// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
//! The [`NetworkGraph`] stores the network gossip and [`P2PGossipSync`] fetches it from peers
use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
use bitcoin::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Verification};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::network::Network;
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{
BaseMessageHandler, ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, GossipTimestampFilter, NodeAnnouncement,
};
use crate::ln::msgs::{
DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress,
MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
};
use crate::ln::msgs::{
MessageSendEvent, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyChannelRange,
ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd,
};
use crate::ln::types::ChannelId;
use crate::routing::utxo::{self, UtxoLookup, UtxoResolver};
use crate::types::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::types::string::PrintableString;
use crate::util::indexed_map::{
Entry as IndexedMapEntry, IndexedMap, OccupiedEntry as IndexedMapOccupiedEntry,
};
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
use crate::util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
use crate::util::ser::{MaybeReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::io;
use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::Mutex;
use crate::sync::{LockTestExt, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::ops::{Bound, Deref};
use core::str::FromStr;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, fmt};
pub use lightning_types::routing::RoutingFees;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
/// We remove stale channel directional info two weeks after the last update, per BOLT 7's
/// suggestion.
const STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 14;
/// We stop tracking the removal of permanently failed nodes and channels one week after removal
const REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS: u64 = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7;
/// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
/// refuse to relay the message.
const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
/// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
/// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
/// A compressed pubkey which a node uses to sign announcements and decode HTLCs routed through it.
///
/// This type stores a simple byte array which is not checked for validity (i.e. that it describes
/// a point which lies on the secp256k1 curve), unlike [`PublicKey`], as validity checking would
/// otherwise represent a large portion of [`NetworkGraph`] deserialization time (and RGS
/// application).
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeId([u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]);
impl NodeId {
/// Create a new NodeId from a public key
pub fn from_pubkey(pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Self {
NodeId(pubkey.serialize())
}
/// Create a new NodeId from a slice of bytes
pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
if bytes.len() != PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
let mut data = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
data.copy_from_slice(bytes);
Ok(NodeId(data))
}
/// Get the public key slice from this NodeId
pub fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.0
}
/// Get the public key as an array from this NodeId
pub fn as_array(&self) -> &[u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] {
&self.0
}
/// Get the public key from this NodeId
pub fn as_pubkey(&self) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
PublicKey::from_slice(&self.0)
}
}
impl fmt::Debug for NodeId {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "NodeId({})", crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0))
}
}
impl fmt::Display for NodeId {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
}
}
impl core::hash::Hash for NodeId {
fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
self.0.hash(hasher);
}
}
impl cmp::PartialOrd for NodeId {
fn partial_cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> Option<cmp::Ordering> {
Some(self.cmp(other))
}
}
impl Ord for NodeId {
fn cmp(&self, other: &Self) -> cmp::Ordering {
self.0[..].cmp(&other.0[..])
}
}
impl Writeable for NodeId {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
writer.write_all(&self.0)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for NodeId {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let mut buf = [0; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
reader.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
Ok(Self(buf))
}
}
impl From<PublicKey> for NodeId {
fn from(pubkey: PublicKey) -> Self {
Self::from_pubkey(&pubkey)
}
}
impl TryFrom<NodeId> for PublicKey {
type Error = secp256k1::Error;
fn try_from(node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
node_id.as_pubkey()
}
}
impl FromStr for NodeId {
type Err = bitcoin::hex::parse::HexToArrayError;
fn from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self, Self::Err> {
let data: [u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE] = bitcoin::hex::FromHex::from_hex(s)?;
Ok(NodeId(data))
}
}
/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
pub struct NetworkGraph<L: Deref>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex<Option<u32>>,
chain_hash: ChainHash,
logger: L,
// Lock order: channels -> nodes
channels: RwLock<IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
nodes: RwLock<IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
removed_node_counters: Mutex<Vec<u32>>,
next_node_counter: AtomicUsize,
// Lock order: removed_channels -> removed_nodes
//
// NOTE: In the following `removed_*` maps, we use seconds since UNIX epoch to track time instead
// of `std::time::Instant`s for a few reasons:
// * We want it to be possible to do tracking in non-`std` environments where we can compare
// a provided current UNIX timestamp with the time at which we started tracking.
// * In the future, if we decide to persist these maps, they will already be serializable.
// * Although we lose out on the platform's monotonic clock, the system clock in a std
// environment should be practical over the time period we are considering (on the order of a
// week).
//
/// Keeps track of short channel IDs for channels we have explicitly removed due to permanent
/// failure so that we don't resync them from gossip. Each SCID is mapped to the time (in seconds)
/// it was removed so that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
removed_channels: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Option<u64>>>,
/// Keeps track of `NodeId`s we have explicitly removed due to permanent failure so that we don't
/// resync them from gossip. Each `NodeId` is mapped to the time (in seconds) it was removed so
/// that once some time passes, we can potentially resync it from gossip again.
removed_nodes: Mutex<HashMap<NodeId, Option<u64>>>,
/// Announcement messages which are awaiting an on-chain lookup to be processed.
pub(super) pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks,
}
/// A read-only view of [`NetworkGraph`].
pub struct ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'a> {
channels: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo>>,
nodes: RwLockReadGuard<'a, IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>>,
max_node_counter: u32,
}
/// Update to the [`NetworkGraph`] based on payment failure information conveyed via the Onion
/// return packet by a node along the route. See [BOLT #4] for details.
///
/// [BOLT #4]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum NetworkUpdate {
/// An error indicating that a channel failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
/// [`NetworkGraph::channel_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
ChannelFailure {
/// The short channel id of the closed channel.
short_channel_id: u64,
/// Whether the channel should be permanently removed or temporarily disabled until a new
/// `channel_update` message is received.
is_permanent: bool,
},
/// An error indicating that a node failed to route a payment, which should be applied via
/// [`NetworkGraph::node_failed_permanent`] if permanent.
NodeFailure {
/// The node id of the failed node.
node_id: PublicKey,
/// Whether the node should be permanently removed from consideration or can be restored
/// when a new `channel_update` message is received.
is_permanent: bool,
},
}
impl Writeable for NetworkUpdate {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
match self {
Self::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
(2, is_permanent, required),
});
},
Self::NodeFailure { node_id, is_permanent } => {
4u8.write(writer)?;
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, node_id, required),
(2, is_permanent, required),
});
},
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl MaybeReadable for NetworkUpdate {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
match id {
0 => {
// 0 was previously used for network updates containing a channel update, subsequently
// removed in LDK version 0.0.124.
let mut msg: RequiredWrapper<ChannelUpdate> = RequiredWrapper(None);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, msg, required),
});
Ok(Some(Self::ChannelFailure {
short_channel_id: msg.0.unwrap().contents.short_channel_id,
is_permanent: false,
}))
},
2 => {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
(2, is_permanent, required),
});
Ok(Some(Self::ChannelFailure {
short_channel_id: short_channel_id.0.unwrap(),
is_permanent: is_permanent.0.unwrap(),
}))
},
4 => {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, node_id, required),
(2, is_permanent, required),
});
Ok(Some(Self::NodeFailure {
node_id: node_id.0.unwrap(),
is_permanent: is_permanent.0.unwrap(),
}))
},
t if t % 2 == 0 => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
_ => Ok(None),
}
}
}
/// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
/// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
/// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
/// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
/// serving historical announcements.
pub struct P2PGossipSync<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
L::Target: Logger,
{
network_graph: G,
utxo_lookup: RwLock<Option<U>>,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
logger: L,
}
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
/// assuming an existing [`NetworkGraph`].
/// UTXO lookup is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain, channel data is
/// correct, and the announcement is signed with channel owners' keys.
pub fn new(network_graph: G, utxo_lookup: Option<U>, logger: L) -> Self {
P2PGossipSync {
network_graph,
full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
utxo_lookup: RwLock::new(utxo_lookup),
pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
logger,
}
}
/// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
/// existing announcements unless they are updated.
/// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
pub fn add_utxo_lookup(&self, utxo_lookup: Option<U>) {
*self.utxo_lookup.write().unwrap() = utxo_lookup;
}
/// Gets a reference to the underlying [`NetworkGraph`] which was provided in
/// [`P2PGossipSync::new`].
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as bindings don't support a reference-to-a-reference yet
pub fn network_graph(&self) -> &G {
&self.network_graph
}
/// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
fn should_request_full_sync(&self) -> bool {
const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
true
} else {
false
}
}
/// Used to broadcast forward gossip messages which were validated async.
///
/// Note that this will ignore events other than `Broadcast*` or messages with too much excess
/// data.
pub(super) fn forward_gossip_msg(&self, mut ev: MessageSendEvent) {
match &mut ev {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { msg, ref mut update_msg } => {
if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY {
return;
}
if update_msg.as_ref().map(|msg| msg.contents.excess_data.len()).unwrap_or(0)
> MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
{
*update_msg = None;
}
},
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg } => {
if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY {
return;
}
},
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { msg } => {
if msg.contents.excess_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
|| msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() > MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
|| msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len()
> MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
{
return;
}
},
_ => return,
}
self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(ev);
}
}
impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Handles any network updates originating from [`Event`]s.
///
/// [`Event`]: crate::events::Event
pub fn handle_network_update(&self, network_update: &NetworkUpdate) {
match *network_update {
NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
if is_permanent {
log_debug!(
self.logger,
"Removing channel graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.",
short_channel_id
);
self.channel_failed_permanent(short_channel_id);
}
},
NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
if is_permanent {
log_debug!(
self.logger,
"Removed node graph entry for {} due to a payment failure.",
log_pubkey!(node_id)
);
self.node_failed_permanent(node_id);
};
},
}
}
/// Gets the chain hash for this network graph.
pub fn get_chain_hash(&self) -> ChainHash {
self.chain_hash
}
}
macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
match $secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_) => {
return Err(LightningError {
err: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
data: format!("Invalid signature on {} message", $msg_type),
},
log_level: Level::Trace,
},
});
},
}
};
}
macro_rules! get_pubkey_from_node_id {
( $node_id: expr, $msg_type: expr ) => {
PublicKey::from_slice($node_id.as_slice()).map_err(|_| LightningError {
err: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
action: ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(),
data: format!("Invalid public key on {} message", $msg_type),
},
log_level: Level::Trace,
},
})?
};
}
fn message_sha256d_hash<M: Writeable>(msg: &M) -> Sha256dHash {
let mut engine = Sha256dHash::engine();
msg.write(&mut engine).expect("In-memory structs should not fail to serialize");
Sha256dHash::from_engine(engine)
}
/// Verifies the signature of a [`NodeAnnouncement`].
///
/// Returns an error if it is invalid.
pub fn verify_node_announcement<C: Verification>(
msg: &NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
secp_verify_sig!(
secp_ctx,
&msg_hash,
&msg.signature,
&get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id, "node_announcement"),
"node_announcement"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Verifies all signatures included in a [`ChannelAnnouncement`].
///
/// Returns an error if one of the signatures is invalid.
pub fn verify_channel_announcement<C: Verification>(
msg: &ChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<C>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg.contents)[..]);
let node_a = get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_1, "channel_announcement");
secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &node_a, "channel_announcement");
let node_b = get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.node_id_2, "channel_announcement");
secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &node_b, "channel_announcement");
let btc_a = get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1, "channel_announcement");
secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &btc_a, "channel_announcement");
let btc_b = get_pubkey_from_node_id!(msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2, "channel_announcement");
secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &btc_b, "channel_announcement");
Ok(())
}
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> RoutingMessageHandler
for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn handle_node_announcement(
&self, _their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement,
) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
self.network_graph.update_node_from_announcement(msg)?;
Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
&& msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
&& msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len()
<= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
fn handle_channel_announcement(
&self, _their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement,
) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
self.network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &*self.utxo_lookup.read().unwrap())?;
Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
fn handle_channel_update(
&self, _their_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate,
) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
self.network_graph.update_channel(msg)?;
Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
}
fn get_next_channel_announcement(
&self, starting_point: u64,
) -> Option<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
for (_, ref chan) in channels.range(starting_point..) {
if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
one_to_two_announcement.clone_from(&one_to_two.last_update_message);
}
if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
two_to_one_announcement.clone_from(&two_to_one.last_update_message);
}
return Some((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
} else {
// TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
// initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
}
}
None
}
fn get_next_node_announcement(
&self, starting_point: Option<&NodeId>,
) -> Option<NodeAnnouncement> {
let mut nodes = self.network_graph.nodes.write().unwrap();
let iter = if let Some(node_id) = starting_point {
nodes.range((Bound::Excluded(node_id), Bound::Unbounded))
} else {
nodes.range(..)
};
for (_, ref node) in iter {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
if let NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(announcement) = node_info {
return Some(announcement.clone());
}
}
}
None
}
fn handle_reply_channel_range(
&self, _their_node_id: PublicKey, _msg: ReplyChannelRange,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
// We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
// reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
// this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
Ok(())
}
fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(
&self, _their_node_id: PublicKey, _msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
// We don't make queries, so should never receive replies. If, in the future, the set
// reconciliation extensions to gossip queries become broadly supported, we should revert
// this code to its state pre-0.0.106.
Ok(())
}
/// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
/// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
/// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
/// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
/// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
/// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
/// memory constrained systems.
fn handle_query_channel_range(
&self, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
log_debug!(
self.logger,
"Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}",
log_pubkey!(their_node_id),
msg.first_blocknum,
msg.number_of_blocks
);
let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
// We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
// If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
let exclusive_end_scid =
scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
// Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
if msg.chain_hash != self.network_graph.chain_hash
|| inclusive_start_scid.is_err()
|| exclusive_end_scid.is_err()
|| msg.number_of_blocks == 0
{
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
msg: ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
},
});
return Err(LightningError {
err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
});
}
// Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
// (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
// exists even if its not yet routable.
let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
let mut channels = self.network_graph.channels.write().unwrap();
for (_, ref chan) in
channels.range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap())
{
if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
// Construct a new batch if last one is full
if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
}
let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
}
}
drop(channels);
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let batch_count = batches.len();
let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
// Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
// and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
//
// Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
// reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
// reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
// significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
// with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
// and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
// Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
// fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
// contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
//
// Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
// >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
// between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
//
// Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
// first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count - 1 {
(true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
}
// Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
// safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
else {
(false, block_from_scid(*batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
};
prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
msg: ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum,
number_of_blocks,
sync_complete,
short_channel_ids: batch,
},
});
}
Ok(())
}
fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(
&self, _their_node_id: PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
// TODO
Err(LightningError {
err: String::from("Not implemented"),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
})
}
fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool {
self.network_graph.pending_checks.too_many_checks_pending()
}
}
impl<G: Deref<Target = NetworkGraph<L>>, U: Deref, L: Deref> BaseMessageHandler
for P2PGossipSync<G, U, L>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
/// using [`gossip_queries`]. The default strategy used by this implementation
/// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
///
/// We should expect one or more [`reply_channel_range`] messages in response
/// to our [`query_channel_range`]. Each reply will enqueue a [`query_scid`] message
/// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
/// when the final [`reply_scids_end`] message is received, though we are not
/// tracking this directly.
///
/// [`gossip_queries`]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#query-messages
/// [`reply_channel_range`]: msgs::ReplyChannelRange
/// [`query_channel_range`]: msgs::QueryChannelRange
/// [`query_scid`]: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds
/// [`reply_scids_end`]: msgs::ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd
fn peer_connected(
&self, their_node_id: PublicKey, init_msg: &Init, _inbound: bool,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
// We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
// Don't disconnect peers for not supporting gossip queries. We may wish to have
// channels with peers even without being able to exchange gossip.
return Ok(());
}
// The lightning network's gossip sync system is completely broken in numerous ways.
//
// Given no broadly-available set-reconciliation protocol, the only reasonable approach is
// to do a full sync from the first few peers we connect to, and then receive gossip
// updates from all our peers normally.
//
// Originally, we could simply tell a peer to dump us the entire gossip table on startup,
// wasting lots of bandwidth but ensuring we have the full network graph. After the initial
// dump peers would always send gossip and we'd stay up-to-date with whatever our peer has
// seen.
//
// In order to reduce the bandwidth waste, "gossip queries" were introduced, allowing you
// to ask for the SCIDs of all channels in your peer's routing graph, and then only request
// channel data which you are missing. Except there was no way at all to identify which
// `channel_update`s you were missing, so you still had to request everything, just in a
// very complicated way with some queries instead of just getting the dump.
//
// Later, an option was added to fetch the latest timestamps of the `channel_update`s to
// make efficient sync possible, however it has yet to be implemented in lnd, which makes
// relying on it useless.
//
// After gossip queries were introduced, support for receiving a full gossip table dump on
// connection was removed from several nodes, making it impossible to get a full sync
// without using the "gossip queries" messages.
//
// Once you opt into "gossip queries" the only way to receive any gossip updates that a
// peer receives after you connect, you must send a `gossip_timestamp_filter` message. This
// message, as the name implies, tells the peer to not forward any gossip messages with a
// timestamp older than a given value (not the time the peer received the filter, but the
// timestamp in the update message, which is often hours behind when the peer received the
// message).
//
// Obnoxiously, `gossip_timestamp_filter` isn't *just* a filter, but its also a request for
// your peer to send you the full routing graph (subject to the filter). Thus, in order to
// tell a peer to send you any updates as it sees them, you have to also ask for the full
// routing graph to be synced. If you set a timestamp filter near the current time, peers
// will simply not forward any new updates they see to you which were generated some time
// ago (which is not uncommon). If you instead set a timestamp filter near 0 (or two weeks
// ago), you will always get the full routing graph from all your peers.
//
// Most lightning nodes today opt to simply turn off receiving gossip data which only
// propagated some time after it was generated, and, worse, often disable gossiping with
// several peers after their first connection. The second behavior can cause gossip to not
// propagate fully if there are cuts in the gossiping subgraph.
//
// In an attempt to cut a middle ground between always fetching the full graph from all of
// our peers and never receiving gossip from peers at all, we send all of our peers a
// `gossip_timestamp_filter`, with the filter time set either two weeks ago or an hour ago.
//
// For non-`std` builds, we bury our head in the sand and do a full sync on each connection.
#[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
let mut gossip_start_time = 0;
#[allow(unused)]
let should_sync = self.should_request_full_sync();
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
gossip_start_time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
if should_sync {
gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2; // 2 weeks ago
} else {
gossip_start_time -= 60 * 60; // an hour ago
}
}
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
msg: GossipTimestampFilter {
chain_hash: self.network_graph.chain_hash,
first_timestamp: gossip_start_time as u32, // 2106 issue!
timestamp_range: u32::max_value(),
},
});
Ok(())
}
fn peer_disconnected(&self, _their_node_id: PublicKey) {}
fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
let mut features = NodeFeatures::empty();
features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
features
}
fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
features
}
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
ret
}
}
// Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
// want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`)
// sit on the same cache line.
//
// We do this by using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we write
// it (ensuring `last_update_message` hangs off the end and no fields are reordered after it), and
// `align(32)`, ensuring the struct starts either at the start, or in the middle, of an x86-64
// 64-byte cache line. This ensures the beginning fields (which are 31 bytes) all sit in the same
// cache line.
#[repr(C, align(32))]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Details about one direction of a channel as received within a [`ChannelUpdate`].
pub struct ChannelUpdateInfo {
/// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
pub htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
/// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
pub fees: RoutingFees,
/// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
pub last_update: u32,
/// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
/// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
pub enabled: bool,
/// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
}
impl fmt::Display for ChannelUpdateInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(
f,
"last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}",
self.last_update,
self.enabled,
self.cltv_expiry_delta,
self.htlc_minimum_msat,
self.fees
)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.last_update, required),
(2, self.enabled, required),
(4, self.cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(6, self.htlc_minimum_msat, required),
// Writing htlc_maximum_msat as an Option<u64> is required to maintain backwards
// compatibility with LDK versions prior to v0.0.110.
(8, Some(self.htlc_maximum_msat), required),
(10, self.fees, required),
(12, self.last_update_message, required),
});
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for ChannelUpdateInfo {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
_init_tlv_field_var!(last_update, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(enabled, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(cltv_expiry_delta, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_minimum_msat, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(htlc_maximum_msat, option);
_init_tlv_field_var!(fees, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(last_update_message, required);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, last_update, required),
(2, enabled, required),
(4, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
(6, htlc_minimum_msat, required),
(8, htlc_maximum_msat, required),
(10, fees, required),
(12, last_update_message, required)
});
if let Some(htlc_maximum_msat) = htlc_maximum_msat {
Ok(ChannelUpdateInfo {
last_update: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update, required),
enabled: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(enabled, required),
cltv_expiry_delta: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(cltv_expiry_delta, required),
htlc_minimum_msat: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_minimum_msat, required),
htlc_maximum_msat,
fees: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(fees, required),
last_update_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(last_update_message, required),
})
} else {
Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
}
}
}
// Fetching values from this struct is very performance sensitive during routefinding. Thus, we
// want to ensure that all of the fields we care about (all of them except `last_update_message`
// and `announcement_received_time`) sit on the same cache line.
//
// Sadly, this is not possible, however we can still do okay - all of the fields before
// `one_to_two` and `two_to_one` are just under 128 bytes long, so we can ensure they sit on
// adjacent cache lines (which are often fetched together in x86-64 processors).
//
// This leaves only the two directional channel info structs on separate cache lines.
//
// We accomplish this using `repr(C)`, which forces the struct to be laid out in memory the way we
// write it (ensuring the fields we care about are at the start of the struct) and `align(128)`,
// ensuring the struct starts at the beginning of two adjacent 64b x86-64 cache lines.
#[repr(align(128), C)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
/// Details about a channel (both directions).
/// Received within a channel announcement.
pub struct ChannelInfo {
/// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
pub features: ChannelFeatures,
/// Source node of the first direction of a channel
pub node_one: NodeId,
/// Source node of the second direction of a channel
pub node_two: NodeId,
/// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_one`].
pub(crate) node_one_counter: u32,
/// The [`NodeInfo::node_counter`] of the node pointed to by [`Self::node_two`].
pub(crate) node_two_counter: u32,
/// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
/// Details about the first direction of a channel
pub one_to_two: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
/// Details about the second direction of a channel
pub two_to_one: Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>,
/// An initial announcement of the channel
/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
/// The timestamp when we received the announcement, if we are running with feature = "std"
/// (which we can probably assume we are - non-`std` environments probably won't have a full
/// network graph in memory!).
announcement_received_time: u64,
}
impl PartialEq for ChannelInfo {
fn eq(&self, o: &ChannelInfo) -> bool {
self.features == o.features
&& self.node_one == o.node_one
&& self.one_to_two == o.one_to_two
&& self.node_two == o.node_two
&& self.two_to_one == o.two_to_one
&& self.capacity_sats == o.capacity_sats
&& self.announcement_message == o.announcement_message
&& self.announcement_received_time == o.announcement_received_time
}
}
impl ChannelInfo {
/// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed to the given `target` from a
/// returned `source`, or `None` if `target` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
pub fn as_directed_to(&self, target: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo<'_>, &NodeId)> {
if self.one_to_two.is_none() || self.two_to_one.is_none() {
return None;
}
let (direction, source, outbound) = {
if target == &self.node_one {
(self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_two, false)
} else if target == &self.node_two {
(self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_one, true)
} else {
return None;
}
};
let dir = direction.expect("We checked that both directions are available at the start");
Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), source))
}
/// Returns a [`DirectedChannelInfo`] for the channel directed from the given `source` to a
/// returned `target`, or `None` if `source` is not one of the channel's counterparties.
pub fn as_directed_from(&self, source: &NodeId) -> Option<(DirectedChannelInfo<'_>, &NodeId)> {
if self.one_to_two.is_none() || self.two_to_one.is_none() {
return None;
}
let (direction, target, outbound) = {
if source == &self.node_one {
(self.one_to_two.as_ref(), &self.node_two, true)
} else if source == &self.node_two {
(self.two_to_one.as_ref(), &self.node_one, false)
} else {
return None;
}
};
let dir = direction.expect("We checked that both directions are available at the start");
Some((DirectedChannelInfo::new(self, dir, outbound), target))
}
/// Returns a [`ChannelUpdateInfo`] based on the direction implied by the channel_flag.
pub fn get_directional_info(&self, channel_flags: u8) -> Option<&ChannelUpdateInfo> {
let direction = channel_flags & 1u8;
if direction == 0 {
self.one_to_two.as_ref()
} else {
self.two_to_one.as_ref()
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(
f,
"features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
log_bytes!(self.features.encode()),
&self.node_one,
self.one_to_two,
&self.node_two,
self.two_to_one
)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Writeable for ChannelInfo {
fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.features, required),
(1, self.announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
(2, self.node_one, required),
(4, self.one_to_two, required),
(6, self.node_two, required),
(8, self.two_to_one, required),
(10, self.capacity_sats, required),
(12, self.announcement_message, required),
});
Ok(())
}
}
// A wrapper allowing for the optional deseralization of ChannelUpdateInfo. Utilizing this is
// necessary to maintain backwards compatibility with previous serializations of `ChannelUpdateInfo`
// that may have no `htlc_maximum_msat` field set. In case the field is absent, we simply ignore
// the error and continue reading the `ChannelInfo`. Hopefully, we'll then eventually receive newer
// channel updates via the gossip network.
struct ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper(Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>);
impl MaybeReadable for ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
Ok(channel_update_option) => Ok(Some(Self(channel_update_option))),
Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => Ok(None),
Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) => Ok(None),
Err(err) => Err(err),
}
}
}
impl Readable for ChannelInfo {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
_init_tlv_field_var!(features, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0));
_init_tlv_field_var!(node_one, required);
let mut one_to_two_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
_init_tlv_field_var!(node_two, required);
let mut two_to_one_wrap: Option<ChannelUpdateInfoDeserWrapper> = None;
_init_tlv_field_var!(capacity_sats, required);
_init_tlv_field_var!(announcement_message, required);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, features, required),
(1, announcement_received_time, (default_value, 0)),
(2, node_one, required),
(4, one_to_two_wrap, upgradable_option),
(6, node_two, required),
(8, two_to_one_wrap, upgradable_option),
(10, capacity_sats, required),
(12, announcement_message, required),
});
Ok(ChannelInfo {
features: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(features, required),
node_one: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_one, required),
one_to_two: one_to_two_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
node_two: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(node_two, required),
two_to_one: two_to_one_wrap.map(|w| w.0).unwrap_or(None),
capacity_sats: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(capacity_sats, required),
announcement_message: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(announcement_message, required),
announcement_received_time: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(
announcement_received_time,
(default_value, 0)
),
node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
})
}
}
/// A wrapper around [`ChannelInfo`] representing information about the channel as directed from a
/// source node to a target node.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
channel: &'a ChannelInfo,
direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo,
source_counter: u32,
target_counter: u32,
/// The direction this channel is in - if set, it indicates that we're traversing the channel
/// from [`ChannelInfo::node_one`] to [`ChannelInfo::node_two`].
from_node_one: bool,
}
impl<'a> DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
#[inline]
fn new(
channel: &'a ChannelInfo, direction: &'a ChannelUpdateInfo, from_node_one: bool,
) -> Self {
let (source_counter, target_counter) = if from_node_one {
(channel.node_one_counter, channel.node_two_counter)
} else {
(channel.node_two_counter, channel.node_one_counter)
};
Self { channel, direction, from_node_one, source_counter, target_counter }
}
/// Returns information for the channel.
#[inline]
pub fn channel(&self) -> &'a ChannelInfo {
self.channel
}
/// Returns the [`EffectiveCapacity`] of the channel in the direction.
///
/// This is either the total capacity from the funding transaction, if known, or the
/// `htlc_maximum_msat` for the direction as advertised by the gossip network, if known,
/// otherwise.
#[inline]
pub fn effective_capacity(&self) -> EffectiveCapacity {
let mut htlc_maximum_msat = self.direction().htlc_maximum_msat;
let capacity_msat = self.channel.capacity_sats.map(|capacity_sats| capacity_sats * 1000);
match capacity_msat {
Some(capacity_msat) => {
htlc_maximum_msat = cmp::min(htlc_maximum_msat, capacity_msat);
EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, htlc_maximum_msat }
},
None => EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat: htlc_maximum_msat },
}
}
/// Returns information for the direction.
#[inline]
pub(super) fn direction(&self) -> &'a ChannelUpdateInfo {
self.direction
}
/// Returns the `node_id` of the source hop.
///
/// Refers to the `node_id` forwarding the payment to the next hop.
#[inline]
pub fn source(&self) -> &'a NodeId {
if self.from_node_one {
&self.channel.node_one
} else {
&self.channel.node_two
}
}
/// Returns the `node_id` of the target hop.
///
/// Refers to the `node_id` receiving the payment from the previous hop.
#[inline]
pub fn target(&self) -> &'a NodeId {
if self.from_node_one {
&self.channel.node_two
} else {
&self.channel.node_one
}
}
/// Returns the source node's counter
#[inline(always)]
pub(super) fn source_counter(&self) -> u32 {
self.source_counter
}
/// Returns the target node's counter
#[inline(always)]
pub(super) fn target_counter(&self) -> u32 {
self.target_counter
}
}
impl<'a> fmt::Debug for DirectedChannelInfo<'a> {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
f.debug_struct("DirectedChannelInfo").field("channel", &self.channel).finish()
}
}
/// The effective capacity of a channel for routing purposes.
///
/// While this may be smaller than the actual channel capacity, amounts greater than
/// [`Self::as_msat`] should not be routed through the channel.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum EffectiveCapacity {
/// The available liquidity in the channel known from being a channel counterparty, and thus a
/// direct hop.
ExactLiquidity {
/// Either the inbound or outbound liquidity depending on the direction, denominated in
/// millisatoshi.
liquidity_msat: u64,
},
/// The maximum HTLC amount in one direction as advertised on the gossip network.
AdvertisedMaxHTLC {
/// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
amount_msat: u64,
},
/// The total capacity of the channel as determined by the funding transaction.
Total {
/// The funding amount denominated in millisatoshi.
capacity_msat: u64,
/// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
htlc_maximum_msat: u64,
},
/// A capacity sufficient to route any payment, typically used for private channels provided by
/// an invoice.
Infinite,
/// The maximum HTLC amount as provided by an invoice route hint.
HintMaxHTLC {
/// The maximum HTLC amount denominated in millisatoshi.
amount_msat: u64,
},
/// A capacity that is unknown possibly because either the chain state is unavailable to know
/// the total capacity or the `htlc_maximum_msat` was not advertised on the gossip network.
Unknown,
}
/// The presumed channel capacity denominated in millisatoshi for [`EffectiveCapacity::Unknown`] to
/// use when making routing decisions.
pub const UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT: u64 = 250_000 * 1000;
impl EffectiveCapacity {
/// Returns the effective capacity denominated in millisatoshi.
pub fn as_msat(&self) -> u64 {
match self {
EffectiveCapacity::ExactLiquidity { liquidity_msat } => *liquidity_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::AdvertisedMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Total { capacity_msat, .. } => *capacity_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::HintMaxHTLC { amount_msat } => *amount_msat,
EffectiveCapacity::Infinite => u64::max_value(),
EffectiveCapacity::Unknown => UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_MSAT,
}
}
}
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {
(0, base_msat, required),
(2, proportional_millionths, required)
});
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Non-relayable information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
pub struct NodeAnnouncementDetails {
/// Protocol features the node announced support for
pub features: NodeFeatures,
/// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
pub last_update: u32,
/// Color assigned to the node
pub rgb: [u8; 3],
/// Moniker assigned to the node.
/// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
/// should not be exposed to the user.
pub alias: NodeAlias,
/// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
pub addresses: Vec<SocketAddress>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
pub enum NodeAnnouncementInfo {
/// An initial announcement of the node
/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
Relayed(NodeAnnouncement),
/// Non-relayable information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
Local(NodeAnnouncementDetails),
}
impl NodeAnnouncementInfo {
/// Protocol features the node announced support for
pub fn features(&self) -> &NodeFeatures {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(relayed) => &relayed.contents.features,
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(local) => &local.features,
}
}
/// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
///
/// Value may or may not be a timestamp, depending on the policy of the origin node.
pub fn last_update(&self) -> u32 {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(relayed) => relayed.contents.timestamp,
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(local) => local.last_update,
}
}
/// Color assigned to the node
pub fn rgb(&self) -> [u8; 3] {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(relayed) => relayed.contents.rgb,
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(local) => local.rgb,
}
}
/// Moniker assigned to the node.
///
/// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars), should not be exposed to the user.
pub fn alias(&self) -> &NodeAlias {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(relayed) => &relayed.contents.alias,
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(local) => &local.alias,
}
}
/// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
pub fn addresses(&self) -> &[SocketAddress] {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(relayed) => &relayed.contents.addresses,
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(local) => &local.addresses,
}
}
/// An initial announcement of the node
///
/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
pub fn announcement_message(&self) -> Option<&NodeAnnouncement> {
match self {
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(announcement) => Some(announcement),
NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(_) => None,
}
}
}
impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
let features = self.features();
let last_update = self.last_update();
let rgb = self.rgb();
let alias = self.alias();
let addresses = self.addresses();
let announcement_message = self.announcement_message();
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, features, required),
(2, last_update, required),
(4, rgb, required),
(6, alias, required),
(8, announcement_message, option),
(10, *addresses, required_vec), // Versions 0.0.115 through 0.0.123 only serialized an empty vec
});
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, features, required),
(2, last_update, required),
(4, rgb, required),
(6, alias, required),
(8, announcement_message, option),
(10, addresses, required_vec),
});
if let Some(announcement) = announcement_message {
Ok(Self::Relayed(announcement))
} else {
Ok(Self::Local(NodeAnnouncementDetails {
features: features.0.unwrap(),
last_update: last_update.0.unwrap(),
rgb: rgb.0.unwrap(),
alias: alias.0.unwrap(),
addresses,
}))
}
}
}
/// A user-defined name for a node, which may be used when displaying the node in a graph.
///
/// Since node aliases are provided by third parties, they are a potential avenue for injection
/// attacks. Care must be taken when processing.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct NodeAlias(pub [u8; 32]);
impl fmt::Display for NodeAlias {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
let first_null = self.0.iter().position(|b| *b == 0).unwrap_or(self.0.len());
let bytes = self.0.split_at(first_null).0;
match core::str::from_utf8(bytes) {
Ok(alias) => PrintableString(alias).fmt(f)?,
Err(_) => {
use core::fmt::Write;
for c in bytes.iter().map(|b| *b as char) {
// Display printable ASCII characters
let control_symbol = core::char::REPLACEMENT_CHARACTER;
let c = if c >= '\x20' && c <= '\x7e' { c } else { control_symbol };
f.write_char(c)?;
}
},
};
Ok(())
}
}
impl Writeable for NodeAlias {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
self.0.write(w)
}
}
impl Readable for NodeAlias {
fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
Ok(NodeAlias(Readable::read(r)?))
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq)]
/// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
pub struct NodeInfo {
/// All valid channels a node has announced
pub channels: Vec<u64>,
/// More information about a node from node_announcement.
/// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
/// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>,
/// In memory, each node is assigned a unique ID. They are eagerly reused, ensuring they remain
/// relatively dense.
///
/// These IDs allow the router to avoid a `HashMap` lookup by simply using this value as an
/// index in a `Vec`, skipping a big step in some of the hottest code when routing.
pub(crate) node_counter: u32,
}
impl PartialEq for NodeInfo {
fn eq(&self, o: &NodeInfo) -> bool {
self.channels == o.channels && self.announcement_info == o.announcement_info
}
}
impl NodeInfo {
/// Returns whether the node has only announced Tor addresses.
pub fn is_tor_only(&self) -> bool {
self.announcement_info
.as_ref()
.map(|info| info.addresses())
.and_then(|addresses| (!addresses.is_empty()).then(|| addresses))
.map(|addresses| addresses.iter().all(|address| address.is_tor()))
.unwrap_or(false)
}
}
impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(
f,
" channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
&self.channels[..],
self.announcement_info
)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
fn write<W: crate::util::ser::Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
// Note that older versions of LDK wrote the lowest inbound fees here at type 0
(2, self.announcement_info, option),
(4, self.channels, required_vec),
});
Ok(())
}
}
// A wrapper allowing for the optional deserialization of `NodeAnnouncementInfo`. Utilizing this is
// necessary to maintain compatibility with previous serializations of `SocketAddress` that have an
// invalid hostname set. We ignore and eat all errors until we are either able to read a
// `NodeAnnouncementInfo` or hit a `ShortRead`, i.e., read the TLV field to the end.
struct NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper(NodeAnnouncementInfo);
impl MaybeReadable for NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
match crate::util::ser::Readable::read(reader) {
Ok(node_announcement_info) => return Ok(Some(Self(node_announcement_info))),
Err(_) => {
copy(reader, &mut sink()).unwrap();
return Ok(None);
},
};
}
}
impl Readable for NodeInfo {
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
// Historically, we tracked the lowest inbound fees for any node in order to use it as an
// A* heuristic when routing. Sadly, these days many, many nodes have at least one channel
// with zero inbound fees, causing that heuristic to provide little gain. Worse, because it
// requires additional complexity and lookups during routing, it ends up being a
// performance loss. Thus, we simply ignore the old field here and no longer track it.
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, _lowest_inbound_channel_fees, option),
(2, announcement_info_wrap, upgradable_option),
(4, channels, required_vec),
});
let _: Option<RoutingFees> = _lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
let announcement_info_wrap: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfoDeserWrapper> =
announcement_info_wrap;
Ok(NodeInfo {
announcement_info: announcement_info_wrap.map(|w| w.0),
channels,
node_counter: u32::max_value(),
})
}
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
impl<L: Deref> Writeable for NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
self.test_node_counter_consistency();
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
(channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in channels.unordered_iter() {
(*chan_id).write(writer)?;
chan_info.write(writer)?;
}
let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
(nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
node_id.write(writer)?;
node_info.write(writer)?;
}
let last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp = self.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp();
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
});
Ok(())
}
}
impl<L: Deref> ReadableArgs<L> for NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: L) -> Result<NetworkGraph<L>, DecodeError> {
let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut channels = IndexedMap::with_capacity(CHAN_COUNT_ESTIMATE);
for _ in 0..channels_count {
let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let chan_info: ChannelInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
}
let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
// There shouldn't be anywhere near `u32::MAX` nodes, and we need some headroom to insert
// new nodes during sync, so reject any graphs claiming more than `u32::MAX / 2` nodes.
if nodes_count > u32::max_value() as u64 / 2 {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
let mut nodes = IndexedMap::with_capacity(NODE_COUNT_ESTIMATE);
for i in 0..nodes_count {
let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut node_info: NodeInfo = Readable::read(reader)?;
node_info.node_counter = i as u32;
nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
}
for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
chan.node_one_counter =
nodes.get(&chan.node_one).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
chan.node_two_counter =
nodes.get(&chan.node_two).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?.node_counter;
}
let mut last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Option<u32> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp, option),
});
Ok(NetworkGraph {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
chain_hash,
logger,
channels: RwLock::new(channels),
nodes: RwLock::new(nodes),
removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(nodes_count as usize),
last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp),
removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
})
}
}
impl<L: Deref> fmt::Display for NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
for (key, val) in self.channels.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
}
writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
for (&node_id, val) in self.nodes.read().unwrap().unordered_iter() {
writeln!(f, " {}: {}", &node_id, val)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl<L: Deref> Eq for NetworkGraph<L> where L::Target: Logger {}
impl<L: Deref> PartialEq for NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
// For a total lockorder, sort by position in memory and take the inner locks in that order.
// (Assumes that we can't move within memory while a lock is held).
let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
let a = if ord { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) } else { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) };
let b = if ord { (&other.channels, &other.nodes) } else { (&self.channels, &self.nodes) };
let (channels_a, channels_b) = (
a.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(),
b.0.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(),
);
let (nodes_a, nodes_b) = (
a.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(),
b.1.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self(),
);
self.chain_hash.eq(&other.chain_hash) && channels_a.eq(&channels_b) && nodes_a.eq(&nodes_b)
}
}
// In Jan, 2025 there were about 49K channels.
// We over-allocate by a bit because 20% more is better than the double we get if we're slightly
// too low
const CHAN_COUNT_ESTIMATE: usize = 60_000;
// In Jan, 2025 there were about 15K nodes
// We over-allocate by a bit because 33% more is better than the double we get if we're slightly
// too low
const NODE_COUNT_ESTIMATE: usize = 20_000;
impl<L: Deref> NetworkGraph<L>
where
L::Target: Logger,
{
/// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
pub fn new(network: Network, logger: L) -> NetworkGraph<L> {
Self {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network),
logger,
channels: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::with_capacity(CHAN_COUNT_ESTIMATE)),
nodes: RwLock::new(IndexedMap::with_capacity(NODE_COUNT_ESTIMATE)),
next_node_counter: AtomicUsize::new(0),
removed_node_counters: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: Mutex::new(None),
removed_channels: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
removed_nodes: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
pending_checks: utxo::PendingChecks::new(),
}
}
fn test_node_counter_consistency(&self) {
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
let removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
let next_counter = self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire);
assert!(next_counter < (u32::max_value() as usize) / 2);
let mut used_node_counters = vec![0u8; next_counter / 8 + 1];
for counter in removed_node_counters.iter() {
let pos = (*counter as usize) / 8;
let bit = 1 << (counter % 8);
assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
}
for (_, node) in nodes.unordered_iter() {
assert!((node.node_counter as usize) < next_counter);
let pos = (node.node_counter as usize) / 8;
let bit = 1 << (node.node_counter % 8);
assert_eq!(used_node_counters[pos] & bit, 0);
used_node_counters[pos] |= bit;
}
for (idx, used_bitset) in used_node_counters.iter().enumerate() {
if idx != next_counter / 8 {
assert_eq!(*used_bitset, 0xff);
} else {
assert_eq!(*used_bitset, (1u8 << (next_counter % 8)) - 1);
}
}
for (_, chan) in channels.unordered_iter() {
assert_eq!(chan.node_one_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_one).unwrap().node_counter);
assert_eq!(chan.node_two_counter, nodes.get(&chan.node_two).unwrap().node_counter);
}
}
}
/// Returns a read-only view of the network graph.
pub fn read_only(&'_ self) -> ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
self.test_node_counter_consistency();
let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
let nodes = self.nodes.read().unwrap();
ReadOnlyNetworkGraph {
channels,
nodes,
max_node_counter: (self.next_node_counter.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32)
.saturating_sub(1),
}
}
/// The unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
/// It will be set by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
pub fn get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self) -> Option<u32> {
self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp.lock().unwrap().clone()
}
/// Update the unix timestamp provided by the most recent rapid gossip sync.
/// This should be done automatically by the rapid sync process after every sync completion.
pub fn set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(&self, last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp: u32) {
self.last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp
.lock()
.unwrap()
.replace(last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp);
}
/// Clears the `NodeAnnouncementInfo` field for all nodes in the `NetworkGraph` for testing
/// purposes.
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn clear_nodes_announcement_info(&self) {
for node in self.nodes.write().unwrap().unordered_iter_mut() {
node.1.announcement_info = None;
}
}
/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
/// given node announcement.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a P2PGossipSync's
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
pub fn update_node_from_announcement(
&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
// First check if we have the announcement already to avoid the CPU cost of validating a
// redundant announcement.
if let Some(node) = self.nodes.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.node_id) {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
if node_info.last_update() == msg.contents.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
}
}
verify_node_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
}
/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
/// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
/// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
/// peers.
pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
}
fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
match nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
None => {
core::mem::drop(nodes);
self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_node_announcement(msg, full_msg)?;
Err(LightningError {
err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
})
},
Some(node) => {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
// The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to order
// updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only vaguely suggesting
// that it be at least the current time.
if node_info.last_update() > msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
} else if node_info.last_update() == msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Update had the same timestamp as last processed update"
.to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
}
let should_relay = msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
&& msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
&& msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len()
<= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
node.announcement_info =
if let (Some(signed_announcement), true) = (full_msg, should_relay) {
Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(signed_announcement.clone()))
} else {
Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo::Local(NodeAnnouncementDetails {
features: msg.features.clone(),
last_update: msg.timestamp,
rgb: msg.rgb,
alias: msg.alias,
addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
}))
};
Ok(())
},
}
}
/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
/// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
///
/// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<U: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
{
self.pre_channel_announcement_validation_check(&msg.contents, utxo_lookup)?;
verify_channel_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), utxo_lookup)
}
/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
/// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
///
/// This will skip verification of if the channel is actually on-chain.
pub fn update_channel_from_announcement_no_lookup(
&self, msg: &ChannelAnnouncement,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_from_announcement::<&UtxoResolver>(msg, &None)
}
/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
/// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
/// channel announcement to any of our peers.
///
/// If a [`UtxoLookup`] object is provided via `utxo_lookup`, it will be called to verify
/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<U: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
{
self.pre_channel_announcement_validation_check(&msg, utxo_lookup)?;
self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, utxo_lookup)
}
/// Update channel from partial announcement data received via rapid gossip sync
///
/// `timestamp: u64`: Timestamp emulating the backdated original announcement receipt (by the
/// rapid gossip sync server)
///
/// All other parameters as used in [`msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement`] fields.
pub fn add_channel_from_partial_announcement(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, capacity_sats: Option<u64>, timestamp: u64,
features: ChannelFeatures, node_id_1: NodeId, node_id_2: NodeId,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
if node_id_1 == node_id_2 {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
});
};
let channel_info = ChannelInfo {
features,
node_one: node_id_1,
one_to_two: None,
node_two: node_id_2,
two_to_one: None,
capacity_sats,
announcement_message: None,
announcement_received_time: timestamp,
node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
};
self.add_channel_between_nodes(short_channel_id, channel_info, None)
}
fn add_channel_between_nodes(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, channel_info: ChannelInfo, utxo_value: Option<Amount>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
let node_id_a = channel_info.node_one.clone();
let node_id_b = channel_info.node_two.clone();
log_gossip!(
self.logger,
"Adding channel {} between nodes {} and {}",
short_channel_id,
node_id_a,
node_id_b
);
let channel_info = match channels.entry(short_channel_id) {
IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
//exactly how...
if utxo_value.is_some() {
// Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
// only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
// that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
// do that because
// a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
// get reorg'd out.
// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &entry.get(), short_channel_id);
*entry.get_mut() = channel_info;
entry.into_mut()
} else {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
},
IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(entry) => entry.insert(channel_info),
};
let mut node_counter_id = [
(&mut channel_info.node_one_counter, node_id_a),
(&mut channel_info.node_two_counter, node_id_b),
];
for (chan_info_node_counter, current_node_id) in node_counter_id.iter_mut() {
match nodes.entry(current_node_id.clone()) {
IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
let node = node_entry.into_mut();
node.channels.push(short_channel_id);
**chan_info_node_counter = node.node_counter;
},
IndexedMapEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
**chan_info_node_counter = removed_node_counters.pop().unwrap_or_else(|| {
self.next_node_counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u32
});
node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
channels: vec![short_channel_id],
announcement_info: None,
node_counter: **chan_info_node_counter,
});
},
};
}
core::mem::drop(nodes);
core::mem::drop(channels);
self.test_node_counter_consistency();
Ok(())
}
/// If we already have all the information for a channel that we're gonna get, there's no
/// reason to redundantly process it.
///
/// In those cases, this will return an `Err` that we can return immediately. Otherwise it will
/// return an `Ok(())`.
fn pre_channel_announcement_validation_check<U: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
{
let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
if let Some(chan) = channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
if chan.capacity_sats.is_some() {
// If we'd previously looked up the channel on-chain and checked the script
// against what appears on-chain, ignore the duplicate announcement.
//
// Because a reorg could replace one channel with another at the same SCID, if
// the channel appears to be different, we re-validate. This doesn't expose us
// to any more DoS risk than not, as a peer can always flood us with
// randomly-generated SCID values anyway.
//
// We use the Node IDs rather than the bitcoin_keys to check for "equivalence"
// as we didn't (necessarily) store the bitcoin keys, and we only really care
// if the peers on the channel changed anyway.
if msg.node_id_1 == chan.node_one && msg.node_id_2 == chan.node_two {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Already have chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
} else if utxo_lookup.is_none() {
// Similarly, if we can't check the chain right now anyway, ignore the
// duplicate announcement without bothering to take the channels write lock.
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Already have non-chain-validated channel".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Update channel information from a received announcement.
///
/// Generally [`Self::pre_channel_announcement_validation_check`] should have been called
/// first.
fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<U: Deref>(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement,
full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, utxo_lookup: &Option<U>,
) -> Result<(), LightningError>
where
U::Target: UtxoLookup,
{
if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
});
}
if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
});
}
{
let removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
let removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
if removed_channels.contains_key(&msg.short_channel_id)
|| removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_1)
|| removed_nodes.contains_key(&msg.node_id_2)
{
return Err(LightningError{
err: format!("Channel with SCID {} or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently", &msg.short_channel_id),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip)});
}
}
let utxo_value =
self.pending_checks.check_channel_announcement(utxo_lookup, msg, full_msg)?;
#[allow(unused_mut, unused_assignments)]
let mut announcement_received_time = 0;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
announcement_received_time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
}
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
features: msg.features.clone(),
node_one: msg.node_id_1,
one_to_two: None,
node_two: msg.node_id_2,
two_to_one: None,
capacity_sats: utxo_value.map(|a| a.to_sat()),
announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY {
full_msg.cloned()
} else {
None
},
announcement_received_time,
node_one_counter: u32::max_value(),
node_two_counter: u32::max_value(),
};
self.add_channel_between_nodes(msg.short_channel_id, chan_info, utxo_value)?;
log_gossip!(
self.logger,
"Added channel_announcement for {}{}",
msg.short_channel_id,
if !msg.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" }
);
Ok(())
}
/// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
///
/// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
pub fn channel_failed_permanent(&self, short_channel_id: u64) {
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
let current_time_unix = Some(
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs(),
);
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
let current_time_unix = None;
self.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(short_channel_id, current_time_unix)
}
/// Marks a channel in the graph as failed permanently.
///
/// The channel and any node for which this was their last channel are removed from the graph.
fn channel_failed_permanent_with_time(
&self, short_channel_id: u64, current_time_unix: Option<u64>,
) {
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
if let Some(chan) = channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().insert(short_channel_id, current_time_unix);
self.remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
}
}
/// Marks a node in the graph as permanently failed, effectively removing it and its channels
/// from local storage.
pub fn node_failed_permanent(&self, node_id: &PublicKey) {
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
let current_time_unix = Some(
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs(),
);
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
let current_time_unix = None;
let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(node_id);
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
let mut removed_channels = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
let mut removed_nodes = self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(node) = nodes.remove(&node_id) {
let mut removed_node_counters = self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap();
for scid in node.channels.iter() {
if let Some(chan_info) = channels.remove(scid) {
let other_node_id = if node_id == chan_info.node_one {
chan_info.node_two
} else {
chan_info.node_one
};
if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut other_node_entry) =
nodes.entry(other_node_id)
{
other_node_entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| *scid != *chan_id);
if other_node_entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
removed_node_counters.push(other_node_entry.get().node_counter);
other_node_entry.remove_entry();
}
}
removed_channels.insert(*scid, current_time_unix);
} else {
debug_assert!(false, "Channels in nodes must always have channel info");
}
}
removed_node_counters.push(node.node_counter);
removed_nodes.insert(node_id, current_time_unix);
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
/// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
/// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
/// exist.
///
/// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
/// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
/// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
///
/// Note that for users of the `lightning-background-processor` crate this method may be
/// automatically called regularly for you.
///
/// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
/// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
///
/// This method is only available with the `std` feature. See
/// [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`] for non-`std` use.
pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking(&self) {
let time =
SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).expect("Time must be > 1970").as_secs();
self.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(time);
}
/// Removes information about channels that we haven't heard any updates about in some time.
/// This can be used regularly to prune the network graph of channels that likely no longer
/// exist.
///
/// While there is no formal requirement that nodes regularly re-broadcast their channel
/// updates every two weeks, the non-normative section of BOLT 7 currently suggests that
/// pruning occur for updates which are at least two weeks old, which we implement here.
///
/// This method will also cause us to stop tracking removed nodes and channels if they have been
/// in the map for a while so that these can be resynced from gossip in the future.
#[cfg_attr(feature = "std", doc = "")]
#[cfg_attr(
feature = "std",
doc = "This function takes the current unix time as an argument. For users with the `std` feature"
)]
#[cfg_attr(
feature = "std",
doc = "enabled, [`NetworkGraph::remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`] may be preferable."
)]
pub fn remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(&self, current_time_unix: u64) {
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
// Time out if we haven't received an update in at least 14 days.
if current_time_unix > u32::max_value() as u64 {
return;
} // Remove by 2106
if current_time_unix < STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
return;
}
let min_time_unix: u32 = (current_time_unix - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
let mut scids_to_remove = new_hash_set();
for (scid, info) in channels.unordered_iter_mut() {
if info.one_to_two.is_some()
&& info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix
{
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update one_to_two (0) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
scid, info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
info.one_to_two = None;
}
if info.two_to_one.is_some()
&& info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update < min_time_unix
{
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing directional update two_to_one (1) for channel {} due to its timestamp {} being below {}",
scid, info.two_to_one.as_ref().unwrap().last_update, min_time_unix);
info.two_to_one = None;
}
if info.one_to_two.is_none() || info.two_to_one.is_none() {
// We check the announcement_received_time here to ensure we don't drop
// announcements that we just received and are just waiting for our peer to send a
// channel_update for.
let announcement_received_timestamp = info.announcement_received_time;
if announcement_received_timestamp < min_time_unix as u64 {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Removing channel {} because both directional updates are missing and its announcement timestamp {} being below {}",
scid, announcement_received_timestamp, min_time_unix);
scids_to_remove.insert(*scid);
}
}
}
if !scids_to_remove.is_empty() {
let mut nodes = self.nodes.write().unwrap();
let mut removed_channels_lck = self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap();
let channels_removed_bulk = channels.remove_fetch_bulk(&scids_to_remove);
self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().reserve(channels_removed_bulk.len());
let mut nodes_to_remove = hash_set_with_capacity(channels_removed_bulk.len());
for (scid, info) in channels_removed_bulk {
self.remove_channel_in_nodes_callback(&mut nodes, &info, scid, |e| {
nodes_to_remove.insert(*e.key());
});
removed_channels_lck.insert(scid, Some(current_time_unix));
}
nodes.remove_bulk(&nodes_to_remove);
}
let should_keep_tracking = |time: &mut Option<u64>| {
if let Some(time) = time {
current_time_unix.saturating_sub(*time) < REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
} else {
// NOTE: In the case of non-`std`, we won't have access to the current UNIX time at the time of removal,
// so we'll just set the removal time here to the current UNIX time on the very next invocation
// of this function.
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
{
let mut tracked_time = Some(current_time_unix);
core::mem::swap(time, &mut tracked_time);
return true;
}
#[allow(unreachable_code)]
false
}
};
self.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
self.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().retain(|_, time| should_keep_tracking(time));
}
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
/// of the channel.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a [`P2PGossipSync`]'s
/// [`RoutingMessageHandler`] implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
///
/// If not built with `std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
/// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn update_channel(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), false)
}
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
/// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
/// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
///
/// If not built with `std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
/// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn update_channel_unsigned(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_internal(msg, None, None, false)
}
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, verify the given [`ChannelUpdate`].
///
/// This checks whether the update currently is applicable by [`Self::update_channel`].
///
/// If not built with `std`, any updates with a timestamp more than two weeks in the past or
/// materially in the future will be rejected.
pub fn verify_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
self.update_channel_internal(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some(&msg.signature), true)
}
fn update_channel_internal(
&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
sig: Option<&secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature>, only_verify: bool,
) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let chan_enabled = msg.channel_flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
});
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test), not(feature = "_test_utils")))]
{
// Note that many tests rely on being able to set arbitrarily old timestamps, thus we
// disable this check during tests!
let time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
if (msg.timestamp as u64) < time - STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "channel_update is older than two weeks old".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
});
}
if msg.timestamp as u64 > time + 60 * 60 * 24 {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "channel_update has a timestamp more than a day in the future".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
});
}
}
log_gossip!(
self.logger,
"Updating channel {} in direction {} with timestamp {}",
msg.short_channel_id,
msg.channel_flags & 1,
msg.timestamp
);
if msg.htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
});
}
let check_update_latest =
|target: &Option<ChannelUpdateInfo>| -> Result<(), LightningError> {
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = target {
// The timestamp field is somewhat of a misnomer - the BOLTs use it to
// order updates to ensure you always have the latest one, only
// suggesting that it be at least the current time. For
// channel_updates specifically, the BOLTs discuss the possibility of
// pruning based on the timestamp field being more than two weeks old,
// but only in the non-normative section.
if existing_chan_info.last_update > msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
} else if existing_chan_info.last_update == msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Update had same timestamp as last processed update".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreDuplicateGossip,
});
}
}
Ok(())
};
let check_msg_sanity =
|channel: &ChannelInfo| -> Result<(), LightningError> {
if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
// It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
// Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000
|| msg.htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000
{
return Err(LightningError{err:
"htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
}
if msg.channel_flags & 1 == 1 {
check_update_latest(&channel.two_to_one)
} else {
check_update_latest(&channel.one_to_two)
}
};
let mut node_pubkey = None;
{
let channels = self.channels.read().unwrap();
match channels.get(&msg.short_channel_id) {
None => {
core::mem::drop(channels);
self.pending_checks.check_hold_pending_channel_update(msg, full_msg)?;
return Err(LightningError {
err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Gossip),
});
},
Some(channel) => {
check_msg_sanity(channel)?;
let node_id = if msg.channel_flags & 1 == 1 {
channel.node_two.as_slice()
} else {
channel.node_one.as_slice()
};
if sig.is_some() {
// PublicKey parsing isn't entirely trivial as it requires that we check
// that the provided point is on the curve. Thus, if we don't have a
// signature to verify, we want to skip the parsing step entirely.
// This represents a substantial speedup in applying RGS snapshots.
node_pubkey =
Some(PublicKey::from_slice(node_id).map_err(|_| LightningError {
err: "Couldn't parse source node pubkey".to_owned(),
action: ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Debug),
})?);
}
},
}
}
if let Some(sig) = sig {
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&message_sha256d_hash(&msg)[..]);
let node_pubkey = if let Some(pubkey) = node_pubkey {
pubkey
} else {
debug_assert!(false, "node_pubkey should have been decoded above");
let err = "node_pubkey wasn't decoded but we need it to check a sig".to_owned();
let action = ErrorAction::IgnoreAndLog(Level::Error);
return Err(LightningError { err, action });
};
secp_verify_sig!(self.secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &node_pubkey, "channel_update");
}
if only_verify {
return Ok(());
}
let mut channels = self.channels.write().unwrap();
if let Some(channel) = channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
check_msg_sanity(channel)?;
let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY {
full_msg.cloned()
} else {
None
};
let new_channel_info = Some(ChannelUpdateInfo {
enabled: chan_enabled,
last_update: msg.timestamp,
cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
htlc_maximum_msat: msg.htlc_maximum_msat,
fees: RoutingFees {
base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
},
last_update_message,
});
if msg.channel_flags & 1 == 1 {
channel.two_to_one = new_channel_info;
} else {
channel.one_to_two = new_channel_info;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn remove_channel_in_nodes_callback<RM: FnMut(IndexedMapOccupiedEntry<NodeId, NodeInfo>)>(
&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64,
mut remove_node: RM,
) {
macro_rules! remove_from_node {
($node_id: expr) => {
if let IndexedMapEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| short_channel_id != *chan_id);
if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
self.removed_node_counters.lock().unwrap().push(entry.get().node_counter);
remove_node(entry);
}
} else {
panic!(
"Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!"
);
}
};
}
remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
}
fn remove_channel_in_nodes(
&self, nodes: &mut IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64,
) {
self.remove_channel_in_nodes_callback(nodes, chan, short_channel_id, |e| {
e.remove_entry();
});
}
}
impl ReadOnlyNetworkGraph<'_> {
/// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
pub fn channels(&self) -> &IndexedMap<u64, ChannelInfo> {
&*self.channels
}
/// Returns information on a channel with the given id.
pub fn channel(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<&ChannelInfo> {
self.channels.get(&short_channel_id)
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `channels`
/// Returns the list of channels in the graph
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<u64> {
self.channels.unordered_keys().map(|c| *c).collect()
}
/// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users because we don't want to return lifetime'd references
pub fn nodes(&self) -> &IndexedMap<NodeId, NodeInfo> {
&*self.nodes
}
/// Returns information on a node with the given id.
pub fn node(&self, node_id: &NodeId) -> Option<&NodeInfo> {
self.nodes.get(node_id)
}
#[cfg(c_bindings)] // Non-bindings users should use `nodes`
/// Returns the list of nodes in the graph
pub fn list_nodes(&self) -> Vec<NodeId> {
self.nodes.unordered_keys().map(|n| *n).collect()
}
/// Get network addresses by node id.
/// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
/// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
pub fn get_addresses(&self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<Vec<SocketAddress>> {
self.nodes
.get(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&pubkey))
.and_then(|node| node.announcement_info.as_ref().map(|ann| ann.addresses().to_vec()))
}
/// Gets the maximum possible node_counter for a node in this graph
pub(crate) fn max_node_counter(&self) -> u32 {
self.max_node_counter
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests {
use crate::ln::chan_utils::make_funding_redeemscript;
use crate::ln::channelmanager;
use crate::ln::msgs::{BaseMessageHandler, MessageSendEvent, SocketAddress};
use crate::ln::msgs::{
ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, QueryChannelRange,
QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyChannelRange, RoutingMessageHandler,
UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement,
MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
};
use crate::routing::gossip::{
ChannelInfo, ChannelUpdateInfo, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate, NodeAlias,
NodeAnnouncementInfo, NodeId, NodeInfo, P2PGossipSync, RoutingFees,
MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY,
};
use crate::routing::utxo::{UtxoLookupError, UtxoResult};
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use crate::types::features::InitFeatures;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
use crate::util::ser::{Hostname, LengthReadable, Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use super::STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
use crate::routing::gossip::REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS;
use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
use bitcoin::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::network::Network;
use bitcoin::script::ScriptBuf;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::transaction::TxOut;
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::Arc;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
fn create_network_graph() -> NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>> {
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, logger)
}
fn create_gossip_sync(
network_graph: &NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
) -> (
Secp256k1<All>,
P2PGossipSync<
&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>,
Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
>,
) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
(secp_ctx, gossip_sync)
}
#[test]
fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (_, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
assert!(gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
assert!(!gossip_sync.should_request_full_sync());
}
pub(crate) fn get_signed_node_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedNodeAnnouncement)>(
f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
) -> NodeAnnouncement {
let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_key));
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(&UserConfig::default()),
timestamp: 100,
node_id,
rgb: [0; 3],
alias: NodeAlias([0; 32]),
addresses: Vec::new(),
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
NodeAnnouncement {
signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
contents: unsigned_announcement,
}
}
pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_announcement<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelAnnouncement)>(
f: F, node_1_key: &SecretKey, node_2_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
) -> ChannelAnnouncement {
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_key);
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_key);
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&UserConfig::default()),
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
short_channel_id: 0,
node_id_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_1),
node_id_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_id_2),
bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(
&secp_ctx,
node_1_btckey,
)),
bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(
&secp_ctx,
node_2_btckey,
)),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
f(&mut unsigned_announcement);
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_key),
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_key),
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
contents: unsigned_announcement,
}
}
pub(crate) fn get_channel_script(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> ScriptBuf {
let node_1_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_btckey = SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
make_funding_redeemscript(
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_1_btckey),
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &node_2_btckey),
)
.to_p2wsh()
}
pub(crate) fn get_signed_channel_update<F: Fn(&mut UnsignedChannelUpdate)>(
f: F, node_key: &SecretKey, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
) -> ChannelUpdate {
let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet),
short_channel_id: 0,
timestamp: 100,
message_flags: 1, // Only must_be_one
channel_flags: 0,
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
htlc_minimum_msat: 1_000_000,
htlc_maximum_msat: 1_000_000,
fee_base_msat: 10_000,
fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
f(&mut unsigned_channel_update);
let msghash =
hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
ChannelUpdate {
signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msghash, node_key),
contents: unsigned_channel_update,
}
}
#[test]
fn handling_node_announcements() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err),
};
{
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
let valid_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement)
{
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
};
}
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(
Some(node_1_pubkey),
&NodeAnnouncement {
signature: secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
contents: valid_announcement.contents.clone(),
},
) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on node_announcement message"),
};
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
let announcement_with_data = get_signed_node_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
// Return false because contains excess data.
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement_with_data) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
// Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
let outdated_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000 - 10;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &outdated_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update"),
};
}
#[test]
fn handling_channel_announcements() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
let valid_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
let mut gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, None, &logger);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
};
let scid = valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => (),
};
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have non-chain-validated channel"),
};
// Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Err(UtxoLookupError::UnknownTx));
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry"),
};
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: Amount::ZERO, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() }));
let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 2;
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
};
let scid = valid_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid) {
None => panic!(),
Some(_) => (),
};
// If we receive announcement for the same channel, once we've validated it against the
// chain, we simply ignore all new (duplicate) announcements.
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() =
UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut { value: Amount::ZERO, script_pubkey: good_script }));
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have chain-validated channel"),
};
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
let tracking_time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
// Mark a node as permanently failed so it's tracked as removed.
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
gossip_sync.network_graph().node_failed_permanent(&node_1_pubkey);
// Return error and ignore valid channel announcement if one of the nodes has been tracked as removed.
let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 3;
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel with SCID 3 or one of its nodes was removed from our network graph recently")
}
gossip_sync.network_graph().remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
// The above channel announcement should be handled as per normal now.
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement)
{
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
}
}
let valid_excess_data_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 4;
unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
let mut invalid_sig_announcement = valid_excess_data_announcement.clone();
invalid_sig_announcement.contents.excess_data = Vec::new();
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &invalid_sig_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_announcement message"),
};
// Don't relay valid channels with excess data
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_excess_data_announcement)
{
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!(),
};
let channel_to_itself_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &channel_to_itself_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself"),
};
// Test that channel announcements with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet,
// announcement is mainnet).
let incorrect_chain_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &incorrect_chain_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => {
assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement chain hash does not match genesis hash")
},
};
}
#[test]
fn handling_channel_update() {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let amount_sats = Amount::from_sat(1000_000);
let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
let good_script = get_channel_script(&secp_ctx);
*chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = UtxoResult::Sync(Ok(TxOut {
value: amount_sats,
script_pubkey: good_script.clone(),
}));
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
network_graph.verify_channel_update(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
};
{
match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
},
};
}
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
// Return false because contains excess data
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
_ => panic!(),
};
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update"),
};
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1;
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats"),
};
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = amount_sats.to_sat() * 1000 + 1;
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 110;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(
e.err,
"htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus"
),
};
// Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
// so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update had same timestamp as last processed update"),
};
let mut invalid_sig_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(zero_hash.as_byte_array());
invalid_sig_channel_update.signature = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &invalid_sig_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature on channel_update message"),
};
// Test that channel updates with the wrong chain hash are ignored (network graph is testnet, channel
// update is mainet).
let incorrect_chain_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.chain_hash =
ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin);
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &incorrect_chain_update) {
Ok(_) => panic!(),
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel update chain hash does not match genesis hash"),
};
}
#[test]
fn handling_network_update() {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_2_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
let node_2_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_2_pk);
{
// There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
}
let scid;
{
// Check that we can manually apply a channel update.
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
scid = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
assert!(network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source)
.is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).is_some());
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
network_graph.update_channel(&valid_channel_update).unwrap();
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
}
// Non-permanent failure doesn't touch the channel at all
{
match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
},
};
network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
short_channel_id: scid,
is_permanent: false,
});
match network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid) {
None => panic!(),
Some(channel_info) => {
assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
},
};
}
// Permanent closing deletes a channel
network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure {
short_channel_id: scid,
is_permanent: true,
});
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
// Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
{
// Get a new network graph since we don't want to track removed nodes in this test with "std"
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
// Announce a channel to test permanent node failure
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
let short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
assert!(network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source)
.is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
// Non-permanent node failure does not delete any nodes or channels
network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: node_2_pk,
is_permanent: false,
});
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&short_channel_id).is_some());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().get(&node_2_id).is_some());
// Permanent node failure deletes node and its channels
network_graph.handle_network_update(&NetworkUpdate::NodeFailure {
node_id: node_2_pk,
is_permanent: true,
});
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
// Channels are also deleted because the associated node has been deleted
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_channel_timeouts() {
// Test the removal of channels with `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking`.
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &logger);
let gossip_sync = P2PGossipSync::new(&network_graph, Some(&chain_source), &logger);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
let scid = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
let chain_source: Option<&test_utils::TestChainSource> = None;
assert!(network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source)
.is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).is_some());
// Submit two channel updates for each channel direction (update.flags bit).
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
assert!(gossip_sync
.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update)
.is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
let valid_channel_update_2 = get_signed_channel_update(
|update| {
update.channel_flags |= 1;
},
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update_2).unwrap();
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().two_to_one.is_some());
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
100 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
{
// Make sure removed channels are tracked.
assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
}
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
101 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
// In std mode, a further check is performed before fully removing the channel -
// the channel_announcement must have been received at least two weeks ago. We
// fudge that here by indicating the time has jumped two weeks.
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 2);
// Note that the directional channel information will have been removed already..
// We want to check that this will work even if *one* of the channel updates is recent,
// so we should add it with a recent timestamp.
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().one_to_two.is_none());
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
let announcement_time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp =
(announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS) as u32;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
assert!(gossip_sync
.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update)
.is_ok());
assert!(network_graph.read_only().channels().get(&scid).unwrap().one_to_two.is_some());
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
announcement_time + 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
// Make sure removed channels are tracked.
assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
// Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
announcement_time
+ 1 + STALE_CHANNEL_UPDATE_AGE_LIMIT_SECS
+ REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
}
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().channels().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(network_graph.read_only().nodes().len(), 0);
assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
{
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
let tracking_time = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
// Clear tracked nodes and channels for clean slate
network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
// Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
// now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
assert!(network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source)
.is_ok());
// Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
// and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
network_graph.channel_failed_permanent_with_time(scid, Some(tracking_time));
// Should not remove from tracking if insufficient time has passed
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS - 1,
);
assert_eq!(
network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(),
1,
"Removed channel count ≠ 1 with tracking_time {}",
tracking_time
);
// Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
tracking_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
assert!(
network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty(),
"Unexpectedly removed channels with tracking_time {}",
tracking_time
);
assert!(
network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty(),
"Unexpectedly removed nodes with tracking_time {}",
tracking_time
);
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
{
// When we don't have access to the system clock, the time we started tracking removal will only
// be that provided by the first call to `remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time`. Hence,
// only if sufficient time has passed after that first call, will the next call remove it from
// tracking.
let removal_time = 1664619654;
// Clear removed nodes and channels for clean slate
network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().clear();
network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().clear();
// Add a channel and nodes from channel announcement. So our network graph will
// now only consist of two nodes and one channel between them.
assert!(network_graph
.update_channel_from_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement, &chain_source)
.is_ok());
// Mark the channel as permanently failed. This will also remove the two nodes
// and all of the entries will be tracked as removed.
network_graph.channel_failed_permanent(scid);
// The first time we call the following, the channel will have a removal time assigned.
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(removal_time);
assert_eq!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
// Provide a later time so that sufficient time has passed
network_graph.remove_stale_channels_and_tracking_with_time(
removal_time + REMOVED_ENTRIES_TRACKING_AGE_LIMIT_SECS,
);
assert!(network_graph.removed_channels.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(network_graph.removed_nodes.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
}
#[test]
fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
// Channels were not announced yet.
let channels_with_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(0);
assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
let short_channel_id;
{
// Announce a channel we will update
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
short_channel_id = valid_channel_announcement.contents.short_channel_id;
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
// Contains initial channel announcement now.
let channels_with_announcements =
gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
} else {
panic!();
}
{
// Valid channel update
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 101;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
// Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
let channels_with_announcements =
gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
} else {
panic!();
}
{
// Channel update with excess data.
let valid_channel_update = get_signed_channel_update(
|unsigned_channel_update| {
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp = 102;
unsigned_channel_update.excess_data =
[1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_update) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
// Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
let channels_with_announcements =
gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id);
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements {
let (_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
} else {
panic!();
}
// Further starting point have no channels after it
let channels_with_announcements =
gossip_sync.get_next_channel_announcement(short_channel_id + 1000);
assert!(channels_with_announcements.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_1 = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
// No nodes yet.
let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
{
// Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
let valid_channel_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync
.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_channel_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
// Nodes were never announced
let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
{
let valid_announcement =
get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
let valid_announcement =
get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(None);
assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
// Skip the first node.
let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
assert!(next_announcements.is_some());
{
// Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 10;
unsigned_announcement.excess_data =
[1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec();
},
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
}
let next_announcements = gossip_sync.get_next_node_announcement(Some(&node_id_1));
assert!(next_announcements.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn network_graph_serialization() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
let valid_announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
_ => panic!(),
};
let valid_announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
match gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement) {
Ok(_) => (),
Err(_) => panic!(),
};
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().nodes().is_empty());
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().channels().is_empty());
network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
assert!(
<NetworkGraph<_>>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap() == network_graph
);
}
#[test]
fn network_graph_tlv_serialization() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
network_graph.set_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp(42);
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
network_graph.write(&mut w).unwrap();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let reassembled_network_graph: NetworkGraph<_> =
ReadableArgs::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), logger).unwrap();
assert!(reassembled_network_graph == network_graph);
assert_eq!(reassembled_network_graph.get_last_rapid_gossip_sync_timestamp().unwrap(), 42);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
use crate::ln::msgs::Init;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
// It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
{
let init_msg = Init {
features: InitFeatures::empty(),
networks: None,
remote_network_address: None,
};
gossip_sync.peer_connected(node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
}
// It should send a gossip_timestamp_filter with the correct information
{
let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
let init_msg = Init { features, networks: None, remote_network_address: None };
gossip_sync.peer_connected(node_id_1, &init_msg, true).unwrap();
let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match &events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { node_id, msg } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
let expected_timestamp = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("Time must be > 1970")
.as_secs();
assert!(
(msg.first_timestamp as u64) >= expected_timestamp - 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2
);
assert!(
(msg.first_timestamp as u64)
< expected_timestamp - 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2 + 10
);
assert_eq!(msg.timestamp_range, u32::max_value());
},
_ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery"),
};
}
}
#[test]
fn handling_query_channel_range() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
];
// used for testing multipart reply across blocks
for block in 100000..=108001 {
scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
}
// used for testing resumption on same block
scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
for scid in scids {
let valid_announcement = get_signed_channel_announcement(
|unsigned_announcement| {
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id = scid;
},
node_1_privkey,
node_2_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
match gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &valid_announcement)
{
Ok(_) => (),
_ => panic!(),
};
}
// Error when number_of_blocks=0
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0,
number_of_blocks: 0,
},
false,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0,
number_of_blocks: 0,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}],
);
// Error when wrong chain
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
first_blocknum: 0,
number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
},
false,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin),
first_blocknum: 0,
number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}],
);
// Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
},
false,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}],
);
// Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
number_of_blocks: 1,
},
true,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
number_of_blocks: 1,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}],
);
// No results in valid query range
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 1000,
number_of_blocks: 1000,
},
true,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 1000,
number_of_blocks: 1000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}],
);
// Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
},
true,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![
0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
],
}],
);
// Single block exactly full
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100000,
number_of_blocks: 8000,
},
true,
vec![ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100000,
number_of_blocks: 8000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
.collect(),
}],
);
// Multiple split on new block
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100000,
number_of_blocks: 8001,
},
true,
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100000,
number_of_blocks: 7999,
sync_complete: false,
short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
.collect(),
},
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 107999,
number_of_blocks: 2,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap()],
},
],
);
// Multiple split on same block
do_handling_query_channel_range(
&gossip_sync,
&node_id_2,
QueryChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100002,
number_of_blocks: 8000,
},
true,
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 100002,
number_of_blocks: 7999,
sync_complete: false,
short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
.collect(),
},
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
first_blocknum: 108001,
number_of_blocks: 1,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap()],
},
],
);
}
fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
gossip_sync: &P2PGossipSync<
&NetworkGraph<Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>,
Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>,
>,
test_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange, expected_ok: bool,
expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>,
) {
let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_channel_range(*test_node_id, msg);
if expected_ok {
assert!(result.is_ok());
} else {
assert!(result.is_err());
}
let events = gossip_sync.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
for i in 0..events.len() {
let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
match &events[i] {
MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
// Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
assert!(
msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum
|| msg.first_blocknum
== c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1)
);
assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum =
msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
// Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
if i == events.len() - 1 {
assert!(
msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks)
>= query_end_blocknum
);
}
},
_ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
}
}
}
#[test]
fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
let result = gossip_sync.handle_query_short_channel_ids(
node_id,
QueryShortChannelIds { chain_hash, short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000] },
);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn displays_node_alias() {
let format_str_alias = |alias: &str| {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias.as_bytes());
format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
};
assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK! \u{26A1}");
assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\0\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!");
assert_eq!(format_str_alias("I\u{1F496}LDK!\t\u{26A1}"), "I\u{1F496}LDK!\u{FFFD}\u{26A1}");
let format_bytes_alias = |alias: &[u8]| {
let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
bytes[..alias.len()].copy_from_slice(alias);
format!("{}", NodeAlias(bytes))
};
assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart> LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart> LDK!");
assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\0LDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>");
assert_eq!(format_bytes_alias(b"\xFFI <heart>\tLDK!"), "\u{FFFD}I <heart>\u{FFFD}LDK!");
}
#[test]
fn channel_info_is_readable() {
let chanmon_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_node_chanmgrs(
2,
&node_cfgs,
&[None, None, None, None],
);
let nodes = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let config = crate::ln::functional_test_utils::test_default_channel_config();
// 1. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelUpdateInfo
let chan_update_info = ChannelUpdateInfo {
last_update: 23,
enabled: true,
cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
htlc_minimum_msat: 1234,
htlc_maximum_msat: 5678,
fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 9, proportional_millionths: 10 },
last_update_message: None,
};
let mut encoded_chan_update_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
assert!(chan_update_info.write(&mut encoded_chan_update_info).is_ok());
// First make sure we can read ChannelUpdateInfos we just wrote
let read_chan_update_info: ChannelUpdateInfo =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_update_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan_update_info, read_chan_update_info);
// Check the serialization hasn't changed.
let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_chan_update_info, legacy_chan_update_info_with_some);
// Check we fail if htlc_maximum_msat is not present in either the ChannelUpdateInfo itself
// or the ChannelUpdate enclosed with `last_update_message`.
let legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("b40004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c8181d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000000000019d6689c085ae165831e934ff763ae46a2a6c172b3f1b60a8ce26f00083a840000034d013413a70000009000000000000f42400000271000000014").unwrap();
let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(
&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice(),
);
assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
let legacy_chan_update_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c0100").unwrap();
let read_chan_update_info_res: Result<ChannelUpdateInfo, crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError> =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_update_info_with_none.as_slice());
assert!(read_chan_update_info_res.is_err());
// 2. Test encoding/decoding of ChannelInfo
// Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo without ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
let chan_info_none_updates = ChannelInfo {
features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
one_to_two: None,
node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
two_to_one: None,
capacity_sats: None,
announcement_message: None,
announcement_received_time: 87654,
node_one_counter: 0,
node_two_counter: 1,
};
let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
assert!(chan_info_none_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan_info_none_updates, read_chan_info);
// Check we can encode/decode ChannelInfo with ChannelUpdateInfo fields present.
let chan_info_some_updates = ChannelInfo {
features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&config),
node_one: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()),
one_to_two: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
node_two: NodeId::from_pubkey(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()),
two_to_one: Some(chan_update_info.clone()),
capacity_sats: None,
announcement_message: None,
announcement_received_time: 87654,
node_one_counter: 0,
node_two_counter: 1,
};
let mut encoded_chan_info: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
assert!(chan_info_some_updates.write(&mut encoded_chan_info).is_ok());
let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut encoded_chan_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(chan_info_some_updates, read_chan_info);
// Check the serialization hasn't changed.
let legacy_chan_info_with_some: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ca00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88043636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23083636340004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d2080909000000000000162e0a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
assert_eq!(encoded_chan_info, legacy_chan_info_with_some);
// Check we can decode legacy ChannelInfo, even if the `two_to_one` / `one_to_two` /
// `last_update_message` fields fail to decode due to missing htlc_maximum_msat.
let legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("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").unwrap();
let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo = crate::util::ser::Readable::read(
&mut legacy_chan_info_with_some_and_fail_update.as_slice(),
)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
let legacy_chan_info_with_none: Vec<u8> = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("ba00020000010800000000000156660221027f921585f2ac0c7c70e36110adecfd8fd14b8a99bfb3d000a283fcac358fce88042e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c010006210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c23082e2e2c0004000000170201010402002a060800000000000004d20801000a0d0c00040000000902040000000a0c01000a01000c0100").unwrap();
let read_chan_info: ChannelInfo =
crate::util::ser::Readable::read(&mut legacy_chan_info_with_none.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.announcement_received_time, 87654);
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.one_to_two, None);
assert_eq!(read_chan_info.two_to_one, None);
}
#[test]
fn node_info_is_readable() {
// 1. Check we can read a valid NodeAnnouncementInfo and fail on an invalid one
let announcement_message = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d977cb9b53d93a6ff64bb5f1e158b4094b66e798fb12911168a3ccdf80a83096340a6a95da0ae8d9f776528eecdbb747eb6b545495a4319ed5378e35b21e073a000122013413a7031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f2020201010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010000701fffefdfc2607").unwrap();
let announcement_message =
NodeAnnouncement::read_from_fixed_length_buffer(&mut announcement_message.as_slice())
.unwrap();
let valid_node_ann_info = NodeAnnouncementInfo::Relayed(announcement_message);
let mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info = Vec::new();
assert!(valid_node_ann_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info).is_ok());
let read_valid_node_ann_info =
NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_ann_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info, valid_node_ann_info);
assert_eq!(read_valid_node_ann_info.addresses().len(), 1);
let encoded_invalid_node_ann_info = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d2").unwrap();
let read_invalid_node_ann_info_res =
NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_ann_info.as_slice());
assert!(read_invalid_node_ann_info_res.is_err());
// 2. Check we can read a NodeInfo anyways, but set the NodeAnnouncementInfo to None if invalid
let valid_node_info = NodeInfo {
channels: Vec::new(),
announcement_info: Some(valid_node_ann_info),
node_counter: 0,
};
let mut encoded_valid_node_info = Vec::new();
assert!(valid_node_info.write(&mut encoded_valid_node_info).is_ok());
let read_valid_node_info = NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_valid_node_info.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(read_valid_node_info, valid_node_info);
let encoded_invalid_node_info_hex = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("4402403f0009000788a000080a51a20204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014004d20400").unwrap();
let read_invalid_node_info =
NodeInfo::read(&mut encoded_invalid_node_info_hex.as_slice()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(read_invalid_node_info.announcement_info, None);
}
#[test]
fn test_node_info_keeps_compatibility() {
let old_ann_info_with_addresses = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3f0009000708a000080a51220204000000000403000000062000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a0505014104d2").unwrap();
let ann_info_with_addresses =
NodeAnnouncementInfo::read(&mut old_ann_info_with_addresses.as_slice())
.expect("to be able to read an old NodeAnnouncementInfo with addresses");
// This serialized info has no announcement_message but its address field should still be considered
assert!(!ann_info_with_addresses.addresses().is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_node_id_display() {
let node_id = NodeId([42; 33]);
assert_eq!(
format!("{}", &node_id),
"2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a"
);
}
#[test]
fn is_tor_only_node() {
let network_graph = create_network_graph();
let (secp_ctx, gossip_sync) = create_gossip_sync(&network_graph);
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
let node_1_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey));
let announcement =
get_signed_channel_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, node_2_privkey, &secp_ctx);
gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
let tcp_ip_v4 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV4 { addr: [255, 254, 253, 252], port: 9735 };
let tcp_ip_v6 = SocketAddress::TcpIpV6 {
addr: [255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240],
port: 9735,
};
let onion_v2 =
SocketAddress::OnionV2([255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 38, 7]);
let onion_v3 = SocketAddress::OnionV3 {
ed25519_pubkey: [
255, 254, 253, 252, 251, 250, 249, 248, 247, 246, 245, 244, 243, 242, 241, 240,
239, 238, 237, 236, 235, 234, 233, 232, 231, 230, 229, 228, 227, 226, 225, 224,
],
checksum: 32,
version: 16,
port: 9735,
};
let hostname = SocketAddress::Hostname {
hostname: Hostname::try_from(String::from("host")).unwrap(),
port: 9735,
};
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(|_| {}, node_1_privkey, &secp_ctx);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses = vec![
tcp_ip_v4.clone(),
tcp_ip_v6.clone(),
onion_v2.clone(),
onion_v3.clone(),
hostname.clone(),
];
announcement.timestamp += 1000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses =
vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone(), tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
announcement.timestamp += 2000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses =
vec![tcp_ip_v6.clone(), onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
announcement.timestamp += 3000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone(), onion_v3.clone()];
announcement.timestamp += 4000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses = vec![onion_v2.clone()];
announcement.timestamp += 5000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
let announcement = get_signed_node_announcement(
|announcement| {
announcement.addresses = vec![tcp_ip_v4.clone()];
announcement.timestamp += 6000;
},
node_1_privkey,
&secp_ctx,
);
gossip_sync.handle_node_announcement(Some(node_1_pubkey), &announcement).unwrap();
assert!(!network_graph.read_only().node(&node_1_id).unwrap().is_tor_only());
}
}
#[cfg(ldk_bench)]
pub mod benches {
use super::*;
use criterion::{black_box, Criterion};
use std::io::Read;
pub fn read_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
let mut v = Vec::new();
d.read_to_end(&mut v).unwrap();
bench.bench_function("read_network_graph", |b| {
b.iter(|| {
NetworkGraph::read(&mut crate::io::Cursor::new(black_box(&v)), &logger).unwrap()
})
});
}
pub fn write_network_graph(bench: &mut Criterion) {
let logger = crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let (mut d, _) = crate::routing::router::bench_utils::get_graph_scorer_file().unwrap();
let mut graph_buffer = Vec::new();
d.read_to_end(&mut graph_buffer).unwrap();
let net_graph = NetworkGraph::read(&mut &graph_buffer[..], &logger).unwrap();
bench.bench_function("write_network_graph", |b| b.iter(|| black_box(&net_graph).encode()));
}
}