kvac 0.7.0

Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials (KVAC) and Algebraic MACs
Documentation
//! # BBS# (called BBS sharp)
//!
//! BBS# as described [here](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/15905230/BBS_Sharp_Short_TR.pdf)
//!
//! This assumes that the messages/attributes have already been prepared before signing, i.e. attributes are hashed
//! with public salts, etc and whats called `H_i` in the paper is already created.
//!
//! Implements support for both Schnorr signature and ECDSA (on secp256r1) generated by the user's secure hardware.
//!
//! Implements both the offline and half-offline (HOL) mode. In the former, the verifier is either the
//! signer (has the secret key) or can ask the signer to verify the proof without revealing any user-specific info
//! In the latter, the user needs to communicate with the signer before creating a proof and get "some helper data"
//! to create a proof which the verifier can check without needing the secret key or interacting with the issuer.
//! For efficiency and avoiding correlation (when signer and verifier collude), the user gets a batch of
//! "helper data" to let him create several proofs.  
//! Also, the proof of knowledge of MAC protocol specified in footnote 31 in the paper is modified to allow  
//! integration with other protocols, see the code comments in the relevant module.
//!
//! Implements designated verifier proof for both issuer's signature (proof of validity of MAC) and user's proof of
//! knowledge of MAC

pub mod ecdsa;
pub mod hol;
pub mod mac;
pub mod proof;
pub mod setup;