= "eu-ai-act-deployer"
= "0.1.0"
= "EU AI Act deployer alignment: Art. 26(6) retention, Art. 10(5) regulated-identifier redaction, Art. 14(4)(e) budget cap, egress denied (framework pin: OJ L 2024/1689; mapping: compliance/mappings/eu-ai-act.toml)"
= "strict-redaction"
[]
# Art. 14(4)(e): a hard cap is the technical intervention point — runaway
# context assembly stops here, with budget_warning fired before exhaustion.
= 12000
# Art. 26(6): deployers keep logs >= 6 months; one year covers annual audits.
= 365
# Art. 15(5): web fetches are the exfiltration sink for deployer codebases.
= ["ctx_url_read"]
[]
# Art. 10(5): special-category and regulated personal identifiers must not
# enter model context. Labeled DOB (label anchors the match across formats).
= '(?i)\b(dob|date[ _-]?of[ _-]?birth)\b[ :=#]*\d{1,4}[-/.]\d{1,2}[-/.]\d{1,4}'
# National identifiers: US SSN shape (grouped).
= '\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b'
# Financial identifiers tied to natural persons.
= '\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\b'
= '\b\d{4}[ -]?\d{4}[ -]?\d{4}[ -]?\d{1,7}\b'
[]
# Art. 10(5) (GL #675): special-category/regulated identifiers are filtered out
# of inbound context. Art. 15(5): prompt-injection in retrieved content is an
# integrity attack and is refused.
= "redact"
= "block"
[]
# Art. 15(5) cybersecurity (GL #676): secrets/PII must not leave via agent
# writes/actions; the write/action rate is bounded.
= true
= 120