lean-ctx-proxy 3.12.1

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

//! Upstream URL construction and request/response header relay.

#[allow(clippy::wildcard_imports)]
use super::*;

#[test]
fn upstream_url_preserves_subpath() {
    let base = "https://api.anthropic.com";
    let parts = parts_for("/v1/messages/count_tokens");
    assert_eq!(
        crate::codec::build_upstream_url(&parts, base, "/v1/messages"),
        "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages/count_tokens"
    );
}

#[test]
fn upstream_url_preserves_batches_subpath() {
    let base = "https://api.anthropic.com";
    let parts = parts_for("/v1/messages/batches/batch_123/results");
    assert_eq!(
        crate::codec::build_upstream_url(&parts, base, "/v1/messages"),
        "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages/batches/batch_123/results"
    );
}

#[test]
fn upstream_url_exact_path() {
    let base = "https://api.anthropic.com";
    let parts = parts_for("/v1/messages");
    assert_eq!(
        crate::codec::build_upstream_url(&parts, base, "/v1/messages"),
        "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages"
    );
}

#[test]
fn upstream_url_preserves_query_params() {
    let base = "https://api.anthropic.com";
    let parts = parts_for("/v1/messages/count_tokens?model=claude-4");
    assert_eq!(
        crate::codec::build_upstream_url(&parts, base, "/v1/messages"),
        "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages/count_tokens?model=claude-4"
    );
}

#[test]
fn forwards_openai_project_and_auth_headers() {
    // #366: project-scoped OpenAI keys carry the scope via `OpenAI-Project`.
    // It must be forwarded upstream, otherwise the Responses API rejects the
    // call with `Missing scopes: api.responses.write`.
    for required in ["authorization", "openai-project", "openai-organization"] {
        assert!(
            ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&required),
            "request header `{required}` must be forwarded upstream"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn forwards_chatgpt_codex_oauth_headers() {
    for required in [
        "authorization",
        "chatgpt-account-id",
        "x-openai-fedramp",
        "x-openai-internal-codex-residency",
        "x-openai-product-sku",
        "oai-product-sku",
        "x-client-request-id",
        "x-codex-installation-id",
        "x-codex-turn-metadata",
        "x-openai-subagent",
        "x-codex-turn-state",
        "originator",
    ] {
        assert!(
            is_allowed_request_header(required),
            "request header `{required}` must be forwarded upstream"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn forwards_streamable_http_mcp_headers() {
    for required in ["mcp-session-id", "last-event-id"] {
        assert!(
            ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&required),
            "request header `{required}` must be forwarded upstream"
        );
    }
    assert!(
        is_forwarded_response_header("mcp-session-id"),
        "MCP session id response header must be forwarded downstream"
    );
}

#[test]
fn forwards_grok_cli_chat_proxy_headers() {
    // Grok CLI → cli-chat-proxy.grok.com. Stripping these used to yield
    // HTTP 426 Upgrade Required with client-version "(none)" on /responses.
    for required in [
        "x-xai-token-auth",
        "x-models-etag",
        "x-grok-client-version",
        "x-grok-client-identifier",
        "x-grok-client-mode",
        "x-grok-client-surface",
        "x-grok-model-override",
        "x-grok-agent-id",
        "x-grok-session-id",
        "x-grok-turn-id",
        "x-grok-conv-id",
        "x-grok-req-id",
        "x-grok-deployment-id",
        "x-grok-user-id",
        "x-grok-context-window",
        "x-grok-max-completion-tokens",
        "x-grok-doom-loop-check",
        "x-grok-managed-gateway",
    ] {
        assert!(
            ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&required),
            "request header `{required}` must be on the allowlist"
        );
    }
    // Internal gateway tag must stay off the allowlist (enterprise#11).
    assert!(!is_allowed_request_header("x-leanctx-project"));
    // The presenter capability is a host-internal secret: never on the
    // allowlist, in no spelling the relay would accept.
    assert!(!is_allowed_request_header(
        crate::request_project::PRESENTER_HEADER
    ));
    assert!(!should_forward_request_header(
        crate::request_project::PRESENTER_HEADER,
        true
    ));
}

#[test]
fn forwards_codex_state_response_headers() {
    for required in [
        "x-codex-turn-state",
        "x-codex-primary-used-percent",
        "openai-model",
        "x-models-etag",
        "x-reasoning-included",
        "x-oai-request-id",
        "cf-ray",
        "x-openai-authorization-error",
        "x-error-json",
    ] {
        assert!(
            is_forwarded_response_header(required),
            "response header `{required}` must be forwarded downstream"
        );
    }
}

/// #1638: Claude Code fills its plan-usage windows *only* from the
/// `anthropic-ratelimit-unified-*` response headers. The allowlist enumerated
/// the four legacy `requests-`/`tokens-` names, so when the `unified-*` family
/// arrived upstream the proxy silently dropped all of it: `rate_limits`
/// disappeared from the statusline payload, and — the part that actually
/// matters — the near-limit warning machinery reads the same state, so a user
/// behind the proxy was never warned before hitting a limit.
///
/// The names below are the full family as parsed by Claude Code 2.1.236,
/// quoted from the report. They are asserted individually rather than through
/// the prefix, so narrowing the rule back to an enumeration fails here.
#[test]
fn forwards_the_whole_anthropic_ratelimit_family() {
    for required in [
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-status",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-reset",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-utilization",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-reset",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-5h-surpassed-threshold",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-utilization",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-reset",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-7d-surpassed-threshold",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-grace-status",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-grace-5h-utilization",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-grace-7d-utilization",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-status",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-utilization",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-reset",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-overage-period",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-representative-claim",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-fallback",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-unified-upgrade-paths",
        // The legacy names the allowlist used to carry explicitly must keep
        // working — the prefix replaced the enumeration, not the coverage.
        "anthropic-ratelimit-requests-limit",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-requests-remaining",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-tokens-limit",
        "anthropic-ratelimit-tokens-remaining",
    ] {
        assert!(
            is_forwarded_response_header(required),
            "response header `{required}` carries the client's own quota state \
             and must reach it"
        );
    }
}

/// Also reported in #1638: without `request-id` a user cannot correlate a
/// failed request with Anthropic support, and `x-should-retry` is what tells
/// an SDK whether a failure is worth retrying at all.
#[test]
fn forwards_request_correlation_and_retry_headers() {
    for required in ["request-id", "x-should-retry", "retry-after"] {
        assert!(
            is_forwarded_response_header(required),
            "response header `{required}` must reach the client"
        );
    }
}

/// The fix widens one family; it must not turn the allowlist into a
/// pass-through. Hop-by-hop and framing headers stay out — the proxy rewrites
/// the body (decompression, SSE re-framing), so relaying the upstream's
/// framing would describe a response that no longer exists.
#[test]
fn the_allowlist_stays_an_allowlist() {
    for denied in [
        "transfer-encoding",
        "connection",
        "content-length",
        "server",
        "set-cookie",
    ] {
        assert!(
            !is_forwarded_response_header(denied),
            "`{denied}` must not be relayed"
        );
    }
}

#[test]
fn chatgpt_responses_use_openai_responses_holdout_key() {
    let _iso = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    lean_ctx::core::config::Config::update_global(|c| {
        c.proxy.output_holdout = Some(1.0);
    })
    .unwrap();

    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "model": "gpt-5",
        "input": "same conversation",
    });

    assert_eq!(
        cohort_arm(&body, "ChatGPT", "/backend-api/codex/responses"),
        cohort_arm(&body, "OpenAI", "/v1/responses")
    );
}

#[test]
fn cache_prompt_hash_is_content_sensitive() {
    let hash = super::super::super::ocla_cache_bridge::prompt_hash;
    assert_ne!(hash(b"one"), hash(b"two"));
}

/// Loopback upstream that answers exactly one request and hands back its raw,
/// lowercased request header block. Lets a test assert what actually leaves the
/// proxy, not only what the allowlist constant claims.
async fn upstream_capturing_headers() -> (String, tokio::task::JoinHandle<String>) {
    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
    let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
        let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
        let mut request = Vec::new();
        let mut buffer = [0_u8; 1024];
        let header_end = loop {
            let read = stream.read(&mut buffer).await.unwrap();
            if read == 0 {
                break request.len();
            }
            request.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..read]);
            if let Some(end) = request.windows(4).position(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
                break end + 4;
            }
        };
        stream
            .write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 2\r\n\r\n{}")
            .await
            .unwrap();
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&request[..header_end]).to_lowercase()
    });
    (format!("http://{address}"), server)
}

/// Minimal state for the transport layer. `send_upstream` reads only
/// `state.client`; the watch receiver keeps serving its last value after the
/// sender drops, so no keep-alive is needed.
fn relay_test_state() -> ProxyState {
    let (_upstreams, state_upstreams) =
        tokio::sync::watch::channel(Arc::new(lean_ctx::core::config::Upstreams {
            anthropic: "https://api.anthropic.com".into(),
            openai: "https://api.openai.com".into(),
            chatgpt: "https://chatgpt.com".into(),
            gemini: "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com".into(),
            providers: Vec::new(),
        }));
    ProxyState {
        client: reqwest::Client::new(),
        port: 0,
        stats: Arc::new(crate::ProxyStats::default()),
        break_even: Arc::new(crate::break_even::BreakEvenCalculator::new(1500)),
        introspect: Arc::new(crate::introspect::IntrospectState::default()),
        ocla_cache: None,
        upstreams: state_upstreams,
        chatgpt_cookies: crate::chatgpt_cookies::shared_chatgpt_cloudflare_cookie_store(),
        mcp_servers: Arc::new(Vec::new()),
    }
}

/// The transport sends admitted bodies only: admit the empty-context `{}`
/// these header tests relay and bind it, with `head`, to the loopback
/// upstream.
async fn admitted_relay_body(
    upstream: &str,
    head: crate::admitted::RequestHead,
) -> crate::admitted::AdmittedBody {
    let target = lean_ctx::core::context_admission::egress::EgressTarget {
        provider: "Anthropic",
        model: None,
        upstream_base: upstream,
    };
    let admission = crate::admitted::admit(
        crate::admitted::Payload::Opaque(0),
        &target,
        lean_ctx::core::context_admission::egress::TrustedDestinationBinding::default(),
    )
    .expect("an empty payload is admitted");
    crate::admitted::AdmittedBody::bind(
        admission,
        b"{}".to_vec(),
        upstream,
        upstream,
        head,
        2,
        None,
    )
    .await
    .expect("the admitted body binds to its own upstream")
}

fn built_head(value: &'static str) -> crate::admitted::RequestHead {
    crate::admitted::RequestHead::new(
        reqwest::Method::POST,
        [(
            axum::http::HeaderName::from_static("x-built"),
            axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static(value),
        )],
    )
}

/// AP10-C2: the caller's code that finished a request could add, change or
/// drop headers after the body was bound, and they left with it. Now the
/// head is bound with the body: a request whose finished head is not the
/// bound one is refused before it is handed to the client.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(cache_telemetry)]
async fn a_header_the_bound_head_does_not_carry_is_not_sent() {
    let _data = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let _community = lean_ctx::core::policy::runtime::TestPolicyOverride::set(None);
    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let upstream = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
    let body = admitted_relay_body(&upstream, built_head("bound")).await;
    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
    let later: [fn(reqwest::RequestBuilder) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder; 2] = [
        |request| request.header("authorization", "Bearer later"),
        |request| request.header("x-built", "changed"),
    ];
    for decorate in later {
        let refused = body.send(&client, 1, decorate).await;
        let Err(refusal) = refused else {
            panic!("a request with another head was handed to the client");
        };
        assert_eq!(
            refusal.response("Anthropic").headers()[crate::admitted::REASON_CODES_HEADER],
            "egress.head_unbound"
        );
    }
    assert!(
        tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200), listener.accept())
            .await
            .is_err(),
        "the upstream sees no connection"
    );
}

/// The authority is proven on the request that is actually sent. A policy
/// that changes while the caller's own code builds the request stops it:
/// the first attempt of an admitted body goes out, the next one of the same
/// body does not, and the upstream sees exactly one connection.
#[tokio::test]
#[serial_test::serial(cache_telemetry)]
async fn a_policy_change_while_the_request_is_built_stops_the_send() {
    let _data = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let _community = lean_ctx::core::policy::runtime::TestPolicyOverride::set(None);
    write_gateway_config("[context_gateway]\nmode = \"developer\"\n");
    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let upstream = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr().unwrap());
    let body = admitted_relay_body(&upstream, built_head("live")).await;
    let client = reqwest::Client::new();
    let built = std::cell::Cell::new(0);

    // Live: the decorated request reaches the bound upstream. The answer
    // closes the connection, so a second dispatch would have to open one.
    let serve = async {
        let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
        let mut request = Vec::new();
        let mut buffer = [0_u8; 1024];
        while !request.windows(4).any(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
            let read = stream.read(&mut buffer).await.unwrap();
            assert!(read > 0, "the request ended before its headers");
            request.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..read]);
        }
        stream
            .write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nconnection: close\r\ncontent-length: 2\r\n\r\n{}")
            .await
            .unwrap();
        String::from_utf8_lossy(&request).to_lowercase()
    };
    let (first, seen) = tokio::join!(
        body.send(&client, 1, |request| {
            built.set(built.get() + 1);
            request
        }),
        serve
    );
    assert!(first.is_ok_and(|attempt| {
        attempt
            .response
            .is_ok_and(|response| response.status().is_success())
    }));
    assert!(seen.contains("x-built: live"), "{seen}");

    // The same admitted body again; the policy changes inside the caller's
    // decoration, after the first proof and before the request would leave.
    let refused = body
        .send(&client, 2, |request| {
            built.set(built.get() + 1);
            write_gateway_config("[context_gateway]\nmode = \"governed\"\n");
            request
        })
        .await;
    assert_eq!(built.get(), 2, "both requests were really built");
    let Err(refusal) = refused else {
        panic!("a request built under a changed policy was handed to the client");
    };
    assert_eq!(
        refusal.response("Anthropic").headers()[crate::admitted::REASON_CODES_HEADER],
        "policy.changed"
    );
    assert!(
        tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200), listener.accept())
            .await
            .is_err(),
        "the ready upstream must see no second connection"
    );
}

#[test]
fn forwards_opencode_session_header() {
    // #1752: OpenCode (and OpenCode zen) key session affinity off their own
    // header. #1730 enumerated only the Claude Code spellings, so this sibling
    // kept being stripped and every relayed request looked like a new session.
    assert!(ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&"x-opencode-session"));
    assert!(is_allowed_request_header("x-opencode-session"));
    assert!(should_forward_request_header("x-opencode-session", false));
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn opencode_session_reaches_the_upstream_verbatim() {
    let _data = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let _community = lean_ctx::core::policy::runtime::TestPolicyOverride::set(None);
    // #1752 end-to-end: assert what the upstream actually receives, including
    // the mixed-case spelling OpenCode puts on the wire.
    let (upstream, server) = upstream_capturing_headers().await;
    let parts = Request::builder()
        .method("POST")
        .uri("/v1/messages")
        .header("X-OpenCode-Session", "0f9c2b71-4d3a-4e58-9c11-7a6e5b2d8f40")
        .header("X-Leanctx-Project", "internal-only")
        .header("X-Leanctx-Presenter", format!("lcp1_{}", "c3".repeat(32)))
        .body(())
        .unwrap()
        .into_parts()
        .0;

    let body = admitted_relay_body(&upstream, transport::forwarded_head(&parts, false)).await;
    let response = transport::send_upstream(&relay_test_state(), &body, "Anthropic")
        .await
        .unwrap()
        .response;
    assert!(response.status().is_success());

    let seen = server.await.unwrap();
    assert!(
        seen.contains("x-opencode-session: 0f9c2b71-4d3a-4e58-9c11-7a6e5b2d8f40"),
        "session header must reach the upstream verbatim, got: {seen}"
    );
    // Widening the allowlist for #1752 must not widen it for anything else.
    assert!(
        !seen.contains("x-leanctx-project"),
        "internal header must stay stripped, got: {seen}"
    );
    // The relay drops a presenter capability even where the handler did not
    // take it out of the headers first (this call bypasses the handler).
    assert!(
        !seen.contains("x-leanctx-presenter") && !seen.contains(&"c3".repeat(32)),
        "a presenter capability must never reach the upstream"
    );

    // The handler's own step: read from the headers only, removed there, and
    // exactly one well-formed value counts.
    let header = crate::request_project::PRESENTER_HEADER;
    let mut headers = parts.headers.clone();
    assert!(crate::request_project::take_presenter(&mut headers).is_some());
    assert!(
        !headers.contains_key(header),
        "taken out of the request before anything else sees it"
    );
    for _ in 0..2 {
        headers.append(header, parts.headers[header].clone());
    }
    assert!(crate::request_project::take_presenter(&mut headers).is_none());
    assert!(!headers.contains_key(header));
}

#[test]
fn forwards_claude_code_session_id_header() {
    // #1730: Claude Code's per-conversation UUID must survive the relay so a
    // downstream proxy can key session affinity and prompt-cache reuse on it.
    assert!(ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&"x-claude-code-session-id"));
    assert!(is_allowed_request_header("x-claude-code-session-id"));
    assert!(should_forward_request_header(
        "x-claude-code-session-id",
        false
    ));
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn claude_code_session_id_reaches_the_upstream_verbatim() {
    let _data = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let _community = lean_ctx::core::policy::runtime::TestPolicyOverride::set(None);
    // #1730 end-to-end: assert what the upstream actually receives, including
    // the mixed-case spelling Claude Code puts on the wire.
    let (upstream, server) = upstream_capturing_headers().await;
    let parts = Request::builder()
        .method("POST")
        .uri("/v1/messages")
        .header(
            "X-Claude-Code-Session-Id",
            "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
        )
        .header("X-Leanctx-Project", "internal-only")
        .body(())
        .unwrap()
        .into_parts()
        .0;

    let body = admitted_relay_body(&upstream, transport::forwarded_head(&parts, false)).await;
    let response = transport::send_upstream(&relay_test_state(), &body, "Anthropic")
        .await
        .unwrap()
        .response;
    assert!(response.status().is_success());

    let seen = server.await.unwrap();
    assert!(
        seen.contains("x-claude-code-session-id: 11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555"),
        "session id must reach the upstream verbatim, got: {seen}"
    );
    // Widening the allowlist for #1730 must not widen it for anything else:
    // the internal gateway tag stays stripped (enterprise#11).
    assert!(
        !seen.contains("x-leanctx-project"),
        "internal header must stay stripped, got: {seen}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn forwards_commandcode_cli_headers() {
    // Command Code (`cmd`) gates agent calls on `x-command-code-version`.
    // Stripping it yields 403 upgrade_required ("CLI is out of date").
    for required in [
        "x-command-code-version",
        "x-cli-environment",
        "x-oauth-token",
        "x-oauth-provider",
        "x-project-slug",
        "x-taste-learning",
        "x-taste-usage",
        "x-oss-primary-provider",
        "x-system-prompt-breakdown",
        "x-cmd-zdr",
        "x-session-id", // shared; pin so CC session stays wired
    ] {
        assert!(
            ALLOWED_REQUEST_HEADERS.contains(&required),
            "Command Code CLI header `{required}` must be on the request allowlist"
        );
    }
}

/// Stub upstream that answers `200 {}` and yields the exact request body
/// bytes it received, so a test can assert byte-identity on the wire.
async fn upstream_capturing_body() -> (String, tokio::task::JoinHandle<Vec<u8>>) {
    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
    let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
        let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
        let mut request = Vec::new();
        let mut buffer = [0_u8; 4096];
        let header_end = loop {
            let read = stream.read(&mut buffer).await.unwrap();
            request.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..read]);
            if let Some(end) = request.windows(4).position(|window| window == b"\r\n\r\n") {
                break end + 4;
            }
        };
        let header = String::from_utf8_lossy(&request[..header_end]).to_lowercase();
        let content_length = header
            .lines()
            .find_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("content-length: "))
            .unwrap()
            .trim()
            .parse::<usize>()
            .unwrap();
        while request.len() < header_end + content_length {
            let read = stream.read(&mut buffer).await.unwrap();
            request.extend_from_slice(&buffer[..read]);
        }
        stream
            .write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-length: 2\r\n\r\n{}")
            .await
            .unwrap();
        request[header_end..header_end + content_length].to_vec()
    });
    (format!("http://{address}"), server)
}

/// #1912: a request the proxy does not change must reach the provider as the
/// client's exact bytes. Re-serializing reorders keys and rewrites number and
/// whitespace formatting, which moves the prompt-cache prefix every turn.
#[tokio::test]
async fn unchanged_request_is_forwarded_byte_identical() {
    let _iso = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let _community = lean_ctx::core::policy::runtime::TestPolicyOverride::set(None);
    let (upstream, server) = upstream_capturing_body().await;
    // Key order, spacing and `1.0` all differ from serde_json's canonical form.
    let raw = br#"{ "temperature": 1.0,  "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5",
  "messages": [ {"role": "user", "content": "hi"} ] }"#
        .to_vec();
    let request = Request::builder()
        .method("POST")
        .uri("/v1/messages")
        .header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
        .body(Body::from(raw.clone()))
        .unwrap();

    let response = forward_request(
        State(relay_test_state()),
        request,
        &upstream,
        "/v1/messages",
        |value, original_size| {
            let out = serde_json::to_vec(&value).unwrap();
            let size = out.len();
            (out, original_size, size)
        },
        "Anthropic",
        &[],
    )
    .await
    .unwrap();
    assert!(response.status().is_success());

    assert_eq!(
        server.await.unwrap(),
        raw,
        "an unchanged request must be forwarded as the client's exact bytes"
    );
}

/// A model alias that targets a `[[proxy.providers]]` entry with `api_key_env`
/// moves a built-in route onto the operator's key. A request that only got in
/// through the provider-key fallback must not have that key injected.
#[tokio::test]
async fn routed_gateway_credential_requires_lean_ctx_token() {
    let _isolation = lean_ctx::core::data_dir::isolated_data_dir();
    let mut config = lean_ctx::core::config::Config::default();
    config.proxy.routing.enabled = Some(true);
    config
        .proxy
        .routing
        .aliases
        .insert("acme/fast".into(), "foundry:gpt-4o-mini".into());
    config.save().unwrap();
    lean_ctx::test_env::set_var("LC_TEST_GATEWAY_HELD_KEY", "sk-gateway-held");
    let body = serde_json::json!({
        "model": "acme/fast",
        "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}]
    });

    for fallback_only in [true, false] {
        let (upstream, server) = upstream_capturing_headers().await;
        let mut state = proxy_test_state("http://127.0.0.1:9");
        let (_sender, upstreams) =
            tokio::sync::watch::channel(Arc::new(lean_ctx::core::config::Upstreams {
                anthropic: "http://127.0.0.1:9".into(),
                openai: "http://127.0.0.1:9".into(),
                chatgpt: "http://127.0.0.1:9".into(),
                gemini: "http://127.0.0.1:9".into(),
                providers: vec![lean_ctx::core::config::ResolvedProvider {
                    id: "foundry".into(),
                    shape: lean_ctx::core::config::WireShape::OpenAi,
                    base_url: upstream,
                    api_key_env: Some("LC_TEST_GATEWAY_HELD_KEY".into()),
                    aws_region: None,
                    account_ref: None,
                    region: None,
                    local: true,
                }],
            }));
        state.upstreams = upstreams;
        let mut driver = proxy_test_driver(state, &body, "http://127.0.0.1:9");
        let request = driver.request.as_mut().unwrap();
        request
            .headers_mut()
            .insert("x-api-key", "caller-junk".parse().unwrap());
        if fallback_only {
            request
                .extensions_mut()
                .insert(crate::server::ProviderKeyFallback);
        }
        let context = proxy_test_context();
        driver.apply_security_boundaries(&context).await.unwrap();
        let prepared = driver.gather_context_strategy(&context).await;
        if fallback_only {
            assert_eq!(prepared.err(), Some(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED));
            server.abort();
        } else {
            prepared.unwrap();
            driver.dispatch_primitive(&context).await.unwrap();
            let headers = server.await.unwrap();
            assert!(
                headers.contains("authorization: bearer sk-gateway-held"),
                "token-authenticated alias traffic still gets the gateway key: {headers}"
            );
        }
    }
    lean_ctx::test_env::remove_var("LC_TEST_GATEWAY_HELD_KEY");
}