liminal-server 0.21.1

use std::collections::HashMap;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::collections::VecDeque;
use std::collections::hash_map::Entry;
use std::net::{SocketAddr, TcpStream};
use std::os::fd::RawFd;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::Barrier;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::mpsc::{Receiver, RecvTimeoutError, Sender, TryRecvError, channel};
use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, OnceLock, PoisonError, Weak};
use std::thread;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};

use beamr::atom::{Atom, AtomTable};
use beamr::module::ModuleRegistry;
use beamr::native::native_process::NativeHandlerFactory;
use beamr::process::ExitReason;
use beamr::scheduler::{
    ExitEvent, ExitEventSubscription, NativeBifs, ReadinessToken, Scheduler, SchedulerConfig,
    SchedulerServices,
};
use beamr::timer::TimerRef;

use liminal::protocol::WorkerRegistration;
use liminal_protocol::wire::ConnectionIncarnation;

use super::incarnation::ConnectionIncarnationAuthority;
use super::loopback::{LoopbackConnectionProcess, LoopbackServerEnd};
use super::notifier::ConnectionNotifier;
use super::outbound::OutboundError;
use super::process::ConnectionProcess;
use super::refusal::AdmissionRefusal;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-support"))]
use super::services::LiminalConnectionServices;
use super::services::{ConnectionServices, build_connection_services};
#[cfg(test)]
use super::services::{SubsystemFactory, build_connection_services_via};
use crate::ServerError;
use crate::auth_pass::{PassPrincipal, PassVerifier};
use crate::config::types::{AuthConfig, LimitsConfig, ServerConfig};
use crate::health::AdmissionReadiness;
use crate::server::mount::MountKind;
use crate::server::participant::{
    CandidateLaneListener, ConnectionFateClass, InstalledParticipantService,
    ParticipantSemanticHandler, ParticipantServiceFatal,
};
use crate::server::shutdown::ShutdownHandle;
use crate::server::signals::ServerSignals;

const CONNECTION_SCHEDULER_THREADS: usize = 4;
const CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM: &str = "liminal_server_connection_shutdown_control";
/// R6 (§1.2(4)): the single `READY` wake vocabulary for a connection. One atom;
/// any marker (or N coalesced) triggers one full slice servicing all sources.
const CONNECTION_READY_ATOM: &str = "liminal_server_connection_ready";

#[path = "supervisor_fate.rs"]
mod fate;
use fate::ParkedConnectionFates;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "supervisor_fate_tests.rs"]
mod fate_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "supervisor_shutdown_wake_tests.rs"]
mod shutdown_wake_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "supervisor_tests.rs"]
mod tests;

/// Supervisor that owns the beamr scheduler for per-connection processes.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ConnectionSupervisor {
    inner: Arc<SupervisorInner>,
}

impl ConnectionSupervisor {
    pub(in crate::server) fn install_signals(
        &self,
        signals: ServerSignals,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .runtime
            .signals
            .set(signals)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: "connection signals were already installed".to_owned(),
            })
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(in crate::server) fn signals_installed(&self) -> bool {
        self.inner.runtime.signals.get().is_some()
    }

    pub(crate) fn current_server_incarnation(&self) -> Result<Option<u64>, ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .incarnations
            .as_ref()
            .map(|authority| authority.current_server_incarnation())
            .transpose()
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor backed by the services the config's
    /// `[services]` profile selects: the full liminal channel/conversation stack
    /// (the default) or the capability-scoped worker front door. Profile
    /// enforcement is [`build_connection_services`](super::services::build_connection_services)'s,
    /// so this constructor can never build full services for a worker-front-door
    /// config.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when service construction or scheduler startup fails.
    pub fn from_config(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::from_config_with_services(config, build_connection_services(config)?)
    }

    /// [`Self::from_config`] with the §9 D2 subsystem factory injected.
    ///
    /// The factory is the only route to every scheduler-owning subsystem the
    /// services construction builds, so a recording factory observes exactly what
    /// was constructed; the connection scheduler itself (built below for BOTH
    /// profiles) is the census baseline, not a census entry.
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn from_config_via(
        config: &ServerConfig,
        subsystems: &dyn SubsystemFactory,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::from_config_with_services(config, build_connection_services_via(config, subsystems)?)
    }

    fn from_config_with_services(
        config: &ServerConfig,
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        // Absent `[auth]` leaves both `None`, so the connection stays open-access.
        let authentication = config
            .auth
            .as_ref()
            .map(configured_authentication)
            .transpose()?;
        let (auth_token, pass_verifier) =
            authentication.map_or((None, None), |(token, verifier)| (Some(token), verifier));
        SupervisorInner::new(
            services,
            None,
            auth_token,
            pass_verifier,
            config
                .auth
                .as_ref()
                .map(|auth| configured_lys(auth, tokio::runtime::Handle::try_current().ok()))
                .transpose()?
                .flatten(),
            config.limits,
            None,
        )
        .map(|inner| Self {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }

    /// Starts composing a connection supervisor over services the caller built
    /// and keeps: the embedder's constructor.
    ///
    /// Every other public constructor fixes one of the three optional parts —
    /// [`Self::from_config`] installs the configured `[auth]` (bearer AND pass
    /// verifier) but builds its own services, [`Self::with_services_and_auth`]
    /// carries a bearer and never a pass verifier, and
    /// [`Self::with_services_and_notifier`] carries a notifier and no auth at
    /// all. An application that embeds liminal — holding the
    /// `Arc<LiminalConnectionServices>` to publish in-process, verifying
    /// registry passes at Connect, and observing connection lifecycle through a
    /// notifier — needs all three at once, and this is the one route to them.
    /// Nothing set on the builder defaults exactly as the non-config
    /// constructors default it: open access, no notifier, signed default
    /// limits.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn builder(services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>) -> ConnectionSupervisorBuilder {
        ConnectionSupervisorBuilder {
            services,
            notifier: None,
            auth_token: None,
            pass_verifier: None,
            lys: None,
            limits: LimitsConfig::default(),
        }
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor with no configured channels.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when scheduler startup fails.
    #[cfg(any(test, feature = "test-support"))]
    pub fn new() -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::with_services(Arc::new(LiminalConnectionServices::empty()?))
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor using an explicit service adapter.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when scheduler startup fails.
    pub fn with_services(services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        SupervisorInner::new(
            services,
            None,
            None,
            None,
            None,
            LimitsConfig::default(),
            None,
        )
        .map(|inner| Self {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor with an explicit service adapter and the
    /// configured connection auth token.
    ///
    /// This is the production constructor for callers that build services
    /// themselves (the runtime needs the shared channel cluster before the
    /// supervisor takes ownership) and therefore cannot use
    /// [`Self::from_config`]: without it the configured `[auth]` token would be
    /// silently dropped and the server would run open-access.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when scheduler startup fails.
    pub fn with_services_and_auth(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::with_services_auth_and_limits(services, auth_token, LimitsConfig::default())
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor with explicit services, authentication,
    /// and operational limits.
    ///
    /// Production runtime construction uses this form so the durable
    /// incarnation stream's complete-reference bound is the same signed
    /// `max_connections` bound enforced by connection admission.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when incarnation startup or scheduler startup fails.
    pub fn with_services_auth_and_limits(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::with_services_auth_limits_and_fatal_shutdown(services, auth_token, limits, None)
    }

    /// Production composition with the process-wide shutdown activation that a
    /// post-Open participant fatal must join, without a Lys install: the
    /// fixtures' constructor.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn with_fatal_shutdown(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        pass_verifier: Option<PassVerifier>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
        fatal_shutdown: ShutdownHandle,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        Self::with_lys_and_fatal_shutdown(
            services,
            auth_token,
            pass_verifier,
            None,
            limits,
            fatal_shutdown,
        )
    }

    /// The production constructor: `[auth]` whole, the Lys install
    /// (`[auth.lys]`: admitter, link host, service bindings) included, with
    /// the fatal shutdown handle. The server's `run` builds through here so
    /// Lys reaches every connection it admits (ACCESS-003 R1 FOUND: the
    /// path without `lys` installed none in production).
    pub(crate) fn with_lys_and_fatal_shutdown(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        pass_verifier: Option<PassVerifier>,
        lys: Option<LysInstall>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
        fatal_shutdown: ShutdownHandle,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        SupervisorInner::new(
            services,
            None,
            auth_token,
            pass_verifier,
            lys,
            limits,
            Some(fatal_shutdown),
        )
        .map(|inner| Self {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }

    fn with_services_auth_limits_and_fatal_shutdown(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
        fatal_shutdown: Option<ShutdownHandle>,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        SupervisorInner::new(
            services,
            None,
            auth_token,
            None,
            None,
            limits,
            fatal_shutdown,
        )
        .map(|inner| Self {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }

    /// Creates a connection supervisor with an explicit service adapter and a
    /// connection-keyed worker-registration notifier.
    ///
    /// The `notifier` is invoked when a worker registers on a connection and when
    /// such a connection closes, and when a pass-stamped connection attaches
    /// and closes. Supervisors built via [`Self::with_services`],
    /// [`Self::from_config`], or [`Self::new`] carry no notifier, so liminal still
    /// runs standalone; a `WorkerRegister` frame is then accepted without any
    /// application callback.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when scheduler startup fails.
    pub fn with_services_and_notifier(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        notifier: Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        SupervisorInner::new(
            services,
            Some(notifier),
            None,
            None,
            None,
            LimitsConfig::default(),
            None,
        )
        .map(|inner| Self {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }

    /// A handle on whether this server can admit a connection, for the
    /// readiness probe (P0 #56 R4).
    ///
    /// Handed to `SharedReadinessState::track_admission` once the supervisor
    /// exists. The health endpoint binds BEFORE the supervisor is built —
    /// liveness has to be answerable while the rest of the server is still
    /// coming up — so this cannot be wired at readiness construction and is
    /// installed afterwards instead.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn admission_readiness(&self) -> AdmissionReadiness {
        self.inner.admission_readiness.clone()
    }

    /// The channel membership gate `[auth.lys.membership]` installed
    /// (ACCESS-006 R2), for the ACCESS-005 grant owner: it installs itself
    /// with [`crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate::install_authority`] and
    /// drives each applied change and resume into the gate through
    /// [`crate::auth_membership::MembershipListener`]. `None` without the
    /// section.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn membership_gate(&self) -> Option<Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>> {
        self.inner.runtime.membership_gate().cloned()
    }

    /// Counts one refused admission, classified by reason.
    ///
    /// Hung on the THREE public admission doors — TCP accept, the sibling
    /// transport spawn (WebSocket), and the in-process loopback — because those
    /// are the three places a connection can be turned away, and each of them
    /// reaches the shared inner body exactly once. Recording deeper would
    /// double-count the loopback (which calls the inner body directly);
    /// recording shallower would miss the doors that only log.
    fn record_admission_refusal(error: &ServerError) {
        crate::metrics::admission_refused(AdmissionRefusal::classify(error));
    }

    /// The runtime every connection process shares. Test-only.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn runtime_for_test(&self) -> Arc<ConnectionRuntime> {
        Arc::clone(&self.inner.runtime)
    }

    /// Spawns one supervised beamr process that owns `stream`.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when stream configuration or beamr spawn fails.
    pub fn spawn_connection(&self, stream: TcpStream) -> Result<ConnectionHandle, ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .spawn_connection(stream)
            .inspect_err(Self::record_admission_refusal)
    }

    /// Returns the underlying beamr scheduler.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn scheduler(&self) -> Arc<Scheduler> {
        Arc::clone(&self.inner.scheduler)
    }

    /// Reaps connection processes that have exited outside the normal handler path.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn reap_crashed_connections(&self) -> usize {
        self.inner.runtime.reap_crashed(&self.inner.scheduler)
    }

    /// Returns true when `pid` is still tracked by the supervisor.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_tracked(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.inner.runtime.contains(pid)
    }

    /// Returns the number of tracked live connections.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn active_connection_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.inner.runtime.active_count()
    }

    /// How many connections have departed this supervisor: the count of
    /// connection records removed, raised by the one removal funnel every exit
    /// route reaches. A teardown that completes its connection's fate does so
    /// before the record is removed, so a departure counted here is one whose
    /// fate has already completed. Pass it to [`Self::await_departures`].
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the departure count's lock is poisoned.
    pub fn departures(&self) -> Result<u64, ServerError> {
        self.inner.runtime.departures()
    }

    /// Parks until `count` connections have departed since `since`, a value
    /// [`Self::departures`] returned, or until `deadline` elapses. Returns
    /// `true` when they have departed and `false` when the deadline won.
    ///
    /// Woken by each departure through the removal `Condvar`, never by a timer
    /// or a count scan; the deadline is the one bound on the park.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the departure count's lock is poisoned.
    pub fn await_departures(
        &self,
        since: u64,
        count: u64,
        deadline: Instant,
    ) -> Result<bool, ServerError> {
        self.inner.runtime.await_departures(since, count, deadline)
    }

    /// Parks until every tracked connection has been removed or `deadline`
    /// elapses, returning `true` when the drain completed and `false` when the
    /// single admitted deadline won.
    ///
    /// The TOLD drain-completion replacement (W4 leg 3, §4.3): the waiter is woken
    /// by the one `remove()` funnel every connection exit reaches — never by a
    /// reap/count timer. Both the graceful drain and the force-close settle call
    /// this same waiter, each with its own one-shot deadline; there is no second
    /// settle poll loop.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn wait_for_connections_drained(&self, deadline: Instant) -> bool {
        self.inner
            .runtime
            .wait_for_active_connections_drained(deadline)
    }

    /// FIX A-ii shutdown flush barrier: parks until every active connection has
    /// fanned out its accepted publishes to its socket, or `deadline` elapses.
    /// Called in `run_shutdown_sequence` BEFORE the shutdown Disconnect broadcast
    /// so an accepted-but-unfanned-out publish can no longer be overtaken by it.
    #[must_use]
    pub(crate) fn wait_for_delivery_quiesced(&self, deadline: Instant) -> bool {
        self.inner.runtime.wait_for_delivery_quiesced(deadline)
    }

    /// Returns the first latched post-Open participant fatal, if any.
    ///
    /// The production runtime reads this after its existing shutdown handle wakes,
    /// then returns the typed fatal after the ordinary drain and durable flush.
    pub(crate) fn participant_service_fatal(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<Option<ParticipantServiceFatal>, ServerError> {
        self.inner.runtime.participant_service_fatal()
    }

    /// Returns the beamr process ids of the currently tracked live connections.
    ///
    /// Useful for addressing a specific connection — e.g. as the `pid` argument to
    /// [`push_to_connection`](Self::push_to_connection) when the caller knows there
    /// is a single connected client.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn active_connection_pids(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
        self.inner
            .runtime
            .active_connections()
            .into_iter()
            .map(|connection| connection.pid)
            .collect()
    }

    /// Broadcasts a best-effort shutdown notification to active connections.
    ///
    /// Connections with no active subscriptions ignore the notification. Failures
    /// to enqueue the control message are logged and skipped; they are not retried.
    pub fn notify_shutdown_subscribers(&self) {
        self.inner
            .broadcast_control(&ConnectionControl::NotifyShutdown);
    }

    /// Sends the orderly close control message to every tracked connection
    /// process.
    ///
    /// Each live process enqueues one protocol `Disconnect`, drains its
    /// outbound buffer, completes its connection fate as `ServerShutdown` and —
    /// on the WebSocket transport — writes a close frame carrying
    /// `CloseCode::Away` and the reason "server shutdown" before exiting
    /// normally. A peer reads a shutdown, not an error. Enqueue failures are
    /// logged and skipped.
    ///
    /// Since 0.14.3 this is the ONLY close route in `run_shutdown_sequence`:
    /// nothing waits for a peer to hang up first, so the log line below is the
    /// ordinary shutdown record rather than a warning about an expired drain.
    pub fn force_close_active_connections(&self) {
        for connection in self.inner.runtime.active_connections() {
            tracing::info!(
                connection_pid = connection.pid,
                peer_addr = ?connection.peer_addr,
                "closing connection for server shutdown"
            );
            if !self
                .inner
                .enqueue_control(connection.pid, ConnectionControl::ForceClose)
            {
                // Observation, not diagnosis — see `broadcast_control`.
                tracing::warn!(
                    connection_pid = connection.pid,
                    peer_addr = ?connection.peer_addr,
                    "forceful connection close was not published to the process"
                );
            }
        }
    }

    /// Installs the services registry (SRV-028), once: lifecycle requests
    /// are served from it and its processes' credentials admitted.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`ServerError::ConfigValidation`] when one is already installed.
    pub fn install_lifecycle(
        &self,
        lifecycle: Arc<crate::services::lifecycle::Lifecycle>,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .runtime
            .lifecycle
            .set(lifecycle)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "a services registry was already installed".to_owned(),
            })
    }

    /// Installs the grant-revocation policy (ACCESS-005), once, before the
    /// first connection. From then on every `Connect` must present a pass
    /// whose grant-decision binding the authority admits and must negotiate
    /// the reason-bearing close; a bearer or open-access `Connect` is refused
    /// `revocation_binding_missing`.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`ServerError::ConfigValidation`] when an authority is already
    /// installed.
    pub fn install_revocation(
        &self,
        authority: Arc<crate::auth_revocation::RevocationAuthority>,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .runtime
            .install_revocation(authority)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "a grant-revocation authority was already installed".to_owned(),
            })
    }

    /// Applies one event of the Lys grant-change stream the caller owns and
    /// reads (ACCESS-005 R2, R4), then tells each affected connection once.
    /// The denied state is in force before any connection is told; when a
    /// connection's control cannot be published the refusal is counted by
    /// name and the connection's own ready wake delivers the sweep. Nothing
    /// is retried on a timer.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// [`ServerError::ConfigValidation`] when no authority is installed.
    pub fn apply_grant_event(
        &self,
        event: &crate::auth_revocation::GrantFeedEvent,
    ) -> Result<crate::auth_revocation::ApplyOutcome, ServerError> {
        let Some(authority) = self.inner.runtime.revocation() else {
            return Err(ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "no grant-revocation authority is installed".to_owned(),
            });
        };
        let outcome = authority.apply(event);
        let mut told = std::collections::BTreeSet::new();
        for effect in &outcome.effects {
            let pid = effect.pid();
            if !told.insert(pid) {
                continue;
            }
            if !self
                .inner
                .enqueue_control(pid, ConnectionControl::Revocation)
            {
                authority.record_close_publication_refused(pid);
                let woken = self
                    .inner
                    .runtime
                    .ready_waker(pid)
                    .as_ref()
                    .is_some_and(super::wake::ReadyWaker::fire);
                tracing::warn!(
                    connection_pid = pid,
                    woken,
                    "revocation control refused; the connection's ready wake carries the sweep"
                );
            }
        }
        Ok(outcome)
    }

    /// Pushes an opaque payload to a specific connected client over that client's
    /// existing connection and returns an awaiter for the client's correlated reply.
    ///
    /// This is the server-initiated leg (server-to-client), the inverse of every
    /// other request frame. It allocates a correlation id, registers a one-shot
    /// reply slot keyed by that id, and enqueues a [`ConnectionControl::Push`] for
    /// the connection process owning `pid`; that process writes a [`Frame::Push`]
    /// out on its socket. When the client answers with a `PushReply` carrying the
    /// same correlation id, the connection process resolves the awaiter's slot. The
    /// returned [`PushReplyAwaiter`] blocks (bounded) for that reply.
    ///
    /// The reply's lifetime belongs to the push, not to any one
    /// [`PushReplyAwaiter::receive`] call: this no-deadline push reserves a slot
    /// that is reclaimed only by (a) the reply being consumed or (b) the
    /// connection closing. An elapsed `receive` poll is a benign re-arm, never a
    /// failure and never a cancellation. The §5
    /// `max_pending_pushes_per_connection` cap bounds abandonment; use
    /// [`push_to_connection_with_deadline`](Self::push_to_connection_with_deadline)
    /// when the reply must have an explicit expiry.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the correlation id cannot be allocated, the
    /// reply slot cannot be registered, or the control message cannot be enqueued
    /// for the (possibly already-gone or concurrently-closing) connection
    /// process. PUBLICATION INVARIANT: an `Err` guarantees no `Push` control was
    /// published — the client never sees a `Push` frame for a failed call.
    /// Conversely `Ok` promises ADMISSION, not delivery: the awaiter's outcome
    /// is the delivery truth (a push admitted just as its connection closes
    /// resolves to the truthful disconnected outcome, never to a lost reply).
    pub fn push_to_connection(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        self.push_with_deadline(pid, payload, None, None)
    }

    /// Like [`push_to_connection`](Self::push_to_connection), with the push
    /// made ON `subject`: the reply slot retains the subject, and a connection
    /// admitted on a Lys pass has its `PushReply` decided as `serve` on that
    /// subject before the slot is resolved (the access matrix's `push_binding`
    /// source). A refused reply resolves the awaiter to
    /// [`ServerError::PushReplyRefused`], so the pusher learns the outcome by
    /// type rather than waiting out a deadline. A push made without a subject
    /// to a Lys-admitted connection is refused the same way when its reply
    /// arrives: the subject is recorded here, at push time, or not at all.
    /// `deadline` is as in
    /// [`push_to_connection_with_deadline`](Self::push_to_connection_with_deadline).
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// As [`push_to_connection_with_deadline`](Self::push_to_connection_with_deadline).
    pub fn push_to_subject(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        subject: &str,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
        deadline: Option<Duration>,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        self.push_with_deadline(pid, payload, deadline, Some(subject.to_owned()))
    }

    /// Like [`push_to_connection`](Self::push_to_connection) but attaches an
    /// explicit reply deadline to the reserved slot: `deadline` is a DURATION
    /// FROM NOW bounding the reply's lifetime — a property of THIS push rather
    /// than of any [`PushReplyAwaiter::receive`] wait quantum.
    ///
    /// Deadline expiry is evaluated HOST-SIDE and LAZILY — at the next `receive`
    /// touch, and at connection close at the latest. It never wakes the connection
    /// process, adds no timer thread, and runs no periodic sweeper: a push that is
    /// abandoned and never polled resolves at the next host-side touch (connection
    /// close). At expiry the slot resolves to [`ServerError::PushReplyExpired`],
    /// is removed, and its §5 `max_pending_pushes_per_connection` cap admission is
    /// released. An elapsed `receive` poll BEFORE the deadline is still a benign
    /// re-arm. A `receive` call in flight when the deadline falls due returns
    /// the terminal expiry PROMPTLY — it waits the earlier of its quantum and
    /// the deadline, so a large quantum can never extend the reply's lifetime
    /// and the terminal outcome is quantum-independent.
    ///
    /// The deadline is evaluated at OBSERVATION POINTS, not enforced against the
    /// wall clock: a reply that arrives before expiry is observed is delivered
    /// normally, even if it arrives after the deadline instant. The deadline
    /// bounds waiting and slot occupancy; it is not a delivery-freshness
    /// guarantee. (This is deliberate — a reply is checked for at every
    /// observation point before the deadline is, so an answer in hand always
    /// beats an expiry.)
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when `deadline` is not representable on the
    /// monotonic clock (an extreme duration is refused, never a panic), the
    /// correlation id cannot be allocated, the reply slot cannot be registered,
    /// or the control message cannot be enqueued for the (possibly already-gone
    /// or concurrently-closing) connection process. PUBLICATION INVARIANT: an
    /// `Err` guarantees no `Push` control was published — the client never sees
    /// a `Push` frame for a failed call. Conversely `Ok` promises ADMISSION,
    /// not delivery: the awaiter's outcome is the delivery truth.
    pub fn push_to_connection_with_deadline(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
        deadline: Duration,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        self.push_with_deadline(pid, payload, Some(deadline), None)
    }

    /// Shared body for the no-deadline and explicit-deadline push paths. With
    /// `deadline == None` this is byte-for-byte the historical
    /// `push_to_connection` behaviour (no per-slot deadline); with `Some`, the
    /// slot carries an absolute expiry evaluated lazily at `receive`. `subject`
    /// is retained on the slot for the reply's access decision
    /// ([`push_to_subject`](Self::push_to_subject)); `None` records no binding.
    fn push_with_deadline(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
        deadline: Option<Duration>,
        subject: Option<String>,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        // S5: an extreme `Duration` must surface as this fallible API's typed
        // error, not an `Instant` addition panic. Checked BEFORE any slot is
        // registered so a refused deadline leaves nothing to roll back.
        let deadline_at = match deadline {
            None => None,
            Some(window) => {
                Some(
                    Instant::now()
                        .checked_add(window)
                        .ok_or_else(|| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                            message: format!(
                                "cannot push to connection process {pid}: reply deadline of {window:?} overflows the monotonic clock"
                            ),
                        })?,
                )
            }
        };
        let correlation_id = self.inner.runtime.next_push_correlation_id();
        let receiver =
            self.inner
                .runtime
                .register_push(pid, correlation_id, deadline_at, subject, None)?;
        // S3+S7 close-vs-register wall, ordered INSERT -> CONFIRM -> PUBLISH.
        // The confirmation runs BEFORE the control is enqueued, which yields the
        // PUBLICATION INVARIANT: an `Err` from this method guarantees no `Push`
        // control was published — the client never sees a Push for a failed
        // call. (Confirming after the enqueue was S7's non-linearizable race: a
        // close could sweep, the published Push could already be answered and
        // resolved, and the failed confirmation then returned `Err` for a push
        // the client had received.) A close landing AFTER a successful confirm
        // linearizes after push admission: the enqueue either fails (process
        // gone — rollback below, `Err` truthful, nothing delivered) or succeeds
        // with the slot already swept, and the awaiter then reads the truthful
        // DISCONNECTED while a late client reply is the pinned harmless no-op.
        // The exactly-one-side-observes argument lives at
        // `confirm_push_registration`.
        if !self
            .inner
            .runtime
            .confirm_push_registration(pid, correlation_id)
        {
            return Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!(
                    "cannot push to connection process {pid}: the connection closed during push registration"
                ),
            });
        }
        let control = ConnectionControl::Push {
            correlation_id,
            payload,
        };
        if self.inner.enqueue_control(pid, control) {
            Ok(PushReplyAwaiter {
                correlation_id,
                receiver,
                deadline: deadline_at,
                runtime: Arc::downgrade(&self.inner.runtime),
            })
        } else {
            // The control provably never reached a consumer: `enqueue_control`
            // returns false only when the control was never queued at all, or
            // when its failed-wake rollback REMOVED the queued control (S8 — an
            // entry a drain already consumed counts as published and returns
            // true, with the slot lifecycle carrying the delivery truth).
            // Dropping the now-unreachable reply slot here therefore keeps the
            // publication invariant exact on every `Err` path. The message
            // states that outcome rather than naming a cause this branch cannot
            // distinguish — the refused-queue case has already warned with its
            // own error.
            self.inner.runtime.cancel_push(correlation_id);
            Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!(
                    "cannot push to connection process {pid}: the control was not published"
                ),
            })
        }
    }

    /// SRV-027 R4: how many keyed lookups the service directory has made,
    /// read by the count pins.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn directory_lookups(&self) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.directory_lookups()
    }

    /// Flushes durable channel state through the configured liminal services.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError::ShutdownFlush`] when the underlying service flush fails.
    pub fn flush_durable_state(&self) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.inner.runtime.services().flush_durable_state()
    }

    /// Tells the services the listener is bound, so what they read off the
    /// start path starts now.
    pub(crate) fn listening(&self) {
        // The thread runs on its own; nothing waits for it.
        drop(self.inner.runtime.services_arc().listening());
    }

    /// Stops the participant warm and records the clean stop's capacity
    /// snapshot, before the final flush (DUR-020 R3, R5).
    pub(crate) fn stop_participant_warm(&self) {
        self.inner.runtime.services().stop_participant_warm();
    }

    /// Completes, before a clean stop reports success, every connection fate
    /// parked on candidate-lane `Precedence`.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError::ShutdownUnsettledConnectionFates`] naming every
    /// durable Open the stop could not complete.
    pub(crate) fn settle_parked_connection_fates(&self) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.inner.runtime.settle_parked_connection_fates()
    }

    /// LP-WS-TRANSPORT R1.3 sibling-transport spawn seam (ADDITIVE ONLY).
    ///
    /// Admits, allocates a durable connection incarnation for, spawns, and
    /// registers a connection process whose handler is built by `build_factory`
    /// over this supervisor's shared [`ConnectionRuntime`]. The WebSocket
    /// sibling acceptor uses this so its connections share the ONE §5
    /// `max_connections` admission bound, the one incarnation authority, the
    /// one registry (controls, pushes, crash reap, drain, forced close), and the
    /// one `apply_frame` seam with TCP connections. The TCP accept path above
    /// (`spawn_connection`) is byte-for-byte untouched and never calls this.
    ///
    /// `fd_guard` is a host-held duplicate of the connection's underlying
    /// socket, exactly like the TCP path's: it keeps the fd alive until the
    /// single record-removal path has synchronously deregistered readiness. It
    /// is `None` for a transport that owns no descriptor.
    ///
    /// `mount` is the admitting door's own name for itself (design §10), which
    /// is why this seam takes it rather than deriving it: the caller IS the
    /// door, and no other party — least of all the client — has any input.
    ///
    /// This method exists because Rust module privacy makes the runtime,
    /// admission counter, incarnation authority, and registry unreachable from
    /// the sibling `websocket` module family; it is the narrow additive seam
    /// that shares them without generalizing any TCP hot path.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when admission is refused
    /// ([`ServerError::ConnectionLimitReached`]), incarnation allocation fails,
    /// or beamr spawn/registration fails.
    pub(super) fn spawn_transport_connection(
        &self,
        peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
        fd_guard: Option<TcpStream>,
        mount: MountKind,
        build_factory: &dyn Fn(
            Arc<ConnectionRuntime>,
            Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        ) -> NativeHandlerFactory,
    ) -> Result<ConnectionHandle, ServerError> {
        self.inner
            .spawn_transport_connection(peer_addr, fd_guard, mount, build_factory)
            .inspect_err(Self::record_admission_refusal)
    }

    /// Admits one in-process connection over `server_end` (design §8 step 3).
    ///
    /// This replaces exactly the listener's `accept()` + `spawn_connection`
    /// pair, and NOTHING else about admission. It runs the same
    /// `try_reserve_admission` against the same §5 slot pool — an in-process
    /// connect at capacity is refused with the same typed
    /// [`ServerError::ConnectionLimitReached`] a socket connect is — allocates a
    /// real durable [`ConnectionIncarnation`] from the same authority, so
    /// participant binding, resume, and fate records work identically, and
    /// registers the same record. Only two fields differ, and both are honest
    /// descriptions rather than semantics: no fd guard (there is no descriptor
    /// to keep alive) and `peer_addr: None` (there is no socket to have an
    /// address). Nothing on this path reads a socket fact.
    ///
    /// The connection's wake is installed by the process itself on its first
    /// serviced slice, which is the earliest point at which its pid and host
    /// record — the two things the wake names — both exist.
    ///
    /// `pub(crate)` rather than `pub`: the embedding handle that grants
    /// loopback connections lives in this crate, and widening the surface
    /// further would hand an outside caller a way to reach the runtime that
    /// module privacy currently denies it.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when admission is refused
    /// ([`ServerError::ConnectionLimitReached`]), incarnation allocation fails,
    /// or beamr spawn/registration fails.
    pub(crate) fn spawn_loopback_connection(
        &self,
        server_end: LoopbackServerEnd,
    ) -> Result<ConnectionHandle, ServerError> {
        // The same interior-mutability handoff the socket path uses: the native
        // handler factory is `Fn + Send + Sync`, so the duplex end cannot be
        // moved into it and the FIRST handler build takes it out exactly once.
        let holder = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(server_end)));
        let build = move |runtime: Arc<ConnectionRuntime>,
                          incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>|
              -> NativeHandlerFactory {
            let holder = Arc::clone(&holder);
            Box::new(move || {
                Box::new(LoopbackConnectionProcess::from_loopback_holder(
                    Arc::clone(&runtime),
                    &holder,
                    incarnation,
                ))
            })
        };
        self.inner
            .spawn_transport_connection(None, None, MountKind::Loopback, &build)
            .inspect_err(Self::record_admission_refusal)
    }

    /// Stops the beamr scheduler used by connection processes.
    pub fn shutdown(&self) {
        // A connection waiting on a conversation's restore is woken and
        // answered at once, so the scheduler join below never waits on a
        // room's replay or rebuild (Gaia, 11 October 2026: 60 s).
        self.stop_participant_warm();
        // Remove every host record while the readiness owner is still live. The
        // removal path ACKs deregistration and only then releases each fd guard;
        // scheduler shutdown subsequently drops the process-owned handles.
        for connection in self.inner.runtime.active_connections() {
            self.inner.runtime.finish(connection.pid);
        }
        self.inner.scheduler.shutdown();
    }

    /// R7 test instrument: slices serviced by connection `pid` since spawn.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn slice_count(&self, pid: u64) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.slice_count(pid)
    }

    /// The mount the admitting door stamped on `pid`'s registry record, or
    /// `None` when no record is tracked (design §10).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn connection_mount(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<MountKind> {
        self.inner.runtime.connection_mount(pid)
    }

    /// Whether `pid`'s registry record holds an fd guard, or `None` when no
    /// record is tracked. A loopback record must answer `Some(false)`: there is
    /// no descriptor for the guard to keep alive.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn connection_has_fd_guard(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<bool> {
        self.inner.runtime.connection_has_fd_guard(pid)
    }

    /// Installs a one-use readiness marker for the next serviced slice of `pid`.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn observe_next_slice(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        self.inner.runtime.observe_next_slice(pid)
    }

    /// Installs a one-use readiness marker for the next genuine scheduler park of
    /// `pid`. The delivered value is the process's slice count at the final probe
    /// that selected `Wait`.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn observe_next_park(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        self.inner.runtime.observe_next_park(pid)
    }

    /// Returns a marker for the current park when `pid` is already settled, or
    /// the next park when a coalesced readiness event has started another slice.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn observe_settled_park(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        self.inner.runtime.observe_settled_park(pid)
    }

    /// Queues an explicit outbound capacity for the next TCP process constructed.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn queue_next_outbound_capacity(&self, capacity: usize) {
        self.inner.runtime.queue_next_outbound_capacity(capacity);
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn install_participant_holdback_pause(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<()> {
        self.inner.runtime.install_participant_holdback_pause(pid)
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn resume_test_process(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.inner.runtime.ready_waker(pid).is_some_and(|waker| {
            waker.fire();
            true
        })
    }

    /// Server `Push` frames this supervisor's connections have queued for their
    /// sockets since it started. A push that failed, was cancelled or was rolled
    /// back never reaches a socket and is not counted.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn pushes_queued(&self) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.pushes_queued()
    }

    /// Reserved push reply slots outstanding (test observability for the public
    /// push paths — lets e2e tests assert slot reclamation and cap accounting).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn pending_push_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.inner.runtime.pending_push_count()
    }

    /// R6 test seam: a [`ReadyWaker`](super::wake::ReadyWaker) for `pid` — the same
    /// handle a subscription-inbox or reply-availability notifier fires.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn ready_waker(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<super::wake::ReadyWaker> {
        self.inner.runtime.ready_waker(pid)
    }

    /// Registered readiness tokens held in host records (test observability).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn readiness_registration_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.inner.runtime.readiness_registration_count()
    }

    /// Kernel fd registered for `pid` (test observability for fd-reuse races).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn readiness_fd(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<RawFd> {
        self.inner.runtime.readiness_fd(pid)
    }

    /// The readiness token registered for `pid` (test observability). Lets the
    /// fd-reuse successor oracle capture a stale token before reclamation and
    /// replay its deregister afterwards, proving it is a keyed no-op.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn readiness_token(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<ReadinessToken> {
        self.inner.runtime.readiness_token(pid)
    }

    /// Installs the pid-specific reclamation gate (oracle 26) and returns its
    /// `(reached, release, done)` endpoints.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_reclaim_barrier(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
    ) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        self.inner.runtime.install_reclaim_barrier(pid)
    }

    /// A weak handle to the connection runtime (test observability): lets a
    /// lifetime test assert the runtime — and transitively the durable store's
    /// writer lock — is released synchronously at supervisor drop rather than
    /// held by the detached reclaim reactor.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn runtime_weak(&self) -> Weak<ConnectionRuntime> {
        Arc::downgrade(&self.inner.runtime)
    }

    /// Installs a one-use observation for the process-owned stream at `fd` being
    /// dropped. External scheduler termination removes the process-table entry
    /// before an executing native handler is destroyed, so table absence is not
    /// sufficient evidence that the descriptor is reusable.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn observe_process_stream_drop(&self, fd: RawFd) -> Receiver<()> {
        self.inner.runtime.observe_process_stream_drop(fd)
    }

    /// Installs a one-use arm-to-probe barrier and returns its test endpoints.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_pre_wait_barrier(&self) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        self.inner.runtime.install_pre_wait_barrier()
    }

    /// Barrier-staged final probes that observed newly arrived work.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn pre_wait_probe_hits(&self) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.pre_wait_probe_hits()
    }

    /// Installs the one-use drain-park gate (oracles 18, 19) and returns its
    /// `(armed, release)` endpoints.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_drain_park_barrier(&self) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        self.inner.runtime.install_drain_park_barrier()
    }

    /// Drain waiter wakes that observed a real connection removal (oracle 12).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn drain_exit_wakes(&self) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.drain_exit_wakes()
    }

    /// Drain waiter deadline expirations (oracles 12, 16).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn drain_deadline_hits(&self) -> u64 {
        self.inner.runtime.drain_deadline_hits()
    }
}

/// Handle for one supervised connection process.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ConnectionHandle {
    pid: u64,
    peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
    connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
    supervisor: Arc<SupervisorInner>,
}

impl ConnectionHandle {
    /// Every later report of the frames this connection writes to its
    /// transport. Test-only (R3b F8, ruling 2a).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(crate) fn observe_frames_written(&self) -> Receiver<Vec<liminal::protocol::FrameType>> {
        self.supervisor.runtime.observe_frames_written(self.pid)
    }

    /// Returns the beamr process id for this connection.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn pid(&self) -> u64 {
        self.pid
    }

    /// Returns the peer address if it was available from the accepted stream.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn peer_addr(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
        self.peer_addr
    }

    /// Returns the durable participant connection incarnation, when this
    /// supervisor has a complete participant service installed.
    ///
    /// `None` identifies a services adapter that does not advertise participant
    /// lifecycle semantics.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn connection_incarnation(&self) -> Option<ConnectionIncarnation> {
        self.connection_incarnation
    }

    /// Returns whether the beamr process is still live.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
        self.supervisor
            .scheduler
            .process_table()
            .get(self.pid)
            .is_some()
    }

    /// Requests an error exit for tests and supervisor control paths.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the process is no longer live.
    pub fn request_crash(&self) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        if self
            .supervisor
            .scheduler
            .enqueue_atom_message(self.pid, Atom::ERROR)
        {
            Ok(())
        } else {
            Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("connection process {} is not live", self.pid),
            })
        }
    }
}

/// Awaits the correlated reply to a single server-initiated push.
///
/// Returned by [`ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_connection`]. The reply slot is
/// resolved when the originating connection process receives a `PushReply` frame
/// carrying the same correlation id, so [`PushReplyAwaiter::receive`] blocks
/// (bounded) for that one correlated answer.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct PushReplyAwaiter {
    correlation_id: u64,
    receiver: Receiver<PushSlotResolution>,
    /// This push's absolute reply deadline, mirrored from its slot. `None` (the
    /// default push) selects the no-deadline receive path, which NEVER touches
    /// the runtime — byte-compatible with 0.2.3, no shared-lock exposure.
    /// `Some` lets `receive` wait `min(caller quantum, time until deadline)` and
    /// resolve expiry promptly, so the caller's quantum can never select a
    /// deadlined push's terminal outcome.
    deadline: Option<Instant>,
    /// Weak handle to the owning runtime, used ONLY by the explicit-deadline
    /// path to resolve expiry host-side at [`receive`](Self::receive). A
    /// no-deadline push never upgrades it. `Weak` so the awaiter never keeps the
    /// runtime alive; if it is already gone, the slot (and its sender) is gone
    /// with it — the connection side is torn down.
    runtime: Weak<ConnectionRuntime>,
}

impl PushReplyAwaiter {
    /// Returns the correlation id this awaiter is matched on.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn correlation_id(&self) -> u64 {
        self.correlation_id
    }

    /// Blocks up to `timeout` for the client's correlated reply payload.
    ///
    /// `timeout` is a WAIT QUANTUM ONLY — a MAXIMUM wait, not a promise to
    /// block: an elapsed poll is a benign re-arm, never a failure; the reply's
    /// lifetime belongs to the push. A caller may re-invoke `receive`
    /// indefinitely after a [`ServerError::PushReplyTimeout`]: the reserved slot
    /// is untouched and a later reply is still delivered byte-exact. The poll
    /// quantum never changes the protocol outcome — for a deadlined push the
    /// call waits no longer than the EARLIER of the caller's quantum and the
    /// push's deadline, so the terminal expiry is returned promptly once due,
    /// never held until the quantum ends and never deferred past it.
    ///
    /// A push with no explicit deadline never touches shared supervisor state
    /// here: the elapsed quantum returns straight from the channel wait
    /// (behaviour-compatible with 0.2.3 — no registry lock, no contention, no
    /// poison exposure on the unchanged API).
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError::PushReplyTimeout`] when no reply arrived within this
    /// `timeout` quantum and the push's deadline (if any) is not yet due (a
    /// benign re-arm — call again to keep waiting);
    /// [`ServerError::PushReplyExpired`] when the push carried an explicit reply
    /// deadline (via
    /// [`push_to_connection_with_deadline`](ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_connection_with_deadline))
    /// and that deadline is due (terminal: the slot is removed and its §5 cap
    /// admission released; returned as soon as the deadline passes, even
    /// mid-quantum — but evaluated at observation points, not against the wall
    /// clock: a reply already delivered when this call observes the slot wins
    /// over expiry, even if it arrived after the deadline instant); or
    /// [`ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected`] when the connection process
    /// dropped the reply slot (the connection closed — the prompt worker-death
    /// signal). The variants are distinct so callers classify by type, not
    /// message.
    pub fn receive(&self, timeout: Duration) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
        self.deadline.map_or_else(
            || self.receive_no_deadline(timeout),
            |deadline| self.receive_deadlined(timeout, deadline),
        )
    }

    /// The default-push receive: exactly the 0.2.3 shape. One bounded channel
    /// wait; an elapsed quantum is a benign timeout straight from the channel —
    /// no runtime upgrade, no registry lock, EVER (unrelated registry work can
    /// never stretch this call past its quantum, and registry poison cannot
    /// reach it).
    fn receive_no_deadline(&self, timeout: Duration) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
        match self.receiver.recv_timeout(timeout) {
            Ok(resolution) => self.resolution_into_result(resolution),
            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => Err(ServerError::PushReplyTimeout {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
            }),
            Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => Err(ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
            }),
        }
    }

    /// The deadlined receive: waits `min(caller quantum, time until deadline)`
    /// and re-evaluates reply-first-then-expiry on every wake, so the caller's
    /// quantum can never select the terminal outcome (S1). Order per iteration:
    ///
    /// 1. Deliver a reply already in hand — an answer that is here must never be
    ///    reported as a timeout OR an expiry (the observation-point rule).
    /// 2. If the deadline is due, resolve expiry atomically against the registry
    ///    (`expire_slot`) and return the terminal outcome promptly — even when
    ///    the caller's quantum has time left (the quantum is a max wait).
    /// 3. Otherwise wait for the earlier of quantum-remaining and deadline; a
    ///    wake re-runs 1-2, and an exhausted quantum before the deadline is the
    ///    benign `PushReplyTimeout` re-arm with the slot untouched.
    fn receive_deadlined(
        &self,
        timeout: Duration,
        deadline: Instant,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
        let started = Instant::now();
        loop {
            if let Some(result) = self.try_take_reply() {
                return result;
            }
            let now = Instant::now();
            if now >= deadline {
                return self.expire_slot();
            }
            let quantum_left = timeout.saturating_sub(now.duration_since(started));
            if quantum_left.is_zero() {
                return Err(ServerError::PushReplyTimeout {
                    correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
                });
            }
            match self
                .receiver
                .recv_timeout(quantum_left.min(deadline.duration_since(now)))
            {
                Ok(resolution) => return self.resolution_into_result(resolution),
                Err(RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => {
                    return Err(ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected {
                        correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
                    });
                }
                // Re-loop: deliver a reply that raced the wake, expire a
                // now-due deadline, or report the exhausted quantum benignly.
                Err(RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => {}
            }
        }
    }

    /// Resolves a due deadline against the registry's atomic removal transition.
    fn expire_slot(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
        let timeout_error = || ServerError::PushReplyTimeout {
            correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
        };
        let Some(runtime) = self.runtime.upgrade() else {
            // The runtime is gone, and the slot map (with every sender) with it:
            // the connection side is torn down. Re-check the channel so the
            // dropped sender reads as the established DISCONNECTED outcome — a
            // dead runtime must not be misreported as a benign healthy-but-slow
            // timeout (S4).
            return self
                .try_take_reply()
                .unwrap_or(Err(ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected {
                    correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
                }));
        };
        match runtime.expire_push_if_due(self.correlation_id) {
            PushSlotDisposition::Expired => Err(ServerError::PushReplyExpired {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
            }),
            // Unreachable by construction (this is only called with the deadline
            // due, and the registry re-reads a monotonic clock); honest benign
            // fallback rather than a panic.
            PushSlotDisposition::Live => Err(timeout_error()),
            // Another path (a concurrent `resolve_push`, or connection close)
            // removed the slot under the registry lock while we waited on it. Its
            // send, if any, happens under that same lock, so re-check the channel:
            // a delivered reply is present now; a dropped sender is disconnected.
            PushSlotDisposition::Absent => self
                .try_take_reply()
                .unwrap_or_else(|| Err(timeout_error())),
        }
    }

    /// SRV-027 R2: the outcome if the slot has resolved, read without waiting
    /// by the requester's slice after its wake: `Some(Ok(payload))` for the
    /// worker's reply, `Some(Err(..))` for a refusal, a frame the worker's
    /// connection could not carry, or the worker gone (the slot swept at its
    /// close), `None` while nothing has arrived.
    pub(super) fn try_receive(&self) -> Option<Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError>> {
        self.try_take_reply()
    }

    /// Non-blocking check for a reply already sitting in the channel. `Some` with
    /// the payload or a disconnected error; `None` when the channel is still empty
    /// (no reply yet — the caller re-arms).
    fn try_take_reply(&self) -> Option<Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError>> {
        match self.receiver.try_recv() {
            Ok(resolution) => Some(self.resolution_into_result(resolution)),
            Err(TryRecvError::Disconnected) => Some(Err(ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
            })),
            Err(TryRecvError::Empty) => None,
        }
    }

    /// Turns one delivered [`PushSlotResolution`] into this awaiter's result, so
    /// all three receive paths read a resolution the same way and none of them
    /// can grow its own interpretation of one.
    ///
    /// Note what is NOT here: a dropped `Sender` never reaches this function. It
    /// is a channel disconnect, and so stays the retryable
    /// [`ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected`] on every path that kills a slot
    /// without naming a reason — connection close included.
    fn resolution_into_result(
        &self,
        resolution: PushSlotResolution,
    ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ServerError> {
        match resolution {
            PushSlotResolution::Reply(payload) => Ok(payload),
            PushSlotResolution::ReplyRefused { reason } => Err(ServerError::PushReplyRefused {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
                reason,
            }),
            PushSlotResolution::OutboundFrameTooLarge {
                needed,
                capacity,
                queued,
            } => Err(ServerError::PushFrameExceedsOutboundCapacity {
                correlation_id: self.correlation_id,
                needed,
                capacity,
                queued,
            }),
        }
    }
}

/// The kernel-parked exit-event reactor (W4 leg 1 reclamation carve-out, §4.1).
/// It is the single TOLD source that reclaims connection host records for
/// processes that exit WITHOUT a final handler slice, replacing the retired
/// per-accept `reap_crashed` scan for that class.
///
/// It blocks on beamr's sole exit-event subscription — never polling, never
/// timed — and on each delivered [`ExitEvent::Exited`] it (1) drains the
/// retained additive outcome so beamr's exactly-once outcome store stays bounded
/// (we are the sole subscriber and therefore the sole drainer) and (2) reclaims
/// the pid through [`ConnectionRuntime::reclaim_terminated`], which funnels into
/// `remove()`. On the bounded queue's [`ExitEvent::Lagged`] overflow marker it
/// runs exactly one reconciliation pass over the tracked records (beamr's
/// documented recovery), driven by that one TELL — not a timer.
///
/// It holds WEAK handles to both the scheduler and the runtime and upgrades them
/// per event, so it never keeps either alive past supervisor drop. It returns
/// when the subscription disconnects (scheduler and publisher dropped) OR when a
/// per-event upgrade fails — both observed at an event delivery, never sampled,
/// so there is no stop flag (LAW-1). The runtime and its durable store therefore
/// release synchronously at supervisor drop rather than after the reactor exits.
fn run_reclaim_reactor(
    subscription: &ExitEventSubscription,
    scheduler: &Weak<Scheduler>,
    runtime: &Weak<ConnectionRuntime>,
) {
    loop {
        match subscription.recv() {
            Ok(ExitEvent::Exited { pid, reason }) => {
                let Some(runtime) = runtime.upgrade() else {
                    return;
                };
                runtime.deliver_reclamation(scheduler, pid, reason);
            }
            Ok(ExitEvent::Lagged) => {
                let (Some(runtime), Some(scheduler)) = (runtime.upgrade(), scheduler.upgrade())
                else {
                    return;
                };
                runtime.reap_crashed(&scheduler);
            }
            Err(error) => {
                // The sole crash-reclamation source for a process that dies
                // without a final slice is ending. Named at the same volume as
                // the startup branch that finds no subscription at all.
                tracing::warn!(
                    %error,
                    "connection reclamation reactor stopping; external-termination \
                     reclamation has no further TOLD exit source"
                );
                return;
            }
        }
    }
}

pub(super) struct SupervisorInner {
    scheduler: Arc<Scheduler>,
    runtime: Arc<ConnectionRuntime>,
    incarnations: Option<Arc<ConnectionIncarnationAuthority>>,
    /// P0 #56 R4: the readiness probe's view of whether this server can admit.
    /// Shared with the incarnation authority when one is installed.
    admission_readiness: AdmissionReadiness,
}

impl std::fmt::Debug for SupervisorInner {
    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        formatter
            .debug_struct("SupervisorInner")
            .field("runtime", &self.runtime)
            .finish_non_exhaustive()
    }
}

/// The configured `[auth]` section as the supervisor carries it: the bearer
/// token as opaque bytes for the handshake's constant-time comparison, and the
/// registry pass verifier built from `auth.pass` when one is configured. The
/// single derivation behind [`ConnectionSupervisor::from_config`] and
/// [`ConnectionSupervisorBuilder::auth`], so the two cannot drift.
fn configured_authentication(
    auth: &AuthConfig,
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, Option<PassVerifier>), ServerError> {
    let pass_verifier = PassVerifier::from_auth(auth)?;
    Ok((auth.token.clone().into_bytes(), pass_verifier))
}

/// Composes a [`ConnectionSupervisor`] over caller-owned services.
///
/// Any of the optional parts — `[auth]` (bearer + pass verifier), a connection
/// notifier, operational limits — can be set together. Minted by
/// [`ConnectionSupervisor::builder`].
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ConnectionSupervisorBuilder {
    services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
    notifier: Option<Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>>,
    auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    pass_verifier: Option<PassVerifier>,
    lys: Option<LysInstall>,
    limits: LimitsConfig,
}

/// What `[auth.lys]` installs on the connection runtime: the admitter with
/// the network id its subjects are placed under (ACCESS-001 R2), the
/// machine's link host (ACCESS-002 R1), the service bindings (ACCESS-003 R1)
/// and the channel membership gate (ACCESS-006 R1).
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct LysInstall {
    /// Admits a Lys pass at `Connect` and decides its routes.
    pub(crate) admitter: Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter>,
    /// The network every subject is placed under.
    pub(crate) network_id: String,
    /// This machine's link host, `[auth.lys.machine]`.
    pub(crate) link_host: Option<Arc<crate::link::LinkHost>>,
    /// The service effect seams, `[auth.lys.services]`.
    pub(crate) services: Option<Arc<crate::services::production::ServiceBindings>>,
    /// The channel membership gate `[auth.lys.membership]` configures, over
    /// the same issuer.
    pub(crate) membership: Option<Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>>,
}

/// The tokio runtime Lys is asked on, live deliberate decisions and the
/// service bindings' HTTP alike, owned by the server for its life; `None`
/// without `[auth.lys]`. One worker: every ask is one short request made
/// from a connection's slice through `Handle::block_on` on a scoped thread,
/// never a runtime nested in the connection scheduler.
///
/// # Errors
/// The runtime could not start, by name.
pub fn lys_ask_runtime(
    auth: Option<&AuthConfig>,
) -> Result<Option<tokio::runtime::Runtime>, ServerError> {
    if auth.is_none_or(|auth| auth.lys.is_none()) {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
        .worker_threads(1)
        .thread_name("liminal-lys-ask")
        .enable_all()
        .build()
        .map(Some)
        .map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!("the Lys ask runtime could not start: {error}"),
        })
}

/// Builds the Lys admitter `[auth.lys]` configures, reading the issuer's key
/// set once; `None` without the section. `ask_handle` is the runtime live
/// asks run on ([`lys_ask_runtime`], or an embedder's own); `auth.lys.live`
/// without one is refused at start, by name.
///
/// # Errors
/// A key set, pass or identity that cannot be read or is refused, by name.
pub fn configured_lys(
    auth: &AuthConfig,
    ask_handle: Option<tokio::runtime::Handle>,
) -> Result<Option<LysInstall>, ServerError> {
    let Some(lys) = auth.lys.as_ref() else {
        return Ok(None);
    };
    let keys_json =
        std::fs::read_to_string(&lys.keys_path).map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!("auth.lys.keys_path {}: {error}", lys.keys_path.display()),
        })?;
    let mut adapter = crate::auth_lys::lys_pass_adapter::LysPassAdapter::from_keys_json(
        &keys_json,
        lys.issuer.clone(),
    )
    .map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
        message: format!("auth.lys key set refused: {error}"),
    })?;
    if lys.live {
        // Deliberate decisions ask the issuer live, with the holder's pass,
        // on the server's runtime; the ask never nests a runtime.
        let Some(handle) = ask_handle else {
            return Err(ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message:
                    "auth.lys.live needs the server's Lys ask runtime at start; none was given"
                        .to_owned(),
            });
        };
        let mut live = crate::auth_lys::live::HttpLysAsk::new(
            lys.api_url.as_deref().unwrap_or(&lys.issuer),
            handle,
        )
        .map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!("auth.lys.issuer refused for live asks: {error}"),
        })?;
        // Lys answers its batch check for an administrator or an app, never
        // a seat's pass: with an app credential configured the question is
        // asked as this liminal, about the holder.
        if let Some(path) = lys.app_credential_path.as_ref() {
            let credential =
                std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                    message: format!(
                        "auth.lys.app_credential_path '{}' cannot be read: {}",
                        path.display(),
                        error.kind()
                    ),
                })?;
            live = live.asking_as(credential.trim().to_owned());
        }
        adapter = adapter.with_live(Arc::new(live));
    }
    let adapter = Arc::new(adapter);
    let link_host = lys
        .machine
        .as_ref()
        .map(|machine| configured_link_host(adapter.as_ref(), machine))
        .transpose()?
        .map(Arc::new);
    let admitter: Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter> =
        Arc::new(crate::auth_lys::session::ConsumerAdmitter::new(adapter));
    let membership = lys
        .membership
        .as_ref()
        .map(|membership| crate::auth_membership::configured_gate(membership, &lys.issuer))
        .transpose()?;
    Ok(Some(LysInstall {
        admitter,
        network_id: lys.network_id.clone(),
        link_host,
        services: None,
        membership,
    }))
}

/// Reads 32 bytes as 64 hexadecimal digits, naming `what` in the refusal.
fn hex_key(what: &str, digits: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32], ServerError> {
    let bytes = hex::decode(digits.trim()).map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
        message: format!("{what} is not hexadecimal: {error}"),
    })?;
    <[u8; 32]>::try_from(bytes).map_err(|bytes| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
        message: format!("{what} is {} bytes, not 32", bytes.len()),
    })
}

/// Builds this liminal as a machine Lys knows from `[auth.lys.machine]`
/// (ACCESS-002 R1): its identity from the seed file, its own link rights from
/// its own pass verified like any other, and the recorded machine keys.
fn configured_link_host(
    adapter: &crate::auth_lys::lys_pass_adapter::LysPassAdapter,
    machine: &crate::config::types::MachineConfig,
) -> Result<crate::link::LinkHost, ServerError> {
    use crate::auth_lys::LysPassConsumer;
    let seed_digits = std::fs::read_to_string(&machine.identity_path).map_err(|error| {
        ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!(
                "auth.lys.machine.identity_path {}: {error}",
                machine.identity_path.display()
            ),
        }
    })?;
    let seed = zeroize::Zeroizing::new(hex_key("auth.lys.machine identity seed", &seed_digits)?);
    let local =
        crate::link_handshake::LocalMachine::new(lys_core::keys::Ed25519Identity::from_seed(&seed));
    let pass_bytes =
        std::fs::read(&machine.pass_path).map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!(
                "auth.lys.machine.pass_path {}: {error}",
                machine.pass_path.display()
            ),
        })?;
    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .map_or(0, |elapsed| elapsed.as_secs());
    let pass = adapter
        .verify_offline(&pass_bytes, crate::auth_lys::LIMINAL_PASS_AUDIENCE, now)
        .map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: format!("auth.lys.machine pass refused: {error}"),
        })?;
    let rights = crate::auth_lys::lys_pass_adapter::MachineLinkRights::new(adapter, pass);
    let mut recorded = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
    for (holder, digits) in &machine.machines {
        let key = hex_key(&format!("auth.lys.machine.machines.{holder}"), digits)?;
        recorded.insert(
            holder.clone(),
            crate::link_handshake::MachineIdentity::new(key),
        );
    }
    Ok(crate::link::LinkHost::new(
        local,
        Box::new(rights),
        recorded,
    ))
}

impl ConnectionSupervisorBuilder {
    /// Installs the configured `[auth]` section: the bearer token, and the
    /// registry pass verifier when `auth.pass` is present — derived exactly as
    /// [`ConnectionSupervisor::from_config`] derives them.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError::ConfigValidation`] when `auth.pass` names a key
    /// that is not exactly one valid Ed25519 verifying key as 64 hexadecimal
    /// digits — the same error, with the same text, that `from_config` returns
    /// for that configuration.
    pub fn auth(mut self, auth: &AuthConfig) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        let (auth_token, pass_verifier) = configured_authentication(auth)?;
        self.auth_token = Some(auth_token);
        self.pass_verifier = pass_verifier;
        self.lys = configured_lys(auth, tokio::runtime::Handle::try_current().ok())?;
        Ok(self)
    }

    /// Test seam: installs `lys` exactly as `[auth.lys]` would, with no
    /// configuration file and no issuer key behind it.
    #[cfg(test)]
    #[must_use]
    pub(super) fn lys_for_tests(mut self, lys: LysInstall) -> Self {
        self.lys = Some(lys);
        self
    }

    /// Installs the connection-keyed notifier, invoked on worker registration
    /// lifecycle and on pass-stamped attach/detach.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn notifier(mut self, notifier: Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>) -> Self {
        self.notifier = Some(notifier);
        self
    }

    /// Installs the operational limits (§5); unset, the signed defaults apply.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn limits(mut self, limits: LimitsConfig) -> Self {
        self.limits = limits;
        self
    }

    /// Starts the supervisor.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when incarnation startup or scheduler startup
    /// fails.
    pub fn build(self) -> Result<ConnectionSupervisor, ServerError> {
        SupervisorInner::new(
            self.services,
            self.notifier,
            self.auth_token,
            self.pass_verifier,
            self.lys,
            self.limits,
            None,
        )
        .map(|inner| ConnectionSupervisor {
            inner: Arc::new(inner),
        })
    }
}

/// Installs the `[auth.lys]` parts on the runtime, each once: the admitter,
/// the link host, the membership gate and the service bindings.
fn install_lys(runtime: &ConnectionRuntime, lys: LysInstall) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
    let LysInstall {
        admitter,
        network_id,
        link_host,
        services: bindings,
        membership,
    } = lys;
    runtime
        .install_lys_admitter(admitter, network_id)
        .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
            message: "auth.lys admitter was already installed".to_owned(),
        })?;
    if let Some(host) = link_host {
        runtime
            .install_link_host(host)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "auth.lys.machine was already installed".to_owned(),
            })?;
    }
    if let Some(gate) = membership {
        runtime
            .install_membership_gate(gate)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "auth.lys.membership was already installed".to_owned(),
            })?;
    }
    if let Some(bindings) = bindings {
        runtime
            .install_service_bindings(bindings)
            .map_err(|_| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
                message: "auth.lys.services was already installed".to_owned(),
            })?;
    }
    Ok(())
}

impl SupervisorInner {
    fn new(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        notifier: Option<Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>>,
        auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        pass_verifier: Option<PassVerifier>,
        lys: Option<LysInstall>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
        fatal_shutdown: Option<ShutdownHandle>,
    ) -> Result<Self, ServerError> {
        let installed_services = ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services);
        // P0 #56 R4. Owned by the supervisor so the readiness probe has a stable
        // handle whether or not a participant service (and therefore an
        // incarnation authority) is installed: a server with no authority has
        // nothing that can hold admission, and reports available.
        let admission_readiness = AdmissionReadiness::available();
        let incarnations = installed_services
            .participant_service
            .as_ref()
            .map(
                |service| -> Result<Arc<ConnectionIncarnationAuthority>, ServerError> {
                    ConnectionIncarnationAuthority::startup(
                        service.durable_store(),
                        limits.max_connections,
                        service.publication_conversation_limit(),
                        service,
                        admission_readiness.clone(),
                    )
                    .map(Arc::new)
                },
            )
            .transpose()?;
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let registry = Arc::new(ModuleRegistry::new());

        let scheduler = Scheduler::with_services(
            SchedulerConfig {
                thread_count: Some(CONNECTION_SCHEDULER_THREADS),
                ..SchedulerConfig::default()
            },
            SchedulerServices::from_config().owned_readiness(),
            registry,
            // The strongest of the three cases: `registry` here is a bare
            // `ModuleRegistry::new()` with NO module ever inserted, so this
            // scheduler cannot execute a single bytecode instruction, let alone
            // a guard BIF. Connections run as native processes via
            // `NativeHandlerFactory`. beamr 0.19 requires the answer be written
            // down rather than inherited; the answer is none.
            NativeBifs::none(),
        )
        .map_err(|message| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
            message: format!("failed to start connection scheduler: {message}"),
        })?;
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        let scheduler = Arc::new(scheduler);
        // The runtime captures a WEAK handle to the connection scheduler so
        // notifier wakes (R3/R1(vi)) can be fired from another actor's slice
        // without a strong scheduler↔process↔runtime cycle that would leak the
        // whole connection scheduler.
        let runtime = Arc::new(ConnectionRuntime::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: installed_services,
                incarnations: incarnations.clone(),
                fatal_shutdown,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Arc::downgrade(&scheduler),
            notifier,
            (auth_token, pass_verifier),
            limits,
        ));
        if let Some(lys) = lys {
            install_lys(&runtime, lys)?;
        }
        // A connection fate parked on candidate-lane `Precedence` is retried by
        // the drain that clears it, so the runtime is told about every drain.
        if let (Some(service), Some(notifier)) = (runtime.participant_service(), runtime.notifier())
        {
            service.install_checkpoint_crossing_observer(Arc::clone(notifier));
        }
        if let Some(service) = runtime.participant_service() {
            let runtime_weak: Weak<ConnectionRuntime> = Arc::downgrade(&runtime);
            let listener: Weak<dyn CandidateLaneListener> = runtime_weak;
            service
                .install_candidate_lane_listener(listener)
                .map_err(|error| ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                    phase: "candidate-lane listener installation",
                    message: error.to_string(),
                })?;
        }
        // W4 leg 1 reclamation carve-out (§4.1): the kernel-parked exit-event
        // reactor is the TOLD source that reclaims a connection host record whose
        // process exited WITHOUT a final handler slice (external/panic
        // termination). It blocks on beamr's single exit-event subscription —
        // never a poll — and routes every reclamation through the same `remove()`
        // funnel as an ordinary exit. Detached on purpose: it exits when the
        // scheduler (and so its event publisher) drops, so there is no stop flag
        // to sample (LAW-1).
        match scheduler.subscribe_exit_events() {
            Some(subscription) => {
                let reactor_scheduler = Arc::downgrade(&scheduler);
                // WEAK, symmetric with the scheduler handle: the reactor must not
                // keep the runtime (and its durable store's writer lock) alive past
                // supervisor drop. It upgrades per event and exits on a failed
                // upgrade, so the runtime is released synchronously at drop.
                let reactor_runtime = Arc::downgrade(&runtime);
                thread::Builder::new()
                    .name("liminal-connection-reclaim".to_owned())
                    .spawn(move || {
                        run_reclaim_reactor(&subscription, &reactor_scheduler, &reactor_runtime);
                    })
                    .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                        message: format!("failed to start connection reclamation reactor: {error}"),
                    })?;
            }
            None => {
                tracing::error!(
                    "connection scheduler exit-event subscription unavailable; \
                     external-termination reclamation has no TOLD exit source (the \
                     shutdown-drain scan that once backstopped it was retired by W4 leg 3)"
                );
            }
        }
        Ok(Self {
            scheduler,
            runtime,
            incarnations,
            admission_readiness,
        })
    }

    fn spawn_connection(
        self: &Arc<Self>,
        stream: TcpStream,
    ) -> Result<ConnectionHandle, ServerError> {
        // §5 `max_connections`: ATOMIC admission reservation acquired BEFORE any
        // process construction (review round 1 item 7 — a signed bound must not
        // be exceedable by concurrent callers; check-then-spawn across an
        // unlocked window was). The CAS reservation is released on every failure
        // path below and converts into the connection record at `register`;
        // thereafter the single record-removal path (`remove`) releases it. An
        // over-cap accept therefore costs nothing and the bound holds under any
        // concurrency.
        self.runtime.try_reserve_admission()?;
        let reservation = AdmissionReservation {
            runtime: &self.runtime,
            armed: true,
        };
        stream
            .set_nonblocking(true)
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("failed to configure connection stream: {error}"),
            })?;
        // A failed `peer_addr` is folded to `None` rather than refusing the
        // accept: an unidentifiable peer is still a serviceable connection. The
        // cost is paid in triage, not in service — every later log line for this
        // connection reports `peer_addr=None`, so nothing that happens on it can
        // be tied back to a remote endpoint.
        let peer_addr = stream.peer_addr().ok();
        // The host-held duplicate keeps the fd alive until the single record-removal
        // path has synchronously deregistered readiness. External process death can
        // therefore never let fd reuse overtake host-side deregistration.
        let fd_guard = stream
            .try_clone()
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("failed to retain connection fd for teardown: {error}"),
            })?;
        let connection_incarnation = self.allocate_connection_incarnation()?;
        let holder = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(stream)));
        let runtime = Arc::clone(&self.runtime);
        let process_holder = Arc::clone(&holder);
        let factory: NativeHandlerFactory = Box::new(move || {
            Box::new(ConnectionProcess::from_holder(
                Arc::clone(&runtime),
                peer_addr,
                &process_holder,
                connection_incarnation,
            ))
        });
        let pid =
            self.scheduler
                .spawn_native(factory)
                .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                    message: format!("failed to spawn connection process: {error}"),
                })?;
        if let Err(error) = self.runtime.register_connection(
            pid,
            peer_addr,
            connection_incarnation,
            MountKind::Tcp,
            Some(fd_guard),
        ) {
            // Registration failure leaves no host record to reap. Terminate the
            // just-spawned process explicitly so neither its stream nor admission
            // reservation can escape this failed spawn.
            self.scheduler.terminate_process(pid, ExitReason::Error);
            return Err(error);
        }
        // The reservation is now owned by the registered record: `remove` (the
        // single record-removal path — finish/mark_crashed/reap all funnel
        // through it) releases the admission when the record goes away.
        reservation.convert();
        Ok(ConnectionHandle {
            pid,
            peer_addr,
            connection_incarnation,
            supervisor: Arc::clone(self),
        })
    }

    /// LP-WS-TRANSPORT R1.3: the sibling-transport spawn body. Mirrors
    /// [`Self::spawn_connection`]'s admission → incarnation → spawn → register →
    /// convert sequence exactly (same reservation guard, same failure rollback,
    /// same single record-removal ownership), differing only in that the caller
    /// supplies the native handler factory and the host-held fd guard instead of
    /// a raw `TcpStream`. Purely additive; the TCP path never calls this.
    fn spawn_transport_connection(
        self: &Arc<Self>,
        peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
        fd_guard: Option<TcpStream>,
        mount: MountKind,
        build_factory: &dyn Fn(
            Arc<ConnectionRuntime>,
            Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        ) -> NativeHandlerFactory,
    ) -> Result<ConnectionHandle, ServerError> {
        self.runtime.try_reserve_admission()?;
        let reservation = AdmissionReservation {
            runtime: &self.runtime,
            armed: true,
        };
        let connection_incarnation = self.allocate_connection_incarnation()?;
        let factory = build_factory(Arc::clone(&self.runtime), connection_incarnation);
        let pid =
            self.scheduler
                .spawn_native(factory)
                .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                    message: format!("failed to spawn connection process: {error}"),
                })?;
        if let Err(error) = self.runtime.register_connection(
            pid,
            peer_addr,
            connection_incarnation,
            mount,
            fd_guard,
        ) {
            self.scheduler.terminate_process(pid, ExitReason::Error);
            return Err(error);
        }
        reservation.convert();
        Ok(ConnectionHandle {
            pid,
            peer_addr,
            connection_incarnation,
            supervisor: Arc::clone(self),
        })
    }

    fn allocate_connection_incarnation(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<Option<ConnectionIncarnation>, ServerError> {
        let Some(authority) = self.incarnations.as_ref() else {
            return Ok(None);
        };
        // Production-era uniqueness invariant: every published incarnation is
        // unique against ALL durable references — binding epochs committed
        // into conversation logs included — by allocator-log monotonicity
        // alone, not by the completeness of the reference set below.
        //
        //   1. Startup replays the durable allocator stream and STRICTLY
        //      increments the server incarnation, fsyncing the Startup event
        //      before any listener becomes ready
        //      (`IncarnationStream::startup`); a server value is never wrapped
        //      or reused, so no two process lifetimes share one.
        //   2. Within a lifetime, allocations are serialized under this
        //      authority's mutex, candidates start strictly above the durable
        //      `last_examined_connection_ordinal`
        //      (`allocate_connection_incarnation`), and every allocation's
        //      event is appended and flushed BEFORE its pair is published
        //      (`StartedIncarnationStream::allocate`), so ordinals never
        //      repeat within a lifetime and replay restores a head at or
        //      above every published ordinal.
        //   3. A durable reference can only name a pair this allocator
        //      previously PUBLISHED (binding epochs are committed only after
        //      their connection was admitted), and the same store's flush
        //      barrier orders the allocator event before any conversation-log
        //      entry that references it.
        //
        // The live-connection reference set below is therefore defense in
        // depth — a bounded collision skip against a rolled-back or divergent
        // allocator stream — never the uniqueness foundation, and never a raw
        // caller-supplied matrix.
        let references = self.runtime.complete_active_incarnation_references()?;
        authority.allocate(&references).map(Some)
    }

    fn broadcast_control(&self, control: &ConnectionControl) {
        for connection in self.runtime.active_connections() {
            if !self.enqueue_control(connection.pid, control.clone()) {
                // Observation, not diagnosis: the routine cause is a process
                // that is no longer live, but a refused control queue reaches
                // here too and has already warned with its own error.
                tracing::debug!(
                    connection_pid = connection.pid,
                    peer_addr = ?connection.peer_addr,
                    ?control,
                    "connection control message was not published to the process"
                );
            }
        }
    }

    /// Queues `control` for `pid` and wakes the process. Returns whether the
    /// control was PUBLISHED (left in the queue with a successful wake, or
    /// already consumed by a drain) — `false` guarantees no consumer ever saw
    /// it.
    ///
    /// S8: a failed wake does NOT prove the queued control was never consumed.
    /// The insert releases the queue lock before the wake attempt, and a
    /// process already executing a control drain (each control atom drains ALL
    /// queued controls for the pid) can pop the just-inserted entry in that
    /// window, then exit before the wake check. Publication is therefore
    /// disambiguated BY OBSERVATION on the failed-wake path: `remove_control`
    /// finding and removing the entry proves no consumer saw it (truly
    /// unpublished — `false`); finding nothing proves a drain consumed it
    /// (`pop_control` is the only other remover of queue entries, and the
    /// removal key embeds the push's runtime-unique correlation id, so it can
    /// never match a different entry) — the control was published and the
    /// caller's slot lifecycle carries the delivery truth (`true`).
    fn enqueue_control(&self, pid: u64, control: ConnectionControl) -> bool {
        self.runtime.publish_control(&self.scheduler, pid, control)
    }
}

impl ConnectionRuntime {
    /// Queues `control` for connection `pid` and wakes it on `scheduler`;
    /// `true` means the control was published (queued and the wake landed,
    /// or a drain consumed it first). The one publication path for a control,
    /// shared by the supervisor's pushes and a routed request's (SRV-027 R2).
    pub(super) fn publish_control(
        &self,
        scheduler: &Scheduler,
        pid: u64,
        control: ConnectionControl,
    ) -> bool {
        // Keep a key for the failure-path removal before the control is moved into
        // the queue, so a non-`Copy` (push) control can still be located and pulled
        // back out if the scheduler wakeup fails.
        let removal_key = control.clone();
        if let Err(error) = self.push_control(pid, control) {
            // The cause is only knowable HERE. Callers see a bare `false` and
            // used to render every one of them as "process is not live", which
            // is a lie about a live process whose control queue refused the
            // entry — and it discarded the one error that said what happened.
            tracing::warn!(
                connection_pid = pid,
                %error,
                "connection control queue refused the entry; the control was never queued"
            );
            return false;
        }
        // Deterministic test seam in the insert->wake window (S8 staging).
        #[cfg(test)]
        self.run_pre_wake_barrier();
        if scheduler.enqueue_atom_message(pid, self.control_atom()) {
            true
        } else {
            // Failed wake: the entry's fate is the publication verdict. Removed
            // here => nobody consumed it => unpublished. Already gone => a
            // drain consumed it before the wake check => published. (A poisoned
            // queue lock reads as not-removed => published — the safe
            // direction: the slot lifecycle then reports the truthful outcome,
            // whereas claiming "unpublished" could be a lie.)
            !self.remove_control(pid, &removal_key)
        }
    }

    /// SRV-027 R2: pushes a routed request's `payload` to the worker
    /// connection `pid` on `subject`, the slot carrying the requester's
    /// `wake`, and hands back the awaiter the requester's slice reads
    /// non-blocking ([`PushReplyAwaiter::try_receive`]). The same
    /// INSERT -> CONFIRM -> PUBLISH order and publication invariant as the
    /// supervisor's pushes: an `Err` means no `Push` was published. The slot
    /// carries no deadline of its own; the requester's pending-reply deadline
    /// governs, and its expiry cancels the slot by correlation id.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// The worker's `max_pending_pushes_per_connection` cap, a worker whose
    /// record closed during registration, a scheduler that is gone, or a
    /// control the queue refused: each by name, with nothing published.
    pub(super) fn route_push(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        subject: &str,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
        wake: Option<super::wake::ReadyWaker>,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        let correlation_id = self.next_push_correlation_id();
        let receiver =
            self.register_push(pid, correlation_id, None, Some(subject.to_owned()), wake)?;
        if !self.confirm_push_registration(pid, correlation_id) {
            return Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!(
                    "cannot route to connection process {pid}: the connection closed during push registration"
                ),
            });
        }
        let Some(scheduler) = self.scheduler.upgrade() else {
            self.cancel_push(correlation_id);
            return Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!(
                    "cannot route to connection process {pid}: the connection scheduler is gone"
                ),
            });
        };
        let control = ConnectionControl::Push {
            correlation_id,
            payload,
        };
        if self.publish_control(&scheduler, pid, control) {
            Ok(PushReplyAwaiter {
                correlation_id,
                receiver,
                deadline: None,
                runtime: Weak::new(),
            })
        } else {
            self.cancel_push(correlation_id);
            Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!(
                    "cannot route to connection process {pid}: the control was not published"
                ),
            })
        }
    }

    /// SRV-027 R1: the connection serving `subject`, by one keyed lookup in
    /// the directory under the registry lock; `None` when no worker serves it.
    pub(super) fn serving(&self, subject: &str) -> Option<u64> {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|records| records.directory.serving(subject))
    }

    /// How many directory lookups `serving` has made (R4 count pins).
    pub(super) fn directory_lookups(&self) -> u64 {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .map_or(0, |records| records.directory.lookups())
    }
}

/// RAII guard for one §5 `max_connections` admission reservation.
///
/// Acquired (via [`ConnectionRuntime::try_reserve_admission`]) before any process
/// construction in `spawn_connection`; every early-return failure path releases
/// it through `Drop`, and a successful `register` converts it into the
/// connection record (whose removal releases the admission instead). RAII means
/// no failure path — present or future — can leak a reservation.
struct AdmissionReservation<'a> {
    runtime: &'a ConnectionRuntime,
    armed: bool,
}

impl AdmissionReservation<'_> {
    /// Converts the reservation into record ownership: `Drop` no longer releases
    /// it, because the registered record's removal will.
    fn convert(mut self) {
        self.armed = false;
    }
}

impl Drop for AdmissionReservation<'_> {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        if self.armed {
            self.runtime.release_admission();
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(super) enum ConnectionControl {
    NotifyShutdown,
    ForceClose,
    /// Server-initiated push of an opaque payload, correlated by `correlation_id`,
    /// to be written out as a [`Frame::Push`] by the receiving connection process.
    Push {
        correlation_id: u64,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
    },
    /// ACCESS-005 R4/R6: this connection's rights changed under a grant
    /// revocation. The connection sweeps its own `ConnectionGrants`: it
    /// retires withdrawn rights' work and, when its admitting right is lost,
    /// closes with the reason. The denied state is already in force before
    /// this control is read, so a refused publication only delays the sweep
    /// to the connection's own wake.
    Revocation,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ActiveConnection {
    pid: u64,
    peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct PreWaitBarrier {
    armed: Arc<Barrier>,
    release: Arc<Barrier>,
}

/// Pid-specific, one-use deterministic gate on the reclamation delivery path
/// (oracle 26). The exit-event reactor stages it only for the targeted pid, so
/// unrelated exits still reclaim immediately; for the target it rendezvouses
/// `reached` (proving the pid is dead but its record still tracked — the S8
/// reclamation window), then `release` (the harness lets the reclaim proceed),
/// then `done` (the `remove()` funnel completed). It changes no production
/// semantics — the whole type and its call sites are `#[cfg(test)]`.
#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct ReclaimBarrier {
    pid: u64,
    reached: Arc<Barrier>,
    release: Arc<Barrier>,
    done: Arc<Barrier>,
}

#[derive(Debug)]
struct ConnectionServiceInstallation {
    services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
    participant_service: Option<InstalledParticipantService>,
}

impl ConnectionServiceInstallation {
    /// Captures the service adapter's capability posture exactly once, before
    /// participant incarnation startup or connection process construction.
    fn capture(services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>) -> Self {
        let participant_service = services.participant_service();
        Self {
            services,
            participant_service,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug)]
struct ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
    services: ConnectionServiceInstallation,
    incarnations: Option<Arc<ConnectionIncarnationAuthority>>,
    fatal_shutdown: Option<ShutdownHandle>,
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Debug)]
enum CloseEventFdProbe {
    Off,
    Armed,
    Observed(Result<bool, std::io::Error>),
}

#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) struct ConnectionRuntime {
    signals: OnceLock<ServerSignals>,
    /// The Lys pass admitter and the Lys network id liminal's subjects are
    /// placed under, installed once before the first connection (ACCESS-001
    /// R2). Absent, a Lys pass record is refused at `Connect` by name.
    lys_admitter: OnceLock<(Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter>, String)>,
    /// The ACCESS-003 service bindings, installed once from
    /// `[auth.lys.services]`; a service request without them is refused by
    /// name.
    service_bindings: OnceLock<Arc<crate::services::production::ServiceBindings>>,
    /// The services registry and lifecycle (SRV-028), installed once after
    /// the listener binds; absent, every lifecycle request is refused by
    /// name and no service process credential is admitted.
    lifecycle: OnceLock<Arc<crate::services::lifecycle::Lifecycle>>,
    /// The channel membership gate, installed once with the admitter
    /// (ACCESS-006 R1). Absent, no channel is membership-protected.
    membership_gate: OnceLock<Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>>,
    /// This liminal as a machine Lys knows, installed once with the admitter
    /// (ACCESS-002 R1). Absent, no link opens here, by name.
    link_host: OnceLock<Arc<crate::link::LinkHost>>,
    /// The grant-revocation policy, installed once before the first
    /// connection (ACCESS-005). Present, every `Connect` must carry a bound
    /// pass the authority admits and negotiate the reason-bearing close;
    /// absent, admission is exactly as before.
    revocation: OnceLock<Arc<crate::auth_revocation::RevocationAuthority>>,
    #[cfg(test)]
    close_event_fd_probe: Mutex<CloseEventFdProbe>,
    services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
    /// Live retry index woken by candidate-lane drains; durable Open rows remain
    /// the recovery authority.
    parked_connection_fates: Mutex<ParkedConnectionFates>,
    /// Complete participant handler/store bundle captured at supervisor startup.
    /// `Some` is paired with an incarnation authority on `SupervisorInner`.
    participant_service: Option<InstalledParticipantService>,
    /// Same started authority used for allocation, shared for terminal Open/Complete.
    incarnations: Option<Arc<ConnectionIncarnationAuthority>>,
    /// Existing runtime shutdown activation notified by the first post-Open fatal.
    /// Test-only/runtime-less constructors intentionally carry `None`.
    fatal_shutdown: Option<ShutdownHandle>,
    records: Mutex<Registry>,
    controls: Mutex<Vec<QueuedConnectionControl>>,
    control_atom: Atom,
    /// R6 single `READY` wake atom for this connection scheduler. Fired by every
    /// wake source's notifier (R3/R1(vi)); coalescing and duplicates are harmless.
    ready_atom: Atom,
    /// Weak handle to the connection scheduler, used to build [`ReadyWaker`]s a
    /// notifier fires from another actor's slice. Weak so it never keeps the
    /// scheduler alive (the scheduler owns the processes that own this runtime).
    scheduler: Weak<Scheduler>,
    /// W4 leg 3 (§4.3) TOLD drain-completion primitive. Reuses the
    /// [`ShutdownHandle`] `Condvar` shape (`shutdown.rs` reuse candidate (c)): a
    /// monotonic connection-removal generation guarded by [`Self::drain_removed`]'s
    /// mutex, bumped once whenever [`Self::remove`] actually drops a record — the
    /// single removal funnel every exit route (in-slice `mark_crashed`/`finish`,
    /// the reclaim reactor, and the reconciliation scan) reaches. The
    /// shutdown-sequence drain/settle waiter parks on the `Condvar` and wakes only
    /// on a delivered exit (a generation bump + `notify_all`) or the one admitted
    /// deadline it passes to `wait_timeout`. No periodic reap or count scan.
    drain_generation: Mutex<u64>,
    /// Woken on every connection-record removal; the drain/settle waiter parks
    /// here. Paired with [`Self::drain_generation`] under the same mutex so an
    /// exit delivered between the waiter's arm-before-observe snapshot and its
    /// park cannot be lost (oracle 18).
    drain_removed: Condvar,
    /// FIX A-ii shutdown flush barrier: a delivery-quiescence generation of the
    /// exact TOLD `drain_generation` shape. Bumped whenever a connection parks
    /// with every accepted publish already fanned out to its socket — but only
    /// while [`Self::settle_armed`] is set (the flush barrier is waiting) — so
    /// normal operation pays nothing. Guards [`Self::settle_changed`]'s mutex.
    settle_generation: Mutex<u64>,
    /// Woken when a connection reaches delivery quiescence during shutdown; the
    /// flush barrier parks here, paired with [`Self::settle_generation`] for the
    /// same arm-before-observe safety as the drain waiter.
    settle_changed: Condvar,
    /// Set only while the flush barrier is actively waiting, so a park bumps the
    /// settle generation and wakes the barrier ONLY when someone is listening.
    settle_armed: AtomicBool,
    /// Server `Push` frames this runtime's connections have queued for their
    /// sockets, counted once per frame accepted into an outbound buffer. A push
    /// that fails, is cancelled or is rolled back is never counted.
    pushes_queued: AtomicU64,
    /// Observes the real condvar predicate while its generation lock is held.
    #[cfg(test)]
    settle_wait_observer: Mutex<Option<Sender<()>>>,
    /// Test-only count of drain waiter wakes that observed a real removal
    /// (generation advanced across the park). A quiet drain records zero — it
    /// wakes only for the single deadline (oracle 12).
    #[cfg(test)]
    drain_exit_wakes: AtomicU64,
    /// Test-only count of drain waiter deadline expirations. A quiet drain that
    /// times out records exactly one — one arming, one delivery, no helper tick
    /// (oracles 12, 16).
    #[cfg(test)]
    drain_deadline_hits: AtomicU64,
    /// Test-only one-use gate in the drain waiter's observe->park window, so a
    /// harness can deliver an exit strictly after the completion observation and
    /// before the park to pin the arm-before-observe barrier (oracles 18, 19).
    #[cfg(test)]
    drain_park_barrier: Mutex<Option<PreWaitBarrier>>,
    /// R7 (§1.2(6)) test-only per-connection slice counter, keyed by pid. Bumped
    /// once at the head of every serviced slice. The park-flip's permanent rule-1
    /// assertion (a parked connection's counter must not advance without an event)
    /// reads this; the instrument lands now with a test proving it counts slices.
    #[cfg(test)]
    slice_counts: Mutex<HashMap<u64, u64>>,
    /// One-use readiness markers for the next serviced slice of a process.
    #[cfg(test)]
    slice_observers: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Sender<u64>>>,
    /// One-use readiness markers emitted only after the real final probe selects
    /// `Wait`, immediately before the native process returns to the scheduler.
    #[cfg(test)]
    park_observers: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Sender<u64>>>,
    /// Most recent slice count whose real final probe selected `Wait`.
    #[cfg(test)]
    park_counts: Mutex<HashMap<u64, u64>>,
    /// Where each report of frames written to a connection's transport goes,
    /// by pid (R3b F8, ruling 2a).
    #[cfg(test)]
    frame_observers: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Sender<Vec<liminal::protocol::FrameType>>>>,
    /// Explicit capacities consumed in TCP process construction order.
    #[cfg(test)]
    next_outbound_capacities: Mutex<VecDeque<usize>>,
    #[cfg(test)]
    participant_holdback_pauses: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Sender<()>>>,
    /// Deterministic test gate placed after arm and before the final probe.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pre_wait_barrier: Mutex<Option<PreWaitBarrier>>,
    /// Deterministic test gate in `enqueue_control`'s insert->wake window (S8).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pre_wake_barrier: Mutex<Option<PreWaitBarrier>>,
    /// Pid-specific one-use gate held on the reclamation delivery path so a test
    /// can pin the dead-but-tracked S8 window deterministically (oracle 26).
    #[cfg(test)]
    reclaim_barrier: Mutex<Option<ReclaimBarrier>>,
    /// Barrier-staged slices where the final probe found newly arrived work.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pre_wait_probe_hits: AtomicU64,
    /// One-use observers for process-owned streams reaching their actual drop
    /// boundary after external scheduler termination.
    #[cfg(test)]
    process_stream_drop_observers: Mutex<HashMap<RawFd, Sender<()>>>,
    /// One-shot reply slots for in-flight server pushes, keyed by correlation id.
    /// The supervisor registers a slot in `push_to_connection`; the connection
    /// process resolves it when the matching `PushReply` frame arrives. Each slot
    /// records the owning connection pid so the close path can drop a connection's
    /// outstanding slots and wake their awaiters with a prompt disconnected error.
    push_replies: Mutex<HashMap<u64, PendingPush>>,
    /// Monotonic source of push correlation ids. Server-allocated, so it never
    /// collides with a client-chosen id on this connection.
    next_push_id: AtomicU64,
    /// §5 `max_connections` admission counter. Incremented atomically (CAS
    /// against the limit) BEFORE a connection process is constructed and
    /// decremented on every spawn-failure path and on final record removal, so
    /// the signed bound holds under concurrent spawns — admission is never
    /// derived from the records-map length across an unlocked window.
    admissions: AtomicU64,
    /// Optional application hook invoked on worker registration and on the close
    /// of a connection that had registered, and on the attach and close of a
    /// pass-stamped connection. `None` keeps liminal standalone: a
    /// `WorkerRegister` is accepted with no callback, a pass attaches silently.
    notifier: Option<Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>>,
    /// Configured connection auth token (the `[auth]` section's token as opaque
    /// bytes). `Some` gates the `Connect` handshake — the frame's `auth_token` must
    /// match under a constant-time comparison; `None` leaves the server open-access,
    /// byte-identical to the pre-auth behaviour.
    auth_token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
    pass_verifier: Option<PassVerifier>,
    /// Operational caps (§5). Enforced with typed refusals at admission:
    /// per-connection subscription, conversation, push, and pending-reply counts,
    /// plus the shared inbox byte budget. Non-config constructors carry the signed
    /// defaults ([`LimitsConfig::default`]).
    limits: LimitsConfig,
}

impl ConnectionRuntime {
    pub(super) fn pressure(&self, connection: u64, response: &str) {
        if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            signals.event(crate::server::self_streams::events::ServerEvent::Pressure {
                connection,
                response,
            });
        }
    }

    fn new(
        installation: ConnectionRuntimeInstallation,
        control_atom: Atom,
        ready_atom: Atom,
        scheduler: Weak<Scheduler>,
        notifier: Option<Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>>,
        authentication: (Option<Vec<u8>>, Option<PassVerifier>),
        limits: LimitsConfig,
    ) -> Self {
        let (auth_token, pass_verifier) = authentication;
        let ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
            services:
                ConnectionServiceInstallation {
                    services,
                    participant_service,
                },
            incarnations,
            fatal_shutdown,
        } = installation;
        Self {
            services,
            participant_service,
            incarnations,
            fatal_shutdown,
            signals: OnceLock::new(),
            lys_admitter: OnceLock::new(),
            service_bindings: OnceLock::new(),
            lifecycle: OnceLock::new(),
            membership_gate: OnceLock::new(),
            link_host: OnceLock::new(),
            revocation: OnceLock::new(),
            #[cfg(test)]
            close_event_fd_probe: Mutex::new(CloseEventFdProbe::Off),
            parked_connection_fates: Mutex::new(ParkedConnectionFates::default()),
            records: Mutex::new(Registry::default()),
            controls: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            scheduler,
            drain_generation: Mutex::new(0),
            drain_removed: Condvar::new(),
            settle_generation: Mutex::new(0),
            settle_changed: Condvar::new(),
            settle_armed: AtomicBool::new(false),
            pushes_queued: AtomicU64::new(0),
            #[cfg(test)]
            settle_wait_observer: Mutex::new(None),
            #[cfg(test)]
            drain_exit_wakes: AtomicU64::new(0),
            #[cfg(test)]
            drain_deadline_hits: AtomicU64::new(0),
            #[cfg(test)]
            drain_park_barrier: Mutex::new(None),
            #[cfg(test)]
            slice_counts: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            slice_observers: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            park_observers: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            frame_observers: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            park_counts: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            next_outbound_capacities: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            participant_holdback_pauses: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            #[cfg(test)]
            pre_wait_barrier: Mutex::new(None),
            #[cfg(test)]
            pre_wake_barrier: Mutex::new(None),
            #[cfg(test)]
            reclaim_barrier: Mutex::new(None),
            #[cfg(test)]
            pre_wait_probe_hits: AtomicU64::new(0),
            #[cfg(test)]
            process_stream_drop_observers: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            push_replies: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            next_push_id: AtomicU64::new(1),
            admissions: AtomicU64::new(0),
            notifier,
            auth_token,
            pass_verifier,
            limits,
        }
    }

    /// Atomically reserves one §5 `max_connections` admission slot: a CAS loop
    /// against the configured limit, so N concurrent callers racing for the last
    /// slot admit EXACTLY one — the bound cannot be transiently exceeded.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError::ConnectionLimitReached`] when every slot is taken.
    fn try_reserve_admission(&self) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.ensure_participant_service_live()?;
        let limit = self.limits.max_connections as u64;
        let mut current = self.admissions.load(Ordering::Acquire);
        loop {
            if current >= limit {
                return Err(ServerError::ConnectionLimitReached {
                    limit: self.limits.max_connections,
                });
            }
            match self.admissions.compare_exchange_weak(
                current,
                current + 1,
                Ordering::AcqRel,
                Ordering::Acquire,
            ) {
                Ok(_) => return Ok(()),
                Err(observed) => current = observed,
            }
        }
    }

    /// Releases one admission slot. Called by the spawn failure paths (via the
    /// [`AdmissionReservation`] guard) and by [`Self::remove`] when a registered
    /// record is removed — exactly one release per reservation. Saturating so a
    /// spurious release can never wrap the counter.
    fn release_admission(&self) {
        let mut current = self.admissions.load(Ordering::Acquire);
        loop {
            let next = current.saturating_sub(1);
            match self.admissions.compare_exchange_weak(
                current,
                next,
                Ordering::AcqRel,
                Ordering::Acquire,
            ) {
                Ok(_) => return,
                Err(observed) => current = observed,
            }
        }
    }

    /// The operational caps (§5) this runtime enforces.
    pub(super) const fn limits(&self) -> &LimitsConfig {
        &self.limits
    }

    /// The connection's single R6 `READY` wake atom.
    pub(super) const fn ready_atom(&self) -> Atom {
        self.ready_atom
    }

    /// Builds a [`ReadyWaker`] targeting `pid` on the connection scheduler, if the
    /// scheduler is still live. `None` when the scheduler is gone (teardown) or in
    /// scheduler-free unit tests — a notifier with no waker simply never wakes,
    /// which under the busy loop is redundant anyway (the every-slice pump still
    /// services the source). This is the seam every wake source installs its
    /// notifier through (R3/R1(vi)).
    pub(super) fn ready_waker(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<super::wake::ReadyWaker> {
        let scheduler = self.scheduler.upgrade()?;
        let ready_pending = self
            .records
            .lock()
            .ok()?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .map(|record| Arc::clone(&record.ready_pending))?;
        Some(super::wake::ReadyWaker::new(
            &scheduler,
            pid,
            self.ready_atom,
            ready_pending,
        ))
    }

    /// Acknowledges READY edges whose mailbox atoms were drained before this slice.
    pub(super) fn acknowledge_ready(&self, pid: u64) {
        if let Ok(records) = self.records.lock()
            && let Some(record) = records.connections.get(&pid)
        {
            record.ready_pending.store(false, Ordering::Release);
        }
    }

    /// Reports a READY edge queued while the current process snapshot is executing.
    pub(super) fn ready_pending(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|records| {
                records
                    .connections
                    .get(&pid)
                    .map(|record| record.ready_pending.load(Ordering::Acquire))
            })
            .unwrap_or(false)
    }

    /// FIX A-ii: marks `pid` as executing a slice — not parked, so not yet
    /// delivery-quiescent. Reuses the registry lock the slice already takes for
    /// `is_registered`; it never touches the barrier condvar.
    pub(super) fn mark_running(&self, pid: u64) {
        if let Ok(records) = self.records.lock()
            && let Some(record) = records.connections.get(&pid)
        {
            record.parked.store(false, Ordering::Release);
        }
    }

    /// FIX A-ii: marks `pid` as parked with every accepted publish already fanned
    /// out to its socket, and — only while the shutdown flush barrier is armed —
    /// bumps the settle generation and wakes it. The bump/notify is skipped
    /// entirely in normal operation, so a park off the shutdown path is just one
    /// flag store.
    pub(super) fn mark_parked(&self, pid: u64) {
        if let Ok(records) = self.records.lock()
            && let Some(record) = records.connections.get(&pid)
        {
            record.parked.store(true, Ordering::Release);
        }
        if self.settle_armed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
            self.signal_settle_changed();
        }
    }

    /// Bumps the delivery-quiescence generation under its mutex, then wakes the
    /// flush barrier — the same lock-then-notify discipline as
    /// [`Self::signal_connection_removed`], so a park published before the notify
    /// can never be missed by a waiter holding the mutex across its re-check.
    fn signal_settle_changed(&self) {
        {
            let mut generation = recover_lock(&self.settle_generation);
            *generation = generation.wrapping_add(1);
        }
        self.settle_changed.notify_all();
    }

    /// Reads the current delivery-quiescence generation under its mutex.
    fn settle_generation_snapshot(&self) -> u64 {
        *recover_lock(&self.settle_generation)
    }

    /// True when every tracked connection is parked with no pending READY edge —
    /// i.e. every accepted publish has been pumped to its subscriber's outbound
    /// and no fan-out wake is still in flight. An empty registry is trivially
    /// quiescent.
    fn all_connections_delivery_quiesced(&self) -> bool {
        let Ok(records) = self.records.lock() else {
            return false;
        };
        records.connections.values().all(|record| {
            record.parked.load(Ordering::Acquire) && !record.ready_pending.load(Ordering::Acquire)
        })
    }

    /// FIX A-ii: wakes every tracked connection once so it drains its socket and
    /// pumps its subscriptions. This is what makes the flush barrier robust to the
    /// readiness gap: a publisher whose fire-and-forget publish bytes have arrived
    /// but whose readiness wake has not yet rescheduled it still looks "parked",
    /// so without this it could be sampled as quiescent before it admits and fans
    /// out those publishes. Firing sets each connection's `ready_pending` edge, so
    /// the quiescence check below cannot pass until every woken connection has run
    /// its slice (reading and admitting any buffered publish, whose admission then
    /// fires its subscribers in turn) and re-parked.
    fn wake_all_connections_for_flush(&self) {
        let pids: Vec<u64> = self
            .records
            .lock()
            .map(|records| records.connections.keys().copied().collect())
            .unwrap_or_default();
        for pid in pids {
            if let Some(waker) = self.ready_waker(pid) {
                waker.fire();
            }
        }
    }

    /// FIX A-ii: parks until every tracked connection has fanned out its accepted
    /// publishes (delivery quiescence) or `deadline` elapses, returning `true` on
    /// quiescence and `false` when the single admitted deadline won. The TOLD
    /// shape mirrors [`Self::wait_for_active_connections_drained`]: arm the
    /// barrier, then snapshot-before-observe so a park delivered between the
    /// observation and the wait bumps a generation the wait detects. It samples
    /// nothing on a timer — it wakes only on a delivered park (generation bump) or
    /// the one deadline.
    pub(super) fn wait_for_delivery_quiesced(&self, deadline: Instant) -> bool {
        self.settle_armed.store(true, Ordering::Release);
        // Force every connection to run once so a publisher whose buffered publish
        // bytes have not yet triggered a readiness wake still drains and admits
        // them (and fires its subscribers) before the quiescence check can pass.
        self.wake_all_connections_for_flush();
        let quiesced = loop {
            let snapshot = self.settle_generation_snapshot();
            if self.all_connections_delivery_quiesced() {
                break true;
            }
            let Some(remaining) = deadline.checked_duration_since(Instant::now()) else {
                break false;
            };
            let (generation, outcome) = self
                .settle_changed
                .wait_timeout_while(
                    recover_lock(&self.settle_generation),
                    remaining,
                    |current| {
                        #[cfg(test)]
                        {
                            let observer = recover_lock(&self.settle_wait_observer).take();
                            if let Some(observer) = observer {
                                let _sent = observer.send(());
                            }
                        }
                        *current == snapshot
                    },
                )
                .unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner);
            drop(generation);
            // A predicate that became true without its completion signal must
            // not turn a missed wake into success when the deadline wakes us.
            if outcome.timed_out() {
                break false;
            }
        };
        self.settle_armed.store(false, Ordering::Release);
        quiesced
    }

    /// R7: records one serviced slice for `pid`. Bumped at the head of every
    /// slice; the park-flip's quiescence assertion reads [`Self::slice_count`].
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn record_slice(&self, pid: u64) {
        let count = if let Ok(mut counts) = self.slice_counts.lock() {
            let count = counts.entry(pid).or_insert(0);
            *count += 1;
            *count
        } else {
            return;
        };
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.slice_observers.lock()
            && let Some(observer) = observers.remove(&pid)
        {
            let _ = observer.send(count);
        }
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn observe_next_slice(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.slice_observers.lock() {
            observers.insert(pid, sender);
        }
        receiver
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn observe_next_park(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.park_observers.lock() {
            observers.insert(pid, sender);
        }
        receiver
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn observe_settled_park(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<u64> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        let Ok(counts) = self.slice_counts.lock() else {
            return receiver;
        };
        let current = counts.get(&pid).copied().unwrap_or(0);
        let Ok(parks) = self.park_counts.lock() else {
            return receiver;
        };
        if current > 0 && parks.get(&pid).copied() == Some(current) {
            let _ = sender.send(current);
        } else if let Ok(mut observers) = self.park_observers.lock() {
            observers.insert(pid, sender);
        }
        drop(parks);
        drop(counts);
        receiver
    }

    /// Reports the kinds of the frames `pid` has written to its transport,
    /// once its outbound buffer has drained (R3b F8, ruling 2a).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn record_frames_written(&self, pid: u64, kinds: Vec<liminal::protocol::FrameType>) {
        if kinds.is_empty() {
            return;
        }
        let observer = self
            .frame_observers
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|observers| observers.get(&pid).cloned());
        if let Some(observer) = observer {
            let _ = observer.send(kinds);
        }
    }

    /// Every later report of the frames `pid` writes to its transport.
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn observe_frames_written(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<Vec<liminal::protocol::FrameType>> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.frame_observers.lock() {
            observers.insert(pid, sender);
        }
        receiver
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn record_park(&self, pid: u64) {
        let count = self.slice_count(pid);
        if let Ok(mut parks) = self.park_counts.lock() {
            parks.insert(pid, count);
        }
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.park_observers.lock()
            && let Some(observer) = observers.remove(&pid)
        {
            let _ = observer.send(count);
        }
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn queue_next_outbound_capacity(&self, capacity: usize) {
        if let Ok(mut capacities) = self.next_outbound_capacities.lock() {
            capacities.push_back(capacity);
        }
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn take_next_outbound_capacity(&self) -> Option<usize> {
        self.next_outbound_capacities
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut capacities| capacities.pop_front())
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn install_participant_holdback_pause(&self, pid: u64) -> Receiver<()> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        if let Ok(mut pauses) = self.participant_holdback_pauses.lock() {
            pauses.insert(pid, sender);
        }
        receiver
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn pause_participant_holdback(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.participant_holdback_pauses
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut pauses| pauses.remove(&pid))
            .is_some_and(|sender| {
                let _ = sender.send(());
                true
            })
    }

    /// R7: slices serviced by connection `pid` since spawn (test instrument).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn slice_count(&self, pid: u64) -> u64 {
        self.slice_counts
            .lock()
            .map_or(0, |counts| counts.get(&pid).copied().unwrap_or(0))
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn install_pre_wait_barrier(&self) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        let armed = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        let release = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        if let Ok(mut slot) = self.pre_wait_barrier.lock() {
            *slot = Some(PreWaitBarrier {
                armed: Arc::clone(&armed),
                release: Arc::clone(&release),
            });
        }
        (armed, release)
    }

    /// Installs the pid-specific reclamation gate (oracle 26) and returns its
    /// `(reached, release, done)` endpoints. The harness rendezvouses `reached`
    /// to pin the dead-but-tracked window, `release` to let the reclaim proceed,
    /// and `done` to observe the `remove()` funnel completing.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_reclaim_barrier(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
    ) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        let reached = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        let release = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        let done = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        if let Ok(mut slot) = self.reclaim_barrier.lock() {
            *slot = Some(ReclaimBarrier {
                pid,
                reached: Arc::clone(&reached),
                release: Arc::clone(&release),
                done: Arc::clone(&done),
            });
        }
        (reached, release, done)
    }

    /// Takes the installed reclamation gate iff it targets `pid` (one-use). Any
    /// other pid's delivery is ungated, so unrelated exits reclaim immediately.
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn stage_reclaim_barrier(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<ReclaimBarrier> {
        let mut slot = self.reclaim_barrier.lock().ok()?;
        if slot.as_ref().is_some_and(|barrier| barrier.pid == pid) {
            slot.take()
        } else {
            None
        }
    }

    /// Installs the one-use drain-park gate (oracles 18, 19) and returns its
    /// `(armed, release)` endpoints. Staged in the drain waiter's observe->park
    /// window so a harness can deliver an exit strictly between the completion
    /// observation and the park. Entirely `#[cfg(test)]`; changes no production
    /// wait semantics.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_drain_park_barrier(&self) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        let armed = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        let release = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        if let Ok(mut slot) = self.drain_park_barrier.lock() {
            *slot = Some(PreWaitBarrier {
                armed: Arc::clone(&armed),
                release: Arc::clone(&release),
            });
        }
        (armed, release)
    }

    /// Runs the one-use drain-park gate, if installed. One-use so only the staged
    /// park rendezvouses; every later park in the same waiter runs ungated.
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn run_drain_park_barrier(&self) {
        let barrier = self
            .drain_park_barrier
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut slot| slot.take());
        let Some(barrier) = barrier else {
            return;
        };
        barrier.armed.wait();
        barrier.release.wait();
    }

    /// Test-only count of drain waiter wakes that observed a real removal.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn drain_exit_wakes(&self) -> u64 {
        self.drain_exit_wakes.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
    }

    /// Test-only count of drain waiter deadline expirations.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn drain_deadline_hits(&self) -> u64 {
        self.drain_deadline_hits.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
    }

    /// Runs a one-use deterministic test gate after arm. Returns whether the gate
    /// was installed so only that staged probe contributes to observability.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn run_pre_wait_barrier(&self) -> bool {
        let barrier = self
            .pre_wait_barrier
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut slot| slot.take());
        let Some(barrier) = barrier else {
            return false;
        };
        barrier.armed.wait();
        barrier.release.wait();
        true
    }

    /// Installs a one-use barrier in `enqueue_control`'s insert->wake window
    /// (S8 staging: lets a test act as the control-drain consumer between the
    /// queue insertion and the wake attempt) and returns its test endpoints.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_pre_wake_barrier(&self) -> (Arc<Barrier>, Arc<Barrier>) {
        let armed = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        let release = Arc::new(Barrier::new(2));
        if let Ok(mut slot) = self.pre_wake_barrier.lock() {
            *slot = Some(PreWaitBarrier {
                armed: Arc::clone(&armed),
                release: Arc::clone(&release),
            });
        }
        (armed, release)
    }

    /// Runs the one-use insert->wake test gate, if installed.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn run_pre_wake_barrier(&self) {
        let barrier = self
            .pre_wake_barrier
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut slot| slot.take());
        if let Some(barrier) = barrier {
            barrier.armed.wait();
            barrier.release.wait();
        }
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn record_pre_wait_probe_hit(&self) {
        self.pre_wait_probe_hits.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn pre_wait_probe_hits(&self) -> u64 {
        self.pre_wait_probe_hits.load(Ordering::Acquire)
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn observe_process_stream_drop(&self, fd: RawFd) -> Receiver<()> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        if let Ok(mut observers) = self.process_stream_drop_observers.lock() {
            observers.insert(fd, sender);
        }
        receiver
    }

    /// Publishes the process-owned stream's real drop boundary to a waiting test.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn record_process_stream_drop(&self, fd: RawFd) {
        let observer = self
            .process_stream_drop_observers
            .lock()
            .ok()
            .and_then(|mut observers| observers.remove(&fd));
        if let Some(observer) = observer {
            let _ = observer.send(());
        }
    }

    /// Builds a runtime wrapping `services` for unit tests that exercise
    /// `apply_frame` without a live scheduler. Uses a fresh interned control atom
    /// and no notifier.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn for_tests(services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>) -> Self {
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        Self::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services),
                incarnations: None,
                fatal_shutdown: None,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Weak::new(),
            None,
            (None, None),
            LimitsConfig::default(),
        )
    }

    /// Builds a runtime wrapping `services` with explicit `limits` for unit tests
    /// that exercise the §5 admission caps without a live scheduler.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn for_tests_with_limits(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        limits: LimitsConfig,
    ) -> Self {
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        Self::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services),
                incarnations: None,
                fatal_shutdown: None,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Weak::new(),
            None,
            (None, None),
            limits,
        )
    }

    /// Builds a runtime wrapping `services` with a configured auth `token` for unit
    /// tests that exercise the `Connect` handshake enforcement without a live
    /// scheduler. Uses a fresh interned control atom and no notifier.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn for_tests_with_auth_token(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        token: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Self {
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        Self::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services),
                incarnations: None,
                fatal_shutdown: None,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Weak::new(),
            None,
            (Some(token), None),
            LimitsConfig::default(),
        )
    }

    /// Builds a runtime wrapping `services` with a `notifier` for unit tests that
    /// exercise `apply_frame` and the close path without a live scheduler.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn for_tests_with_notifier(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        notifier: Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>,
    ) -> Self {
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        Self::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services),
                incarnations: None,
                fatal_shutdown: None,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Weak::new(),
            Some(notifier),
            (None, None),
            LimitsConfig::default(),
        )
    }

    /// Builds a runtime wrapping `services` that verifies registry passes
    /// with `verifier`, accepts the bearer `token` when given, and reports to
    /// `notifier`, for unit tests of a worker
    /// bound to the holder its `Connect` verified (ACCESS-004).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn for_tests_with_pass(
        services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices>,
        notifier: Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>,
        token: Option<Vec<u8>>,
        verifier: PassVerifier,
    ) -> Self {
        let atoms = AtomTable::with_common_atoms();
        let control_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_SHUTDOWN_CONTROL_ATOM);
        let ready_atom = atoms.intern(CONNECTION_READY_ATOM);
        Self::new(
            ConnectionRuntimeInstallation {
                services: ConnectionServiceInstallation::capture(services),
                incarnations: None,
                fatal_shutdown: None,
            },
            control_atom,
            ready_atom,
            Weak::new(),
            Some(notifier),
            (token, Some(verifier)),
            LimitsConfig::default(),
        )
    }

    pub(super) fn services(&self) -> &dyn ConnectionServices {
        self.services.as_ref()
    }

    pub(super) fn services_arc(&self) -> Arc<dyn ConnectionServices> {
        Arc::clone(&self.services)
    }

    /// Returns the complete participant service captured at supervisor startup.
    pub(super) const fn participant_service(&self) -> Option<&InstalledParticipantService> {
        self.participant_service.as_ref()
    }

    fn participant_service_fatal(&self) -> Result<Option<ParticipantServiceFatal>, ServerError> {
        let Some(service) = self.participant_service() else {
            return Ok(None);
        };
        service
            .service_fatal()
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "participant fatal latch inspection",
                message: error.to_string(),
            })
    }

    fn activate_fatal_shutdown(&self) {
        if let Some(shutdown) = self.fatal_shutdown.as_ref() {
            shutdown.initiate();
        }
    }

    fn ensure_participant_service_live(&self) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        let Some(fatal) = self.participant_service_fatal()? else {
            return Ok(());
        };
        self.activate_fatal_shutdown();
        Err(ServerError::ParticipantServiceFatal { fatal })
    }

    fn latch_connection_fate_intent_incomplete(
        &self,
        open_sequence: u64,
        conversation_id: u64,
    ) -> Result<ParticipantServiceFatal, ServerError> {
        let Some(service) = self.participant_service() else {
            return Err(ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "connection-fate fatal latch",
                message: "a durable Open lacks its installed participant service".to_owned(),
            });
        };
        let fatal = service
            .latch_connection_fate_intent_incomplete(open_sequence, conversation_id)
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "connection-fate fatal latch",
                message: error.to_string(),
            })?;
        self.activate_fatal_shutdown();
        Ok(fatal)
    }

    fn complete_connection_fate_fatal(
        &self,
        open_sequence: u64,
        conversations: &[u64],
        phase: &'static str,
        error: &impl std::fmt::Display,
    ) -> ServerError {
        tracing::error!(open_sequence, phase, %error, "durable connection-fate intent is incomplete");
        let Some(&conversation_id) = conversations.first() else {
            return ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "connection-fate fatal target",
                message: "a durable Open has no tracked conversation target".to_owned(),
            };
        };
        match self.latch_connection_fate_intent_incomplete(open_sequence, conversation_id) {
            Ok(fatal) => ServerError::ParticipantServiceFatal { fatal },
            Err(latch_error) => latch_error,
        }
    }

    /// Runs one typed terminal fold after classification and before teardown.
    pub(super) fn complete_connection_fate(
        &self,
        connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        class: ConnectionFateClass,
        conversations: &[u64],
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        if conversations.is_empty() {
            return Ok(());
        }
        self.ensure_participant_service_live()?;
        let (Some(connection_incarnation), Some(_), Some(authority)) = (
            connection_incarnation,
            self.participant_service(),
            self.incarnations.as_ref(),
        ) else {
            return Err(ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "connection-fate authority composition",
                message: "tracked participant conversations lack a complete service/incarnation authority"
                    .to_owned(),
            });
        };
        let intent =
            authority.open_connection_fate(connection_incarnation, class, conversations)?;
        self.fold_or_park_connection_fate(intent)
    }

    /// Resolves the bound-only protocol-error gate from participant authority.
    pub(super) fn connection_has_bound_participant(
        &self,
        connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        conversations: &[u64],
    ) -> Result<bool, ServerError> {
        if conversations.is_empty() {
            return Ok(false);
        }
        self.ensure_participant_service_live()?;
        let (Some(connection_incarnation), Some(service)) =
            (connection_incarnation, self.participant_service())
        else {
            return Err(ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "bound participant classification",
                message:
                    "tracked participant conversations lack a complete service/incarnation pair"
                        .to_owned(),
            });
        };
        service
            .connection_has_bound_participant(connection_incarnation, conversations)
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ParticipantIncarnation {
                phase: "bound participant classification",
                message: error.to_string(),
            })
    }

    /// Returns the configured connection auth token as opaque bytes, or `None` when
    /// no `[auth]` section was configured (open access).
    pub(super) fn auth_token(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
        self.auth_token.as_deref()
    }

    pub(super) const fn pass_verifier(&self) -> Option<&PassVerifier> {
        self.pass_verifier.as_ref()
    }

    /// The installed Lys admitter with the network id subjects are placed
    /// under, or `None` while no deploy has installed one.
    pub(super) fn lys_admitter(
        &self,
    ) -> Option<(&Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter>, &str)> {
        self.lys_admitter
            .get()
            .map(|(admitter, network)| (admitter, network.as_str()))
    }

    /// Installs the Lys admitter once; a second install is refused so one
    /// deploy cannot swap the authority another relied on.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// The admitter already installed.
    pub(super) fn install_lys_admitter(
        &self,
        admitter: Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter>,
        network_id: String,
    ) -> Result<(), Arc<dyn crate::auth_lys::session::LysAdmitter>> {
        self.lys_admitter
            .set((admitter, network_id))
            .map_err(|(admitter, _)| admitter)
    }

    /// This liminal as a machine Lys knows, if `[auth.lys.machine]` named it.
    pub(super) fn link_host(&self) -> Option<&Arc<crate::link::LinkHost>> {
        self.link_host.get()
    }

    pub(super) fn service_bindings(
        &self,
    ) -> Option<&Arc<crate::services::production::ServiceBindings>> {
        self.service_bindings.get()
    }

    /// The services registry, if templates are configured (SRV-028).
    pub(super) fn lifecycle(&self) -> Option<&Arc<crate::services::lifecycle::Lifecycle>> {
        self.lifecycle.get()
    }

    /// Installs a services registry on a test runtime, once.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn install_lifecycle_for_tests(
        &self,
        lifecycle: Arc<crate::services::lifecycle::Lifecycle>,
    ) -> bool {
        self.lifecycle.set(lifecycle).is_ok()
    }

    pub(super) fn install_service_bindings(
        &self,
        bindings: Arc<crate::services::production::ServiceBindings>,
    ) -> Result<(), Arc<crate::services::production::ServiceBindings>> {
        self.service_bindings.set(bindings)
    }

    /// The channel membership gate, if `[auth.lys.membership]` configured
    /// one (ACCESS-006 R1).
    pub(super) fn membership_gate(&self) -> Option<&Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>> {
        self.membership_gate.get()
    }

    /// Installs the membership gate once; a second install is refused so
    /// one deploy cannot swap the gate live bindings rely on.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// The gate already installed.
    pub(super) fn install_membership_gate(
        &self,
        gate: Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>,
    ) -> Result<(), Arc<crate::auth_membership::MembershipGate>> {
        self.membership_gate.set(gate)
    }

    /// Installs the link host once; a second install is refused.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// The host already installed.
    pub(super) fn install_link_host(
        &self,
        host: Arc<crate::link::LinkHost>,
    ) -> Result<(), Arc<crate::link::LinkHost>> {
        self.link_host.set(host)
    }

    /// The grant-revocation authority, when a revocation policy is
    /// installed (ACCESS-005).
    pub(super) fn revocation(&self) -> Option<&Arc<crate::auth_revocation::RevocationAuthority>> {
        self.revocation.get()
    }

    /// Installs the grant-revocation authority once; a second install is
    /// refused.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// The authority already installed.
    pub(super) fn install_revocation(
        &self,
        authority: Arc<crate::auth_revocation::RevocationAuthority>,
    ) -> Result<(), Arc<crate::auth_revocation::RevocationAuthority>> {
        self.revocation.set(authority)
    }

    /// Returns the configured connection-keyed notifier, if any.
    pub(super) fn notifier(&self) -> Option<&Arc<dyn ConnectionNotifier>> {
        self.notifier.as_ref()
    }

    /// Offers a channel publish to the notifier's observability-drain tap, returning
    /// `true` when the application consumed it (so the connection process skips the
    /// normal fan-out). `false` when no notifier is installed (liminal standalone) or
    /// the notifier did not recognise the channel, so the caller can invoke it
    /// unconditionally and fall through to the normal publish path.
    pub(super) fn notifier_channel_publish(&self, pid: u64, channel: &str, payload: &[u8]) -> bool {
        self.notifier
            .as_ref()
            .is_some_and(|notifier| notifier.on_channel_publish(pid, channel, payload))
    }

    /// SRV-012 R7: connection `pid`'s pass names `participant`, so the
    /// topology shows it on that connection from now on, in lowercase hex.
    pub(super) fn pass_attached(&self, pid: u64, mount: MountKind, participant: &[u8]) {
        const HEX: &[u8; 16] = b"0123456789abcdef";
        if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            let mut text = String::with_capacity(participant.len() * 2);
            for byte in participant {
                text.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte >> 4)]));
                text.push(char::from(HEX[usize::from(byte & 0x0f)]));
            }
            signals.topology(crate::console::TopologyChange::ConnectionOpened {
                id: pid,
                mount: mount.into(),
                participant: Some(text),
            });
        }
    }

    /// SRV-012 `to_stations`: the subscription whose library subscriber is
    /// `subscriber` belongs to connection `pid`, so a publish it receives
    /// names `pid`'s station.
    pub(super) fn receiver(&self, pid: u64, subscriber: u64) {
        if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            signals.receiver(subscriber, pid);
        }
    }

    /// SRV-012 R7: connection `pid` starts (`present`) or stops using `line`
    /// one way; a worker's flows are its line's stops.
    pub(super) fn flow(&self, pid: u64, line: &str, role: crate::console::FlowRole, present: bool) {
        if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            signals.topology(crate::console::TopologyChange::Flow {
                connection: pid,
                line: line.to_owned(),
                role,
                present,
            });
        }
    }

    /// Stores `registration` on the connection record for `pid`, so the close
    /// path can later fire `on_worker_unregistered` for exactly the connections
    /// that registered. A missing record (the connection already closed) is a
    /// no-op.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the connection registry mutex is poisoned.
    pub(super) fn set_registration(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        registration: WorkerRegistration,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        let identity = registration.identity.clone();
        let subjects = vec![registration.task_queue.clone()];
        let activities = registration
            .activities
            .iter()
            .map(|activity| crate::console::StationActivity {
                name: activity.name.clone(),
                input_schema_json: activity.input_schema_json.clone(),
                output_schema_json: activity.output_schema_json.clone(),
            })
            .collect();
        let mut records = lock(&self.records, "connection registry")?;
        let Registry {
            connections,
            directory,
        } = &mut *records;
        let stored = match connections.get_mut(&pid) {
            Some(record) => {
                // SRV-027 R1: the directory follows the record under the one
                // lock; a replacement registration moves the subject.
                if let Some(earlier) = record.registration.as_ref() {
                    directory.forget(pid, &earlier.task_queue);
                }
                directory.register(pid, &registration.task_queue);
                record.registration = Some(registration);
                true
            }
            None => false,
        };
        drop(records);
        // SRV-012 R7: a registered worker is a station on the topology, by
        // its identity, until its connection closes; SRV-027 R3: with its
        // subjects and activities.
        if stored && let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            signals.topology(crate::console::TopologyChange::Worker {
                connection: pid,
                identity,
                subjects,
                activities,
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Stores the registry principal a successful pass-stamped `Connect`
    /// verified on the connection record for `pid`, then fires
    /// `on_pass_attached` — so the close path can later fire the matching
    /// `on_pass_detached` for exactly the connections that attached, with the
    /// same principal. The store precedes the fire and the registry lock is
    /// released before it, so the notifier may call back into the supervisor.
    /// A missing record (the connection already closed) stores nothing and
    /// fires nothing: an attach with no record could never be paired with a
    /// detach.
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the connection registry mutex is poisoned.
    pub(super) fn attach_pass_principal(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        principal: &PassPrincipal,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        let stored = lock(&self.records, "connection registry")?
            .connections
            .get_mut(&pid)
            .is_some_and(|record| {
                record.pass_principal = Some(principal.clone());
                true
            });
        if stored {
            if let Some(notifier) = self.notifier.as_ref() {
                notifier.on_pass_attached(pid, principal);
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Allocates the next monotonic push correlation id.
    fn next_push_correlation_id(&self) -> u64 {
        self.next_push_id.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed)
    }

    /// Registers a one-shot reply slot for `correlation_id`, owned by connection
    /// `pid`, and returns its receiver. `deadline` is the slot's optional absolute
    /// reply expiry (`None` = the default no-deadline shape). The connection
    /// process resolves the slot via [`resolve_push`]; the close path drops the
    /// connection's outstanding slots via [`cancel_pushes_for_connection`]; an
    /// explicit deadline resolves it via [`expire_push_if_due`].
    ///
    /// # Errors
    /// Returns [`ServerError`] when the correlation registry mutex is poisoned.
    fn register_push(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        correlation_id: u64,
        deadline: Option<Instant>,
        subject: Option<String>,
        wake: Option<super::wake::ReadyWaker>,
    ) -> Result<Receiver<PushSlotResolution>, ServerError> {
        let (sender, receiver) = channel();
        let limit = self.limits.max_pending_pushes_per_connection;
        {
            let mut slots = lock(&self.push_replies, "push correlation registry")?;
            // §5 `max_pending_pushes_per_connection`: refuse a new in-flight push
            // once this connection already holds the cap. Counted per owning pid so
            // one connection cannot exhaust the shared registry; slots free on
            // reply, deadline expiry, or connection close. The count-and-insert
            // stays under the one lock so the cap is enforced atomically.
            let outstanding = slots.values().filter(|pending| pending.pid == pid).count();
            if outstanding >= limit {
                return Err(ServerError::ConnectionCapReached {
                    operation: "server push".to_owned(),
                    cap: "max_pending_pushes_per_connection",
                    limit,
                });
            }
            slots.insert(
                correlation_id,
                PendingPush {
                    pid,
                    subject,
                    sender,
                    deadline,
                    wake,
                },
            );
        }
        Ok(receiver)
    }

    /// Registers a confirmed, no-deadline push slot for `pid` without a
    /// supervisor, so a unit fixture can answer it with a `PushReply` frame
    /// through `apply_frame` and read the outcome on the awaiter. The awaiter's
    /// runtime handle is empty: the no-deadline receive path never upgrades it.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn push_for_tests(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        subject: Option<&str>,
    ) -> Result<PushReplyAwaiter, ServerError> {
        let correlation_id = self.next_push_correlation_id();
        let receiver =
            self.register_push(pid, correlation_id, None, subject.map(str::to_owned), None)?;
        if !self.confirm_push_registration(pid, correlation_id) {
            return Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("connection process {pid} is not registered"),
            });
        }
        Ok(PushReplyAwaiter {
            correlation_id,
            receiver,
            deadline: None,
            runtime: Weak::new(),
        })
    }

    /// The subject retained by `pid`'s reply slot for `correlation_id`, read
    /// before the reply is decided. Read and settle are two lock takes on
    /// purpose (never nested with a record lock): a slot swept between them is
    /// named by the settle as `UnknownCorrelation`, which is the truth then.
    pub(super) fn push_binding(&self, pid: u64, correlation_id: u64) -> PushBinding {
        let slots = recover_lock(&self.push_replies);
        match slots.get(&correlation_id) {
            Some(pending) if pending.pid == pid => pending
                .subject
                .clone()
                .map_or(PushBinding::Subjectless, PushBinding::Subject),
            Some(_) | None => PushBinding::Unbound,
        }
    }

    /// Host-side, lazy evaluation of a push's reply deadline, called from an
    /// elapsed [`PushReplyAwaiter::receive`] quantum. This NEVER wakes the
    /// connection process and runs no timer — it inspects supervisor-owned state
    /// under the registry lock only.
    ///
    /// A slot with an explicit deadline that has passed is removed here (dropping
    /// its `Sender` and releasing its §5 `max_pending_pushes_per_connection` cap
    /// admission, since the cap is the per-pid slot count) and reported
    /// [`PushSlotDisposition::Expired`]. A slot with no deadline, or a deadline
    /// still in the future, is left UNTOUCHED and reported
    /// [`PushSlotDisposition::Live`] — the elapsed quantum is a benign re-arm. A
    /// missing slot is [`PushSlotDisposition::Absent`].
    fn expire_push_if_due(&self, correlation_id: u64) -> PushSlotDisposition {
        // S4: a poisoned registry must NOT read as slot absence — the slot (and
        // its cap admission) may still be in the map. Reclamation recovers the
        // guard: removal-only operations are sound on a recovered map (a panic
        // in another critical section cannot leave the HashMap itself in a
        // partial state; only our bookkeeping invariants could be stale, and
        // removal restores them). Admission (`register_push`) stays fail-closed.
        let mut slots = recover_lock(&self.push_replies);
        let Some(pending) = slots.get(&correlation_id) else {
            return PushSlotDisposition::Absent;
        };
        // Copy the deadline out so the immutable borrow of `slots` ends before the
        // conditional `remove` below takes a mutable one.
        let deadline = pending.deadline;
        match deadline {
            Some(at) if Instant::now() >= at => {
                slots.remove(&correlation_id);
                PushSlotDisposition::Expired
            }
            _ => PushSlotDisposition::Live,
        }
    }

    /// Drops a registered reply slot without resolving it, used on the
    /// push-enqueue failure path (the control could not be delivered to a
    /// now-gone process, so the just-reserved slot is unreachable). Dropping the
    /// slot's `Sender` wakes a still-waiting awaiter with a disconnected error.
    ///
    /// Returns whether THIS call removed the slot. Removal under the registry
    /// mutex is the atomic resolved-vs-cancelled transition: `false` means
    /// another path won — [`resolve_push`](Self::resolve_push) already sent the
    /// reply (its send happens under the same lock, so the payload is already in
    /// the channel when this returns), or the connection's close path dropped
    /// the slot (sender gone, channel disconnected).
    /// Records one server `Push` frame queued for a connection's socket.
    pub(super) fn record_push_queued(&self) {
        self.pushes_queued.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
    }

    /// Server `Push` frames queued for sockets so far.
    pub(super) fn pushes_queued(&self) -> u64 {
        self.pushes_queued.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
    }

    pub(super) fn cancel_push(&self, correlation_id: u64) -> bool {
        // S4: reclamation recovers a poisoned guard — a rollback that silently
        // skipped its removal would strand the slot and its cap admission.
        recover_lock(&self.push_replies)
            .remove(&correlation_id)
            .is_some()
    }

    /// Settles the reply slot for a push whose frame could not be enqueued,
    /// applying the one ruling that separates a certain failure from a
    /// recoverable one.
    ///
    /// A frame larger than the whole outbound buffer can never be carried on
    /// this connection at this bound, so its slot resolves to the named terminal
    /// [`ServerError::PushFrameExceedsOutboundCapacity`]. EVERYTHING ELSE —
    /// congestion behind traffic still draining, an encode failure, a socket
    /// write error — cancels the slot exactly as before, and its dropped
    /// `Sender` keeps the retryable [`ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected`]
    /// reading, because retrying is the correct answer to all three.
    ///
    /// This is the sole branch between the two, deliberately: a caller that
    /// widened it would turn a busy moment into a permanent failure, which is a
    /// worse defect than the one the named outcome exists to fix.
    pub(super) fn settle_push_enqueue_failure(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        correlation_id: u64,
        error: &OutboundError,
    ) {
        if let Some(too_large) = error.frame_exceeds_capacity() {
            tracing::warn!(
                connection_pid = pid,
                correlation_id,
                needed = too_large.needed,
                capacity = too_large.capacity,
                queued = too_large.queued,
                "server push frame exceeds the connection's whole outbound capacity; \
                 it can never be sent on this connection and its reply slot is failed by name"
            );
            self.fail_push_outbound_frame_too_large(
                correlation_id,
                too_large.needed,
                too_large.capacity,
                too_large.queued,
            );
            return;
        }
        tracing::warn!(
            connection_pid = pid,
            correlation_id,
            %error,
            "server push could not be enqueued; the push reply slot is cancelled"
        );
        self.cancel_push(correlation_id);
    }

    /// Resolves the reply slot for `correlation_id` with the ONE named terminal
    /// outcome the outbound path can prove: the push's encoded frame is larger
    /// than the whole outbound buffer, so it can never be carried on this
    /// connection at this bound and no retry could change that.
    ///
    /// Callers must have established `needed > capacity` first —
    /// [`settle_push_enqueue_failure`](Self::settle_push_enqueue_failure) is the
    /// only one, and it does. A frame that merely does not fit the CURRENT free
    /// space is congestion and belongs on [`cancel_push`](Self::cancel_push),
    /// whose dropped `Sender` keeps its retryable disconnect reading.
    ///
    /// A slot that is already gone — answered, expired, or swept by connection
    /// close — is a harmless no-op, exactly as a late reply is to
    /// [`resolve_push`](Self::resolve_push): the first path to remove it under
    /// the registry lock wins and the outcome it chose stands.
    ///
    /// Removal and delivery stay under the ONE registry lock for the same reason
    /// `resolve_push` does it — an awaiter that observes the slot gone is then
    /// guaranteed to find the outcome already in the channel, instead of seeing
    /// the removal, finding the channel empty, and reporting something else.
    fn fail_push_outbound_frame_too_large(
        &self,
        correlation_id: u64,
        needed: usize,
        capacity: usize,
        queued: usize,
    ) {
        // S4: as `cancel_push` — a skipped removal here would strand the slot and
        // its cap admission, and lose the only report the caller will ever get.
        let mut slots = recover_lock(&self.push_replies);
        if let Some(pending) = slots.remove(&correlation_id) {
            pending
                .sender
                .send(PushSlotResolution::OutboundFrameTooLarge {
                    needed,
                    capacity,
                    queued,
                })
                .ok();
        }
    }

    /// Drops every reply slot owned by connection `pid`, waking each awaiter with a
    /// disconnected error (the dropped `Sender` disconnects the awaiter's
    /// `Receiver`). Called from the close path so a connection that exits with
    /// in-flight pushes signals worker death immediately instead of leaving each
    /// awaiter to block the full push-reply timeout. A slot that [`resolve_push`]
    /// already removed is gone, so it is untouched here; an unknown pid is a no-op.
    fn cancel_pushes_for_connection(&self, pid: u64) {
        // S4: the close sweep is the reclamation of last resort ("connection
        // close at the latest") — it must complete on a poisoned map too.
        // SRV-027 R2: a requester waiting on a routed push to this connection
        // is woken now, so its next slice names the worker gone instead of
        // waiting out the reply deadline. The senders drop with the slots, so
        // each requester reads the disconnected outcome.
        let woken = {
            let mut slots = recover_lock(&self.push_replies);
            let mut woken = Vec::new();
            slots.retain(|_correlation_id, pending| {
                if pending.pid == pid {
                    woken.extend(pending.wake.take());
                    false
                } else {
                    true
                }
            });
            woken
        };
        for wake in woken {
            wake.fire();
        }
    }

    /// S3 second half (shape (b), check-after-insert): pre-publication
    /// confirmation that the connection record for `pid` still exists, run in
    /// the INSERT -> CONFIRM -> PUBLISH order (S7 — confirming after the
    /// enqueue let a close-swept-then-answered push report `Err` for a Push the
    /// client had received). `true` leaves the slot in place and the caller may
    /// publish; `false` means a concurrent close already removed the record —
    /// this call then removes the caller's own just-inserted slot (rolling back
    /// its cap admission) so nothing is stranded, and the caller returns
    /// WITHOUT publishing: an `Err` from the push methods guarantees no `Push`
    /// control was published.
    ///
    /// Why exactly one side always observes the slot: `remove` (the single
    /// record-removal path) removes the host record BEFORE sweeping the pid's
    /// push slots, and this check reads the record AFTER inserting the slot and
    /// BEFORE the control is published. Both records accesses are serialized by
    /// the `records` mutex, so either (i) this read precedes the record removal
    /// — then the slot insert precedes the sweep (insert < read < removal <
    /// sweep in the happens-before order) and the SWEEP observes and removes
    /// the slot: if the control was published in the meantime the awaiter reads
    /// the truthful disconnected outcome and a late client reply is a harmless
    /// no-op; or (ii) this read follows the record removal — then THIS call
    /// observes the absence, rolls the slot back itself, and nothing was
    /// published. When both observe (a sweep and a rollback can both run in
    /// case (ii) if the insert also preceded the sweep), removal is idempotent
    /// and the cap is derived from map membership, so nothing double-releases.
    ///
    /// Lock discipline: `records` and `push_replies` are NEVER held together —
    /// here (`records` read, released, then `push_replies` on rollback), in
    /// `remove` (`records` removal, released, then the sweep), and everywhere
    /// else in this file the two mutexes are taken strictly sequentially, so no
    /// lock-order inversion is possible. This adds ZERO work to the connection
    /// slice path: the re-check runs on the push caller's thread only.
    pub(super) fn confirm_push_registration(&self, pid: u64, correlation_id: u64) -> bool {
        if self.is_registered(pid) {
            return true;
        }
        self.cancel_push(correlation_id);
        false
    }

    /// Number of reserved push reply slots outstanding. A benign wait-quantum
    /// timeout must NOT change this (the slot survives); an explicit-deadline
    /// expiry, a consumed reply, and connection close each release exactly one.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn pending_push_count(&self) -> usize {
        recover_lock(&self.push_replies).len()
    }

    /// Reserved push reply slots owned by connection `pid` — the exact quantity
    /// the §5 `max_pending_pushes_per_connection` cap counts (test instrument).
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn pending_push_count_for(&self, pid: u64) -> usize {
        recover_lock(&self.push_replies)
            .values()
            .filter(|pending| pending.pid == pid)
            .count()
    }

    /// Resolves the reply slot for `correlation_id` with the client's reply
    /// payload, waking the [`PushReplyAwaiter`]. Called by the connection process
    /// when a correlated `PushReply` frame arrives. A different connection is
    /// refused without consuming the slot. A missing slot — already
    /// resolved, expired at its explicit deadline, dropped by connection close, or
    /// an unknown id — is a harmless no-op: a late `PushReply` for a slot that is
    /// gone is discarded here, never delivered and never a panic or desync.
    pub(super) fn resolve_push(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        correlation_id: u64,
        payload: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> PushReplyDisposition {
        self.settle_push(pid, correlation_id, PushSlotResolution::Reply(payload))
    }

    /// Settles the reply slot for `correlation_id` with the access refusal the
    /// connection process decided for its `PushReply`: the slot is removed
    /// exactly as for a delivered reply and the awaiter reads
    /// [`ServerError::PushReplyRefused`] carrying `reason`. Same ownership and
    /// missing-slot rules as [`resolve_push`](Self::resolve_push).
    pub(super) fn refuse_push(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        correlation_id: u64,
        reason: String,
    ) -> PushReplyDisposition {
        self.settle_push(
            pid,
            correlation_id,
            PushSlotResolution::ReplyRefused { reason },
        )
    }

    /// The one removal-and-send for a reply slot, shared by the delivered reply
    /// and the refused one so neither can grow its own slot lifecycle.
    fn settle_push(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        correlation_id: u64,
        resolution: PushSlotResolution,
    ) -> PushReplyDisposition {
        // Recover the guard so a poisoned registry still delivers and reclaims replies.
        let mut slots = recover_lock(&self.push_replies);
        let Entry::Occupied(entry) = slots.entry(correlation_id) else {
            return PushReplyDisposition::UnknownCorrelation;
        };
        // The connection identity is checked before the slot or its credit is released.
        if entry.get().pid != pid {
            return PushReplyDisposition::SenderMismatch;
        }
        let pending = entry.remove();
        // Keep removal and send atomic to awaiters checking whether the slot still exists.
        // The unbounded send never blocks; an abandoned receiver is a named discard.
        let disposition = match pending.sender.send(resolution) {
            Ok(()) => PushReplyDisposition::Resolved,
            Err(_) => PushReplyDisposition::ReceiverDropped,
        };
        drop(slots);
        // SRV-027 R2: a routed push tells its requester, once, after the
        // resolution is in the channel; the requester's slice reads it.
        if let Some(wake) = pending.wake {
            wake.fire();
        }
        disposition
    }

    pub(super) const fn control_atom(&self) -> Atom {
        self.control_atom
    }

    /// Sole registration path for a connection: the spawn thread inserts the
    /// record synchronously, before `spawn_connection` returns the handle, so
    /// `is_tracked`/`active_connection_count` reflect the connection
    /// immediately. The connection handler never writes the registry (it only
    /// reads via `mark_crashed`/`finish`), so there is a single writer here and
    /// no register/ensure-register race.
    ///
    /// Ordering note: `spawn_native` only enqueues the process, so its first
    /// slice may run on another worker thread before this insert lands. If that
    /// first slice exits immediately (e.g. a missing-stream crash) its
    /// `mark_crashed`/`finish` removes nothing and this insert then leaves a
    /// record for an already-dead pid. W4 leg 1 retires the per-accept
    /// `reap_crashed` scan that used to self-heal that orphan continuously;
    /// instead [`Self::reconcile_register_orphan`] closes the race with a SINGLE
    /// point check on the registration event itself — never a loop.
    /// `fd_guard` is `None` for a transport that owns no descriptor. The guard
    /// exists to keep an fd alive until readiness deregistration has been
    /// acknowledged; a loopback connection registers no readiness and holds no
    /// descriptor, so there is nothing to guard and the slot is honestly empty
    /// rather than filled with a placeholder.
    fn register_connection(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
        connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        mount: MountKind,
        fd_guard: Option<TcpStream>,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.register_record(pid, peer_addr, connection_incarnation, mount, fd_guard)?;
        self.reconcile_register_orphan(pid);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Closes the register-orphan race (see [`Self::register_with_fd`]) with one
    /// point check driven by the registration event — not a periodic scan. If
    /// the just-registered pid is already absent from the scheduler process
    /// table, its first slice has run and exited, so the record this
    /// registration inserted is an orphan the retiring reap scan used to sweep;
    /// reclaim it immediately through the ordinary `remove()` funnel. A pid still
    /// present is live and needs nothing here: a later external termination rides
    /// the exit-event reactor and an ordinary exit its own final slice.
    fn reconcile_register_orphan(&self, pid: u64) {
        let Some(scheduler) = self.scheduler.upgrade() else {
            return;
        };
        // The process-table lookup returns a sharded guard; bind only the
        // presence bool so the guard is released before `reclaim_terminated`
        // takes the connection registry lock (no cross-lock hold).
        let already_exited = scheduler.process_table().get(pid).is_none();
        if !already_exited {
            return;
        }
        let reason = scheduler
            .peek_exit_reason(pid)
            .unwrap_or(ExitReason::Normal);
        self.reclaim_terminated(pid, reason);
    }

    /// TOLD reclamation of a connection whose process exited WITHOUT running a
    /// final handler slice — external/panic termination, where
    /// [`ConnectionProcess::Drop`] runs but no `mark_crashed`/`finish` does, and
    /// the register-orphan race above. Delivered the instant beamr publishes the
    /// process's [`ExitEvent`] (via [`run_reclaim_reactor`]) or at the
    /// registration point check, and routed through the SAME [`Self::remove`]
    /// funnel as every other teardown — no third funnel, no periodic scan.
    /// Idempotent: a record already removed in-slice, by the orphan reconcile, or
    /// by a duplicate delivery is a no-op here (remove returns `None`), so the §5
    /// admission gauge is released exactly once.
    fn reclaim_terminated(&self, pid: u64, reason: ExitReason) {
        let Some(record) = self.remove(pid) else {
            return;
        };
        self.fire_close_hooks(pid, &record);
        tracing::warn!(
            connection_pid = pid,
            peer_addr = ?record.peer_addr,
            mount = ?record.mount,
            reason = ?reason,
            "connection process exited without a final slice; host record reclaimed by delivery"
        );
    }

    /// One exit-event delivery: drain beamr's retained outcome (sole drainer,
    /// bounding its store) then reclaim through [`Self::reclaim_terminated`]. The
    /// only non-production element is the `#[cfg(test)]` reclamation gate, which
    /// is staged for at most one targeted pid and compiled out entirely in
    /// production — the delivery semantics are identical with or without it.
    fn deliver_reclamation(&self, scheduler: &Weak<Scheduler>, pid: u64, reason: ExitReason) {
        if let Some(scheduler) = scheduler.upgrade() {
            // The reason is already in-hand from the event; the drained outcome
            // is discarded, its purpose being only to bound beamr's store.
            drop(scheduler.take_exit_outcome(pid));
        }
        #[cfg(test)]
        let staged = self.stage_reclaim_barrier(pid);
        #[cfg(test)]
        if let Some(barrier) = staged.as_ref() {
            // Rendezvous: the pid is now dead but its record is still tracked —
            // the S8 reclamation window (oracle 26). Then wait for the harness to
            // release the reclaim.
            barrier.reached.wait();
            barrier.release.wait();
        }
        self.reclaim_terminated(pid, reason);
        #[cfg(test)]
        if let Some(barrier) = staged.as_ref() {
            // Signal the funnel completed so the harness can observe the record
            // gone without sampling.
            barrier.done.wait();
        }
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn register(&self, pid: u64, peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.register_record(pid, peer_addr, None, MountKind::Tcp, None)
    }

    /// Gives connection `pid` a record, as a spawned connection has, so a
    /// unit test through `apply_frame` can see what is stored on it.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn register_for_tests(&self, pid: u64) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        self.register(pid, None)
    }

    /// The worker registration stored on connection `pid`'s record. A
    /// registration is stored before its topology change is emitted, and
    /// only then (`set_registration`), so `None` also means no
    /// `TopologyChange::Worker` was emitted for it.
    #[cfg(test)]
    pub(super) fn stored_registration_for_tests(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
    ) -> Result<Option<WorkerRegistration>, ServerError> {
        Ok(lock(&self.records, "connection registry")?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .and_then(|record| record.registration.clone()))
    }

    fn register_record(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
        connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
        mount: MountKind,
        fd_guard: Option<TcpStream>,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        match lock(&self.records, "connection registry")?
            .connections
            .entry(pid)
        {
            // ENFORCED (not comment-only): pids are fresh per spawn and a record
            // is reclaimed through the single `remove` funnel before its pid can
            // recycle, so an occupied slot here is a supervision defect. Refuse
            // the whole registration rather than silently replacing — a replace
            // would drop the displaced record's `fd_guard` outside the teardown
            // funnel (orphaning a live connection's stream) and increment the
            // `liminal_connections_active` gauge a second time with no paired
            // decrement. The prior record stays intact; both spawn paths roll the
            // fresh process back on this error. Same idiom as
            // `StreamTable::insert` (entry-vacant → typed error) and the
            // fail-closed duplicate-conversation refusal in `apply.rs`.
            Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(ServerError::ConnectionPidCollision { pid }),
            Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
                entry.insert(ConnectionRecord {
                    peer_addr,
                    mount,
                    connection_incarnation,
                    registration: None,
                    pass_principal: None,
                    readiness: None,
                    ready_pending: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
                    parked: AtomicBool::new(false),
                    fd_guard,
                });
            }
        }
        // Single-writer vacant-only insert (see doc above and the refusal arm)
        // pairs EXACTLY one gauge increment with the decrement in `remove`,
        // keeping `liminal_connections_active` equal to the live record count on
        // every teardown route; a refused duplicate increments nothing.
        crate::metrics::connection_spawned();
        if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
            signals.connection(pid, true);
            signals.topology(crate::console::TopologyChange::ConnectionOpened {
                id: pid,
                mount: mount.into(),
                participant: None,
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    pub(super) fn mark_crashed(&self, pid: u64, reason: ExitReason, peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>) {
        let removed = self.remove(pid);
        if let Some(record) = removed.as_ref() {
            self.fire_close_hooks(pid, record);
        }
        let removed_peer_addr = removed
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|record| record.peer_addr)
            .or(peer_addr);
        // The mount names the door this connection came through — the one fact
        // that tells a reader whether a crashed connection was a socket peer or
        // a co-resident caller, which `peer_addr: None` alone cannot.
        let mount = removed.as_ref().map(|record| record.mount);
        tracing::warn!(
            connection_pid = pid,
            peer_addr = ?removed_peer_addr,
            mount = ?mount,
            reason = ?reason,
            "connection process crashed"
        );
    }

    /// Whether the spawn thread has installed the host record. A first native
    /// slice can win the enqueue-vs-record race and must remain runnable until it
    /// has somewhere host-reachable to publish its readiness token.
    pub(super) fn is_registered(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.contains(pid)
    }

    /// Removes a token minted in-slice when publishing it to the host record fails.
    pub(super) fn deregister_unpublished_readiness(&self, token: ReadinessToken) {
        if let Some(scheduler) = self.scheduler.upgrade() {
            scheduler.readiness_deregister(token);
        }
    }

    /// Cancels deadline timers detached by reply completion or connection close.
    pub(super) fn cancel_deadline_timers(&self, timers: Vec<TimerRef>) {
        let Some(scheduler) = self.scheduler.upgrade() else {
            return;
        };
        if let Ok(mut wheel) = scheduler.timers().lock() {
            for timer in timers {
                wheel.cancel(timer);
            }
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn finish(&self, pid: u64) {
        if let Some(removed) = self.remove(pid) {
            self.fire_close_hooks(pid, &removed);
        }
    }

    /// Records the one readiness token minted for this connection. A live
    /// connection never re-registers: later parked slices rearm this identity.
    pub(super) fn set_readiness_token_once(
        &self,
        pid: u64,
        token: ReadinessToken,
        fd: RawFd,
    ) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        let mut records = lock(&self.records, "connection registry")?;
        let record =
            records
                .connections
                .get_mut(&pid)
                .ok_or_else(|| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                    message: format!(
                        "connection {pid} has no host record for readiness registration"
                    ),
                })?;
        if record.readiness.is_some() {
            return Err(ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("connection {pid} attempted to replace its readiness token"),
            });
        }
        record.readiness = Some(ReadinessRegistration { token, fd });
        drop(records);
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Fires the close-side notifier hooks for a removed connection record:
    /// `on_worker_unregistered` when it carried a worker registration, and
    /// `on_pass_detached` (with the principal) when it carried a pass
    /// principal. A record with neither — a plain bearer or open-access
    /// connection, or a worker connection that never registered — is a no-op,
    /// so each close hook fires for exactly the connections whose open-side
    /// counterpart fired. Every teardown route (`finish`, `mark_crashed`,
    /// `reclaim_terminated`, `reap_crashed`) reaches this through the
    /// idempotent [`Self::remove`], so each fires at most once per connection.
    fn fire_close_hooks(&self, pid: u64, record: &ConnectionRecord) {
        let Some(notifier) = self.notifier.as_ref() else {
            return;
        };
        if record.registration.is_some() {
            notifier.on_worker_unregistered(pid);
        }
        if let Some(principal) = record.pass_principal.as_ref() {
            notifier.on_pass_detached(pid, principal);
        }
    }

    fn reap_crashed(&self, scheduler: &Scheduler) -> usize {
        let pids = match self.records.lock() {
            Ok(records) => records.connections.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
            Err(error) => {
                tracing::warn!(%error, "connection registry unavailable during crash reap");
                return 0;
            }
        };
        let mut reaped = 0;
        for pid in pids {
            if scheduler.process_table().get(pid).is_none() {
                let removed = self.remove(pid);
                if let Some(record) = removed.as_ref() {
                    self.fire_close_hooks(pid, record);
                }
                let peer_addr = removed.and_then(|record| record.peer_addr);
                // This process exited without ever reaching `mark_crashed`/`finish`
                // (e.g. the beamr scheduler terminated it externally). W4 leg 1
                // retired this scan from the per-accept listener loop, and W4 leg 3
                // retired the shutdown-drain reconciliation that also drove it: the
                // reclaimer of these exits is now the TOLD exit-event reactor
                // ([`run_reclaim_reactor`]), which also composes drain completion
                // through the one `remove()` funnel. This scan now survives only as
                // that reactor's exit-event overflow (`Lagged`) recovery, driven a
                // bounded number of times, never periodically. beamr 0.15.4 exposes
                // a public, non-blocking
                // `peek_exit_reason` (and `take_exit_outcome`), so the real reason
                // IS recoverable here rather than logged as an opaque literal.
                let reason = scheduler.peek_exit_reason(pid);
                tracing::warn!(
                    connection_pid = pid,
                    ?peer_addr,
                    ?reason,
                    "connection process exited without a final slice; reclaimed by reconciliation"
                );
                reaped += 1;
            }
        }
        reaped
    }

    fn contains(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .is_ok_and(|records| records.connections.contains_key(&pid))
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn readiness_registration_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.records.lock().map_or(0, |records| {
            records
                .connections
                .values()
                .filter(|record| record.readiness.is_some())
                .count()
        })
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn readiness_fd(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<RawFd> {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .and_then(|record| record.readiness.map(|registration| registration.fd))
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn readiness_token(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<ReadinessToken> {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .and_then(|record| record.readiness.map(|registration| registration.token))
    }

    fn active_connections(&self) -> Vec<ActiveConnection> {
        self.records.lock().map_or_else(
            |_| Vec::new(),
            |records| {
                records
                    .connections
                    .iter()
                    .map(|(&pid, record)| ActiveConnection {
                        pid,
                        peer_addr: record.peer_addr,
                    })
                    .collect()
            },
        )
    }

    /// Reads the complete active-connection incarnation set under the
    /// registry lock — the bounded defense-in-depth collision-skip input to
    /// incarnation allocation (uniqueness itself comes from allocator-log
    /// monotonicity; see `allocate_connection_incarnation`). Poisoning fails
    /// admission closed: treating an unreadable registry as empty would
    /// silently drop the defense layer.
    fn complete_active_incarnation_references(
        &self,
    ) -> Result<Vec<ConnectionIncarnation>, ServerError> {
        Ok(
            lock(&self.records, "connection incarnation reference registry")?
                .connections
                .values()
                .filter_map(|record| record.connection_incarnation)
                .collect(),
        )
    }

    fn push_control(&self, pid: u64, control: ConnectionControl) -> Result<(), ServerError> {
        lock(&self.controls, "connection control queue")?
            .push(QueuedConnectionControl { pid, control });
        Ok(())
    }

    pub(super) fn pop_control(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<ConnectionControl> {
        let mut controls = self.controls.lock().ok()?;
        let index = controls.iter().position(|queued| queued.pid == pid)?;
        Some(controls.remove(index).control)
    }

    /// Non-consuming final-probe query for controls enqueued after mailbox drain.
    pub(super) fn has_control(&self, pid: u64) -> bool {
        self.controls
            .lock()
            .is_ok_and(|controls| controls.iter().any(|queued| queued.pid == pid))
    }

    /// Pulls a queued-but-unconsumed control back out of the queue. Returns
    /// whether THIS call removed it — `false` means the entry already left the
    /// queue, and since [`Self::pop_control`] is the only other remover, a
    /// consumer drain took it (S8's publication disambiguator). Matching is
    /// `pid` + full control equality; a `Push` control embeds its
    /// runtime-unique correlation id, so this can never remove a different
    /// push's entry and misreport.
    fn remove_control(&self, pid: u64, control: &ConnectionControl) -> bool {
        let Ok(mut controls) = self.controls.lock() else {
            return false;
        };
        let Some(index) = controls
            .iter()
            .position(|queued| queued.pid == pid && &queued.control == control)
        else {
            return false;
        };
        controls.remove(index);
        true
    }

    fn active_count(&self) -> usize {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .map_or(0, |records| records.connections.len())
    }

    /// Test read of the record's stamped mount (design §10).
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn connection_mount(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<MountKind> {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .map(|record| record.mount)
    }

    /// Test read of whether the record holds an fd guard.
    #[cfg(test)]
    fn connection_has_fd_guard(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<bool> {
        self.records
            .lock()
            .ok()?
            .connections
            .get(&pid)
            .map(|record| record.fd_guard.is_some())
    }

    /// Removes the connection record for `pid` and, in the same close step, drops
    /// every push reply slot that connection still owns so each waiting
    /// [`PushReplyAwaiter`] wakes immediately with a disconnected error. This runs
    /// on every close route — `finish`, `mark_crashed`, and `reap_crashed` all
    /// remove through here — and fires regardless of whether the connection ever
    /// registered a worker, so a plain push target is covered too.
    ///
    /// ORDER MATTERS (S3/S7): the record is removed BEFORE the push sweep. A
    /// push registering concurrently runs INSERT -> CONFIRM -> PUBLISH
    /// (`confirm_push_registration` reads the record after inserting its slot
    /// and before publishing its control), so with this ordering exactly one
    /// side always observes a racing slot: a confirm that ran before this
    /// removal implies the slot was inserted before the sweep below (which then
    /// reaps it — a control published after that confirm is answered into a
    /// swept slot, read as the truthful disconnected outcome); a confirm after
    /// this removal sees the absence, rolls the slot back itself, and never
    /// publishes. Sweeping first (the original order) left a window — sweep,
    /// then insert+confirm, then record removal — where NEITHER side observed
    /// the slot and it leaked past connection close. The two locks are taken
    /// strictly sequentially (never nested), so no lock-order inversion.
    fn remove(&self, pid: u64) -> Option<ConnectionRecord> {
        let mut removed = self.records.lock().ok().and_then(|mut records| {
            let removed = records.connections.remove(&pid);
            // SRV-027 R1: the directory entry leaves with its record, in
            // this same lock take.
            if let Some(registration) = removed
                .as_ref()
                .and_then(|record| record.registration.as_ref())
            {
                records.directory.forget(pid, &registration.task_queue);
            }
            removed
        });
        #[cfg(test)]
        let host_fd = removed
            .as_ref()
            .and_then(|record| record.fd_guard.as_ref())
            .map(std::os::fd::AsRawFd::as_raw_fd);
        self.cancel_pushes_for_connection(pid);
        if let Some(registration) = removed.as_mut().and_then(|record| record.readiness.take()) {
            if let Some(scheduler) = self.scheduler.upgrade() {
                // This call is ACK'd: it returns only after the poll owner has
                // removed the registration. `fd_guard` is still live here.
                scheduler.readiness_deregister(registration.token);
                tracing::debug!(
                    registered_fd = registration.fd,
                    "connection readiness deregistration acknowledged"
                );
            }
        }
        if let Some(record) = removed.as_mut() {
            // Explicit after-deregister drop documents and enforces the fd wall.
            drop(record.fd_guard.take());
        }
        // Decrement only when a record was actually present so a double-remove
        // (e.g. `finish` after `reap_crashed`) cannot drive the gauge negative.
        // The §5 admission slot is released on the same guard: the reservation
        // acquired in `spawn_connection` converted into this record at
        // `register`, so its removal is exactly one release per reservation.
        if removed.is_some() {
            crate::metrics::connection_closed();
            self.release_admission();
            // ACCESS-005 R6: the connection's grant-index membership is
            // retired on this same once-per-record guard, so revoke, EOF,
            // crash and force-close all release it exactly once.
            if let Some(revocation) = self.revocation.get()
                && revocation.release(pid)
            {
                tracing::debug!(connection_pid = pid, "grant-decision binding released");
            }
            if let Some(signals) = self.signals.get() {
                #[cfg(test)]
                self.probe_close_event_fd(host_fd);
                signals.connection(pid, false);
                signals.topology(crate::console::TopologyChange::ConnectionClosed { id: pid });
            }
        }
        // TOLD drain-completion tell (W4 leg 3, §4.3): the record map above already
        // reflects this removal, so bump the removal generation and wake the
        // drain/settle waiter AFTER the observed state is updated. Ordering the
        // state update before the generation bump — paired with the waiter arming
        // its snapshot before observing `active_count` — is the arm-before-observe
        // barrier that makes a concurrently delivered exit un-losable (oracle 18).
        // Only a real removal tells, so a double-remove drives no spurious wake.
        if removed.is_some() {
            self.signal_connection_removed();
            // Removal can complete delivery quiescence without another park.
            // Tell the earlier flush waiter as well as the later drain waiter.
            if self.settle_armed.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
                self.signal_settle_changed();
            }
        }
        removed
    }

    #[cfg(test)]
    fn probe_close_event_fd(&self, host_fd: Option<RawFd>) {
        let mut probe = match self.close_event_fd_probe.lock() {
            Ok(probe) => probe,
            Err(error) => {
                tracing::error!(%error, "close-event fd probe lock poisoned");
                return;
            }
        };
        if !matches!(*probe, CloseEventFdProbe::Armed) {
            return;
        }
        let observed = host_fd.map_or_else(
            || Err(std::io::Error::other("close-event probe has no owned fd")),
            |fd| match std::fs::File::open(format!("/dev/fd/{fd}")) {
                Ok(duplicate) => {
                    drop(duplicate);
                    Ok(false)
                }
                Err(error) if matches!(error.raw_os_error(), Some(2 | 9)) => Ok(true),
                Err(error) => Err(error),
            },
        );
        *probe = CloseEventFdProbe::Observed(observed);
    }

    /// Bumps the drain-completion generation and wakes the drain/settle waiter.
    /// Called from [`Self::remove`] on every route that actually drops a record.
    fn signal_connection_removed(&self) {
        // Bump the generation under the lock, release it, THEN notify. A waiter
        // holds this lock continuously from its generation re-check through the
        // atomic release inside `wait_timeout`, so it can never miss a bump
        // published before the notify — the Condvar lost-wakeup contract holds
        // without notifying under the guard.
        {
            let mut generation = recover_lock(&self.drain_generation);
            *generation = generation.wrapping_add(1);
        }
        self.drain_removed.notify_all();
    }

    /// Parks the calling thread until every tracked connection has been removed
    /// or `deadline` elapses, returning `true` when the drain completed and
    /// `false` when the single admitted deadline won. This is the TOLD
    /// replacement (W4 leg 3, §4.3) for the retired reap/count/sleep drain loop:
    /// it never samples completion on a timer. Completion is observed only on a
    /// delivered connection-removal wake (composed from the one `remove()` funnel,
    /// so a Died/Detached/crash exit and an orderly close decrement through the
    /// same path — oracle 15) or the one deadline. Force-close settle reuses this
    /// same waiter with its own deadline rather than a second poll loop (oracle
    /// 14).
    pub(super) fn wait_for_active_connections_drained(&self, deadline: Instant) -> bool {
        loop {
            // ARM before OBSERVE: snapshot the removal generation first, so an exit
            // delivered after the completion observation below and before the park
            // bumps a generation the park detects — it is never lost (oracle 18).
            let snapshot = self.drain_generation_snapshot();
            // OBSERVE completion first: a last exit that reaches zero wins a tie
            // with a simultaneously elapsed deadline (oracle 19).
            if self.active_count() == 0 {
                return true;
            }
            let Some(remaining) = deadline.checked_duration_since(Instant::now()) else {
                #[cfg(test)]
                self.drain_deadline_hits.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
                return false;
            };
            #[cfg(test)]
            self.run_drain_park_barrier();
            self.park_until_removed_or(snapshot, remaining);
        }
    }

    /// Reads the current removal generation under its mutex.
    fn drain_generation_snapshot(&self) -> u64 {
        *recover_lock(&self.drain_generation)
    }

    /// The removal generation, read as a departure count. A poisoned lock is
    /// an error here, not recovered: a caller waiting on departures must not
    /// read a count a panicking holder may have left half-written.
    pub(super) fn departures(&self) -> Result<u64, ServerError> {
        Ok(*lock(&self.drain_generation, "connection departures")?)
    }

    /// Parks on the removal `Condvar` until the generation has advanced by
    /// `count` since `since`, or until `deadline`. `wait_timeout_while` checks
    /// the predicate under the lock before it parks, so departures already
    /// counted return at once, and spurious wakes park again inside the call.
    pub(super) fn await_departures(
        &self,
        since: u64,
        count: u64,
        deadline: Instant,
    ) -> Result<bool, ServerError> {
        let remaining = deadline.saturating_duration_since(Instant::now());
        let (generation, _timed_out) = self
            .drain_removed
            .wait_timeout_while(
                lock(&self.drain_generation, "connection departures")?,
                remaining,
                |current| current.wrapping_sub(since) < count,
            )
            .map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
                message: format!("connection departures unavailable: {error}"),
            })?;
        let departed = generation.wrapping_sub(since) >= count;
        drop(generation);
        Ok(departed)
    }

    /// Parks on the removal `Condvar` for at most `timeout`, but only while no
    /// removal has bumped the generation since `snapshot` — the arm-before-observe
    /// barrier. `wait_timeout_while` evaluates the predicate under the lock BEFORE
    /// waiting, so a generation already advanced (an exit landed between the
    /// observation and here) returns immediately without sleeping; spurious wakes
    /// re-wait inside the call and never return early.
    fn park_until_removed_or(&self, snapshot: u64, timeout: Duration) {
        let outcome = self
            .drain_removed
            .wait_timeout_while(recover_lock(&self.drain_generation), timeout, |current| {
                *current == snapshot
            })
            .unwrap_or_else(PoisonError::into_inner);
        // A non-timed-out return means the predicate went false — a real removal
        // bumped the generation and woke this park (as opposed to the deadline).
        #[cfg(test)]
        if !outcome.1.timed_out() {
            self.drain_exit_wakes.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
        }
        // Release the guard promptly; the caller re-loops unlocked.
        drop(outcome);
    }
}

/// A reply either settles its recipient's slot or names why it was discarded.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub(super) enum PushReplyDisposition {
    Resolved,
    SenderMismatch,
    UnknownCorrelation,
    ReceiverDropped,
}

/// What `pid`'s reply slot retains for a reply's access decision.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[must_use]
pub(super) enum PushBinding {
    /// No slot for this correlation id is owned by `pid`; the settle names the
    /// exact disposition.
    Unbound,
    /// The push was made with no subject ([`ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_connection`]).
    Subjectless,
    /// The subject the push was made on ([`ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_subject`]).
    Subject(String),
}

/// One in-flight server-push reply slot, associating the awaiter's reply `sender`
/// with the `pid` of the connection that owns the push. The pid lets the close
/// path drop exactly that connection's slots; the correlation id (the map key)
/// still drives [`ConnectionRuntime::resolve_push`] and
/// [`ConnectionRuntime::cancel_push`].
#[derive(Debug)]
struct PendingPush {
    pid: u64,
    /// The subject the push was made on, recorded at push time by
    /// [`ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_subject`] and read back by
    /// [`ConnectionRuntime::push_binding`] when the reply is decided. `None`
    /// for a push made without one.
    subject: Option<String>,
    sender: Sender<PushSlotResolution>,
    /// Absolute reply deadline for this push, when one was requested via
    /// [`ConnectionSupervisor::push_to_connection_with_deadline`]. `None` is the
    /// default 0.2.3 shape: the slot has no per-slot deadline and is reclaimed
    /// only by reply-consumed or connection-close. `Some` is evaluated host-side
    /// and lazily in [`ConnectionRuntime::expire_push_if_due`].
    deadline: Option<Instant>,
    /// SRV-027 R2: the requester connection a routed push answers, woken once
    /// when the slot resolves (a reply, a refusal, or the worker's close) so
    /// its next slice relays the outcome. `None` for a hosting application's
    /// push, whose awaiter is received on the caller's own thread.
    wake: Option<super::wake::ReadyWaker>,
}

/// What a reply slot resolves TO when it is woken through its channel.
///
/// Distinct from [`PushSlotDisposition`], which is what a host-side deadline
/// touch FOUND. Every OTHER way a slot dies — connection close, the close sweep,
/// the publication rollback — drops the `Sender` instead of sending one of these,
/// and so keeps reading as the retryable [`ServerError::PushReplyDisconnected`].
/// That is deliberate: only a frame the connection can NEVER carry gets a named
/// terminal outcome here.
enum PushSlotResolution {
    /// The client's correlated reply payload.
    Reply(Vec<u8>),
    /// The client's correlated reply arrived and was refused by the access
    /// decision on the push's retained subject; `reason` is the refusal as the
    /// route would have carried it. TERMINAL: the reply was never delivered.
    ReplyRefused {
        /// The refusal, rendered as the four-field access refusal.
        reason: String,
    },
    /// The push was never queued for the wire: its encoded frame is larger than
    /// the whole outbound buffer, so draining could never make room for it.
    /// CERTAIN, and therefore terminal. Congestion never arrives here.
    OutboundFrameTooLarge {
        /// Encoded size of the rejected frame; exceeds `capacity` on its own.
        needed: usize,
        /// The outbound buffer's whole capacity.
        capacity: usize,
        /// Bytes queued when the frame was rejected (log context only).
        queued: usize,
    },
}

/// Host-side disposition of a reply slot at an elapsed `receive` quantum.
enum PushSlotDisposition {
    /// The slot carried an explicit deadline that has passed; this call removed
    /// it (releasing its §5 cap admission).
    Expired,
    /// The slot is present with no deadline, or a deadline still in the future:
    /// the elapsed quantum is a benign re-arm and the slot is untouched.
    Live,
    /// No slot for this correlation id — a concurrent resolve or connection close
    /// already removed it.
    Absent,
}

/// The connection records and the service directory built from them, under
/// one lock (SRV-027 R1): a directory entry is added when its record stores a
/// registration and removed in the same lock take that removes or replaces
/// the record, so no lookup names a connection whose record is gone.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Registry {
    connections: HashMap<u64, ConnectionRecord>,
    directory: super::service_directory::ServiceDirectory,
}

#[derive(Debug)]
struct ConnectionRecord {
    peer_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
    /// Which door admitted this connection (design §10). Written once, by the
    /// spawn path, from the server's own knowledge of which path it is; never
    /// read from, or influenced by, anything the client sends.
    mount: MountKind,
    /// Durable pair allocated and flushed before the process was spawned.
    connection_incarnation: Option<ConnectionIncarnation>,
    /// Worker registration declared on this connection, set by `set_registration`
    /// when a `WorkerRegister` frame is accepted. `Some` marks a connection whose
    /// close must fire `on_worker_unregistered`.
    registration: Option<WorkerRegistration>,
    /// Registry principal a pass-stamped `Connect` verified, set by
    /// `attach_pass_principal` once the handshake succeeded. `Some` marks a
    /// connection whose close must fire `on_pass_detached` with it.
    pass_principal: Option<PassPrincipal>,
    /// Host-reachable identity for ACK'd deregistration after external death.
    readiness: Option<ReadinessRegistration>,
    /// Shared edge set before READY enters beamr's process-table pending queue;
    /// the executing process reads it at its final probe.
    ready_pending: Arc<AtomicBool>,
    /// FIX A-ii: `true` while this connection is parked (its last slice returned
    /// `Wait`). A parked connection with no `ready_pending` edge has fanned out
    /// every accepted publish to its socket, so the shutdown flush barrier reads
    /// this with `ready_pending` to know delivery has quiesced before it lets the
    /// shutdown Disconnect be broadcast.
    parked: AtomicBool,
    /// Keeps the fd alive until deregistration has been acknowledged, preventing
    /// stale registration delivery to a subsequently reused descriptor number.
    fd_guard: Option<TcpStream>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct ReadinessRegistration {
    token: ReadinessToken,
    fd: RawFd,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct QueuedConnectionControl {
    pid: u64,
    control: ConnectionControl,
}

fn lock<'a, T>(mutex: &'a Mutex<T>, context: &str) -> Result<MutexGuard<'a, T>, ServerError> {
    mutex.lock().map_err(|error| ServerError::ListenerAccept {
        message: format!("{context} unavailable: {error}"),
    })
}

/// Locks `mutex`, RECOVERING a poisoned guard instead of failing (S4). For
/// lifecycle-cleanup paths only (reply delivery, expiry, cancellation, the
/// close sweep): removal-style operations are sound on a recovered map, and a
/// cleanup that silently skipped its removal would strand slots and their §5
/// cap admissions forever. Admission paths keep the fail-closed [`lock`].
fn recover_lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> {
    mutex
        .lock()
        .unwrap_or_else(std::sync::PoisonError::into_inner)
}

#[test]
fn host_fd_is_closed_before_connection_close_event_handoff()
-> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
    use std::os::fd::AsRawFd;
    let fixture = crate::server::self_streams::tests::R3Fixture::new()?;
    let services: Arc<dyn ConnectionServices> = fixture.services;
    let runtime = ConnectionRuntime::for_tests(services);
    runtime
        .signals
        .set(ServerSignals::default())
        .map_err(|_| "close-event signals already installed")?;
    let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0")?;
    let client = TcpStream::connect(listener.local_addr()?)?;
    let (server, address) = listener.accept()?;
    let host_fd = server.as_raw_fd();
    let positive_control = std::fs::File::open(format!("/dev/fd/{host_fd}"))?;
    drop(positive_control);
    runtime.register_record(1, Some(address), None, MountKind::Tcp, Some(server))?;
    *runtime
        .close_event_fd_probe
        .lock()
        .map_err(|error| error.to_string())? = CloseEventFdProbe::Armed;
    let removed = runtime
        .remove(1)
        .ok_or("fd-owning connection was not removed")?;
    let mut probe = runtime
        .close_event_fd_probe
        .lock()
        .map_err(|error| error.to_string())?;
    let CloseEventFdProbe::Observed(observed) =
        std::mem::replace(&mut *probe, CloseEventFdProbe::Off)
    else {
        return Err("close-event handoff was not observed".into());
    };
    drop(probe);
    assert!(
        observed?,
        "connection-close event was handed off while its host fd remained open"
    );
    assert!(removed.fd_guard.is_none());
    drop(removed);
    drop(client);
    drop(listener);
    Ok(())
}

/// ACCESS-003 R1: the context watch drains its own subscription the way the
/// connection pump does; each reading carries its message id, the stable
/// event id Lys charges it under.
impl crate::services::context_watch::ContextFeed for super::services::ConnectionSubscription {
    fn next_reading(&mut self) -> Option<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
        self.try_next()
            .map(|envelope| (envelope.message_id.as_uuid().to_string(), envelope.payload))
    }
}

/// Starts the context watch over the `context-watch` channel when the
/// service bindings ask for it (ACCESS-003 R1).
///
/// One subscription whose inbox
/// wakes the watcher on every admitted reading, bounded by the same §5
/// limits a connection's subscription is. `Ok(None)` when the bindings do not
/// watch.
///
/// # Errors
/// The `context-watch` channel refused the subscription (it must be
/// configured), or the watcher thread did not start.
pub fn start_context_watch(
    services: &dyn ConnectionServices,
    bindings: &crate::services::production::ServiceBindings,
    limits: &LimitsConfig,
) -> Result<Option<crate::services::context_watch::ContextWatch>, ServerError> {
    if !bindings.watches_context() {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    let wake = crate::services::context_watch::ContextWake::new();
    let install = liminal::channel::InboxInstall {
        budget: liminal::channel::ConnectionInboxBudget::new(limits.max_connection_inbox_bytes),
        depth_cap: limits.max_subscription_inbox_depth,
        notifier: Some(wake.notifier()),
        capacity: None,
    };
    let subscription = services.subscribe(
        crate::services::ServiceKind::ContextWatch.subject_shape(),
        &[],
        Some(install),
    )?;
    crate::services::context_watch::ContextWatch::start(
        subscription,
        wake,
        bindings.context_reporter(),
    )
    .map(Some)
    .map_err(|error| ServerError::ConfigValidation {
        message: error.to_string(),
    })
}