lightning 0.2.2

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

use crate::ln::chan_utils::{
	ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, ClosingTransaction, CommitmentTransaction,
	HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TrustedCommitmentTransaction,
};
use crate::ln::channel::{ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS};
use crate::ln::channel_keys::HtlcKey;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::sign::ChannelSigner;
use crate::types::payment::PaymentPreimage;

#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;

#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
use crate::sync::MutexGuard;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};

use core::cmp;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};

use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::sighash;
use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
use bitcoin::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::Txid;

#[cfg(taproot)]
use crate::ln::msgs::PartialSignatureWithNonce;
#[cfg(taproot)]
use crate::sign::taproot::TaprootChannelSigner;
use crate::sign::HTLCDescriptor;
use crate::util::dyn_signer::DynSigner;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
#[cfg(taproot)]
use bitcoin::secp256k1::All;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{ecdsa::Signature, Secp256k1};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
#[cfg(taproot)]
use musig2::types::{PartialSignature, PublicNonce};

/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;

/// An implementation of Sign that enforces some policy checks.  The current checks
/// are an incomplete set.  They include:
///
/// - When signing, the holder transaction has not been revoked
/// - When revoking, the holder transaction has not been signed
/// - The holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
/// - The revoked holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
/// - There is at least one unrevoked holder transaction at all times
/// - The counterparty commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
/// - The pre-derived keys and pre-built transaction in CommitmentTransaction were correctly built
///
/// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
/// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
///
/// Note that counterparty signatures on the holder transaction are not checked, but it should
/// be in a complete implementation.
///
/// Note that before we do so we should ensure its serialization format has backwards- and
/// forwards-compatibility prefix/suffixes!
pub struct TestChannelSigner {
	pub inner: DynSigner,
	/// Channel state used for policy enforcement
	pub state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
	pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
	pub disable_all_state_policy_checks: bool,
	have_fetched_pubkeys: AtomicBool,
}

impl Clone for TestChannelSigner {
	fn clone(&self) -> Self {
		// Generally, a signer should only ever be cloned when a ChannelMonitor is cloned (which
		// doesn't fetch the pubkeys at all). This isn't really a critical test, but if it
		// ever does fail we should make sure the clone is happening in a sensible place.
		assert!(!self.have_fetched_pubkeys.load(Ordering::Acquire));
		Self {
			inner: self.inner.clone(),
			state: Arc::clone(&self.state),
			disable_revocation_policy_check: self.disable_revocation_policy_check,
			disable_all_state_policy_checks: self.disable_all_state_policy_checks,
			// In some tests we clone a `ChannelMonitor` multiple times, so we have to initialize
			// with `!have_fetched_pubkeys` to ensure the above assertion passes.
			have_fetched_pubkeys: AtomicBool::new(false),
		}
	}
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum SignerOp {
	GetPerCommitmentPoint,
	ReleaseCommitmentSecret,
	ValidateHolderCommitment,
	SignCounterpartyCommitment,
	ValidateCounterpartyRevocation,
	SignHolderCommitment,
	SignJusticeRevokedOutput,
	SignJusticeRevokedHtlc,
	SignHolderHtlcTransaction,
	SignCounterpartyHtlcTransaction,
	SignClosingTransaction,
	SignHolderAnchorInput,
	SignChannelAnnouncementWithFundingKey,
}

impl SignerOp {
	pub fn all() -> Vec<Self> {
		vec![
			SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint,
			SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret,
			SignerOp::ValidateHolderCommitment,
			SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment,
			SignerOp::ValidateCounterpartyRevocation,
			SignerOp::SignHolderCommitment,
			SignerOp::SignJusticeRevokedOutput,
			SignerOp::SignJusticeRevokedHtlc,
			SignerOp::SignHolderHtlcTransaction,
			SignerOp::SignCounterpartyHtlcTransaction,
			SignerOp::SignClosingTransaction,
			SignerOp::SignHolderAnchorInput,
			SignerOp::SignChannelAnnouncementWithFundingKey,
		]
	}
}

impl PartialEq for TestChannelSigner {
	fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
		Arc::ptr_eq(&self.state, &o.state)
	}
}

impl TestChannelSigner {
	/// Construct an TestChannelSigner
	pub fn new(inner: DynSigner) -> Self {
		let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
		Self {
			inner,
			state,
			disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
			disable_all_state_policy_checks: false,
			have_fetched_pubkeys: AtomicBool::new(false),
		}
	}

	/// Construct an TestChannelSigner with externally managed storage
	///
	/// Since there are multiple copies of this struct for each channel, some coordination is needed
	/// so that all copies are aware of enforcement state.  A pointer to this state is provided
	/// here, usually by an implementation of KeysInterface.
	pub fn new_with_revoked(
		inner: DynSigner, state: Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>,
		disable_revocation_policy_check: bool, disable_all_state_policy_checks: bool,
	) -> Self {
		Self {
			inner,
			state,
			disable_revocation_policy_check,
			disable_all_state_policy_checks,
			have_fetched_pubkeys: AtomicBool::new(false),
		}
	}

	#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
	pub fn get_enforcement_state(&self) -> MutexGuard<'_, EnforcementState> {
		self.state.lock().unwrap()
	}

	#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
	pub fn enable_op(&self, signer_op: SignerOp) {
		self.get_enforcement_state().disabled_signer_ops.remove(&signer_op);
	}

	#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
	pub fn disable_op(&self, signer_op: SignerOp) {
		self.get_enforcement_state().disabled_signer_ops.insert(signer_op);
	}

	#[cfg(test)]
	fn is_signer_available(&self, signer_op: SignerOp) -> bool {
		!self.get_enforcement_state().disabled_signer_ops.contains(&signer_op)
	}
}

impl ChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
	fn get_per_commitment_point(
		&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::GetPerCommitmentPoint) {
			return Err(());
		}
		self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
	}

	fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::ReleaseCommitmentSecret) {
			return Err(());
		}
		let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			assert!(idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, last revoked {}", idx, state.last_holder_revoked_commitment);
			assert!(idx > state.last_holder_commitment, "cannot revoke the last holder commitment - attempted to revoke {} last commitment {}", idx, state.last_holder_commitment);
		}
		state.last_holder_revoked_commitment = idx;
		self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
	}

	fn validate_holder_commitment(
		&self, holder_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction,
		_outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>,
	) -> Result<(), ()> {
		let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
		let idx = holder_tx.commitment_number();
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			assert!(
				idx == state.last_holder_commitment || idx == state.last_holder_commitment - 1,
				"expecting to validate the current or next holder commitment - trying {}, current {}",
				idx,
				state.last_holder_commitment
			);
		}
		state.last_holder_commitment = idx;
		Ok(())
	}

	fn validate_counterparty_revocation(&self, idx: u64, _secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<(), ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::ValidateCounterpartyRevocation) {
			return Err(());
		}
		let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			assert!(idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment || idx == state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 1, "expecting to validate the current or next counterparty revocation - trying {}, current {}", idx, state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment);
		}
		state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment = idx;
		Ok(())
	}

	fn pubkeys(&self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ChannelPublicKeys {
		assert!(!self.have_fetched_pubkeys.swap(true, Ordering::AcqRel));
		self.inner.pubkeys(secp_ctx)
	}

	fn new_funding_pubkey(
		&self, splice_parent_funding_txid: Txid, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> PublicKey {
		self.inner.new_funding_pubkey(splice_parent_funding_txid, secp_ctx)
	}

	fn channel_keys_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
		self.inner.channel_keys_id()
	}
}

impl EcdsaChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>,
		outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
		self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(channel_parameters, commitment_tx, secp_ctx);

		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignCounterpartyCommitment) {
			return Err(());
		}
		let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
		let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
		let last_commitment_number = state.last_counterparty_commitment;
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			// These commitment numbers are backwards counting.  We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
			// or the next one.
			assert!(
				last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number
					|| last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number,
				"{} doesn't come after {}",
				actual_commitment_number,
				last_commitment_number
			);
			// Ensure that the counterparty doesn't get more than two broadcastable commitments -
			// the last and the one we are trying to sign
			assert!(
				actual_commitment_number >= state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment - 2,
				"cannot sign a commitment if second to last wasn't revoked - signing {} revoked {}",
				actual_commitment_number,
				state.last_counterparty_revoked_commitment
			);
		}
		state.last_counterparty_commitment =
			cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number);

		Ok(self
			.inner
			.sign_counterparty_commitment(
				channel_parameters,
				commitment_tx,
				inbound_htlc_preimages,
				outbound_htlc_preimages,
				secp_ctx,
			)
			.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignHolderCommitment) {
			return Err(());
		}
		let trusted_tx =
			self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(channel_parameters, commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
			let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
			if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != commitment_number
				&& state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != commitment_number
			{
				if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
					panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
						state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, commitment_number, self.inner.channel_keys_id()[0])
				}
			}
		}
		Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment(channel_parameters, commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
	}

	#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils", feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		Ok(self
			.inner
			.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment(channel_parameters, commitment_tx, secp_ctx)
			.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_justice_revoked_output(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters, justice_tx: &Transaction,
		input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignJusticeRevokedOutput) {
			return Err(());
		}
		Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output(
			&self.inner,
			channel_parameters,
			justice_tx,
			input,
			amount,
			per_commitment_key,
			secp_ctx,
		)
		.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters, justice_tx: &Transaction,
		input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignJusticeRevokedHtlc) {
			return Err(());
		}
		Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_htlc(
			&self.inner,
			channel_parameters,
			justice_tx,
			input,
			amount,
			per_commitment_key,
			htlc,
			secp_ctx,
		)
		.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
		&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignHolderHtlcTransaction) {
			return Err(());
		}
		if !self.disable_all_state_policy_checks {
			let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
			if state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 1 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number
				&& state.last_holder_revoked_commitment - 2 != htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number
			{
				if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
					panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
						state.last_holder_revoked_commitment, htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, self.inner.channel_keys_id()[0])
				}
			}
		}
		assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[input], htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
		assert_eq!(htlc_tx.output[input], htlc_descriptor.tx_output(secp_ctx));
		{
			let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(secp_ctx);
			let channel_parameters =
				&htlc_descriptor.channel_derivation_parameters.transaction_parameters;
			let channel_type_features = &channel_parameters.channel_type_features;
			let sighash_type = if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()
				|| channel_type_features.supports_anchor_zero_fee_commitments()
			{
				EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay
			} else {
				EcdsaSighashType::All
			};
			let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&*htlc_tx)
				.p2wsh_signature_hash(
					input,
					&witness_script,
					htlc_descriptor.htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(),
					sighash_type,
				)
				.unwrap();
			let countersignatory_htlc_key = HtlcKey::from_basepoint(
				&secp_ctx,
				&channel_parameters.counterparty_pubkeys().unwrap().htlc_basepoint,
				&htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_point,
			);

			secp_ctx
				.verify_ecdsa(
					&hash_to_message!(sighash.as_byte_array()),
					&htlc_descriptor.counterparty_sig,
					&countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key(),
				)
				.unwrap();
		}
		Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
			&self.inner,
			htlc_tx,
			input,
			htlc_descriptor,
			secp_ctx,
		)
		.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_tx: &Transaction,
		input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignCounterpartyHtlcTransaction) {
			return Err(());
		}
		Ok(EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(
			&self.inner,
			channel_parameters,
			htlc_tx,
			input,
			amount,
			per_commitment_point,
			htlc,
			secp_ctx,
		)
		.unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_closing_transaction(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignClosingTransaction) {
			return Err(());
		}
		closing_tx
			.verify(channel_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint())
			.expect("derived different closing transaction");
		Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(channel_parameters, closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
	}

	fn sign_holder_keyed_anchor_input(
		&self, chan_params: &ChannelTransactionParameters, anchor_tx: &Transaction, input: usize,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		debug_assert!(MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS > ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI);
		// As long as our minimum dust limit is enforced and is greater than our anchor output
		// value, an anchor output can only have an index within [0, 1].
		assert!(
			anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 0
				|| anchor_tx.input[input].previous_output.vout == 1
		);
		#[cfg(test)]
		if !self.is_signer_available(SignerOp::SignHolderAnchorInput) {
			return Err(());
		}
		self.inner.sign_holder_keyed_anchor_input(chan_params, anchor_tx, input, secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
		self.inner.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(channel_parameters, msg, secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_splice_shared_input(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters, tx: &Transaction,
		input_index: usize, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
	) -> Signature {
		self.inner.sign_splice_shared_input(channel_parameters, tx, input_index, secp_ctx)
	}
}

#[cfg(taproot)]
#[allow(unused)]
impl TaprootChannelSigner for TestChannelSigner {
	fn generate_local_nonce_pair(
		&self, commitment_number: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> PublicNonce {
		todo!()
	}

	fn partially_sign_counterparty_commitment(
		&self, counterparty_nonce: PublicNonce, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction,
		inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>,
		outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<(PartialSignatureWithNonce, Vec<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature>), ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn finalize_holder_commitment(
		&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction,
		counterparty_partial_signature: PartialSignatureWithNonce, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<PartialSignature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn sign_justice_revoked_output(
		&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn sign_justice_revoked_htlc(
		&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey,
		htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn sign_holder_htlc_transaction(
		&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, htlc_descriptor: &HTLCDescriptor,
		secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(
		&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
		htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<secp256k1::schnorr::Signature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}

	fn partially_sign_closing_transaction(
		&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>,
	) -> Result<PartialSignature, ()> {
		todo!()
	}
}

impl TestChannelSigner {
	fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
	) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
		commitment_tx
			.verify(&channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
			.expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
	}

	fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
		&self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
		commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
	) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
		commitment_tx
			.verify(&channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
			.expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
	}
}

/// The state used by [`TestChannelSigner`] in order to enforce policy checks
///
/// This structure is maintained by KeysInterface since we may have multiple copies of
/// the signer and they must coordinate their state.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct EnforcementState {
	/// The last counterparty commitment number we signed, backwards counting
	pub last_counterparty_commitment: u64,
	/// The last counterparty commitment they revoked, backwards counting
	pub last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: u64,
	/// The last holder commitment number we revoked, backwards counting
	pub last_holder_revoked_commitment: u64,
	/// The last validated holder commitment number, backwards counting
	pub last_holder_commitment: u64,
	/// Set of signer operations that are disabled. If an operation is disabled,
	/// the signer will return `Err` when the corresponding method is called.
	pub disabled_signer_ops: HashSet<SignerOp>,
}

impl EnforcementState {
	/// Enforcement state for a new channel
	pub fn new() -> Self {
		EnforcementState {
			last_counterparty_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
			last_counterparty_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
			last_holder_revoked_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
			last_holder_commitment: INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
			disabled_signer_ops: new_hash_set(),
		}
	}
}