lean-ctx-engine 3.12.3

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//! Provable security events for the value surface.
//!
//! lean-ctx's default-on protections (secret redaction, the shell allowlist,
//! the path jail, prompt-injection screening) used to act silently: nothing a
//! user could later point to. This module turns each firing into
//!
//! 1. a hash-chained, signed [`crate::core::audit_trail`] entry — the proof, and
//! 2. a session counter ([`SecurityCounts`]) — what the status line shows.
//!
//! Counting is **once per tool result**. Deep code (redaction, allowlist) calls
//! [`note`], which only lands in the collector that
//! [`collect`] opens around one MCP tool handler; the dispatch layer then
//! records the tally for that single result. `note` outside a collector (CLI,
//! hooks, config loading) is deliberately dropped, so a secret redacted twice
//! on its way through nested passes, or a re-rendered cache entry outside a
//! tool call, never inflates the count. Undercounting is acceptable; claiming
//! more than happened is not. Prompt-injection flags go further: one per
//! flagged object per process ([`record_injections`]), however often the same
//! object is delivered again.
//!
//! The audit trail's `event_type` enum is **not** extended: an older binary
//! verifying a trail that contains an unknown variant would report it as
//! tampered. The kind is committed in the (hashed) `action` field instead.

use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::sync::Mutex;

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// What a protection did. The wording each kind renders with is part of the
/// honesty contract: injections are *flagged*, never "neutralized".
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SecurityKind {
    /// A secret was replaced by `[REDACTED:…]` before the model saw it.
    SecretRedacted,
    /// A shell command was refused by the allowlist / dangerous-pattern gate.
    ShellBlocked,
    /// A path outside the project jail was refused.
    PathBlocked,
    /// Tool output matched prompt-injection patterns and was flagged.
    InjectionFlagged,
    /// A checksum-validated PII value was masked by the context gateway.
    PiiRedacted,
    /// The context gateway withheld a source entirely.
    ContentWithheld,
    /// A source was delivered although a detector did not inspect all of it.
    CoverageIncomplete,
}

impl SecurityKind {
    /// Stable identifier committed into the audit trail's `action` field.
    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::SecretRedacted => "secret_redacted",
            Self::ShellBlocked => "shell_blocked",
            Self::PathBlocked => "path_blocked",
            Self::InjectionFlagged => "injection_flagged",
            Self::PiiRedacted => "pii_redacted",
            Self::ContentWithheld => "content_withheld",
            Self::CoverageIncomplete => "coverage_incomplete",
        }
    }

    /// Existing trail event types only: an unknown variant would read as
    /// tampering to an older verifier, so the kind lives in `action`.
    fn audit_event_type(self) -> crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEventType {
        use crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEventType;
        match self {
            Self::SecretRedacted | Self::PiiRedacted => AuditEventType::SecretDetected,
            Self::ShellBlocked | Self::ContentWithheld => AuditEventType::ToolDenied,
            Self::PathBlocked => AuditEventType::PathJailViolation,
            Self::InjectionFlagged | Self::CoverageIncomplete => AuditEventType::SecurityViolation,
        }
    }

    /// Parses the `action` prefix written by [`record`] back into a kind.
    pub fn from_action(action: &str) -> Option<Self> {
        let kind = action.split(':').next()?;
        Self::ALL.into_iter().find(|k| k.as_str() == kind)
    }

    /// Kinds a signed savings-batch tally carries; server mirrors verify the
    /// tally field by field and predate the context-gateway kinds.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn in_signed_tally(self) -> bool {
        matches!(
            self,
            Self::SecretRedacted | Self::ShellBlocked | Self::PathBlocked | Self::InjectionFlagged
        )
    }

    const ALL: [Self; 7] = [
        Self::SecretRedacted,
        Self::ShellBlocked,
        Self::PathBlocked,
        Self::InjectionFlagged,
        Self::PiiRedacted,
        Self::ContentWithheld,
        Self::CoverageIncomplete,
    ];
}

/// Per-kind event counts. Persisted inside `SessionStats`, so every field is
/// `serde(default)` and old session files load unchanged.
///
/// The context-gateway kinds are written only when non-zero: every count
/// serialized before they existed keeps its exact bytes (signed tallies, see
/// [`Self::signed_tally_projection`]).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(default)]
pub struct SecurityCounts {
    pub secrets_redacted: u64,
    pub shell_blocked: u64,
    pub path_blocked: u64,
    pub injection_flagged: u64,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "is_zero")]
    pub pii_redacted: u64,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "is_zero")]
    pub content_withheld: u64,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "is_zero")]
    pub coverage_incomplete: u64,
}

#[allow(clippy::trivially_copy_pass_by_ref)]
fn is_zero(n: &u64) -> bool {
    *n == 0
}

impl SecurityCounts {
    /// The counts a signed savings-batch tally carries. Server mirrors verify
    /// the tally field by field and do not know the gateway kinds yet, so they
    /// are left out (zero, hence not serialized) instead of breaking the
    /// signature; the audit trail still proves them locally.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn signed_tally_projection(&self) -> Self {
        Self {
            pii_redacted: 0,
            content_withheld: 0,
            coverage_incomplete: 0,
            ..*self
        }
    }

    pub const ZERO: Self = Self {
        secrets_redacted: 0,
        shell_blocked: 0,
        path_blocked: 0,
        injection_flagged: 0,
        pii_redacted: 0,
        content_withheld: 0,
        coverage_incomplete: 0,
    };

    fn slot(&mut self, kind: SecurityKind) -> &mut u64 {
        match kind {
            SecurityKind::SecretRedacted => &mut self.secrets_redacted,
            SecurityKind::ShellBlocked => &mut self.shell_blocked,
            SecurityKind::PathBlocked => &mut self.path_blocked,
            SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged => &mut self.injection_flagged,
            SecurityKind::PiiRedacted => &mut self.pii_redacted,
            SecurityKind::ContentWithheld => &mut self.content_withheld,
            SecurityKind::CoverageIncomplete => &mut self.coverage_incomplete,
        }
    }

    fn get(&self, kind: SecurityKind) -> u64 {
        match kind {
            SecurityKind::SecretRedacted => self.secrets_redacted,
            SecurityKind::ShellBlocked => self.shell_blocked,
            SecurityKind::PathBlocked => self.path_blocked,
            SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged => self.injection_flagged,
            SecurityKind::PiiRedacted => self.pii_redacted,
            SecurityKind::ContentWithheld => self.content_withheld,
            SecurityKind::CoverageIncomplete => self.coverage_incomplete,
        }
    }

    pub fn add(&mut self, kind: SecurityKind, n: u64) {
        let slot = self.slot(kind);
        *slot = slot.saturating_add(n);
    }

    pub fn merge(&mut self, other: &Self) {
        for kind in SecurityKind::ALL {
            self.add(kind, other.get(kind));
        }
    }

    /// Events since `base` (a counter never goes below zero).
    #[must_use]
    pub fn since(&self, base: &Self) -> Self {
        let mut out = Self::ZERO;
        for kind in SecurityKind::ALL {
            *out.slot(kind) = self.get(kind).saturating_sub(base.get(kind));
        }
        out
    }

    pub fn total(&self) -> u64 {
        SecurityKind::ALL
            .into_iter()
            .fold(0u64, |sum, kind| sum.saturating_add(self.get(kind)))
    }

    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
        self.total() == 0
    }

    fn iter(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (SecurityKind, u64)> + '_ {
        SecurityKind::ALL
            .into_iter()
            .map(|kind| (kind, self.get(kind)))
            .filter(|(_, n)| *n > 0)
    }
}

/// Why the I/O boundary refused a path a call asked for. The trail records
/// this class only: like every other entry, never the path, a digest of it
/// or any content.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum RefusalClass {
    /// A secret-like path (`.env`, key material, credential files): withheld.
    SecretPath,
    /// Outside the project root, its trusted roots or the Workspace.
    OutsideRoot,
    /// lean-ctx's own runtime context, or a symlink inside the jail.
    ProtectedPath,
}

impl RefusalClass {
    /// Stable identifier committed as `reason=` into the trail's `action`.
    pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::SecretPath => "secret_path",
            Self::OutsideRoot => "outside_root",
            Self::ProtectedPath => "protected_path",
        }
    }

    /// The counted kind: a secret path is withheld content; every other class
    /// is the path jail's existing `path_blocked`.
    pub const fn kind(self) -> SecurityKind {
        match self {
            Self::SecretPath => SecurityKind::ContentWithheld,
            Self::OutsideRoot | Self::ProtectedPath => SecurityKind::PathBlocked,
        }
    }

    /// The class of a path-jail refusal. A path that simply does not exist
    /// (or a malformed one) is no boundary decision and has none.
    pub fn of_jail_error(error: &crate::core::error::PathJailError) -> Option<Self> {
        use crate::core::error::PathJailError;
        match error {
            PathJailError::EscapesRoot { .. }
            | PathJailError::PostCanonicalizeEscape { .. }
            | PathJailError::OutsideWorkspace { .. }
            | PathJailError::WorkspaceUnavailable { .. } => Some(Self::OutsideRoot),
            PathJailError::ProtectedContext { .. } | PathJailError::Symlink { .. } => {
                Some(Self::ProtectedPath)
            }
            PathJailError::NullByte | PathJailError::NoExistingAncestor { .. } => None,
        }
    }

    const ALL: [Self; 3] = [Self::SecretPath, Self::OutsideRoot, Self::ProtectedPath];
}

/// What one tool call noted: the per-kind counts and the boundary refusals,
/// which are recorded with their [`RefusalClass`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct CallTally {
    pub counts: SecurityCounts,
    refusals: [u64; RefusalClass::ALL.len()],
}

impl CallTally {
    fn merge(&mut self, other: &Self) {
        self.counts.merge(&other.counts);
        for (mine, theirs) in self.refusals.iter_mut().zip(other.refusals) {
            *mine = mine.saturating_add(theirs);
        }
    }

    /// Refusals noted for `class`.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn refusals(&self, class: RefusalClass) -> u64 {
        self.refusals[class as usize]
    }
}

thread_local! {
    static COLLECTOR: RefCell<Option<CallTally>> = const { RefCell::new(None) };
}

/// Notes `n` firings of `kind` into the collector of the tool call running on
/// this thread. A no-op outside [`collect`] — see the module docs for why.
pub fn note(kind: SecurityKind, n: usize) {
    if n == 0 {
        return;
    }
    COLLECTOR.with(|c| {
        if let Some(tally) = c.borrow_mut().as_mut() {
            tally.counts.add(kind, n as u64);
        }
    });
}

/// Notes `n` boundary refusals of `class` into the running call's collector,
/// like [`note`] (a no-op outside one). A call that refuses several paths of
/// one class gets one trail entry carrying the count.
pub fn note_refusals(class: RefusalClass, n: usize) {
    if n == 0 {
        return;
    }
    COLLECTOR.with(|c| {
        if let Some(tally) = c.borrow_mut().as_mut() {
            let slot = &mut tally.refusals[class as usize];
            *slot = slot.saturating_add(n as u64);
        }
    });
}

/// Runs `f` (one synchronous tool handler) with a fresh collector and returns
/// what it noted. Nested calls keep the outer collector's tally intact.
pub fn collect<T>(f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> (T, SecurityCounts) {
    let (value, tally) = collect_call(f);
    (value, tally.counts)
}

/// [`collect`], including the call's boundary refusals ([`record_call`]).
pub fn collect_call<T>(f: impl FnOnce() -> T) -> (T, CallTally) {
    let outer = COLLECTOR.with(|c| c.borrow_mut().replace(CallTally::default()));
    let value = f();
    let tally = COLLECTOR
        .with(|c| std::mem::replace(&mut *c.borrow_mut(), outer))
        .unwrap_or_default();
    if let Some(mut outer) = outer {
        outer.merge(&tally);
        COLLECTOR.with(|c| *c.borrow_mut() = Some(outer));
    }
    (value, tally)
}

/// Counts recorded since the MCP server last drained them into its session.
static PENDING: Mutex<SecurityCounts> = Mutex::new(SecurityCounts::ZERO);

/// The session suffix of a trail `action`. The session id rides in the hashed
/// `action` field (the trail's timestamp is not hashed), so per-session
/// security claims are chain-backed.
fn session_suffix() -> String {
    crate::core::value::current_session()
        .map(|id| format!("|session={id}"))
        .unwrap_or_default()
}

/// The audit `action` of `n` refusals: the count first (older readers parse
/// `<kind>:<n>` up to the session), then the reason class, then the session.
fn refusal_action(class: RefusalClass, n: u64, session: &str) -> String {
    format!(
        "{}:{n}|reason={}{session}",
        class.kind().as_str(),
        class.as_str()
    )
}

/// Records `n` boundary refusals of `class` for one tool call: one trail
/// entry with the reason class (never the path) plus the session counter.
pub fn record_refusals(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, class: RefusalClass, n: u64) {
    if n == 0 {
        return;
    }
    let kind = class.kind();
    crate::core::audit_trail::record(crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEntryData {
        agent_id: agent_id.to_string(),
        tool: tool.to_string(),
        action: Some(refusal_action(class, n, &session_suffix())),
        input_hash: String::new(),
        output_tokens: 0,
        role: crate::core::roles::active_role_name(),
        event_type: kind.audit_event_type(),
    });
    if let Ok(mut pending) = PENDING.lock() {
        pending.add(kind, n);
    }
}

/// Records one tool call's [`CallTally`]: the counted kinds ([`record`]) and
/// one entry per refusal class.
pub fn record_call(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, tally: &CallTally) {
    record(tool, agent_id, &tally.counts);
    for class in RefusalClass::ALL {
        record_refusals(tool, agent_id, class, tally.refusals(class));
    }
}

/// Records one tool result's security tally: one audit-trail entry per kind
/// (the proof) plus the pending session counters (the display).
pub fn record(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, counts: &SecurityCounts) {
    if counts.is_empty() {
        return;
    }
    let role = crate::core::roles::active_role_name();
    let session = session_suffix();
    for (kind, n) in counts.iter() {
        crate::core::audit_trail::record(crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEntryData {
            agent_id: agent_id.to_string(),
            tool: tool.to_string(),
            action: Some(format!("{}:{n}{session}", kind.as_str())),
            input_hash: String::new(),
            output_tokens: 0,
            role: role.clone(),
            event_type: kind.audit_event_type(),
        });
    }
    if let Ok(mut pending) = PENDING.lock() {
        pending.merge(counts);
    }
}

/// One object the prompt-injection heuristic flagged: which pattern families
/// matched and the object's SHA-256 — never its content.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct InjectionFlag {
    /// Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the flagged object.
    pub object_sha256: String,
    /// [`crate::core::output_sanitizer::InjectionCategory`] bits.
    pub patterns: u8,
}

/// Flagged objects remembered per process (a few hundred KiB at most).
const SEEN_INJECTIONS_CAPACITY: usize = 4096;

/// Digests of flagged objects recorded by this process, bounded LRU.
static SEEN_INJECTIONS: Mutex<Option<lru::LruCache<String, ()>>> = Mutex::new(None);

/// Whether this process records `object_sha256` for the first time. The
/// proxy re-admits the unchanged history of every turn and agents re-read the
/// same files: the object is one finding, not one per delivery. Receipts
/// still carry the per-delivery signal.
fn first_sighting(object_sha256: &str) -> bool {
    let Ok(mut seen) = SEEN_INJECTIONS.lock() else {
        // Undercounting is acceptable; claiming more than happened is not.
        return false;
    };
    let seen = seen.get_or_insert_with(|| {
        lru::LruCache::new(
            std::num::NonZeroUsize::new(SEEN_INJECTIONS_CAPACITY).expect("non-zero capacity"),
        )
    });
    seen.put(object_sha256.to_owned(), ()).is_none()
}

/// The audit `action` of one flagged object: the count first (older readers
/// parse `<kind>:<n>` up to the session), then what matched and a short
/// object digest prefix, then the session.
fn injection_action(flag: &InjectionFlag, session: &str) -> String {
    let prefix: String = flag.object_sha256.chars().take(12).collect();
    format!(
        "{}:1|pattern={}|object={prefix}{session}",
        SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged.as_str(),
        crate::core::output_sanitizer::InjectionCategory::describe(flag.patterns),
    )
}

/// Records flagged objects: one audit-trail entry per object this process has
/// not recorded yet (with the pattern kinds and a digest prefix, never
/// content) plus the pending session counter. Returns how many were recorded.
pub fn record_injections(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, flags: &[InjectionFlag]) -> u64 {
    let fresh: Vec<&InjectionFlag> = flags
        .iter()
        .filter(|flag| first_sighting(&flag.object_sha256))
        .collect();
    if fresh.is_empty() {
        return 0;
    }
    let role = crate::core::roles::active_role_name();
    let session = crate::core::value::current_session()
        .map(|id| format!("|session={id}"))
        .unwrap_or_default();
    for flag in &fresh {
        crate::core::audit_trail::record(crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEntryData {
            agent_id: agent_id.to_string(),
            tool: tool.to_string(),
            action: Some(injection_action(flag, &session)),
            input_hash: String::new(),
            output_tokens: 0,
            role: role.clone(),
            event_type: SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged.audit_event_type(),
        });
    }
    let recorded = fresh.len() as u64;
    if let Ok(mut pending) = PENDING.lock() {
        pending.add(SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged, recorded);
    }
    recorded
}

/// Anchors a Context Gateway receipt in the signed, hash-chained audit trail:
/// the digest in the hashed `action` binds the stored receipt to the chain.
/// Not a counted kind (`parse_action` ignores it), so nothing is counted twice.
pub fn anchor_receipt(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, receipt_sha256_hex: &str) {
    let session = crate::core::value::current_session()
        .map(|id| format!("|session={id}"))
        .unwrap_or_default();
    crate::core::audit_trail::record(crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEntryData {
        agent_id: agent_id.to_string(),
        tool: tool.to_string(),
        action: Some(format!("gateway_receipt:{receipt_sha256_hex}{session}")),
        input_hash: String::new(),
        output_tokens: 0,
        role: crate::core::roles::active_role_name(),
        event_type: crate::core::audit_trail::AuditEventType::ToolCall,
    });
}

/// Convenience for a single event recorded outside a handler (dispatch layer).
pub fn record_one(tool: &str, agent_id: &str, kind: SecurityKind) {
    let mut counts = SecurityCounts::default();
    counts.add(kind, 1);
    record(tool, agent_id, &counts);
}

/// Takes the counts recorded since the last drain (the MCP server folds them
/// into the current session's stats).
pub fn drain_pending() -> SecurityCounts {
    PENDING
        .lock()
        .map(|mut pending| std::mem::take(&mut *pending))
        .unwrap_or_default()
}

/// Splits a recorded `action` (`<kind>:<n>[|<detail>…][|session=<id>]`) into
/// its parts; details (an injection flag's pattern kinds) are skipped.
pub fn parse_action(action: &str) -> Option<(SecurityKind, u64, Option<&str>)> {
    let kind = SecurityKind::from_action(action)?;
    let rest = action.split_once(':').map_or("", |(_, rest)| rest);
    let (head, session) = match rest.split_once("|session=") {
        Some((head, session)) => (head, Some(session)),
        None => (rest, None),
    };
    let n = head.split('|').next().unwrap_or(head);
    Some((kind, n.parse().unwrap_or(1), session))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn note_outside_collector_is_dropped() {
        note(SecurityKind::SecretRedacted, 3);
        let ((), tally) = collect(|| {});
        assert!(tally.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn collect_counts_only_its_own_handler() {
        let ((), tally) = collect(|| {
            note(SecurityKind::SecretRedacted, 2);
            note(SecurityKind::ShellBlocked, 1);
        });
        assert_eq!(tally.secrets_redacted, 2);
        assert_eq!(tally.shell_blocked, 1);
        assert_eq!(tally.total(), 3);

        let ((), next) = collect(|| {});
        assert!(
            next.is_empty(),
            "a collector never leaks into the next call"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn nested_collect_keeps_outer_total() {
        let ((), outer) = collect(|| {
            note(SecurityKind::PathBlocked, 1);
            let ((), inner) = collect(|| note(SecurityKind::PathBlocked, 1));
            assert_eq!(inner.path_blocked, 1);
        });
        assert_eq!(outer.path_blocked, 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn action_roundtrips_kind() {
        for kind in [
            SecurityKind::SecretRedacted,
            SecurityKind::ShellBlocked,
            SecurityKind::PathBlocked,
            SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged,
        ] {
            let action = format!("{}:4", kind.as_str());
            assert_eq!(SecurityKind::from_action(&action), Some(kind));
        }
        assert_eq!(SecurityKind::from_action("tool_call"), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_action_reads_count_and_session() {
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action("secret_redacted:3|session=abc"),
            Some((SecurityKind::SecretRedacted, 3, Some("abc")))
        );
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action("shell_blocked:1"),
            Some((SecurityKind::ShellBlocked, 1, None))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_flagged_object_is_recorded_once_per_process() {
        let object = "f".repeat(63) + "1";
        assert!(first_sighting(&object), "first delivery is recorded");
        assert!(!first_sighting(&object), "a re-read is not a new finding");
        assert!(first_sighting(&("f".repeat(63) + "2")));
    }

    #[test]
    fn injection_action_explains_without_content_and_parses() {
        let flag = InjectionFlag {
            object_sha256: "0123456789abcdef".repeat(4),
            patterns: crate::core::output_sanitizer::InjectionCategory::RoleMarker.bit(),
        };
        let action = injection_action(&flag, "|session=s1");
        assert_eq!(
            action,
            "injection_flagged:1|pattern=role_marker|object=0123456789ab|session=s1"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action(&action),
            Some((SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged, 1, Some("s1")))
        );
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action(&injection_action(&flag, "")),
            Some((SecurityKind::InjectionFlagged, 1, None))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn refusal_action_carries_the_class_only_and_parses() {
        let action = refusal_action(RefusalClass::SecretPath, 1, "|session=s1");
        assert_eq!(action, "content_withheld:1|reason=secret_path|session=s1");
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action(&action),
            Some((SecurityKind::ContentWithheld, 1, Some("s1")))
        );
        let action = refusal_action(RefusalClass::OutsideRoot, 2, "");
        assert_eq!(action, "path_blocked:2|reason=outside_root");
        assert_eq!(
            parse_action(&action),
            Some((SecurityKind::PathBlocked, 2, None))
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn refusals_are_collected_per_class_and_kept_apart_from_counts() {
        let ((), tally) = collect_call(|| {
            note_refusals(RefusalClass::SecretPath, 2);
            let ((), inner) = collect_call(|| note_refusals(RefusalClass::OutsideRoot, 1));
            assert_eq!(inner.refusals(RefusalClass::OutsideRoot), 1);
            note(SecurityKind::SecretRedacted, 1);
        });
        assert_eq!(tally.refusals(RefusalClass::SecretPath), 2);
        assert_eq!(tally.refusals(RefusalClass::OutsideRoot), 1);
        assert_eq!(tally.refusals(RefusalClass::ProtectedPath), 0);
        assert_eq!(
            tally.counts.total(),
            1,
            "a refusal is recorded once, not as a count too"
        );

        note_refusals(RefusalClass::SecretPath, 1);
        let ((), next) = collect_call(|| {});
        assert_eq!(
            next,
            CallTally::default(),
            "outside a collector it is dropped"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_missing_path_is_no_boundary_refusal() {
        use crate::core::error::PathJailError;
        let escape = PathJailError::EscapesRoot {
            path: "/etc/passwd".into(),
            root: "/p".into(),
            hint: String::new(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            RefusalClass::of_jail_error(&escape),
            Some(RefusalClass::OutsideRoot)
        );
        let symlink = PathJailError::Symlink {
            path: "/p/l".into(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            RefusalClass::of_jail_error(&symlink),
            Some(RefusalClass::ProtectedPath)
        );
        let missing = PathJailError::NoExistingAncestor { path: "/x".into() };
        assert_eq!(RefusalClass::of_jail_error(&missing), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn old_session_json_loads_with_zero_counts() {
        let counts: SecurityCounts = serde_json::from_str("{}").unwrap();
        assert!(counts.is_empty());
    }
}