libfreemkv 1.1.0

//! CSS drive bus-authentication — read-unlock primitive.
//!
//! A CSS-enforcing DVD drive refuses to return scrambled sectors until a
//! CSS bus-auth handshake has set its Authentication Success Flag (ASF=1).
//! [`unlock_css_reads`] runs that bus-auth challenge-response (which is what
//! actually opens scrambled-sector reads), then a best-effort, non-fatal
//! disc-key REPORT KEY. The bytes are NOT used as keys: the descramble title
//! key is recovered keylessly by the Stevenson known-plaintext attack (see
//! [`super::crack_key`]).

use crate::drive::Drive;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};

// ── CryptKey tables ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

const CRYPT_TAB0: [u8; 256] = [
    0xB7, 0xF4, 0x82, 0x57, 0xDA, 0x4D, 0xDB, 0xE2, 0x2F, 0x52, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xFF,
    0xFB, 0x0E, 0x6D, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x76, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x79, 0x29, 0x39, 0x62, 0x08, 0x24,
    0xA5, 0x85, 0x7B, 0x56, 0x01, 0x23, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x0A, 0xE2, 0x5A, 0xED, 0x3D, 0x59, 0xB0, 0xA9,
    0xB0, 0x2C, 0xF2, 0xB8, 0xEF, 0x32, 0xA9, 0x40, 0x80, 0x71, 0xAF, 0x1E, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x58, 0x88,
    0xB8, 0x3A, 0xD0, 0xFC, 0xC4, 0x1E, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0xBB, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0x01, 0x7E, 0x1F, 0x9F, 0xD9,
    0xAA, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x1E, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x37, 0x56, 0x8F, 0x16, 0xBA, 0x49, 0x2B, 0xAC,
    0xD0, 0xBD, 0x95, 0x20, 0xBE, 0x7A, 0x28, 0xD0, 0x51, 0x64, 0x63, 0x1C, 0x7F, 0x66, 0x10, 0xBB,
    0xC4, 0x56, 0x1A, 0x04, 0x6E, 0x0A, 0xEC, 0x9C, 0xD6, 0xE8, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0xCF, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0xB1,
    0xEF, 0x71, 0xDE, 0x31, 0xFF, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x69, 0x96, 0xB0, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x47,
    0xC7, 0x96, 0x8F, 0xE4, 0x2B, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xEE, 0xB9, 0x86, 0x9A, 0x64, 0x84, 0x72, 0xE2, 0x5B,
    0xA2, 0x96, 0x58, 0x99, 0x50, 0x03, 0xF5, 0x38, 0x4D, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xE7, 0x7D, 0x75, 0xA7, 0xB8,
    0x67, 0x87, 0x84, 0x3F, 0x1D, 0x11, 0xE5, 0xFC, 0x1E, 0xD3, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5, 0x29, 0xF6, 0xC7,
    0x15, 0x61, 0x29, 0x1A, 0x43, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0xAF, 0xC5, 0x87, 0x34, 0x6C, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0xA8, 0x1D,
    0x45, 0x58, 0x25, 0xDC, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0x3B, 0xD1, 0x79, 0x1B, 0x48, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x1F, 0xFC,
    0xDB, 0x2A, 0x90, 0xA9, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x39, 0x18, 0xA3, 0x8E, 0x58, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0x12, 0xBB, 0x25,
    0xCD, 0x71, 0x22, 0xA2, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xE7, 0xFB, 0xAD, 0x94, 0x77, 0x04, 0x9A, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x7C,
];

const CRYPT_TAB1: [u8; 256] = [
    0x8C, 0x47, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0xEB, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x56, 0x10, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xBE, 0x4F,
    0x08, 0x75, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x8E, 0x6E, 0x39, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x53, 0xC4, 0x1F, 0xF4, 0x5C,
    0x4E, 0xE6, 0x99, 0x30, 0xE0, 0x42, 0x88, 0xAB, 0xE5, 0x85, 0xBC, 0x8F, 0xD8, 0x3C, 0x54, 0xC9,
    0x53, 0x47, 0x18, 0xD6, 0x06, 0x5B, 0x41, 0x2C, 0x67, 0x1E, 0x41, 0x74, 0x33, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0xE0,
    0x23, 0x29, 0x42, 0xEA, 0x55, 0x0F, 0x25, 0xB4, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x13, 0xEB, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0xC9,
    0xF9, 0x63, 0x67, 0x43, 0x2D, 0xC7, 0x7D, 0x07, 0x60, 0x89, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE7, 0x94, 0x77, 0x74,
    0x9B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0xE6, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x68, 0x14, 0x1E, 0xA3, 0x25, 0xDE, 0x3A, 0xA3, 0x54, 0x7B,
    0x87, 0x9D, 0x50, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xC3, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD4, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x41, 0x97, 0x79,
    0x94, 0x82, 0xAC, 0xC7, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0x4E, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x9E, 0xE0, 0x42, 0xBA, 0x28, 0xEA, 0xB7,
    0x74, 0xAD, 0x35, 0xDA, 0x92, 0x60, 0x7E, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x24, 0x5E, 0x39, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0x63,
    0x09, 0xB5, 0xFA, 0xBF, 0xF1, 0x22, 0x55, 0x1C, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xDB, 0xC5, 0xD8, 0x50, 0x03, 0x98,
    0xC4, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x11, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0x2D, 0x3C, 0x08, 0x04, 0x5A, 0xEF,
    0xCE, 0x32, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x92, 0x1E, 0x4B, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xDA, 0x6E, 0x7C, 0x4D,
    0x56, 0xC3, 0x3F, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x3A, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x6E, 0x84, 0x56, 0x68, 0xF4, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x64,
    0xD0, 0xA9, 0x92, 0x2F, 0x8B, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x09, 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xE5, 0x97, 0xBF, 0xA5,
    0xCE, 0xFA, 0x28, 0x2C, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x1B, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x97, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xF4,
];

const CRYPT_TAB2: [u8; 256] = [
    0xB7, 0x75, 0x81, 0xD5, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0xDE, 0x66, 0x23, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x26, 0x62, 0xD1, 0x83, 0x77,
    0xE3, 0x97, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0xC3, 0x6B, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xB0, 0x6E, 0xBF, 0x2B, 0xF1, 0x19, 0xB4,
    0x95, 0x34, 0x48, 0xE4, 0x37, 0x94, 0x5D, 0x7B, 0x36, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x53, 0x07, 0xE2, 0x89, 0x11,
    0x98, 0x85, 0xD9, 0x12, 0xC1, 0x9D, 0x84, 0xEC, 0xA4, 0xD4, 0x88, 0xB8, 0xFC, 0x2C, 0x79, 0x28,
    0xD8, 0xDB, 0xB3, 0x1E, 0xA2, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xD6, 0x60, 0xEF, 0x14, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x31,
    0xD2, 0x41, 0x46, 0x67, 0x0A, 0xE1, 0x58, 0x27, 0x43, 0xA3, 0xF8, 0xE0, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x5A, 0x5C,
    0x80, 0x6C, 0xC6, 0xF2, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x7D, 0x04, 0x0D, 0xB9, 0x3C, 0xC2, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x49, 0x63,
    0x8C, 0x9F, 0x51, 0xCE, 0x20, 0xC5, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x92, 0x2D, 0xDD, 0xBC, 0x8D, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0x71,
    0x2F, 0x30, 0x1D, 0x73, 0x39, 0x13, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xCB, 0x24, 0x59, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x96, 0x57, 0x0F,
    0x1F, 0xCF, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF5, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0x6D, 0xD3, 0x4D, 0x32, 0x56, 0x21, 0x33, 0x0B,
    0x52, 0xE7, 0xAB, 0xEB, 0xA6, 0x74, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xB1, 0x7F, 0x82, 0x99, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0xC0,
    0x8F, 0xEE, 0x6F, 0x55, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x08, 0x90, 0xFA, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x70, 0x47, 0x4A, 0x17, 0xA7,
    0xB5, 0x40, 0x8A, 0x38, 0xE5, 0x68, 0x3E, 0x8B, 0x69, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x42, 0xA5, 0x10, 0x01, 0x35,
    0xFD, 0x61, 0x9E, 0xE6, 0x16, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xED, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0xC4, 0x5B, 0xA0, 0xAE, 0xCC,
    0x4B, 0x3B, 0x03, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x0C, 0x3F, 0x93, 0xC7, 0x72, 0x7A, 0x09, 0x22, 0x3D,
    0x45, 0x78, 0xA9, 0xA8, 0xEA, 0xC9, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x02, 0x18, 0x3A, 0x4E, 0x7C,
];

const CRYPT_TAB3: [u8; 256] = [
    0x73, 0x51, 0x95, 0xE1, 0x12, 0xE4, 0xC0, 0x58, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x08, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x98, 0x4C,
    0xA7, 0x33, 0xE2, 0x1B, 0xA7, 0x6D, 0xF5, 0x30, 0x97, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x02, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x82, 0x0F,
    0x91, 0xD0, 0x9C, 0x10, 0x39, 0x7A, 0x83, 0x85, 0x3B, 0xB2, 0xB8, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x52, 0xEA,
    0x1C, 0xE1, 0x8D, 0x66, 0x4F, 0xF3, 0xDA, 0x92, 0x29, 0xB9, 0xD5, 0xC5, 0x77, 0x47, 0x22, 0x53,
    0x14, 0xF7, 0xAF, 0x22, 0x64, 0xDF, 0xC6, 0x72, 0x12, 0xF3, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xD7, 0xD7, 0xE5, 0x02,
    0x9E, 0xED, 0xDA, 0xDB, 0x4C, 0x47, 0xCE, 0x91, 0x06, 0x06, 0x6D, 0x55, 0x8B, 0x19, 0xC9, 0xEF,
    0x8C, 0x80, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0xAB, 0xF2, 0x08, 0x5C, 0xE9, 0x37, 0x26, 0x5E, 0x9A, 0x90,
    0x00, 0xF3, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xF7, 0x26, 0x17, 0x48, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2C, 0xC9, 0x02,
    0xE7, 0x18, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x39, 0xE1, 0x20, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x40, 0xC7, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0x48, 0x30,
    0x57, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x06, 0xBF, 0xAC, 0x81, 0x08, 0x24, 0x7A, 0xD4, 0x8B, 0x19, 0x8E, 0xAC, 0xB4,
    0x5A, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x13, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xDA, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x5B, 0x60, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x3F,
    0x07, 0x86, 0x37, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x14, 0x52, 0xEA, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x3D, 0x09, 0xC8, 0x25, 0x48, 0xD8,
    0x75, 0x60, 0x9A, 0x08, 0x27, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x62, 0x37, 0x16, 0x02,
    0xBD, 0xC1, 0x0E, 0x56, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x14, 0x5F, 0x8C, 0x8F, 0x6E, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x07, 0x39, 0x7B,
    0x4B, 0xDB, 0xD3, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0xFE, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x16, 0x83, 0x7D, 0xEE, 0xF5, 0xCA,
    0xC5, 0x18, 0xF9, 0xD8, 0x68, 0xAB, 0x38, 0x85, 0xA8, 0xF0, 0xA1, 0x73, 0x9F, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x0B,
];

const VARIANTS: [u8; 32] = [
    0xB7, 0x74, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xCC, 0xDB, 0xCA, 0x73, 0x03, 0xFE, 0x31, 0x03, 0x52, 0xE0, 0xB7, 0x42,
    0x63, 0x16, 0xF2, 0x2A, 0x79, 0x52, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0x7A, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0x9B, 0x40, 0xAD, 0x01,
];

const SECRET: [u8; 5] = [0x55, 0xD6, 0xC4, 0xC5, 0x28];

const PERM_CHALLENGE: [[usize; 10]; 3] = [
    [1, 3, 0, 7, 5, 2, 9, 6, 4, 8],
    [6, 1, 9, 3, 8, 5, 7, 4, 0, 2],
    [4, 0, 3, 5, 7, 2, 8, 6, 1, 9],
];

const PERM_VARIANT: [[u8; 32]; 2] = [
    [
        0x0A, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x0F, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x1C, 0x1B, 0x19, 0x1F,
        0x1D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05, 0x12, 0x10, 0x16, 0x14, 0x13, 0x11,
        0x17, 0x15,
    ],
    [
        0x12, 0x1A, 0x16, 0x1E, 0x02, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x10, 0x18, 0x14, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x08, 0x04,
        0x0C, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x1F, 0x03, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x19, 0x15, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x09,
        0x05, 0x0D,
    ],
];

// ── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// CSS bus-auth **unlock** primitive.
///
/// Runs the bus-auth challenge-response (which sets the drive's ASF=1 and is
/// what actually unlocks scrambled-sector reads), then a best-effort,
/// non-fatal disc-key REPORT KEY. The title-key REPORT KEY is NOT issued: it
/// is unnecessary (the descramble key is recovered keylessly by the Stevenson
/// attack in [`super::crack_key`]) and its hard failure on some USB bridges
/// used to abort the whole unlock (the 7014 bug). The bytes are discarded.
pub fn unlock_css_reads(drive: &mut Drive, lba: u32) -> Result<()> {
    let t0 = std::time::Instant::now();
    tracing::info!(target: "freemkv::css", phase = "unlock_css_reads", lba, "begin");
    let r = unlock_css_reads_inner(drive, lba);
    tracing::info!(
        target: "freemkv::css",
        phase = "unlock_css_reads",
        lba,
        ok = r.is_ok(),
        elapsed_ms = t0.elapsed().as_millis() as u64,
        "end"
    );
    r
}

fn unlock_css_reads_inner(drive: &mut Drive, _lba: u32) -> Result<()> {
    tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", "css unlock: begin");
    // The bus-auth challenge-response sets the drive's Authentication Success
    // Flag (ASF=1), which is what opens scrambled-sector reads. This is the
    // ONLY step required to unlock reads; a failure here is fatal — we
    // genuinely cannot read scrambled sectors.
    let (agid, _bus_key) = bus_auth(drive).inspect_err(|e| {
        tracing::warn!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: bus_auth failed");
    })?;
    tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", agid, "css unlock: bus_auth ok");
    // Disc-key REPORT KEY: issued BEST-EFFORT for any firmware that ties part
    // of its read-unlock to it. The bytes are unused (the descramble key is
    // recovered keylessly) and a failure is NON-FATAL — the gate is already
    // open from bus-auth. This replaces the title-key REPORT KEY, whose hard
    // failure used to abort the whole unlock (the 7014 bug on USB bridges).
    if let Err(e) = read_disc_key(drive, agid) {
        tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", error_code = e.code(), "css unlock: disc-key REPORT KEY skipped (non-fatal)");
    }
    tracing::debug!(target: "freemkv::css", "css unlock: ok");
    Ok(())
}

// ── Step 1: Bus Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────

fn bus_auth(drive: &mut Drive) -> Result<(u8, [u8; 5])> {
    let scsi = drive.scsi_mut();

    // Invalidate all AGIDs via REPORT KEY format 0x3F
    for agid in 0..4u8 {
        let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
        cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_REPORT_KEY;
        // alloc_len = 0 (no data transfer)
        cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | 0x3F;
        let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
        let _ = scsi.execute(
            &cdb,
            crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
            &mut buf,
            5_000,
        );
    }

    // Allocate AGID
    let mut buf = [0u8; 8];
    scsi.execute(
        &report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 8),
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
        &mut buf,
        5_000,
    )
    .map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
    let agid = (buf[7] >> 6) & 0x03;

    // Host sends challenge. The spec wants a fresh per-session random nonce,
    // not a fixed constant — a predictable challenge weakens the bus-auth
    // handshake.
    let mut host_challenge = [0u8; 10];
    {
        use rand::RngCore;
        rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut host_challenge);
    }
    let mut hc_buf = [0u8; 16];
    hc_buf[0] = 0x00;
    hc_buf[1] = 0x0E;
    for i in 0..10 {
        hc_buf[4 + i] = host_challenge[9 - i];
    }
    scsi.execute(
        &send_key_cdb(agid, 0x01, 16),
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::ToDevice,
        &mut hc_buf,
        5_000,
    )
    .map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;

    // Get Key1 from drive
    let mut dk_buf = [0u8; 12];
    scsi.execute(
        &report_key_cdb(agid, 0x02, 12),
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
        &mut dk_buf,
        5_000,
    )
    .map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
    let mut key1 = [0u8; 5];
    for i in 0..5 {
        key1[i] = dk_buf[4 + (4 - i)];
    }

    // Brute-force variant (0-31)
    let mut variant: Option<u8> = None;
    for v in 0..32u8 {
        if crypt_key(0, v, &host_challenge) == key1 {
            variant = Some(v);
            break;
        }
    }
    let variant = variant.ok_or(Error::CssAuthFailed)?;

    // Get drive challenge
    let mut dc_buf = [0u8; 16];
    scsi.execute(
        &report_key_cdb(agid, 0x01, 16),
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
        &mut dc_buf,
        5_000,
    )
    .map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;
    let mut drive_challenge = [0u8; 10];
    for i in 0..10 {
        drive_challenge[i] = dc_buf[4 + (9 - i)];
    }

    // Compute Key2 and send it
    let key2 = crypt_key(1, variant, &drive_challenge);
    let mut hk_buf = [0u8; 12];
    hk_buf[0] = 0x00;
    hk_buf[1] = 0x0A;
    for i in 0..5 {
        hk_buf[4 + i] = key2[4 - i];
    }
    scsi.execute(
        &send_key_cdb(agid, 0x03, 12),
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::ToDevice,
        &mut hk_buf,
        5_000,
    )
    .map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;

    // Bus key = CryptKey(2, variant, key1 || key2)
    let mut combined = [0u8; 10];
    combined[..5].copy_from_slice(&key1);
    combined[5..].copy_from_slice(&key2);
    let bus_key = crypt_key(2, variant, &combined);

    Ok((agid, bus_key))
}

// ── Step 2: Disc Key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

/// Issue READ DVD STRUCTURE format 0x02 (Copyright Information — opcode 0xAD,
/// NOT the REPORT KEY 0xA4 disc-key block) purely for the bus-auth unlock side
/// effect. The returned block contents are not used — the descramble title key
/// is recovered keylessly elsewhere, so the genuine disc-key REPORT KEY is
/// intentionally skipped. (If a drive is ever found where bus-auth alone does
/// not open scrambled reads, a real REPORT KEY format 0x02 belongs here.)
fn read_disc_key(drive: &mut Drive, agid: u8) -> Result<()> {
    let scsi = drive.scsi_mut();

    // READ DVD STRUCTURE, format 0x02 (disc key), 2048+4 bytes
    let alloc_len: u16 = 2048 + 4;
    let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
    cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_READ_DISC_STRUCTURE;
    // bytes 2-5: address = 0
    cdb[6] = 0; // layer
    cdb[7] = 0x02; // format = disc key
    cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8) as u8;
    cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8;
    cdb[10] = agid << 6;

    let mut buf = vec![0u8; alloc_len as usize];
    let dvd_result = scsi.execute(
        &cdb,
        crate::scsi::DataDirection::FromDevice,
        &mut buf,
        5_000,
    );
    dvd_result.map_err(|_| Error::CssAuthFailed)?;

    Ok(())
}

// ── CSSCryptKey ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

fn crypt_key(key_type: usize, variant: u8, challenge: &[u8; 10]) -> [u8; 5] {
    // key_type indexes PERM_CHALLENGE ([_;3]); variant indexes
    // VARIANTS/PERM_VARIANT ([_;32]). All internal callers pass key_type in
    // 0..3 and variant in 0..32; the asserts document the contract for the
    // pub(crate) test entry point test_crypt_key and turn a would-be
    // out-of-bounds panic into an explicit precondition violation.
    debug_assert!(key_type < 3, "crypt_key: key_type out of range");
    debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, "crypt_key: variant out of range");
    let perm = &PERM_CHALLENGE[key_type];
    let mut scratch = [0u8; 10];
    for i in 0..10 {
        scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]];
    }

    let css_variant = match key_type {
        0 => variant as usize,
        1 => PERM_VARIANT[0][variant as usize] as usize,
        _ => PERM_VARIANT[1][variant as usize] as usize,
    };

    let cse = VARIANTS[css_variant] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[css_variant];

    let mut tmp1 = [0u8; 5];
    for i in 0..5 {
        tmp1[i] = scratch[5 + i] ^ SECRET[i] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[i];
    }

    let mut lfsr0: u32 = ((tmp1[0] as u32) << 17)
        | ((tmp1[1] as u32) << 9)
        | (((tmp1[2] as u32) & !7) << 1)
        | 8
        | (tmp1[2] as u32 & 7);

    let mut lfsr1: u32 = ((tmp1[3] as u32) << 9) | 0x100 | (tmp1[4] as u32);

    let mut bits = [0u8; 30];
    let mut carry: u32 = 0;
    for idx in (0..30).rev() {
        let mut val: u8 = 0;
        for bit in 0..8u8 {
            let lfsr0_out = ((lfsr0 >> 24) ^ (lfsr0 >> 21) ^ (lfsr0 >> 20) ^ (lfsr0 >> 12)) & 1;
            lfsr0 = ((lfsr0 << 1) | lfsr0_out) & 0x1FFFFFF;

            let lfsr1_out = ((lfsr1 >> 16) ^ (lfsr1 >> 2)) & 1;
            lfsr1 = ((lfsr1 << 1) | lfsr1_out) & 0x1FFFF;

            let combined = ((!lfsr1_out) & 1) + carry + ((!lfsr0_out) & 1);
            carry = (combined >> 1) & 1;
            val |= ((combined & 1) as u8) << bit;
        }
        bits[idx] = val;
    }

    let mut tmp1 = [scratch[0], scratch[1], scratch[2], scratch[3], scratch[4]];
    let mut tmp2 = [0u8; 5];

    // Round 1: bits[25..29] ^ scratch -> tmp1 (term from original scratch)
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[25 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
            term = scratch[i]; // original challenge, NOT modified tmp1
        }
        tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
    }

    // Round 2
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[20 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            tmp2[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
            term = tmp1[i];
        }
        tmp2[4] ^= tmp2[0];
    }

    // Round 3 (uses CRYPT_TAB0)
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[15 + i] ^ tmp2[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            let idx3 = (CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term) as usize;
            tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB0[idx3] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[idx3];
            term = tmp2[i];
        }
        tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
    }

    // Round 4 (uses CRYPT_TAB0)
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[10 + i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            let idx3 = (CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term) as usize;
            tmp2[i] = CRYPT_TAB0[idx3] ^ CRYPT_TAB2[idx3];
            term = tmp1[i];
        }
        tmp2[4] ^= tmp2[0];
    }

    // Round 5
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[5 + i] ^ tmp2[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            tmp1[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
            term = tmp2[i];
        }
        tmp1[4] ^= tmp1[0];
    }

    // Round 6
    let mut key = [0u8; 5];
    {
        let mut term: u8 = 0;
        for i in (0..5usize).rev() {
            let idx = (bits[i] ^ tmp1[i]) as usize;
            let idx2 = (CRYPT_TAB1[idx] ^ (!CRYPT_TAB2[idx]) ^ cse) as usize;
            key[i] = CRYPT_TAB2[idx2] ^ CRYPT_TAB3[idx2] ^ term;
            term = tmp1[i];
        }
    }

    key
}

// ── SCSI CDB builders ────────────────────────────────────────────────────

fn report_key_cdb(agid: u8, format: u8, alloc_len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
    let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
    cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_REPORT_KEY;
    cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8) as u8;
    cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8;
    cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
    cdb
}

fn send_key_cdb(agid: u8, format: u8, param_len: u16) -> [u8; 12] {
    let mut cdb = [0u8; 12];
    cdb[0] = crate::scsi::SCSI_SEND_KEY;
    cdb[8] = (param_len >> 8) as u8;
    cdb[9] = param_len as u8;
    cdb[10] = (agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F);
    cdb
}

// ── Tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// SECURITY REGRESSION GUARD: no instrumentation in libfreemkv may emit
    /// raw key material. Scan every source file for a `tracing` field that
    /// binds a forbidden key name to a value-producing expression (`= expr`
    /// or `%expr` / `?expr`). The only allowed forms are a string literal
    /// (e.g. `disc_key = "<redacted>"`) or a `_fp` fingerprint field.
    ///
    /// This is a source-scan test (not a runtime capture) so it stays cheap
    /// and catches re-introductions at compile/CI time.
    #[test]
    fn no_key_bytes_in_instrumentation() {
        use std::path::Path;

        // Forbidden field names whose VALUES must never be logged.
        const FORBIDDEN: &[&str] = &[
            "title_key",
            "disc_key",
            "unit_key",
            "vuk",
            "player_key",
            "bus_key",
        ];

        fn scan_dir(dir: &Path, forbidden: &[&str], violations: &mut Vec<String>) {
            let entries = match std::fs::read_dir(dir) {
                Ok(e) => e,
                Err(_) => return,
            };
            for entry in entries.flatten() {
                let path = entry.path();
                if path.is_dir() {
                    scan_dir(&path, forbidden, violations);
                    continue;
                }
                if path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) != Some("rs") {
                    continue;
                }
                let src = match std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
                    Ok(s) => s,
                    Err(_) => continue,
                };
                for (lineno, line) in src.lines().enumerate() {
                    let trimmed = line.trim_start();
                    // Only inspect tracing instrumentation lines.
                    if !(trimmed.contains("tracing::")
                        || trimmed.starts_with("debug!")
                        || trimmed.starts_with("info!")
                        || trimmed.starts_with("warn!")
                        || trimmed.starts_with("trace!")
                        || trimmed.starts_with("error!"))
                    {
                        continue;
                    }
                    // This guard test itself contains the forbidden names.
                    if path.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()) == Some("auth.rs")
                        && line.contains("FORBIDDEN")
                    {
                        continue;
                    }
                    for &name in forbidden {
                        // A fingerprint field (`<name>_fp = ...`) is allowed.
                        // Match `<name>` followed by optional fingerprint
                        // suffix then `=` and a value that is NOT a string
                        // literal redaction marker.
                        if let Some(idx) = line.find(name) {
                            let after = &line[idx + name.len()..];
                            let after = after.trim_start();
                            // `<name>_fp` / `<name>_id` etc. are safe.
                            if after.starts_with('_') {
                                continue;
                            }
                            // Must be a field binding `name = ...`.
                            let Some(rest) = after.strip_prefix('=') else {
                                continue;
                            };
                            let rest = rest.trim_start();
                            // Redaction string literal is the only allowed value.
                            if rest.starts_with('"') {
                                continue;
                            }
                            // Anything else (`%expr`, `?expr`, bare expr) leaks bytes.
                            violations.push(format!(
                                "{}:{}: forbidden key field `{}` logged with a value: {}",
                                path.display(),
                                lineno + 1,
                                name,
                                line.trim()
                            ));
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Scan this crate's `src` plus the sibling workspace crates so the
        // key-material logging guard covers every crate that can reach the
        // CSS/AACS internals, not just libfreemkv. Missing sibling dirs (e.g.
        // when building the crate standalone) are simply skipped.
        let manifest = Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"));
        let workspace = manifest.parent().unwrap_or(manifest);
        let mut violations = Vec::new();
        scan_dir(&manifest.join("src"), FORBIDDEN, &mut violations);
        for sibling in ["autorip", "freemkv", "freemkv-keysources"] {
            let dir = workspace.join(sibling).join("src");
            if dir.is_dir() {
                scan_dir(&dir, FORBIDDEN, &mut violations);
            }
        }
        assert!(
            violations.is_empty(),
            "key material logged in instrumentation:\n{}",
            violations.join("\n")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_is_deterministic() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        for v in 0..32u8 {
            let r1 = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
            let r2 = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
            assert_eq!(r1, r2);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_varies_by_variant() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, 0, &challenge), crypt_key(0, 1, &challenge));
    }

    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_varies_by_type() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, 5, &challenge), crypt_key(1, 5, &challenge));
    }

    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_nonzero() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        for v in 0..32u8 {
            assert_ne!(crypt_key(0, v, &challenge), [0u8; 5]);
        }
    }

    // ── CSS constant-table integrity ───────────────────────────────────────

    /// Each PERM_CHALLENGE row is a permutation of indices 0..10 (it reorders
    /// the 10 challenge bytes). A non-permutation would drop/duplicate
    /// challenge bytes, weakening or corrupting the bus key derivation.
    ///
    /// Grounding: crypt_key does `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` for i in
    /// 0..10 — perm must be a bijection on 0..10 to use every challenge byte
    /// exactly once.
    /// Mutation: change PERM_CHALLENGE[0] entry `9` to `8` (duplicate) -> the
    /// "covers 0..10" assert fires.
    #[test]
    fn perm_challenge_rows_are_permutations() {
        for (row, perm) in PERM_CHALLENGE.iter().enumerate() {
            let mut seen = [false; 10];
            for &idx in perm.iter() {
                assert!(idx < 10, "PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] index {idx} out of range");
                assert!(!seen[idx], "PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] duplicates index {idx}");
                seen[idx] = true;
            }
            assert!(
                seen.iter().all(|&b| b),
                "PERM_CHALLENGE[{row}] misses an index"
            );
        }
    }

    /// Each PERM_VARIANT row maps the 32 variants to 32 distinct 5-bit values
    /// (it is a permutation of 0..32). key_type 1 uses PERM_VARIANT[0],
    /// key_type 2 uses PERM_VARIANT[1] to pick the css_variant; a collision
    /// would make two variants indistinguishable.
    ///
    /// Grounding: `css_variant = PERM_VARIANT[k][variant]` then indexes
    /// VARIANTS[css_variant] (0..32).
    /// Mutation: set PERM_VARIANT[0][1] = PERM_VARIANT[0][0] -> duplicate
    /// assert fires; also any value >= 32 would later index VARIANTS OOB.
    #[test]
    fn perm_variant_rows_are_permutations_of_0_31() {
        for (row, perm) in PERM_VARIANT.iter().enumerate() {
            let mut seen = [false; 32];
            for &v in perm.iter() {
                let v = v as usize;
                assert!(v < 32, "PERM_VARIANT[{row}] value {v} out of 0..32");
                assert!(!seen[v], "PERM_VARIANT[{row}] duplicates {v}");
                seen[v] = true;
            }
            assert!(
                seen.iter().all(|&b| b),
                "PERM_VARIANT[{row}] misses a value"
            );
        }
    }

    // ── crypt_key behaviour ────────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// crypt_key result depends on every challenge byte. The challenge is
    /// permuted into `scratch` and folded through the LFSR seeding and the 6
    /// XOR rounds. Flipping any single challenge byte must change the output.
    ///
    /// Grounding: scratch[i]=challenge[perm[i]] for all 10 i, and scratch
    /// seeds both LFSRs (bytes 5..10 via tmp1) and the round terms (bytes
    /// 0..5).
    /// Mutation: in `scratch[i] = challenge[perm[i]]` replace with
    /// `challenge[i]` for a perm that drops a byte — or hardcode one scratch
    /// entry — and some challenge byte stops mattering; this fails.
    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_depends_on_every_challenge_byte() {
        let base: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        let base_out = crypt_key(0, 5, &base);
        for i in 0..10 {
            let mut c = base;
            c[i] ^= 0x55;
            assert_ne!(
                crypt_key(0, 5, &c),
                base_out,
                "flipping challenge byte {i} did not change the bus-key derivation"
            );
        }
    }

    /// crypt_key(0, v, ..) must produce a DISTINCT result for each of the 32
    /// variants on a fixed challenge. bus_auth brute-forces the variant by
    /// matching crypt_key(0, v, host_challenge) == key1; if two variants
    /// collided, the wrong variant could be selected and the whole auth
    /// derail.
    ///
    /// Grounding: variant selects css_variant -> VARIANTS[css_variant] -> cse,
    /// which feeds every round; distinct variants give distinct cse-driven
    /// keys in practice.
    /// Mutation: make `cse` ignore the variant (e.g. `let cse = 0`) -> all 32
    /// outputs collapse to one value; the distinctness assert fires.
    #[test]
    fn crypt_key_type0_distinct_per_variant() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        let mut outs = Vec::new();
        for v in 0..32u8 {
            let k = crypt_key(0, v, &challenge);
            assert!(
                !outs.contains(&k),
                "variant {v} collides with an earlier variant"
            );
            outs.push(k);
        }
    }

    /// crypt_key enforces its documented precondition `key_type < 3` via
    /// debug_assert (active in test builds). A key_type of 3 would index
    /// PERM_CHALLENGE (len 3) out of bounds; the assert turns that into an
    /// explicit precondition panic.
    ///
    /// Grounding: `debug_assert!(key_type < 3, ...)`; PERM_CHALLENGE has 3
    /// rows (indices 0,1,2).
    /// Mutation: delete the debug_assert AND the match-arm guard — but the
    /// match `_ =>` arm would then index PERM_CHALLENGE[3] OOB and panic
    /// differently; with the assert in place this test pins the contract.
    #[test]
    #[should_panic]
    fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_key_type() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        let _ = crypt_key(3, 0, &challenge);
    }

    /// crypt_key enforces `variant < 32` via debug_assert. A variant of 32
    /// would index VARIANTS / PERM_VARIANT (len 32) out of bounds.
    ///
    /// Grounding: `debug_assert!((variant as usize) < 32, ...)`.
    /// Mutation: removing the assert makes this index VARIANTS[32] (still a
    /// panic, but unguarded); the assert documents/enforces the contract.
    #[test]
    #[should_panic]
    fn crypt_key_rejects_out_of_range_variant() {
        let challenge: [u8; 10] = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9];
        let _ = crypt_key(0, 32, &challenge);
    }

    // ── SCSI CDB builders (MMC REPORT KEY / SEND KEY layout) ───────────────

    /// report_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC REPORT KEY (opcode 0xA4) CDB:
    ///   byte 0  = operation code 0xA4
    ///   bytes 8-9 = allocation length, big-endian
    ///   byte 10 = (AGID << 6) | (key_format & 0x3F)
    /// All other bytes are zero.
    ///
    /// Grounding: MMC REPORT KEY CDB; the AGID is the top 2 bits of byte 10,
    /// key format the low 6 bits.
    /// Mutation: change `(alloc_len >> 8)` to `alloc_len` for byte 8 (lose the
    /// big-endian split) -> byte 8/9 assert fails. Change `agid << 6` to
    /// `agid << 5` -> the AGID-position assert fails.
    #[test]
    fn report_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
        let cdb = report_key_cdb(0b10, 0x04, 0x010C); // AGID=2, format=0x04, len=268
        assert_eq!(cdb[0], 0xA4, "REPORT KEY opcode");
        assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x01, "alloc_len high byte (big-endian)");
        assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x0C, "alloc_len low byte");
        assert_eq!(
            cdb[10],
            (0b10 << 6) | 0x04,
            "AGID in bits 6-7, format in bits 0-5"
        );
        // Every other byte must be zero.
        for (i, &b) in cdb.iter().enumerate() {
            if ![0, 8, 9, 10].contains(&i) {
                assert_eq!(b, 0, "CDB byte {i} must be zero");
            }
        }
        assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12, "REPORT KEY is a 12-byte CDB");
    }

    /// The key format field is masked to 6 bits: a format with high bits set
    /// must not corrupt the AGID. report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, _) -> byte 10 low 6
    /// bits = 0x3F, AGID = 0.
    ///
    /// Grounding: `(agid << 6) | (format & 0x3F)`.
    /// Mutation: drop the `& 0x3F` mask -> 0xFF would overwrite the AGID bits;
    /// byte 10 would be 0xFF not 0x3F, this fails.
    #[test]
    fn report_key_cdb_masks_format_to_6_bits() {
        let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0xFF, 8);
        assert_eq!(cdb[10], 0x3F, "format masked to 6 bits, AGID stays 0");
    }

    /// send_key_cdb encodes a 12-byte MMC SEND KEY (opcode 0xA3) CDB with the
    /// parameter-list length at bytes 8-9 (big-endian) and AGID/format at byte
    /// 10.
    ///
    /// Grounding: MMC SEND KEY CDB layout.
    /// Mutation: change opcode to SCSI_REPORT_KEY -> opcode assert fails;
    /// swap bytes 8/9 -> length assert fails.
    #[test]
    fn send_key_cdb_matches_mmc_layout() {
        let cdb = send_key_cdb(0b11, 0x03, 0x000C); // AGID=3, format=3, param_len=12
        assert_eq!(cdb[0], 0xA3, "SEND KEY opcode");
        assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x00, "param_len high byte");
        assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x0C, "param_len low byte");
        assert_eq!(
            cdb[10],
            (0b11 << 6) | 0x03,
            "AGID bits 6-7, format bits 0-5"
        );
        assert_eq!(cdb.len(), 12);
    }

    /// Allocation length larger than 255 must split across bytes 8 (high) and
    /// 9 (low) — a 16-bit big-endian field. report_key_cdb with alloc_len
    /// 0x0804 (2052, the disc-key block size used in read_disc_key) -> byte 8
    /// = 0x08, byte 9 = 0x04.
    ///
    /// Grounding: read_disc_key uses `alloc_len = 2048 + 4 = 2052 = 0x0804`
    /// and writes `cdb[8] = (alloc_len >> 8); cdb[9] = alloc_len`.
    /// Mutation: write only byte 9 (`cdb[9] = alloc_len as u8`) without byte 8
    /// -> the drive sees a 4-byte transfer, truncating the disc-key block;
    /// this asserts the high byte is present.
    #[test]
    fn report_key_cdb_alloc_len_is_16bit_big_endian() {
        let cdb = report_key_cdb(0, 0x00, 0x0804);
        assert_eq!(cdb[8], 0x08, "high byte of 2052-byte transfer");
        assert_eq!(cdb[9], 0x04, "low byte of 2052-byte transfer");
    }
}