lean-ctx-engine 3.12.3

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//! Owner-only secret files.

/// Writes a secret file atomically (tmp + rename) with owner-only permissions
/// (0o600 on Unix), so secrets are never world-readable — not even
/// transiently between create and chmod.
pub(crate) fn write_secret_file(path: &std::path::Path, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    use std::io::Write;

    let parent = path
        .parent()
        .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("secret path has no parent directory"))?;
    let name = path
        .file_name()
        .ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other("secret path has no file name"))?
        .to_string_lossy();
    // A random part keeps two threads of one process writing the same path
    // from sharing a temporary file.
    let mut nonce = [0u8; 8];
    getrandom::fill(&mut nonce).map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
    let tmp = parent.join(format!(
        ".{name}.tmp.{}.{}",
        std::process::id(),
        hex::encode(nonce)
    ));

    let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
    opts.write(true).create_new(true);
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
        opts.mode(0o600);
    }

    let result = (|| {
        let mut f = opts.open(&tmp)?;
        f.write_all(bytes)?;
        f.sync_all()?;
        drop(f);
        // One atomic replace on every platform. Removing the target first on
        // Windows raced with concurrent writers: a rename onto a target whose
        // delete is still pending fails with ACCESS_DENIED.
        crate::core::atomic_fs::replace_file(&tmp, path)
    })();

    if result.is_err() {
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
    }
    result
}

/// Creates `dir` (and its parents) and restricts it to its owner (0700 on Unix). Errors name
/// the step and the path.
pub fn private_dir(dir: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    let step = |what: &str, e: std::io::Error| {
        std::io::Error::new(e.kind(), format!("{what} {}: {e}", dir.display()))
    };
    std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).map_err(|e| step("create", e))?;
    restrict_to_owner(dir).map_err(|e| step("restrict", e))
}

/// Sets `path` to mode 0700 on Unix, but only when its mode differs (GH #2227).
///
/// A `chmod` updates the inode's ctime and raises an inotify `IN_ATTRIB` event
/// even when the mode stays the same, so an unconditional chmod on a path that
/// runs per call floods watchers, backup and sync tools. Like `chmod`, this
/// follows a symlink at `path`. A no-op on other platforms.
pub fn restrict_to_owner(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    #[cfg(unix)]
    {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
        if std::fs::metadata(path)?.permissions().mode() & 0o7777 != 0o700 {
            std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;
        }
    }
    #[cfg(not(unix))]
    let _ = path;
    Ok(())
}

/// Writes `dir/name` so that it is never readable by others and never seen half-written:
/// [`private_dir`] and `write_secret_file`.
pub fn write_private(dir: &std::path::Path, name: &str, bytes: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
    private_dir(dir)?;
    write_secret_file(&dir.join(name), bytes).map_err(|e| {
        std::io::Error::new(e.kind(), format!("write {name} in {}: {e}", dir.display()))
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::write_secret_file;

    #[test]
    fn concurrent_writers_of_one_path_all_succeed_and_leave_one_whole_file() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let path = dir.path().join("secret.json");
        let writers: Vec<_> = (0..8u8)
            .map(|i| {
                let path = path.clone();
                std::thread::spawn(move || write_secret_file(&path, &[i; 64]))
            })
            .collect();
        for writer in writers {
            writer.join().unwrap().unwrap();
        }
        let written = std::fs::read(&path).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(written.len(), 64);
        assert!(written.iter().all(|byte| *byte == written[0]));
        let names: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir.path())
            .unwrap()
            .map(|entry| entry.unwrap().file_name())
            .collect();
        assert_eq!(names, ["secret.json"], "no temporary file is left");
        #[cfg(unix)]
        {
            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
            let mode = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode();
            assert_eq!(mode & 0o777, 0o600);
        }
    }

    /// GH #2227: a directory that is already 0700 is not chmodded again, so
    /// its ctime stays put and watchers see no `IN_ATTRIB` event.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn restrict_to_owner_leaves_a_private_dir_untouched() {
        use std::os::unix::fs::{MetadataExt as _, PermissionsExt as _};
        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let dir = tmp.path().join("data");
        std::fs::create_dir(&dir).unwrap();
        std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700)).unwrap();
        let ctime = |p: &std::path::Path| {
            let m = std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap();
            (m.ctime(), m.ctime_nsec())
        };
        let before = ctime(&dir);
        // Coarse ctime clocks: wait long enough for a chmod to be visible.
        std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1100));
        super::restrict_to_owner(&dir).unwrap();
        super::private_dir(&dir).unwrap();
        crate::core::data_dir::ensure_dir_permissions(&dir);
        assert_eq!(
            ctime(&dir),
            before,
            "an already private dir is not chmodded"
        );
    }

    /// GH #2227: the check does not weaken the guarantee — a 0755 directory
    /// is still tightened to 0700.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn restrict_to_owner_still_tightens_an_open_dir() {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt as _;
        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let mode =
            |p: &std::path::Path| std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o7777;
        for (i, restrict) in [
            (|p: &std::path::Path| super::restrict_to_owner(p).unwrap()) as fn(&std::path::Path),
            |p| super::private_dir(p).unwrap(),
            |p| crate::core::data_dir::ensure_dir_permissions(p),
        ]
        .into_iter()
        .enumerate()
        {
            let dir = tmp.path().join(format!("open-{i}"));
            std::fs::create_dir(&dir).unwrap();
            std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755)).unwrap();
            restrict(&dir);
            assert_eq!(mode(&dir), 0o700);
        }
    }
}