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//! AACS encryption resolution — key derivation, SCSI handshake, VUK lookup.
use super::*;
use crate::error::{Error, Result};
use crate::sector::SectorSource;
use crate::udf;
/// Result of SCSI AACS handshake (ECDH authentication).
/// Only available when scanning from a real drive, not ISO images.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) struct HandshakeResult {
pub volume_id: [u8; 16],
pub read_data_key: Option<[u8; 16]>,
}
impl Disc {
/// SCSI handshake result — volume ID and bus keys from ECDH authentication.
/// Only available when scanning from a real drive (not ISO images).
pub(super) fn do_handshake(
session: &mut crate::drive::Drive,
opts: &ScanOptions,
) -> Option<HandshakeResult> {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_entry",
"do_handshake entered"
);
let keydb_path = match opts.resolve_keydb() {
Some(p) => p,
None => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_no_keydb",
"no KEYDB found in search paths; handshake skipped"
);
return None;
}
};
let keydb = match KeyDb::load(&keydb_path) {
Ok(db) => db,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_keydb_load_failed",
io_error_kind = ?e.kind(),
keydb = %keydb_path.display(),
"KEYDB load failed; handshake skipped"
);
return None;
}
};
let host_cert_count = keydb.host_certs.len();
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_start",
host_cert_count,
keydb = %keydb_path.display(),
"handshake starting"
);
// v0.25.7 wedge fix. Pre-0.25.7 this loop fired up to 16 AACS
// authenticate attempts back-to-back with no pause. Each attempt
// is 5-10 SCSI REPORT_KEY/SEND_KEY exchanges. On a disc whose
// host cert isn't in our KEYDB (or one the drive rejects),
// that's 80-160 SCSI commands hammered at the drive in a
// few hundred milliseconds — and the BU40N (and most consumer
// optical drives) responds by entering a fast-fail firmware
// wedge state where every subsequent CDB returns
// ILLEGAL_REQUEST/INVALID_FIELD_IN_CDB (sense 05/24) until
// power-cycled. Hit live on rip1 2026-05-20 during a Barbie
// UHD scan: KEYDB miss → 16 cert attempts in a tight loop →
// wedge → forced host reboot + drive disconnect to recover.
//
// Defense-in-depth: cap attempts, sleep between, and bail
// early on the drive's wedge sense so any later regression
// can't undo the protection silently.
const MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;
const PER_CERT_BACKOFF_MS: u64 = 1000;
let mut last_err_code: Option<u16> = None;
for (idx, hc) in keydb.host_certs.iter().take(MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS).enumerate() {
if idx > 0 {
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(PER_CERT_BACKOFF_MS));
}
match aacs::handshake::aacs_authenticate(session, &hc.private_key, &hc.certificate) {
Ok(mut auth) => {
let volume_id = match aacs::handshake::read_volume_id(session, &mut auth) {
Ok(vid) => vid,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_vid_read_failed",
cert_index = idx,
error_code = e.code(),
"auth ok but volume ID read failed"
);
return None;
}
};
let read_data_key = aacs::handshake::read_data_keys(session, &mut auth)
.ok()
.map(|(rdk, _)| rdk);
tracing::debug!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_ok",
cert_index = idx,
has_read_data_key = read_data_key.is_some(),
);
return Some(HandshakeResult {
volume_id,
read_data_key,
});
}
Err(e) => {
let code = e.code();
last_err_code = Some(code);
// Drive wedge senses (any with high byte 0x05 =
// ILLEGAL_REQUEST). The drive isn't merely
// rejecting our cert — it's saying "I won't talk
// to you anymore." Trying more certs makes the
// wedge worse. Bail out immediately.
let sense_key = ((code >> 8) & 0xFF) as u8;
if sense_key == 0x05 {
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_wedge_detected",
cert_index = idx,
error_code = code,
"drive returned ILLEGAL_REQUEST during auth; bailing out to avoid wedge"
);
return None;
}
continue;
}
}
}
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "handshake_all_certs_failed",
host_cert_count,
tried = host_cert_count.min(MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS),
last_error_code = last_err_code,
"all host certs in KEYDB rejected by drive (capped at {} attempts to prevent firmware wedge)",
MAX_CERT_ATTEMPTS
);
// All host certs failed — return None, not a fake success
None
}
/// Resolve disc encryption — AACS 1.0, AACS 2.0, CSS, or none.
///
/// Reads AACS files from UDF (via SectorSource), resolves keys through
/// whatever path works: KEYDB VUK lookup, media key derivation, processing
/// keys, device keys. Uses handshake result (volume ID, bus key) if available.
pub(super) fn resolve_encryption(
udf_fs: &udf::UdfFs,
reader: &mut dyn SectorSource,
keydb_path: &std::path::Path,
handshake: Option<&HandshakeResult>,
) -> Result<AacsState> {
use crate::aacs::{self, KeyDb};
let keydb = KeyDb::load(keydb_path).map_err(|_| Error::KeydbLoad {
path: keydb_path.display().to_string(),
})?;
// Read AACS files from disc/image via UDF
let uk_ro_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Unit_Key_RO.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/DUPLICATE/Unit_Key_RO.inf"))
.map_err(|_| Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
// Log the disc hash so we can confirm whether it's present in KEYDB
// when key resolution fails. The disc hash is SHA-1 of the full
// Unit_Key_RO.inf file bytes — same value KEYDB.cfg keys VUK entries by.
let dh = crate::aacs::disc_hash(&uk_ro_data);
let dh_hex = crate::aacs::disc_hash_hex(&dh);
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_disc_hash",
disc_hash = %dh_hex,
uk_ro_len = uk_ro_data.len(),
"disc hash computed (compare with keydb.cfg entries)"
);
let cc_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content000.cer")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/Content001.cer"))
.ok();
let mkb_data = udf_fs
.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RW.inf")
.or_else(|_| udf_fs.read_file(reader, "/AACS/MKB_RO.inf"))
.ok();
let mkb_ver = mkb_data.as_deref().and_then(aacs::mkb_version);
let mkb_first_64_hex = mkb_data
.as_deref()
.map(|m| {
m.iter()
.take(64)
.map(|b| format!("{b:02x}"))
.collect::<String>()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::warn!(
target: "freemkv::disc",
phase = "scan_aacs_mkb_info",
mkb_present = mkb_data.is_some(),
mkb_len = mkb_data.as_deref().map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0),
mkb_version = ?mkb_ver,
mkb_first_64 = %mkb_first_64_hex,
keydb_disc_count = keydb.disc_entries.len(),
keydb_dk_count = keydb.device_keys.len(),
keydb_pk_count = keydb.processing_keys.len(),
"AACS resolution inputs"
);
// Use handshake volume ID if available, otherwise zeros
// (KEYDB VUK lookup by disc hash works without volume ID)
let volume_id = handshake.map(|h| h.volume_id).unwrap_or([0u8; 16]);
let read_data_key = handshake.and_then(|h| h.read_data_key);
// Resolve: tries all available paths — KEYDB VUK, media key, processing key, device key
let resolved = aacs::resolve_keys(
&uk_ro_data,
cc_data.as_deref(),
&volume_id,
&keydb,
mkb_data.as_deref(),
)
.ok_or(Error::AacsNoKeys)?;
Ok(AacsState {
version: if resolved.aacs2 { 2 } else { 1 },
bus_encryption: resolved.bus_encryption,
mkb_version: mkb_ver,
disc_hash: aacs::disc_hash_hex(&resolved.disc_hash),
key_source: match resolved.key_source {
1 => KeySource::KeyDb,
2 => KeySource::KeyDbDerived,
3 => KeySource::ProcessingKey,
4 => KeySource::DeviceKey,
_ => KeySource::KeyDb,
},
vuk: resolved.vuk,
unit_keys: resolved.unit_keys,
read_data_key,
volume_id,
})
}
}