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//! Enrollment: process member joins and self-enroll the CA node.
//!
//! Part of the inherent impl CertmeshCore, split from lib.rs (certmesh M2).
//! As a child module of the crate root, 'use super::*' inherits lib.rs's
//! imports, sibling modules, and crate-private state/helpers as in the original.
use super::*;
impl CertmeshCore {
/// Process an enrollment request. Returns the join response on success.
///
/// The joining machine’s hostname comes from the request - not from
/// `hostname::get()` which would return the CA server’s hostname.
pub async fn enroll(
&self,
request: &protocol::JoinRequest,
) -> Result<protocol::JoinResponse, CertmeshError> {
let hostname = &request.hostname;
validate_hostname(hostname)?;
// Default SANs: hostname + hostname.local, plus any extras the joiner sent.
// Every extra SAN is validated (F15): IP literals pass through; everything
// else must be a valid RFC 1123 hostname — so a joiner can't slip a wildcard
// or junk DNS name into its cert. Capped to bound the SAN list.
const MAX_EXTRA_SANS: usize = 16;
let mut sans = vec![hostname.clone(), format!("{hostname}.local")];
for extra in request.sans.iter().take(MAX_EXTRA_SANS) {
if extra.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_err() {
validate_hostname(extra)?;
}
if !sans.contains(extra) {
sans.push(extra.clone());
}
}
let ca_guard = self.state.ca.lock().await;
let ca = ca_guard.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
if self.state.paths.is_ca_initialized() {
CertmeshError::CaLocked
} else {
CertmeshError::CaNotInitialized
}
})?;
let roster = self.state.roster.lock().await;
let auth_guard = self.state.auth.lock().await;
// The enrollment auth credential may be absent when the CA was unlocked
// via a non-passphrase slot (TOTP/auto-unlock master key). Invite-token
// enrollment (ADR-015 F2) does not need it; the TOTP branch inside
// `process_enrollment` fails closed (CaLocked) when it does.
let auth_state = auth_guard.as_ref();
let challenge_guard = self.state.pending_challenge.lock().await;
let challenge = challenge_guard
.as_ref()
.cloned()
.unwrap_or(koi_crypto::auth::AuthChallenge::Totp);
let mut rate_limiter = self.state.rate_limiter.lock().await;
let requires_approval = roster.requires_approval();
let fallback_operator = roster.metadata.operator.clone();
drop(roster);
let approved_by = if requires_approval {
request_approval(&self.state, hostname, requires_approval).await?
} else {
fallback_operator
};
// Single-writer commit (ADR-017 F8): process_enrollment validates, signs,
// and pushes the member under the lock; commit_roster bumps `seq` and
// persists atomically. On any error it errors *before* mutating, so the
// roster is left unchanged and nothing is persisted.
let result = self
.state
.commit_roster(|roster| {
enrollment::process_enrollment(
ca,
roster,
auth_state,
&challenge,
&mut rate_limiter,
request,
hostname,
&sans,
approved_by,
&self.state.paths,
)
})
.await;
// Persist the rate-limiter regardless of outcome (ADR-017 F7): a failed
// TOTP attempt advances a lockout that must survive a restart. Snapshot +
// drop the guard before the blocking write (no lock held across I/O).
// Invite joins never consult the limiter, so this is a no-op for them.
let limiter_snapshot = rate_limiter.clone();
drop(rate_limiter);
if let Err(e) = persist_rate_limiter(&self.state.paths, &limiter_snapshot) {
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "Could not persist rate-limiter state");
}
let (response, _issued) = result?;
let _ = self.state.event_tx.send(CertmeshEvent::MemberJoined {
hostname: response.hostname.clone(),
fingerprint: response.ca_fingerprint.clone(),
});
Ok(response)
}
/// Self-enroll the daemon as a certmesh member.
///
/// Called automatically after CA creation (and on every daemon start) to get
/// the server leaf the mTLS + ACME listeners use. This is the **one** issuance
/// path that key-gens on the CA (the CA's own identity, [`ca::issue_certificate`]
/// — ADR-017 P3); member leaves only ever come from a member CSR.
///
/// Idempotent **except** when the on-disk leaf is within the CA policy's
/// `renew_threshold_days`: then it re-issues, so a restart refreshes the
/// listener cert (the CA self-renews — no live mTLS reload yet; the restart is
/// the reload point).
pub async fn self_enroll(&self) -> Result<SelfEnrollment, CertmeshError> {
let hostname = hostname::get()
.ok()
.and_then(|os| os.into_string().ok())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string());
// Validate hostname before using as certificate SAN (RFC 1123, F15).
validate_hostname(&hostname)?;
let sans = vec![
hostname.clone(),
format!("{hostname}.local"),
"localhost".to_string(),
"127.0.0.1".to_string(),
];
// Read the CA-held policy (self-leaf lifetime + restart-renewal threshold).
let policy = {
let roster = self.state.roster.lock().await;
roster.metadata.policy.clone()
};
// The self leaf always lives at certs_dir()/<hostname> — derived, not read
// from the roster (cert_path is no longer persisted, F13). Reuse the on-disk
// leaf unless it is within the renewal threshold.
{
let cert_dir = self.state.paths.certs_dir().join(&hostname);
let on_disk = (
std::fs::read_to_string(cert_dir.join("cert.pem")).ok(),
std::fs::read_to_string(cert_dir.join("key.pem")).ok(),
);
if let (Some(cert_pem), Some(key_pem)) = on_disk {
let due = leaf_not_after_utc(&cert_pem)
.map(|na| {
chrono::Utc::now()
+ chrono::Duration::days(i64::from(policy.renew_threshold_days))
>= na
})
.unwrap_or(true); // unparseable → re-issue to be safe
if !due {
let ca_guard = self.state.ca.lock().await;
let ca = ca_guard.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
if self.state.paths.is_ca_initialized() {
CertmeshError::CaLocked
} else {
CertmeshError::CaNotInitialized
}
})?;
let ca_cert_pem = ca.cert_pem.clone();
drop(ca_guard);
tracing::debug!(hostname = %hostname, "already self-enrolled, reusing existing cert");
return Ok(SelfEnrollment {
cert_pem,
key_pem,
ca_cert_pem,
});
}
tracing::info!(hostname = %hostname, "CA self-cert within renewal threshold; re-issuing");
}
}
// Issue a fresh (or renewed) self leaf at the policy lifetime.
let ca_guard = self.state.ca.lock().await;
let ca = ca_guard.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
if self.state.paths.is_ca_initialized() {
CertmeshError::CaLocked
} else {
CertmeshError::CaNotInitialized
}
})?;
let issued = ca::issue_certificate(ca, &hostname, &sans, policy.leaf_lifetime_days)?;
let ca_cert_pem = ca.cert_pem.clone();
drop(ca_guard);
// Write cert files to the standard path (blocking I/O)
let cert_path = self.state.paths.certs_dir().join(&hostname);
let issued_clone = issued.clone();
let cert_dir = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
certfiles::write_cert_files_to(&cert_path, &issued_clone)
})
.await
.map_err(|e| CertmeshError::Internal(format!("cert write task: {e}")))??;
// Update the existing self entry in place, or insert as primary, then
// commit (ADR-017 F8). The update path covers both restart-renewal and
// concurrent self_enroll.
if let Err(e) = self
.state
.commit_roster(|roster| {
if let Some(member) = roster.find_member_mut(&hostname) {
member.cert_fingerprint = issued.fingerprint.clone();
member.cert_expires = issued.expires;
member.cert_path = cert_dir.display().to_string();
} else {
roster.members.push(roster::RosterMember {
hostname: hostname.clone(),
role: roster::MemberRole::Primary,
enrolled_at: chrono::Utc::now(),
enrolled_by: Some("self-enrollment".to_string()),
cert_fingerprint: issued.fingerprint.clone(),
cert_expires: issued.expires,
cert_sans: sans.clone(),
cert_path: cert_dir.display().to_string(),
status: roster::MemberStatus::Active,
reload_hook: None,
last_seen: Some(chrono::Utc::now()),
pinned_ca_fingerprint: None,
proxy_entries: Vec::new(),
});
}
Ok(())
})
.await
{
tracing::warn!(error = %e, "Failed to save roster after self-enrollment");
}
tracing::info!(hostname = %hostname, "Daemon self-enrolled as certmesh member");
// Audit the self-enroll issuance (ADR-017 F14) — the one issuance path that
// key-gens on the CA must leave a trail like any other trust decision.
let _ = audit::append_entry_to(
&self.state.paths.audit_log_path(),
"self_enroll",
&[
("hostname", hostname.as_str()),
("fingerprint", issued.fingerprint.as_str()),
],
);
let _ = self.state.event_tx.send(CertmeshEvent::MemberJoined {
hostname,
fingerprint: issued.fingerprint,
});
// A leaf is now on disk → posture may have flipped Open→Authenticated.
self.state.republish_posture();
Ok(SelfEnrollment {
cert_pem: issued.cert_pem,
key_pem: issued.key_pem,
ca_cert_pem,
})
}
}