krill 0.12.1

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) daemon
Documentation
//! Support for signing mft, crl, certificates, roas..
//! Common objects for TAs and CAs

use std::convert::TryFrom;

use rpki::{
    ca::{csr::RpkiCaCsr, provisioning::RequestResourceLimit},
    crypto::{KeyIdentifier, PublicKey},
    repository::{
        cert::{KeyUsage, Overclaim, TbsCert},
        resources::ResourceSet,
        x509::{Name, Time, Validity},
        Cert,
    },
    uri,
};

use crate::{
    commons::{
        api::{IssuedCertificate, ReceivedCert},
        crypto::KrillSigner,
        error::Error,
        util::AllowedUri,
        KrillResult,
    },
    daemon::ca::CertifiedKey,
};

//------------ CsrInfo -------------------------------------------------------

pub type CaRepository = uri::Rsync;
pub type RpkiManifest = uri::Rsync;
pub type RpkiNotify = uri::Https;

#[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Eq, PartialEq, Serialize)]
pub struct CsrInfo {
    ca_repository: CaRepository,
    rpki_manifest: RpkiManifest,
    rpki_notify: Option<RpkiNotify>,
    key: PublicKey,
}

impl CsrInfo {
    pub fn new(
        ca_repository: CaRepository,
        rpki_manifest: RpkiManifest,
        rpki_notify: Option<RpkiNotify>,
        key: PublicKey,
    ) -> Self {
        CsrInfo {
            ca_repository,
            rpki_manifest,
            rpki_notify,
            key,
        }
    }

    pub fn ca_repository(&self) -> &CaRepository {
        &self.ca_repository
    }

    pub fn global_uris(&self) -> bool {
        self.ca_repository.seems_global_uri()
            && self.rpki_manifest.seems_global_uri()
            && self
                .rpki_notify
                .as_ref()
                .map(|uri| uri.seems_global_uri())
                .unwrap_or_else(|| true)
    }

    pub fn unpack(self) -> (CaRepository, RpkiManifest, Option<RpkiNotify>, PublicKey) {
        (self.ca_repository, self.rpki_manifest, self.rpki_notify, self.key)
    }

    pub fn key_id(&self) -> KeyIdentifier {
        self.key.key_identifier()
    }
}

impl TryFrom<&RpkiCaCsr> for CsrInfo {
    type Error = Error;

    fn try_from(csr: &RpkiCaCsr) -> KrillResult<CsrInfo> {
        csr.verify_signature().map_err(Error::invalid_csr)?;
        let ca_repository = csr
            .ca_repository()
            .cloned()
            .ok_or_else(|| Error::invalid_csr("missing ca repository"))?;
        let rpki_manifest = csr
            .rpki_manifest()
            .cloned()
            .ok_or_else(|| Error::invalid_csr("missing rpki manifest"))?;
        let rpki_notify = csr.rpki_notify().cloned();
        let key = csr.public_key().clone();
        Ok(CsrInfo {
            ca_repository,
            rpki_manifest,
            rpki_notify,
            key,
        })
    }
}

//------------ CaSignSupport -------------------------------------------------

/// Support signing by CAs
pub struct SignSupport;

impl SignSupport {
    /// Create an IssuedCert
    pub fn make_issued_cert(
        csr: CsrInfo,
        resources: &ResourceSet,
        limit: RequestResourceLimit,
        signing_key: &CertifiedKey,
        validity: Validity,
        signer: &KrillSigner,
    ) -> KrillResult<IssuedCertificate> {
        let signing_cert = signing_key.incoming_cert();
        let resources = limit.apply_to(resources)?;
        if !signing_cert.resources().contains(&resources) {
            return Err(Error::MissingResources);
        }

        let request = CertRequest::Ca(csr, validity);

        let tbs = Self::make_tbs_cert(&resources, signing_cert, request, signer)?;
        let cert = signer.sign_cert(tbs, signing_key.key_id())?;

        let uri = signing_cert.uri_for_object(&cert);

        // The following cannot fail in practice, because it can only fail if the certificate that
        // we just signed did not include ca_repository in its SIA. This cannot happen because it's
        // guaranteed to be included in the CsrInfo.
        //
        // Still, to to be absolutely sure and future proof it's better to fail with an error
        // than it would be to unwrap and panic.
        IssuedCertificate::create(cert, uri, resources, limit)
            .map_err(|e| Error::Custom(format!("Signed certificate has issue: {}", e)))
    }

    /// Create an EE certificate for use in ResourceTaggedAttestations.
    /// Note that for RPKI signed objects such as ROAs and Manifests, the
    /// EE certificate is created by the rpki.rs library instead.
    pub fn make_rta_ee_cert(
        resources: &ResourceSet,
        signing_key: &CertifiedKey,
        validity: Validity,
        pub_key: PublicKey,
        signer: &KrillSigner,
    ) -> KrillResult<Cert> {
        let signing_cert = signing_key.incoming_cert();
        let request = CertRequest::Ee(pub_key, validity);
        let tbs = Self::make_tbs_cert(resources, signing_cert, request, signer)?;

        let cert = signer.sign_cert(tbs, signing_key.key_id())?;
        Ok(cert)
    }

    fn make_tbs_cert(
        resources: &ResourceSet,
        signing_cert: &ReceivedCert,
        request: CertRequest,
        signer: &KrillSigner,
    ) -> KrillResult<TbsCert> {
        let serial = signer.random_serial()?;
        let issuer = signing_cert.subject().clone();

        let validity = match &request {
            CertRequest::Ca(_, validity) => *validity,
            CertRequest::Ee(_, validity) => *validity,
        };

        let pub_key = match &request {
            CertRequest::Ca(info, _) => info.key.clone(),
            CertRequest::Ee(key, _) => key.clone(),
        };

        let subject = Some(Name::from_pub_key(&pub_key));

        let key_usage = match &request {
            CertRequest::Ca(_, _) => KeyUsage::Ca,
            CertRequest::Ee(_, _) => KeyUsage::Ee,
        };

        let overclaim = Overclaim::Refuse;

        let mut cert = TbsCert::new(serial, issuer, validity, subject, pub_key, key_usage, overclaim);

        let asns = resources.to_as_resources();
        if asns.is_inherited() || !asns.to_blocks().unwrap().is_empty() {
            cert.set_as_resources(asns);
        }

        let ipv4 = resources.to_ip_resources_v4();
        if ipv4.is_inherited() || !ipv4.to_blocks().unwrap().is_empty() {
            cert.set_v4_resources(ipv4);
        }

        let ipv6 = resources.to_ip_resources_v6();
        if ipv6.is_inherited() || !ipv6.to_blocks().unwrap().is_empty() {
            cert.set_v6_resources(ipv6);
        }

        cert.set_authority_key_identifier(Some(signing_cert.key_identifier()));
        cert.set_ca_issuer(Some(signing_cert.uri().clone()));
        cert.set_crl_uri(Some(signing_cert.crl_uri()));

        match request {
            CertRequest::Ca(csr, _) => {
                let (ca_repository, rpki_manifest, rpki_notify, _pub_key) = csr.unpack();
                cert.set_basic_ca(Some(true));
                cert.set_ca_repository(Some(ca_repository));
                cert.set_rpki_manifest(Some(rpki_manifest));
                cert.set_rpki_notify(rpki_notify);
            }
            CertRequest::Ee(_, _) => {
                // cert.set_signed_object() ??
            }
        }

        Ok(cert)
    }

    /// Returns a validity period from 5 minutes ago (in case of NTP mess-up), to
    /// X weeks from now.
    pub fn sign_validity_weeks(weeks: i64) -> Validity {
        let from = Time::five_minutes_ago();
        let until = Time::now() + chrono::Duration::weeks(weeks);
        Validity::new(from, until)
    }

    pub fn sign_validity_days(days: i64) -> Validity {
        let from = Time::five_minutes_ago();
        let until = Time::now() + chrono::Duration::days(days);
        Validity::new(from, until)
    }
}

#[allow(clippy::large_enum_variant)]
enum CertRequest {
    Ca(CsrInfo, Validity),
    Ee(PublicKey, Validity),
}