landstrip
landstrip runs a tool in an OS-level sandbox using Landlock LSM on Linux,
Seatbelt on macOS, and LPAC AppContainer on Windows. It accepts the Anthropic
Sandbox Runtime JSON subset as the policy, in JSON or YAML syntax.
Installation
npm
The npm package installs a small Node.js wrapper and a platform-specific native binary package.
Platforms
| Area | macOS | Linux | Windows |
|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | path based rules | file based rules | per-run AppContainer ACLs |
| Timing | dynamic subset of paths | file based static ruleset | per-run ACL grants |
| TCP | localhost proxy ports | loopback proxy ports | allow all or deny all |
| Unix sockets | allowlist | allowlist via seccomp broker | allow all or deny all |
Windows AppContainer
Win32 API provides AppContainer for application level sandboxing. The platform creates a per-run LPAC AppContainer profile, grants its SID access to the lowered read and write roots, and removes those grants after the sandboxed process tree exits. Windows policies must use explicit read allowlists.
Landstrip assigns the sandboxed process to a Job Object with
KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE, so child processes are kept in the sandbox process tree and
are terminated when the launcher exits.
allowNetwork grants the internet and private-network AppContainer
capabilities, while the default container holds none and denies all network
access.
AppContainer capabilities are coarse: fine-grained TCP policies by host or port require Windows Filtering Platform rules keyed by the AppContainer SID. I.e., this would require elevated privileges, which is not sustainable for a agent sandbox runtime, which should rely on unprivileged tools and techniques.
Policy Format
JSON is the default policy format. Use --format yaml for YAML policy files or
YAML read from standard input.
YAML path fields can use normal lists or one statement per line:
filesystem:
allowWrite: |
.
~/.cargo
denyRead: |
~/.ssh
allowRead: |
~/.ssh/config
network:
allowNetwork: true
Windows-only hardening options live under windows. They are optional because
some tools, shells, JITs, and GUI helpers may rely on the blocked behaviors:
Network Policy
Sandbox mode denies direct network access by default. Proxy ports, local binding, and Unix sockets can be allowed with the Anthropic Sandbox Runtime network fields.
For a filesystem-only sandbox with unrestricted direct network access, set:
allowNetwork disables landstrip network enforcement while leaving filesystem
policy enforcement in place. On Windows this grants the AppContainer its network
capabilities; without it the container denies all network access.
Error Output
Failures reported by landstrip are printed as JSON objects on standard
error, one object per line. Each object is tagged by the trap kind, with the
kind name as the single top-level key.
The trap kinds are:
Filesystem: a filesystem access denial, as[operation, path, mechanism]where the operation isreadorwriteand the mechanism is the kernel enforcement layer that detected the denial.Network: a denied TCP connect or bind, as[operation, target, mechanism]where the operation isconnectorbindand the target isaddress:port.Launch: the tool could not be started, as[program, message].Usage: a command-line usage error, as a message string. Usage errors exit with status 2.Internal: any other policy, platform, or system error, as an object of diagnostic key/value pairs (for examplesource,file, or platform API details).
Logs and sandboxed tool output are not part of the response. Normal successful
tool execution does not print a landstrip response unless a write denial was
observed ({"Filesystem":["write","/repo/out","seccomp"]}), because standard error
belongs to landstrip; standard output belongs to the sandboxed tool.
Trap FD
Use --trap-fd FD to write landstrip trap denial blocks to an
already-open file descriptor as JSON objects, one per line followed by
a newline.
Linux filesystem and network denials observed by the seccomp broker are emitted with the same shapes as standard error:
The mechanism element records the kernel enforcement layer that detected
the denial (e.g. seccomp or landlock).
This stream is separate from the sandboxed tool's output. If the option is omitted, landstrip is quiet unless it has to report a policy, launch, or platform error. These long-lived error messages remain on standard error and are not duplicated in the trap stream.
Trap responses are informational. The configured sandbox policy always applies. However, writing trap responses requires an already-open file descriptor and a readable file path. If the sandbox blocks writing to the descriptor, or if writing fails, the denial is quietly dropped and the policy remains in effect. On backends without per-denial callbacks the option is best-effort.
The descriptor must be 3 or greater (standard I/O descriptors 0-2 are reserved).
Development
Commit messages
<subsystem>: <message>- Long description for non-trivial changes.
- Kernel style commit messages.
Signed-off-by
Documenting errors
The following snippet demonstrates the recommended pattern for documenting the return values on error:
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns [`<variant's unqualified name>`](<variant's unqualified name>)
/// Returns ...
Licensing
The JavaScript npm wrapper is licensed under Apache-2.0. The Rust source and
native binaries are licensed under LGPL-2.1-or-later.
Corresponding source for each published native binary is available from the
GitHub repository tag that matches the package version.