKey,
137 },
138}
139
140/// Which protocols the upper layer will accept (§4.10.3.1).
141///
142/// "The Interaction Model layer indicates to the Exchange Layer which Protocols it will accept.
143/// Any message for a Protocol ID that is not registered with the Exchange Layer SHALL be
144/// dropped."
145///
146/// This is not bookkeeping. §4.10.5.2 opens an exchange for any unsolicited message with the
147/// **I** flag, and on the unsecured session that is any datagram at all — so the set of
148/// protocols a node answers is also the set an attacker can make it allocate for. A node that
149/// registers only what it serves refuses the rest before the exchange table is touched.
150#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
151pub struct Protocols(u8);
152
153impl Protocols {
154 const fn bit(protocol: ProtocolId) -> Option<u8> {
155 if protocol.vendor.0 != crate::msg::VendorId::COMMON.0 {
156 return None;
157 }
158 match protocol.id {
159 0x0000..=0x0004 => Some(1u8 << protocol.id),
160 _ => None,
161 }
162 }
163
164 /// Nothing registered — every unsolicited message is dropped.
165 pub const NONE: Self = Self(0);
166
167 /// Secure Channel (§4.11). Every node needs it: it is how sessions are established.
168 pub const SECURE_CHANNEL: Self = Self(1 << 0);
169 /// The Interaction Model (ch. 8) — what a node that serves clusters registers.
170 pub const INTERACTION_MODEL: Self = Self(1 << 1);
171 /// BDX (§11.22), for a node that transfers files.
172 pub const BDX: Self = Self(1 << 2);
173 /// User Directed Commissioning (§5.3).
174 pub const USER_DIRECTED_COMMISSIONING: Self = Self(1 << 3);
175 /// The range reserved for testing.
176 pub const FOR_TESTING: Self = Self(1 << 4);
177
178 /// What an ordinary device registers: Secure Channel and the Interaction Model.
179 pub const DEVICE: Self = Self(Self::SECURE_CHANNEL.0 | Self::INTERACTION_MODEL.0);
180
181 /// Both of these, registered.
182 #[must_use]
183 pub const fn with(self, other: Self) -> Self {
184 Self(self.0 | other.0)
185 }
186
187 /// Whether `protocol` is registered.
188 ///
189 /// A vendor-specific protocol id is never registered: §4.10.3.1's registration is by
190 /// identity, and this node serves none.
191 #[must_use]
192 pub const fn contains(self, protocol: ProtocolId) -> bool {
193 match Self::bit(protocol) {
194 Some(bit) => self.0 & bit != 0,
195 None => false,
196 }
197 }
198}
199
200/// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context, reduced to what framing needs.
201#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
202struct UnsecuredPeer {
203 /// The Ephemeral Initiator Node ID, whichever end chose it.
204 ephemeral_initiator: crate::msg::NodeId,
205 /// Whether *this* node is the initiator, which decides which header field carries it.
206 we_initiated: bool,
207}
208
209/// A session that was evicted to make room for a new one (§4.11.1.1).
210///
211/// The session and its exchanges are already gone. What is left is the `CLOSE_SESSION`
212/// status report the specification owes the evicted peer, framed and ready in the caller's
213/// output buffer.
214#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
215#[must_use = "§4.11.1.1 step 2a owes the evicted peer a CloseSession status report"]
216pub struct Evicted {
217 /// The session that was removed.
218 pub session: SessionId,
219 /// Where its peer was, if the session knew — nothing to send to if it did not.
220 pub peer: Option<Peer>,
221 /// How many octets of the output buffer the report occupies. Zero if it could not be
222 /// framed, which is not a reason to abandon the eviction.
223 pub len: usize,
224}
225
226/// A node's message processing: sessions, exchanges, and the framing between them.
227///
228/// `S` is [`Config::SESSIONS`] and `X` is `SESSIONS * EXCHANGES_PER_SESSION`.
229#[derive(Debug)]
230pub struct Messaging<C: Config, const S: usize, const X: usize> {
231 sessions: SessionTable<C, S>,
232 exchanges: ExchangeTable<C, X>,
233 /// The counter for messages sent on the unsecured session (§4.6.1.2).
234 unsecured_counter: MessageCounter,
235 /// Duplicate detection for the unsecured session.
236 ///
237 /// §4.6.5 applies to unencrypted messages too, and this is the window that makes a PASE
238 /// handshake replay-resistant before any key exists.
239 unsecured_window: CounterWindow,
240 /// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context: the **Ephemeral Initiator Node ID**, and which
241 /// end of it this node is.
242 ///
243 /// "Randomly selected for each session by the initiator from the Operational Node ID range
244 /// and enclosed by initiator as Source Node ID and responder as Destination Node ID."
245 ///
246 /// One context, not a table. §4.13.2.1 allows several, keyed by ephemeral id, but a device
247 /// answers one session establishment at a time — which
248 /// [`PaseAdmission`](crate::commissioning::PaseAdmission) now enforces — and a controller
249 /// commissions one device at a time.
250 unsecured_peer: Option<UnsecuredPeer>,
251 /// Whether to apply §4.9's privacy processing to outgoing secure unicast messages.
252 privacy: bool,
253 /// §4.10.3.1's registered protocols.
254 protocols: Protocols,
255}
256
257impl<C: Config, const S: usize, const X: usize> Messaging<C, S, X> {
258 /// A node with no sessions and no exchanges.
259 ///
260 /// `first_session_id`, `first_exchange_id` and `initial_counter` should all come from
261 /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng). §4.6.1.1 requires the counter to start at random: one
262 /// that always starts at zero leaks how many times a device has rebooted and makes nonce
263 /// reuse across a factory reset far too easy. A full-width random number is what to pass —
264 /// [`MessageCounter::new`](crate::msg::MessageCounter::new) narrows it to the twenty-eight
265 /// bits §4.6.1.1 allows, so the caller does not have to know that it must.
266 #[must_use]
267 pub fn new(first_session_id: u16, first_exchange_id: u16, initial_counter: u32) -> Self {
268 Self {
269 sessions: SessionTable::new(first_session_id),
270 exchanges: ExchangeTable::new(first_exchange_id),
271 unsecured_counter: MessageCounter::new(initial_counter),
272 unsecured_window: CounterWindow::new(CounterKind::Rollover),
273 unsecured_peer: None,
274 privacy: false,
275 protocols: Protocols::DEVICE,
276 }
277 }
278
279 /// Registers the protocols this node's upper layer will accept (§4.10.3.1).
280 ///
281 /// Defaults to [`Protocols::DEVICE`] — Secure Channel and the Interaction Model — which is
282 /// what a node that serves clusters needs. A node that also transfers files registers
283 /// [`Protocols::BDX`] on top; one that does neither registers less.
284 pub const fn register(&mut self, protocols: Protocols) {
285 self.protocols = protocols;
286 }
287
288 /// Which protocols are registered.
289 #[must_use]
290 pub const fn protocols(&self) -> Protocols {
291 self.protocols
292 }
293
294 /// Applies §4.9's privacy processing to outgoing secure unicast messages.
295 ///
296 /// Off by default, and deliberately. The **P** flag is only *required* on group messages
297 /// (§4.16.2 step 2c, §4.18): on a secure unicast session it is the sender's choice, and what it
298 /// buys is hiding the message counter from a passive observer on the link — the counter
299 /// is already authenticated, and anyone with the key can read it either way. What it
300 /// costs is depending on every peer having exercised its deobfuscation path, which is
301 /// not a bet worth making by default for a property this small.
302 ///
303 /// Receiving a private message never needs this: the flag is in the message, and
304 /// [`Messaging::receive`] honours it whatever this is set to.
305 pub const fn set_privacy(&mut self, privacy: bool) {
306 self.privacy = privacy;
307 }
308
309 /// Opens §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context as the **initiator**.
310 ///
311 /// `ephemeral` is the Ephemeral Initiator Node ID this node encloses as the Source Node ID
312 /// of every unsecured message it sends, and which the responder will echo back as the
313 /// Destination Node ID. §4.13.2.1: "Initiators SHALL select a new random ephemeral node ID
314 /// for each unsecured session", from the Operational Node ID range — so it comes from
315 /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng) and is *not* the node's operational identity. A node that
316 /// reused one identity across sessions would let a passive observer link them.
317 ///
318 /// # Errors
319 ///
320 /// [`ErrorCode::InvalidArgument`] unless `ephemeral` is in the Operational Node ID range.
321 pub fn open_unsecured_as_initiator(&mut self, ephemeral: crate::msg::NodeId) -> Result<()> {
322 if !ephemeral.is_operational() {
323 bail!(InvalidArgument)
324 }
325 self.unsecured_peer = Some(UnsecuredPeer {
326 ephemeral_initiator: ephemeral,
327 we_initiated: true,
328 });
329 Ok(())
330 }
331
332 /// Forgets the Unsecured Session Context, so the next handshake starts a new one.
333 pub const fn close_unsecured(&mut self) {
334 self.unsecured_peer = None;
335 }
336
337 /// The Ephemeral Initiator Node ID of the current Unsecured Session Context, if there is one.
338 #[must_use]
339 pub const fn unsecured_ephemeral_id(&self) -> Option<crate::msg::NodeId> {
340 match self.unsecured_peer {
341 Some(peer) => Some(peer.ephemeral_initiator),
342 None => None,
343 }
344 }
345
346 /// The session table.
347 pub const fn sessions(&self) -> &SessionTable<C, S> {
348 &self.sessions
349 }
350
351 /// The session table, mutably — for the fields a completed handshake fills in
352 /// afterwards, such as §11.18.6.8 step 10a's accessing fabric.
353 ///
354 /// Installing a session goes through [`Messaging::install_session`] instead: a session
355 /// and its exchanges are one lifetime, and this reference only reaches one of them.
356 pub const fn sessions_mut(&mut self) -> &mut SessionTable<C, S> {
357 &mut self.sessions
358 }
359
360 /// Installs the session a handshake produced, evicting one if there is no room
361 /// (§4.11.1.1).
362 ///
363 /// A session table that answers `NoSpace` is a node that can be commissioned exactly
364 /// `Config::SESSIONS` times and then never again — and the failure appears at the
365 /// *next* administrator, not at the one who filled it. §4.11.1.1 is explicit about the
366 /// alternative and about its three steps, in order:
367 ///
368 /// 1. the least recently used session, by `SessionTimestamp`;
369 /// 2. a `StatusReport(SUCCESS, SECURE_CHANNEL, CLOSE_SESSION)` **to that peer**, and
370 /// only then "remove all state associated with the session";
371 /// 3. the new session's own establishment message, which the caller was sending anyway.
372 ///
373 /// Step 2's two halves are why this takes buffers and returns an [`Evicted`]: the report
374 /// has to be framed while the session that encrypts it still exists, and put on the wire
375 /// by whoever owns the socket. The removal has already happened when this returns; what
376 /// is left is a datagram the caller sends to [`Evicted::peer`]. Dropping it costs the
377 /// peer nothing worse than a session it believes in until its next message fails, which
378 /// is why this is `must_use` rather than an error.
379 ///
380 /// `Ok(None)` is the ordinary case: there was room and nothing was evicted.
381 pub fn install_session(
382 &mut self,
383 session: SecureSession,
384 now: Instant,
385 randomness: u32,
386 scratch: &mut [u8],
387 out: &mut [u8],
388 ) -> Result<Option<Evicted>> {
389 if self.sessions.len() < S {
390 self.sessions.insert(session)?;
391 return Ok(None);
392 }
393 let Some(victim) = self.sessions.least_recently_used() else {
394 // No room and nothing to evict means `S == 0`, which `AssertValid` forbids.
395 bail!(NoSpace)
396 };
397 let peer = self.sessions.find(victim).and_then(|s| s.peer);
398 // Framed before the removal, because it is encrypted under the evicted session's own
399 // keys: a report built afterwards has nothing to encrypt it with.
400 let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
401 general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
402 protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
403 protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
404 data: &[],
405 };
406 let mut body = [0u8; 16];
407 let len = report.encode(&mut body)?;
408 let Some(body) = body.get(..len) else {
409 bail!(BufferTooSmall)
410 };
411 let exchange = self.open(victim, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, now)?;
412 let framed = self
413 .send(
414 exchange,
415 crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
416 false,
417 body,
418 now,
419 randomness,
420 scratch,
421 out,
422 )
423 .map(|(n, _)| n);
424 // §4.13.3.1: "remove all state associated with the session" — the exchanges on it
425 // included, and including the one just used to say goodbye.
426 self.close_session(victim);
427 self.sessions.insert(session)?;
428 Ok(Some(Evicted {
429 session: victim,
430 peer,
431 len: framed.unwrap_or(0),
432 }))
433 }
434
435 /// Removes a session and everything associated with it (§4.13.3.1).
436 ///
437 /// Returns whether there was one. The exchanges on that session go with it: an exchange
438 /// outlives its session only as an entry nothing can ever answer on, holding a slot in a
439 /// fixed-capacity table until it times out.
440 pub fn close_session(&mut self, session: SessionId) -> bool {
441 self.exchanges.close_session(session);
442 self.sessions.remove(session)
443 }
444
445 /// Removes every session on a fabric, and their exchanges — what `RemoveFabric`
446 /// (§11.18.6.12) owes at the message layer.
447 ///
448 /// Returns how many sessions went. The clusters' half of the same command is
449 /// [`Lifecycle::FabricRemoved`](crate::im::Lifecycle::FabricRemoved).
450 pub fn remove_fabric(&mut self, fabric: crate::msg::FabricIndex) -> usize {
451 let doomed: heapless::Vec<SessionId, S> = self
452 .sessions
453 .iter()
454 .filter(|s| s.fabric_index == fabric)
455 .map(|s| s.local_session_id)
456 .collect();
457 for session in &doomed {
458 self.exchanges.close_session(*session);
459 }
460 self.sessions.remove_fabric(fabric)
461 }
462
463 /// The exchange table.
464 pub const fn exchanges(&self) -> &ExchangeTable<C, X> {
465 &self.exchanges
466 }
467
468 /// The exchange table, mutably.
469 pub const fn exchanges_mut(&mut self) -> &mut ExchangeTable<C, X> {
470 &mut self.exchanges
471 }
472
473 /// Opens an exchange this node initiates, to a peer it has not named yet.
474 ///
475 /// The peer is learned from the first message that comes back. Prefer
476 /// [`Messaging::open_to`] where it is already known: until it is, this node assumes UDP
477 /// and runs MRP, which is right for UDP and one wasted round trip on BTP.
478 pub fn open(
479 &mut self,
480 session: SessionId,
481 protocol: ProtocolId,
482 now: Instant,
483 ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
484 let params = self.mrp_params(session);
485 // Where the peer last was, which is the only answer available and the right one: a
486 // session exists because that peer authenticated itself from there. Opening with no
487 // peer produces an exchange that cannot send — [`Stack::send`] builds the message and
488 // [`Stack::peer`] then has no address to give the caller, so the message is built,
489 // counted, and dropped, with no error anywhere. Use [`Stack::open_to`] to name a
490 // different address, for a peer just rediscovered at a new one.
491 let peer = self.sessions.find(session).and_then(|s| s.peer);
492 self.exchanges
493 .open_initiator(session, protocol, params, peer, now)
494 }
495
496 /// Opens an exchange to a peer this node has already found.
497 ///
498 /// Naming the transport is what lets §4.12.4 be honoured: a BLE peer's exchange never
499 /// sets the **R** flag, because BTP has already delivered the message or closed the
500 /// session trying.
501 pub fn open_to(
502 &mut self,
503 session: SessionId,
504 protocol: ProtocolId,
505 peer: Peer,
506 now: Instant,
507 ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
508 let params = self.mrp_params(session);
509 self.exchanges
510 .open_initiator(session, protocol, params, Some(peer), now)
511 }
512
513 /// Where an exchange's peer is, once it is known.
514 #[must_use]
515 pub fn peer(&self, exchange: ExchangeKey) -> Option<Peer> {
516 self.exchanges.find(exchange).and_then(|e| e.peer)
517 }
518
519 fn mrp_params(&self, session: SessionId) -> MrpParams {
520 self.sessions
521 .find(session)
522 .map_or_else(MrpParams::default, |s| s.mrp)
523 }
524
525 /// Closes an exchange.
526 pub fn close(&mut self, exchange: ExchangeKey) -> bool {
527 self.exchanges.close(exchange)
528 }
529
530 /// Processes one arriving datagram, in place (§4.7.2).
531 ///
532 /// `buf` is decrypted in place, so the returned payload borrows it. On any failure the
533 /// contents of `buf` are unspecified — §3.6.2 says a failed tag check leaves the payload
534 /// undefined — and nothing in this node's state has moved.
535 pub fn receive<'b>(
536 &mut self,
537 buf: &'b mut [u8],
538 from: Peer,
539 now: Instant,
540 ) -> Result<Received<'b>> {
541 let head = preview(buf)?;
542 if matches!(head.session_type, SessionType::Group) {
543 // §4.16: a group message is keyed by an *operational group key* and belongs to no
544 // session, so none of this function's machinery applies to it — there is no
545 // session to find, no replay window of a session's to move, and no exchange, since
546 // §4.16.2 step 2c sets only the P flag, so a group message is never
547 // reliable and never acknowledged.
548 //
549 // It is handed back rather than refused. A device with a group key store routes it
550 // to [`group::wire::receive`](crate::group::wire::receive), which is the same layer
551 // as this one for keys it holds rather than sessions; a device without one drops
552 // it. Answering `Unsupported` here made the two halves look like one missing one.
553 return Ok(Received::Group {
554 session_id: head.session_id,
555 from,
556 });
557 }
558
559 let (header, range) = if head.session_id == SessionId::UNSECURED {
560 let (header, rest) = MessageHeader::decode(buf)?;
561 if !header.is_unsecured() {
562 bail!(MessageReserved)
563 }
564 let start = buf.len().saturating_sub(rest.len());
565 (header, start..buf.len())
566 } else {
567 let session = self
568 .sessions
569 .find(head.session_id)
570 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
571 // §4.8.1.1's nonce depends on how the session was established, and getting it
572 // wrong fails the tag rather than silently mis-decrypting — but naming it here
573 // keeps the two readings from ever being confused.
574 let nonce_source = match session.kind {
575 SessionKind::Pase => NonceSource::Pase,
576 SessionKind::Case => NonceSource::Case(session.peer_node_id),
577 };
578 let keys = session.keys.receiving(session.role).clone();
579 unprotect(buf, &keys, nonce_source)?
580 };
581
582 // Authenticated. Only now may any counter move.
583 let verdict = if header.is_unsecured() {
584 self.unsecured_window.accept(header.message_counter)
585 } else {
586 let session = self
587 .sessions
588 .find_mut(head.session_id)
589 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
590 // Authenticated, so it is the peer and this is where it is. A node that opens an
591 // exchange of its own — §8.5.3's subscription reports above all — has no other way
592 // to learn the address, and an exchange with no peer sends nothing.
593 session.peer = Some(from);
594 session.accept_counter(header.message_counter, now)
595 };
596
597 let Some(payload) = buf.get(range) else {
598 bail!(MessageTruncated)
599 };
600 let (protocol_header, body) = ProtocolHeader::decode(payload)?;
601
602 // §4.13.2.1's context matching: "Else if the message carries a Source Node ID … Set
603 // Session Role to responder … Record the incoming message's Source Node ID as Ephemeral
604 // Initiator Node ID." Recorded here, before the exchange is routed, so that the very
605 // first reply carries it back as the Destination Node ID.
606 if header.is_unsecured()
607 && let Some(source) = header.source
608 && self
609 .unsecured_peer
610 .is_none_or(|peer| peer.ephemeral_initiator != source)
611 {
612 // §4.13.2.1 matches a context by Ephemeral Initiator Node ID and creates a *new*
613 // one when no context matches. A different id is a different session — a second
614 // commissioner, or the same one returning for CASE after PASE — so the context is
615 // replaced rather than kept. Keeping the first would address every reply to a peer
616 // that has gone, which the CHIP SDK drops as belonging to no session of its own.
617 //
618 // One context at a time is the simplification here; the specification allows
619 // several. What makes it safe is that the *contents* are two header fields and a
620 // replay window, and admitting a second handshake at all is refused a layer up by
621 // `PaseAdmission`.
622 self.unsecured_peer = Some(UnsecuredPeer {
623 ephemeral_initiator: source,
624 we_initiated: false,
625 });
626 }
627
628 let duplicate = matches!(verdict, Verdict::Duplicate);
629 let key = self.route(header.session_id, &protocol_header, duplicate, now)?;
630 let Some(exchange) = self.exchanges.find_mut(key) else {
631 bail!(NoExchange)
632 };
633 exchange.touch(now);
634 // Where the reply goes, and — §4.12.4 — whether MRP runs on this exchange. A peer
635 // that moved (a Thread node changing address, say) is followed here.
636 exchange.peer = Some(from);
637 exchange.mrp.note_peer_activity(now);
638
639 // §4.12.1: an acknowledgement may ride on any message, so it is taken before the
640 // message's own kind is considered.
641 if let Some(acknowledged) = protocol_header.acknowledged_counter {
642 exchange.mrp.on_ack(acknowledged, now);
643 }
644
645 if protocol_header.reliability {
646 exchange
647 .mrp
648 .on_reliable_received(header.message_counter, now, duplicate);
649 }
650 let needs_ack = protocol_header.reliability;
651
652 if duplicate {
653 return Ok(Received::Duplicate {
654 exchange: key,
655 needs_ack,
656 });
657 }
658 if protocol_header.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
659 && protocol_header.opcode == crate::sc::opcode::MRP_STANDALONE_ACK
660 {
661 // A standalone acknowledgement carries nothing above the reliability layer.
662 return Ok(Received::Acknowledged { exchange: key });
663 }
664
665 // §4.11.1.4: "If a Node has either sent or received a CloseSession StatusReport, that
666 // Node SHALL remove all state associated with the session." Both halves are the
667 // message layer's, and this is the half a node is most likely to leave out — sending
668 // one is a decision it makes, receiving one is something that happens to it.
669 //
670 // Handled here rather than handed upward because the rule is about *this* layer's
671 // state: the session, its keys, its counters and its exchanges, including the exchange
672 // this message arrived on. A node that passed it up would answer on a session the
673 // specification says is already gone.
674 if !header.is_unsecured()
675 && protocol_header.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
676 && protocol_header.opcode == crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT
677 && matches!(
678 crate::sc::status::StatusReport::decode(body),
679 Ok(report)
680 if report.protocol == ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL
681 && report.protocol_code
682 == crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16
683 )
684 {
685 let session = header.session_id;
686 self.close_session(session);
687 return Ok(Received::SessionClosed { session });
688 }
689
690 Ok(Received::Message {
691 exchange: key,
692 header: protocol_header,
693 needs_ack,
694 payload: body,
695 })
696 }
697
698 /// Finds or opens the exchange a message belongs to (§4.10.5.2).
699 ///
700 /// The three rules are in order, and the order is what bounds the table:
701 ///
702 /// 1. "If the unsolicited message is not marked as having a duplicate message counter,
703 /// **has a registered Protocol ID**, and the I Flag is set: create a new exchange."
704 /// 2. "Otherwise, if the message has the R Flag set: create an *ephemeral* exchange … and
705 /// send an immediate standalone acknowledgement. The message SHALL NOT be forwarded to
706 /// the upper layer."
707 /// 3. "Otherwise, processing of the message SHALL stop."
708 ///
709 /// Rule 3 is the one that matters most and is the easiest to leave out: a message this
710 /// node will never act on, and which is not even asking for an acknowledgement, must not
711 /// cost a table entry. Without it every datagram that reaches the port allocates.
712 fn route(
713 &mut self,
714 session: SessionId,
715 header: &ProtocolHeader,
716 duplicate: bool,
717 now: Instant,
718 ) -> Result<ExchangeKey> {
719 if let Some(exchange) =
720 self.exchanges
721 .find_for_message(session, header.exchange_id, header.initiator)
722 {
723 return Ok(exchange.key);
724 }
725 // Only a message *from* an initiator may open an exchange. One claiming to be from a
726 // responder with no exchange to respond to is answering a question nobody asked.
727 if !header.initiator {
728 bail!(NoExchange)
729 }
730 let params = self.mrp_params(session);
731 if !duplicate && self.protocols.contains(header.protocol) {
732 return self.exchanges.open_responder(
733 session,
734 header.exchange_id,
735 header.protocol,
736 params,
737 now,
738 );
739 }
740 if header.reliability {
741 // Rule 2. The sender is owed an acknowledgement even though nothing here will
742 // read its message — withholding it costs five retransmissions — but the entry
743 // that carries it is closed as soon as it has been sent.
744 return self.exchanges.open_ephemeral(
745 session,
746 header.exchange_id,
747 header.protocol,
748 params,
749 now,
750 );
751 }
752 // Rule 3.
753 bail!(NoExchange)
754 }
755
756 /// Builds an outgoing message on an exchange (§4.7.1).
757 ///
758 /// `reliable` sets the MRP **R** flag; a reliable message is remembered for
759 /// retransmission until it is acknowledged, and [`Messaging::poll`] is what resends it.
760 /// `randomness` is the jitter draw of §4.12.2.1 and should come from
761 /// [`Rng`](crate::platform::Rng).
762 ///
763 /// Returns how many octets of `out` the datagram occupies, and the counter it was sent
764 /// with — which is what a retransmission is identified by.
765 #[expect(
766 clippy::too_many_arguments,
767 reason = "every one is a distinct fact about the message; bundling them into a \
768 struct would only move the same list one line up"
769 )]
770 pub fn send(
771 &mut self,
772 exchange: ExchangeKey,
773 opcode: u8,
774 reliable: bool,
775 payload: &[u8],
776 now: Instant,
777 randomness: u32,
778 scratch: &mut [u8],
779 out: &mut [u8],
780 ) -> Result<(usize, u32)> {
781 let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find(exchange) else {
782 bail!(NoExchange)
783 };
784 let protocol = open.protocol;
785 // §4.12.4: "Reliable messages sent over TCP, PAFTP, or BTP SHALL utilize the
786 // underlying reliability mechanisms of those transports and SHOULD NOT set the R
787 // Flag." Running MRP on top of BTP would retransmit a message BTP has already
788 // guaranteed, and BTP would carry the duplicate faithfully.
789 let reliable = reliable && !open.is_transport_reliable();
790 let piggyback = self
791 .exchanges
792 .find_mut(exchange)
793 .and_then(|e| e.mrp.take_piggyback());
794
795 let protocol_header = ProtocolHeader {
796 initiator: exchange.role.is_initiator(),
797 acknowledged_counter: piggyback,
798 reliability: reliable,
799 exchange_id: exchange.id,
800 protocol,
801 opcode,
802 };
803
804 let counter = self.next_counter(exchange.session, now)?;
805 let written = self.frame(
806 exchange.session,
807 counter,
808 &protocol_header,
809 payload,
810 scratch,
811 out,
812 )?;
813
814 if reliable && let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find_mut(exchange) {
815 open.mrp.on_send(counter, now, randomness)?;
816 }
817 Ok((written, counter))
818 }
819
820 /// Sends the standalone acknowledgement a [`Received`] said was owed (§4.12.1).
821 ///
822 /// A standalone ack is *not* reliable — acknowledging an acknowledgement would never
823 /// terminate — and carries no payload.
824 pub fn acknowledge(
825 &mut self,
826 exchange: ExchangeKey,
827 now: Instant,
828 out: &mut [u8],
829 ) -> Result<usize> {
830 let Some(open) = self.exchanges.find_mut(exchange) else {
831 bail!(NoExchange)
832 };
833 let ephemeral = open.ephemeral;
834 let Some(acknowledged) = open.mrp.take_piggyback() else {
835 // Nothing owed: the acknowledgement was already carried by an earlier message.
836 if ephemeral {
837 self.exchanges.close(exchange);
838 }
839 return Ok(0);
840 };
841 let protocol_header = ProtocolHeader {
842 initiator: exchange.role.is_initiator(),
843 acknowledged_counter: Some(acknowledged),
844 reliability: false,
845 exchange_id: exchange.id,
846 // §4.12.7.1: "The Protocol ID SHALL be set to PROTOCOL_ID_SECURE_CHANNEL."
847 //
848 // Not the exchange's protocol, which is the natural thing to write and what this
849 // did: the opcode is Secure Channel's, so sending it under the exchange's protocol
850 // id produces a message that decodes as, say, Interaction Model opcode 0x10 — an
851 // opcode the Interaction Model does not define. The CHIP SDK prints it as
852 // `IM:----` and answers `Invalid message type`, which ends the interaction the
853 // acknowledgement was supposed to keep alive.
854 //
855 // MRP is a property of the *exchange layer*, below the protocol running on it, and
856 // this is where that shows on the wire.
857 protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
858 opcode: crate::sc::opcode::MRP_STANDALONE_ACK,
859 };
860 let counter = self.next_counter(exchange.session, now)?;
861 // A standalone acknowledgement carries no payload, so the body being joined is the
862 // protocol header alone and the scratch never needs to be larger than one.
863 let mut scratch = [0u8; PROTOCOL_HEADER_MAX];
864 let written = self.frame(
865 exchange.session,
866 counter,
867 &protocol_header,
868 &[],
869 &mut scratch,
870 out,
871 )?;
872 // §4.12.5.2.2: "If the Exchange is marked as an ephemeral exchange the Exchange SHALL
873 // be closed." It existed only to carry this acknowledgement, and holding it open is
874 // what would make answering a stranger politely cost a table entry.
875 if ephemeral {
876 self.exchanges.close(exchange);
877 }
878 Ok(written)
879 }
880
881 /// Takes the next message counter for a session (§4.6.1).
882 fn next_counter(&mut self, session: SessionId, now: Instant) -> Result<u32> {
883 if session == SessionId::UNSECURED {
884 self.unsecured_counter.take()
885 } else {
886 self.sessions
887 .find_mut(session)
888 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?
889 .next_counter(now)
890 }
891 }
892
893 /// Frames, and encrypts when the session is secure.
894 fn frame(
895 &self,
896 session: SessionId,
897 counter: u32,
898 protocol_header: &ProtocolHeader,
899 payload: &[u8],
900 scratch: &mut [u8],
901 out: &mut [u8],
902 ) -> Result<usize> {
903 // §4.8's AEAD needs the protocol header and the payload contiguous before it can
904 // encrypt them, and this is where they are joined. The buffer is the caller's
905 // because its size is the *transport's*: a datagram node needs
906 // [`MAX_UDP_MESSAGE`](crate::config::MAX_UDP_MESSAGE) and nothing more, and a node on
907 // TCP needs [`Config::MAX_TCP_MSG`](crate::Config::MAX_TCP_MSG) — which is the whole
908 // reason §4.15 exists and is far too much to put on the stack of every node that
909 // never opens a connection.
910 let header_len = protocol_header.encode(scratch)?;
911 let end = header_len
912 .checked_add(payload.len())
913 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::BufferTooSmall))?;
914 let Some(slot) = scratch.get_mut(header_len..end) else {
915 bail!(BufferTooSmall)
916 };
917 slot.copy_from_slice(payload);
918 let Some(body) = scratch.get(..end) else {
919 bail!(BufferTooSmall)
920 };
921
922 if session == SessionId::UNSECURED {
923 // §4.13.2.1: the Ephemeral Initiator Node ID is "enclosed by initiator as Source
924 // Node ID and responder as Destination Node ID". Which field it goes in is decided
925 // by which end of the context this node is, and a message carrying neither is one
926 // the peer cannot associate with any session — the CHIP SDK drops it outright.
927 let (source, destination) = match self.unsecured_peer {
928 Some(peer) if peer.we_initiated => {
929 (Some(peer.ephemeral_initiator), Destination::None)
930 }
931 Some(peer) => (None, Destination::Node(peer.ephemeral_initiator)),
932 None => (None, Destination::None),
933 };
934 let header = MessageHeader {
935 session_id: SessionId::UNSECURED,
936 message_counter: counter,
937 source,
938 destination,
939 ..MessageHeader::default()
940 };
941 let header_len = header.encode(out)?;
942 let total = header_len
943 .checked_add(body.len())
944 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::BufferTooSmall))?;
945 let Some(slot) = out.get_mut(header_len..total) else {
946 bail!(BufferTooSmall)
947 };
948 slot.copy_from_slice(body);
949 return Ok(total);
950 }
951
952 let found = self
953 .sessions
954 .find(session)
955 .ok_or(Error::new(ErrorCode::NoSession))?;
956 let header = MessageHeader {
957 session_id: found.peer_session_id,
958 message_counter: counter,
959 // §4.4.1.5: the Source Node ID is elided on a secure unicast session, where the
960 // session itself already says who is speaking.
961 source: None,
962 destination: Destination::None,
963 // §4.9 is the sender's choice on a unicast session; see
964 // [`Messaging::set_privacy`]. A PASE session is never private: it has no
965 // operational identity to correlate, so there would be nothing to hide.
966 privacy: self.privacy && matches!(found.kind, SessionKind::Case),
967 ..MessageHeader::default()
968 };
969 let nonce_source = match found.kind {
970 SessionKind::Pase => NonceSource::Pase,
971 SessionKind::Case => NonceSource::Case(found.local_node_id),
972 };
973 let keys = found.keys.sending(found.role);
974 protect(&header, nonce_source, body, keys, out)
975 }
976
977 /// When [`Messaging::poll`] next needs to be called.
978 ///
979 /// The earlier of a reliability deadline and the next moment an abandoned exchange could
980 /// be reclaimed, so a node that honours this wake-up gets §4.10.5.3's cleanup without
981 /// scheduling anything of its own.
982 #[must_use]
983 pub fn wake_at(&self) -> Option<Instant> {
984 let reap = self.exchanges.reap_deadline(EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
985 match (self.exchanges.poll_deadline(), reap) {
986 (Some(a), Some(b)) => Some(if a <= b { a } else { b }),
987 (Some(a), None) => Some(a),
988 (None, b) => b,
989 }
990 }
991
992 /// Drives the reliability timers (§4.12.2.1) and reclaims abandoned exchanges (§4.10.5.3).
993 ///
994 /// Returns one action at a time; call until it returns `None`.
995 ///
996 /// Reaping happens here rather than in a method a node has to remember to call, because an
997 /// exchange table reclaimed only on request is one an attacker fills at leisure: every
998 /// unsecured datagram with the **I** flag opens an entry (§4.10.5.2), and `X` of them
999 /// would otherwise deny every later session establishment for the node's whole uptime.
1000 pub fn poll(&mut self, now: Instant, randomness: u32) -> Option<Due> {
1001 self.exchanges.reap(now, EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
1002 let expired = self
1003 .exchanges
1004 .iter()
1005 .find(|e| e.mrp.poll_deadline().is_some_and(|at| at <= now))
1006 .map(|e| e.key)?;
1007 let open = self.exchanges.find_mut(expired)?;
1008 match open.mrp.on_timeout(now, randomness) {
1009 OnTimeout::Retransmit { counter, .. } => Some(Due::Retransmit {
1010 exchange: expired,
1011 counter,
1012 }),
1013 // §4.12.5.2.2: nothing to piggyback on, so the acknowledgement goes on its own.
1014 OnTimeout::SendStandaloneAck { .. } => Some(Due::Acknowledge { exchange: expired }),
1015 OnTimeout::GiveUp { .. } => {
1016 self.exchanges.close(expired);
1017 Some(Due::Abandoned { exchange: expired })
1018 }
1019 OnTimeout::Nothing => None,
1020 }
1021 }
1022}
1023
1024#[cfg(test)]
1025mod tests {
1026 use super::*;
1027 use crate::config::DefaultConfig;
1028 use crate::exchange::Role;
1029
1030 type Node = Messaging<DefaultConfig, 4, 8>;
1031
1032 fn at(ms: u64) -> Instant {
1033 Instant::from_micros(ms.saturating_mul(1000))
1034 }
1035
1036 const PEER: Peer = Peer::Udp(crate::platform::PeerAddr::new([
1037 0xFE, 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1038 ]));
1039
1040 fn keys() -> crate::session::EstablishedKeys {
1041 crate::session::EstablishedKeys::derive(b"shared secret", &[]).expect("derive")
1042 }
1043
1044 fn session_on(id: u16, fabric: u8, now: Instant) -> SecureSession {
1045 let mut s = SecureSession::new(
1046 SessionId(id),
1047 SessionId(id.wrapping_add(100)),
1048 SessionKind::Case,
1049 crate::session::Role::Responder,
1050 keys(),
1051 1,
1052 now,
1053 );
1054 s.fabric_index = crate::msg::FabricIndex(fabric);
1055 s.peer = Some(PEER);
1056 s
1057 }
1058
1059 /// §4.11.1.4: "The CloseSession StatusReport SHALL only be sent encrypted within an
1060 /// exchange associated with a PASE or CASE session." So one that arrives on the *unsecured*
1061 /// session closes nothing — otherwise anybody who can reach the port could end a
1062 /// commissioned node's sessions with a datagram costing them nothing to send.
1063 #[test]
1064 fn an_unsecured_close_session_report_closes_nothing() {
1065 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1066 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1067 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1068 node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1069 .expect("install");
1070
1071 // A stranger's unsecured datagram carrying exactly the report a peer would send.
1072 let mut attacker = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1073 let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
1074 general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
1075 protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1076 protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
1077 data: &[],
1078 };
1079 let mut body = [0u8; 16];
1080 let len = report.encode(&mut body).expect("encode");
1081 let exchange = attacker
1082 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1083 .expect("open");
1084 let (sent, _) = attacker
1085 .send(
1086 exchange,
1087 crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
1088 false,
1089 body.get(..len).expect("body"),
1090 at(0),
1091 0,
1092 &mut scratch,
1093 &mut wire,
1094 )
1095 .expect("send");
1096
1097 let received = node.receive(wire.get_mut(..sent).expect("wire"), PEER, at(1));
1098 assert!(
1099 matches!(received, Ok(Received::Message { .. })),
1100 "an unsecured status report is an ordinary message, got {received:?}"
1101 );
1102 assert!(
1103 node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_some(),
1104 "no unauthenticated datagram may close a session"
1105 );
1106 }
1107
1108 /// §4.16: a group datagram belongs to the group key store, and this layer says so rather
1109 /// than refusing it. Refusing made a node that holds group keys look like a node that
1110 /// cannot receive groupcast at all.
1111 #[test]
1112 fn a_group_datagram_is_handed_back_rather_than_refused() {
1113 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1114 // §4.4.1.2's session type bits: a group message names its Group Session Id and carries
1115 // the session type in the low bits of the security flags.
1116 let mut datagram = [0u8; 32];
1117 datagram[0] = 0b0000_0000; // message flags: no source, no destination
1118 datagram[1..3].copy_from_slice(&0x1234u16.to_le_bytes()); // group session id
1119 datagram[3] = 0b0000_0001; // security flags: session type = group
1120 datagram[4..8].copy_from_slice(&7u32.to_le_bytes()); // message counter
1121
1122 let received = node.receive(&mut datagram, PEER, at(0));
1123 assert!(
1124 matches!(
1125 received,
1126 Ok(Received::Group { session_id, from })
1127 if session_id == SessionId(0x1234) && from == PEER
1128 ),
1129 "expected a group hand-off, got {received:?}"
1130 );
1131 assert_eq!(
1132 node.exchanges().len(),
1133 0,
1134 "a group message opens nothing: §4.16.2 step 2c sets only the P flag"
1135 );
1136 }
1137
1138 /// §4.11.1.4: "If a Node has either sent or received a CloseSession StatusReport, that
1139 /// Node SHALL remove all state associated with the session." The receiving half is the
1140 /// one a node leaves out, because sending one is a decision and receiving one is not.
1141 #[test]
1142 fn a_close_session_report_from_the_peer_closes_the_session_here_too() {
1143 let mut a = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1144 let mut b = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1145 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1146 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1147
1148 // The same keys at both ends, with opposite roles, is a session the two share.
1149 let mut left = SecureSession::new(
1150 SessionId(1),
1151 SessionId(2),
1152 SessionKind::Case,
1153 crate::session::Role::Initiator,
1154 keys(),
1155 1,
1156 at(0),
1157 );
1158 left.peer = Some(PEER);
1159 let mut right = SecureSession::new(
1160 SessionId(2),
1161 SessionId(1),
1162 SessionKind::Case,
1163 crate::session::Role::Responder,
1164 keys(),
1165 1,
1166 at(0),
1167 );
1168 right.peer = Some(PEER);
1169 a.install_session(left, at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1170 .expect("install");
1171 b.install_session(right, at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1172 .expect("install");
1173 b.open(SessionId(2), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1174 .expect("an exchange that the close has to take with it");
1175
1176 // A closes its end, which frames the report §4.11.1.4 owes the peer: a new exchange,
1177 // and no R flag.
1178 let report = crate::sc::status::StatusReport {
1179 general: crate::sc::status::GeneralCode::Success,
1180 protocol: ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1181 protocol_code: crate::sc::status::SecureChannelCode::CloseSession as u16,
1182 data: &[],
1183 };
1184 let mut body = [0u8; 16];
1185 let len = report.encode(&mut body).expect("encode");
1186 let exchange = a
1187 .open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1188 .expect("open");
1189 let (sent, _) = a
1190 .send(
1191 exchange,
1192 crate::sc::opcode::STATUS_REPORT,
1193 false,
1194 body.get(..len).expect("body"),
1195 at(0),
1196 0,
1197 &mut scratch,
1198 &mut wire,
1199 )
1200 .expect("send");
1201
1202 let received = b.receive(wire.get_mut(..sent).expect("wire"), PEER, at(1));
1203 assert!(
1204 matches!(received, Ok(Received::SessionClosed { session }) if session == SessionId(2)),
1205 "expected the session to be closed, got {received:?}"
1206 );
1207 assert!(b.sessions().find(SessionId(2)).is_none());
1208 assert_eq!(
1209 b.exchanges().len(),
1210 0,
1211 "§4.13.3.1: all state associated with the session"
1212 );
1213 }
1214
1215 /// §4.11.1.1: a full session table evicts the least recently used session rather than
1216 /// refusing the handshake. Refusing it is a node that can be commissioned
1217 /// `Config::SESSIONS` times and never again.
1218 #[test]
1219 fn a_full_session_table_evicts_the_least_recently_used_session() {
1220 // `S` is 4 for this alias, so the fifth session has to displace one.
1221 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1222 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1223 let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1224 for i in 0..4u16 {
1225 let evicted = node
1226 .install_session(
1227 session_on(i + 1, 1, at(u64::from(i))),
1228 at(u64::from(i)),
1229 0,
1230 &mut scratch,
1231 &mut out,
1232 )
1233 .expect("install");
1234 assert!(evicted.is_none(), "there was room for session {i}");
1235 }
1236 assert_eq!(node.sessions().len(), 4);
1237
1238 let evicted = node
1239 .install_session(session_on(9, 1, at(10)), at(10), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1240 .expect("install")
1241 .expect("the table was full, so one had to go");
1242
1243 // Step 1: the least recently used, which is the one installed first.
1244 assert_eq!(evicted.session, SessionId(1));
1245 // Step 2a: a datagram for its peer, framed before the session went away.
1246 assert_eq!(evicted.peer, Some(PEER));
1247 assert!(evicted.len > 0, "the CloseSession report was framed");
1248 // Step 2b: and the session itself is gone, with the new one in its place.
1249 assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1250 assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(9)).is_some());
1251 assert_eq!(node.sessions().len(), 4);
1252 }
1253
1254 /// §4.13.3.1: closing a session removes "all state associated with" it, which includes
1255 /// the exchanges on it. An exchange that outlives its session can never be answered on,
1256 /// and holds a slot in a fixed-capacity table until it times out.
1257 #[test]
1258 fn closing_a_session_closes_its_exchanges() {
1259 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1260 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1261 let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1262 node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1263 .expect("install");
1264 node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1265 .expect("open");
1266 node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1267 .expect("open");
1268 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 2);
1269
1270 assert!(node.close_session(SessionId(1)));
1271 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "the exchanges went with it");
1272 assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1273 }
1274
1275 /// §11.18.6.12: `RemoveFabric` takes the fabric's sessions — and their exchanges — while
1276 /// leaving every other fabric's alone.
1277 #[test]
1278 fn removing_a_fabric_takes_its_sessions_and_their_exchanges() {
1279 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1280 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1281 let mut out = [0u8; 512];
1282 node.install_session(session_on(1, 1, at(0)), at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1283 .expect("install");
1284 node.install_session(session_on(2, 2, at(1)), at(1), 0, &mut scratch, &mut out)
1285 .expect("install");
1286 node.open(SessionId(1), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1287 .expect("open");
1288 node.open(SessionId(2), ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, at(0))
1289 .expect("open");
1290
1291 assert_eq!(node.remove_fabric(crate::msg::FabricIndex(1)), 1);
1292 assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(1)).is_none());
1293 assert!(node.sessions().find(SessionId(2)).is_some());
1294 assert_eq!(
1295 node.exchanges().len(),
1296 1,
1297 "only the removed fabric's exchange went"
1298 );
1299 }
1300
1301 /// The unsecured session is what PASE runs over before any key exists.
1302 #[test]
1303 fn an_unsecured_message_round_trips_through_a_new_exchange() {
1304 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1305 let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1306
1307 let key = initiator
1308 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1309 .expect("open");
1310 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1311 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1312 let (len, counter) = initiator
1313 .send(
1314 key,
1315 0x20,
1316 true,
1317 b"pbkdf-param-request",
1318 at(0),
1319 0,
1320 &mut scratch,
1321 &mut wire,
1322 )
1323 .expect("send");
1324
1325 let received = responder
1326 .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1327 .expect("receive");
1328 let Received::Message {
1329 exchange,
1330 header,
1331 needs_ack,
1332 payload,
1333 } = received
1334 else {
1335 panic!("expected a message, got {received:?}");
1336 };
1337 assert_eq!(payload, b"pbkdf-param-request");
1338 assert_eq!(header.opcode, 0x20);
1339 assert!(needs_ack, "a reliable message owes an acknowledgement");
1340 // The responder opened its own half of the exchange, with the peer's id.
1341 assert_eq!(exchange.role, Role::Responder);
1342 assert_eq!(exchange.id, key.id);
1343
1344 // ...and the acknowledgement it sends clears the initiator's retransmission.
1345 let mut ack = [0u8; 512];
1346 let ack_len = responder
1347 .acknowledge(exchange, at(1), &mut ack)
1348 .expect("ack");
1349 assert!(ack_len > 0);
1350 assert!(initiator.wake_at().is_some(), "waiting for the ack");
1351 let back = initiator
1352 .receive(&mut ack[..ack_len], PEER, at(2))
1353 .expect("receive ack");
1354 assert!(matches!(back, Received::Acknowledged { .. }));
1355 assert!(
1356 !initiator
1357 .exchanges()
1358 .find(key)
1359 .expect("still open")
1360 .mrp
1361 .is_awaiting_ack(),
1362 "acknowledged, so no retransmission is outstanding"
1363 );
1364 let _ = counter;
1365 }
1366
1367 /// Builds one unsecured datagram from a stranger, with the exchange id and protocol of
1368 /// its choosing — which is everything an off-path attacker controls before any key exists.
1369 fn stranger_datagram(
1370 exchange_id: u16,
1371 protocol: ProtocolId,
1372 reliable: bool,
1373 counter: u32,
1374 out: &mut [u8],
1375 ) -> usize {
1376 let mut sender = Node::new(1, exchange_id, counter);
1377 sender.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL.with(Protocols::INTERACTION_MODEL));
1378 let key = sender
1379 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, protocol, at(0))
1380 .expect("open");
1381 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1382 let (len, _) = sender
1383 .send(key, 0x20, reliable, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, out)
1384 .expect("send");
1385 len
1386 }
1387
1388 /// The exhaustion attack, and the shape CVE-2024-3297 had: every unsecured message with
1389 /// the **I** flag opens an exchange (§4.10.5.2), so a stranger who varies the exchange id
1390 /// fills the table. Without reclamation the node can never open another exchange — which
1391 /// means it can never establish another session, PASE or CASE, for the rest of its uptime.
1392 #[test]
1393 fn a_stranger_cannot_fill_the_exchange_table_for_good() {
1394 let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1395 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1396
1397 // Eight is this node's whole table.
1398 for id in 0..8u16 {
1399 let len = stranger_datagram(
1400 id,
1401 ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1402 true,
1403 u32::from(id) + 1,
1404 &mut wire,
1405 );
1406 let _ = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0));
1407 }
1408 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 8, "the table is full");
1409
1410 // A legitimate peer arrives while the attacker's entries are still fresh, and is
1411 // refused — which is correct, and is why the entries must not be permanent.
1412 let len = stranger_datagram(900, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, true, 900, &mut wire);
1413 assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1)).is_err());
1414
1415 // A minute later nothing has happened on any of them, so they go.
1416 assert!(
1417 node.wake_at().is_some(),
1418 "the node knows it has something to reclaim"
1419 );
1420 node.poll(at(61_000), 0);
1421 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "every abandoned entry reclaimed");
1422
1423 // ...and the node answers again.
1424 let len = stranger_datagram(901, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, true, 901, &mut wire);
1425 assert!(
1426 node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(62_000)).is_ok(),
1427 "a node that cannot open an exchange can never establish a session again"
1428 );
1429 }
1430
1431 /// Reclaiming on the timer is not enough on its own: a node whose timers are slow, or
1432 /// which is simply busy, must still not be refusing legitimate peers on behalf of entries
1433 /// that expired long ago.
1434 #[test]
1435 fn a_full_table_reclaims_before_refusing() {
1436 let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1437 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1438 for id in 0..8u16 {
1439 let len = stranger_datagram(
1440 id,
1441 ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL,
1442 true,
1443 u32::from(id) + 1,
1444 &mut wire,
1445 );
1446 let _ = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0));
1447 }
1448 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 8);
1449
1450 // No `poll` in between — the pressure itself is the trigger.
1451 let len = stranger_datagram(900, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, true, 900, &mut wire);
1452 assert!(
1453 node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(61_000)).is_ok(),
1454 "the entry that would have refused this one had been idle for a minute"
1455 );
1456 }
1457
1458 /// §4.10.5.2 rule 1: "has a registered Protocol ID". An unregistered protocol is not
1459 /// something this node will ever act on, so it must not cost a table entry.
1460 #[test]
1461 fn an_unregistered_protocol_opens_no_exchange() {
1462 let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1463 node.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL);
1464 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1465
1466 // The Interaction Model is not registered on this node.
1467 let len = stranger_datagram(5, ProtocolId::INTERACTION_MODEL, false, 5, &mut wire);
1468 assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).is_err());
1469 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 0, "rule 3: processing SHALL stop");
1470
1471 // Secure Channel is, so that one is answered.
1472 let len = stranger_datagram(6, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, false, 6, &mut wire);
1473 assert!(node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).is_ok());
1474 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 1);
1475 }
1476
1477 /// §4.10.5.2 rule 2: an unregistered protocol that *asks* for an acknowledgement still
1478 /// gets one — withholding it costs the sender five retransmissions — but on an ephemeral
1479 /// exchange that §4.12.5.2.2 closes as soon as the acknowledgement is sent.
1480 #[test]
1481 fn an_unregistered_reliable_message_is_acknowledged_on_an_ephemeral_exchange() {
1482 let mut node = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1483 node.register(Protocols::SECURE_CHANNEL);
1484 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1485 let len = stranger_datagram(7, ProtocolId::BDX, true, 7, &mut wire);
1486
1487 let received = node.receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(0)).expect("routed");
1488 let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1489 panic!("expected the ephemeral exchange, got {received:?}")
1490 };
1491 assert_eq!(node.exchanges().len(), 1);
1492 assert!(
1493 node.exchanges().find(exchange).is_some_and(|e| e.ephemeral),
1494 "it is ephemeral"
1495 );
1496
1497 let mut ack = [0u8; 512];
1498 assert!(node.acknowledge(exchange, at(0), &mut ack).expect("ack") > 0);
1499 assert_eq!(
1500 node.exchanges().len(),
1501 0,
1502 "§4.12.5.2.2: the ephemeral exchange SHALL be closed once it has acknowledged"
1503 );
1504 }
1505
1506 /// An exchange that is still trying to deliver something is not abandoned, however quiet
1507 /// the peer has been — §4.10.5.3 step 2b.
1508 #[test]
1509 fn an_exchange_with_a_pending_retransmission_is_never_reaped() {
1510 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1511 let key = node
1512 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1513 .expect("open");
1514 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1515 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1516 let _ = node
1517 .send(key, 0x20, true, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1518 .expect("send");
1519
1520 // Far past the idle timeout, and never acknowledged.
1521 node.exchanges_mut()
1522 .reap(at(600_000), EXCHANGE_IDLE_TIMEOUT);
1523 assert_eq!(
1524 node.exchanges().len(),
1525 1,
1526 "a retransmission still pending keeps the exchange open"
1527 );
1528 }
1529
1530 /// §4.13.2.1's Unsecured Session Context, and the rule that no test of this crate against
1531 /// itself could catch.
1532 ///
1533 /// > Ephemeral Initiator Node ID: Randomly selected for each session by the initiator from
1534 /// > the Operational Node ID range and **enclosed by initiator as Source Node ID and
1535 /// > responder as Destination Node ID.**
1536 ///
1537 /// Both halves have to hold, and a stack that encloses *neither* is self-consistent: two
1538 /// nodes built from it commission each other perfectly. The CHIP SDK drops such a message
1539 /// before it reaches any protocol — "Received malformed unsecure packet with source 0x0
1540 /// destination 0x0" — so the symptom is a device no certified controller can pair with,
1541 /// while every test passes.
1542 #[test]
1543 fn an_unsecured_response_carries_the_initiators_ephemeral_node_id() {
1544 const EPHEMERAL: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x0102_0304_0506_0708);
1545
1546 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1547 initiator
1548 .open_unsecured_as_initiator(EPHEMERAL)
1549 .expect("an operational node id");
1550 let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1551
1552 let key = initiator
1553 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1554 .expect("open");
1555 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1556 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1557 let (len, _) = initiator
1558 .send(
1559 key,
1560 0x20,
1561 true,
1562 b"request",
1563 at(0),
1564 0,
1565 &mut scratch,
1566 &mut wire,
1567 )
1568 .expect("send");
1569
1570 // The initiator encloses it as the Source Node ID: flag bit 2 of octet 0, then eight
1571 // octets little-endian after the four-octet counter.
1572 assert_eq!(wire[0] & 0x04, 0x04, "S flag set");
1573 assert_eq!(
1574 u64::from_le_bytes(wire[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1575 EPHEMERAL.0,
1576 "and it is the ephemeral id"
1577 );
1578
1579 let received = responder
1580 .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1581 .expect("receive");
1582 let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1583 panic!("expected a message, got {received:?}")
1584 };
1585 assert_eq!(
1586 responder.unsecured_ephemeral_id(),
1587 Some(EPHEMERAL),
1588 "the responder recorded it as the context's ephemeral initiator id"
1589 );
1590
1591 // ...and encloses it as the *Destination* Node ID on the way back.
1592 let mut back = [0u8; 512];
1593 let (len, _) = responder
1594 .send(
1595 exchange,
1596 0x21,
1597 true,
1598 b"response",
1599 at(1),
1600 0,
1601 &mut scratch,
1602 &mut back,
1603 )
1604 .expect("send");
1605 assert_eq!(back[0] & 0x04, 0, "no S flag on the responder's message");
1606 assert_eq!(back[0] & 0x03, 0x01, "DSIZ = 1, a 64-bit Node ID");
1607 assert_eq!(
1608 u64::from_le_bytes(back[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1609 EPHEMERAL.0,
1610 "the destination is the initiator's ephemeral id"
1611 );
1612
1613 // The initiator accepts what comes back.
1614 let round = initiator
1615 .receive(&mut back[..len], PEER, at(2))
1616 .expect("the initiator accepts its own ephemeral id as the destination");
1617 assert!(matches!(round, Received::Message { .. }));
1618 }
1619
1620 /// §4.13.2.1 matches a context by Ephemeral Initiator Node ID and creates a new one when
1621 /// none matches. A node that kept the first would answer a second initiator — the same
1622 /// commissioner coming back for CASE after PASE, most of the time — with replies addressed
1623 /// to a peer that has gone, which the CHIP SDK drops before any protocol sees them.
1624 #[test]
1625 fn a_second_initiator_replaces_the_unsecured_context() {
1626 const FIRST: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x1111_1111_1111_1111);
1627 const SECOND: crate::msg::NodeId = crate::msg::NodeId(0x2222_2222_2222_2222);
1628
1629 let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1630 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1631 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1632
1633 for (n, (ephemeral, counter)) in [(FIRST, 1u32), (SECOND, 2u32)].into_iter().enumerate() {
1634 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100 + u16::try_from(n).expect("fits"), counter);
1635 initiator
1636 .open_unsecured_as_initiator(ephemeral)
1637 .expect("operational");
1638 let key = initiator
1639 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1640 .expect("open");
1641 let (len, _) = initiator
1642 .send(key, 0x20, true, b"x", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1643 .expect("send");
1644 let received = responder
1645 .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1646 .expect("receive");
1647 let Received::Message { exchange, .. } = received else {
1648 panic!("expected a message")
1649 };
1650 assert_eq!(
1651 responder.unsecured_ephemeral_id(),
1652 Some(ephemeral),
1653 "the newest initiator owns the context"
1654 );
1655
1656 let mut back = [0u8; 512];
1657 let _ = responder
1658 .send(
1659 exchange,
1660 0x21,
1661 true,
1662 b"y",
1663 at(1),
1664 0,
1665 &mut scratch,
1666 &mut back,
1667 )
1668 .expect("send");
1669 assert_eq!(
1670 u64::from_le_bytes(back[8..16].try_into().expect("eight octets")),
1671 ephemeral.0,
1672 "and the reply is addressed to it"
1673 );
1674 }
1675 }
1676
1677 /// §4.13.2.1 constrains the ephemeral id to the Operational Node ID range, because it is
1678 /// what the responder will put in a Destination Node ID field.
1679 #[test]
1680 fn an_ephemeral_id_outside_the_operational_range_is_refused() {
1681 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1682 assert!(
1683 node.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId::UNSPECIFIED)
1684 .is_err()
1685 );
1686 assert!(
1687 node.open_unsecured_as_initiator(crate::msg::NodeId(1))
1688 .is_ok()
1689 );
1690 }
1691
1692 /// §4.12.2.2: a duplicate is acknowledged and not delivered.
1693 #[test]
1694 fn a_duplicate_is_acknowledged_and_not_delivered_twice() {
1695 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1696 let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1697 let key = initiator
1698 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1699 .expect("open");
1700
1701 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1702 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1703 let (len, _) = initiator
1704 .send(key, 0x20, true, b"once", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1705 .expect("send");
1706 let copy = wire;
1707
1708 let first = responder
1709 .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1710 .expect("first");
1711 assert!(matches!(first, Received::Message { .. }));
1712
1713 let mut again = copy;
1714 let second = responder
1715 .receive(&mut again[..len], PEER, at(2))
1716 .expect("second");
1717 match second {
1718 Received::Duplicate { needs_ack, .. } => {
1719 assert!(needs_ack, "still acknowledged — the sender's ack was lost");
1720 }
1721 other => panic!("a repeat must not reach the application: {other:?}"),
1722 }
1723 }
1724
1725 /// A message for a session this node does not have is refused, not guessed at.
1726 #[test]
1727 fn a_message_for_an_unknown_session_is_refused() {
1728 let mut node = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1729 let mut wire = [0u8; 64];
1730 // Flags: version 0, no source/destination. Session id 0x1234, unicast.
1731 wire[0] = 0x00;
1732 wire[1] = 0x34;
1733 wire[2] = 0x12;
1734 wire[3] = 0x00;
1735 let err = node
1736 .receive(&mut wire, PEER, at(0))
1737 .expect_err("no session");
1738 assert_eq!(err.code(), ErrorCode::NoSession);
1739 }
1740
1741 /// A response to an exchange that was never opened is refused (§4.4.3.1).
1742 #[test]
1743 fn a_message_from_a_responder_cannot_open_an_exchange() {
1744 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1745 let mut responder = Node::new(2, 200, 9);
1746 let key = initiator
1747 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1748 .expect("open");
1749 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1750 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1751 let (len, _) = initiator
1752 .send(
1753 key,
1754 0x20,
1755 false,
1756 b"hello",
1757 at(0),
1758 0,
1759 &mut scratch,
1760 &mut wire,
1761 )
1762 .expect("send");
1763 // Clear the I flag in the protocol header: now it claims to be a *response*.
1764 let header_len = MessageHeader::default().encoded_len();
1765 wire[header_len] &= !0x01;
1766
1767 let err = responder
1768 .receive(&mut wire[..len], PEER, at(1))
1769 .expect_err("a response answers a question nobody asked");
1770 assert_eq!(err.code(), ErrorCode::NoExchange);
1771 }
1772
1773 /// The retransmission timer fires, and names the counter to resend (§4.12.2.1).
1774 #[test]
1775 fn an_unacknowledged_message_is_retransmitted_with_its_own_counter() {
1776 let mut initiator = Node::new(1, 100, 7);
1777 let key = initiator
1778 .open(SessionId::UNSECURED, ProtocolId::SECURE_CHANNEL, at(0))
1779 .expect("open");
1780 let mut wire = [0u8; 512];
1781 let mut scratch = [0u8; 512];
1782 let (_, counter) = initiator
1783 .send(key, 0x20, true, b"lost", at(0), 0, &mut scratch, &mut wire)
1784 .expect("send");
1785
1786 let deadline = initiator.wake_at().expect("a reliable send arms a timer");
1787 match initiator.poll(deadline, 0) {
1788 Some(Due::Retransmit {
1789 exchange,
1790 counter: again,
1791 }) => {
1792 assert_eq!(exchange, key);
1793 assert_eq!(
1794 again, counter,
1795 "the same counter: a new one would be a new message and a reused nonce"
1796 );
1797 }
1798 other => panic!("expected a retransmission, got {other:?}"),
1799 }
1800 }
1801}