koda-core 0.2.19

//! Tool registry and execution engine.
//!
//! Each tool is a function that takes JSON arguments and returns a string result.
//! Path validation is enforced here to prevent directory traversal.
//!
//! ## Available tools
//!
//! | Tool | Module | Effect | Description |
//! |---|---|---|---|
//! | **Read** | `file_tools` | ReadOnly | Read file contents with line numbers |
//! | **Write** | `file_tools` | LocalMutation | Create or overwrite a file |
//! | **Edit** | `file_tools` | LocalMutation | Find-and-replace in an existing file |
//! | **Delete** | `file_tools` | Destructive | Delete a file |
//! | **List** | `file_tools` | ReadOnly | List files and directories |
//! | **Bash** | `shell` | LocalMutation | Execute shell commands (with background mode) |
//! | **Grep** | `grep` | ReadOnly | Recursive text search (respects .gitignore) |
//! | **Glob** | `glob_tool` | ReadOnly | Find files by glob pattern |
//! | **WebFetch** | `web_fetch` | RemoteAction | Fetch URL content (HTML→text) |
//! | **WebSearch** | `web_search` | RemoteAction | Web search via DuckDuckGo |
//! | **InvokeAgent** | `agent` | LocalMutation | Delegate task to a sub-agent |
//! | **ListAgents** | `agent` | ReadOnly | List available sub-agents |
//! | **MemoryRead** | `memory` | ReadOnly | Read project/global memory |
//! | **MemoryWrite** | `memory` | LocalMutation | Save facts to memory |
//! | **TodoRead** | `todo` | ReadOnly | Read task list |
//! | **TodoWrite** | `todo` | LocalMutation | Update task list |
//! | **AskUser** | `ask_user` | ReadOnly | Ask the user a question |
//! | **ActivateSkill** | `skills` | ReadOnly | Load a skill's instructions |
//! | **ListSkills** | `skills` | ReadOnly | List available skills |
//! | **ListBackgroundTasks** | `bg_task_tools` | ReadOnly | Snapshot background tasks owned by the caller |
//! | **CancelTask** | `bg_task_tools` | ReadOnly | Cancel a background agent or process |
//! | **WaitTask** | `bg_task_tools` | ReadOnly | Block until a background task finishes (max 300 s) |
//!
//! ## Safety model
//!
//! Every tool call is classified by `ToolEffect` and checked against the
//! current approval mode before execution. See
//! `classify_tool` for the effect of each tool.

/// Effect classification for tool calls.
///
/// Two-axis model: what does the tool touch (local vs. remote)
/// and how severe are its effects (read vs. mutate vs. destroy)?
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use koda_core::tools::{ToolEffect, classify_tool};
///
/// assert_eq!(classify_tool("Read"), ToolEffect::ReadOnly);
/// assert_eq!(classify_tool("Write"), ToolEffect::LocalMutation);
/// assert_eq!(classify_tool("Delete"), ToolEffect::Destructive);
/// ```
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "PascalCase")]
pub enum ToolEffect {
    /// No side-effects: file reads, grep, git status.
    ReadOnly,
    /// Side-effects on remote services only: GitHub API, WebFetch POST.
    RemoteAction,
    /// Mutates local filesystem or state: Write, Edit, Delete, MemoryWrite.
    LocalMutation,
    /// Irreversible or high-blast-radius: rm -rf, git push --force, DROP TABLE.
    Destructive,
}

/// Classify a built-in tool by name.
///
/// For `Bash`, this returns the *default* classification (`LocalMutation`);
/// the actual effect depends on the command string and must be refined
/// via [`crate::bash_safety::classify_bash_command`].
///
/// Unknown tools default to `LocalMutation` (conservative — always asks).
///
/// For MCP tools (names containing `__`), call
/// [`ToolRegistry::classify_tool_with_mcp`] instead to use server-provided
/// annotations.
pub fn classify_tool(name: &str) -> ToolEffect {
    match name {
        // Pure reads — zero side-effects
        "Read" | "List" | "Grep" | "Glob" | "MemoryRead" | "ListAgents" | "ListSkills"
        | "ActivateSkill" | "RecallContext" | "AskUser" | "TodoRead" => ToolEffect::ReadOnly,

        // Remote actions — side-effects on remote services only
        "WebFetch" => ToolEffect::ReadOnly,    // GET-only fetch
        "WebSearch" => ToolEffect::ReadOnly,   // read-only search
        "InvokeAgent" => ToolEffect::ReadOnly, // sub-agents inherit parent's mode

        // Background task management (Layer 2 of #996). ListBackgroundTasks
        // is a pure read; CancelTask / WaitTask signal but don't write
        // files — they're idempotent observation/control of work the
        // model already started. Treating as ReadOnly avoids an approval
        // prompt every time the model checks on a bg task.
        "ListBackgroundTasks" | "CancelTask" | "WaitTask" => ToolEffect::ReadOnly,

        // Local mutations — write to filesystem or local state
        "Write" | "Edit" | "MemoryWrite" | "TodoWrite" => ToolEffect::LocalMutation,

        // Bash — default to LocalMutation; refined by classify_bash_command()
        "Bash" => ToolEffect::LocalMutation,

        // Delete is destructive (irreversible without undo)
        "Delete" => ToolEffect::Destructive,

        // MCP tools — use annotations-based classification.
        name if crate::mcp::is_mcp_tool_name(name) => ToolEffect::RemoteAction,

        // Unknown tools — default to LocalMutation (conservative)
        _ => ToolEffect::LocalMutation,
    }
}

/// Returns true if the tool performs a mutating operation.
///
/// Convenience wrapper over [`classify_tool`] for call sites that only
/// need a bool (e.g., loop guard).
///
/// ```
/// use koda_core::tools::is_mutating_tool;
///
/// assert!(!is_mutating_tool("Read"));
/// assert!(is_mutating_tool("Write"));
/// assert!(is_mutating_tool("Delete"));
/// ```
pub fn is_mutating_tool(name: &str) -> bool {
    !matches!(classify_tool(name), ToolEffect::ReadOnly)
}

/// Sub-agent invocation tool (`InvokeAgent`, `ListAgents`).
pub mod agent;
pub mod ask_user;
pub mod bg_process;
/// Background-task management tools — `ListBackgroundTasks`,
/// `CancelTask`, `WaitTask` (Layer 2 of #996).
pub mod bg_task_tools;
/// File CRUD tools (`Read`, `Write`, `Edit`, `Delete`, `List`).
pub mod file_tools;
pub mod fuzzy;
/// Glob pattern search tool (`Glob`).
pub mod glob_tool;
/// Recursive text search tool (`Grep`).
pub mod grep;
/// Project memory read/write tools (`MemoryRead`, `MemoryWrite`).
pub mod memory;
/// On-demand conversation history retrieval (`RecallContext`).
pub mod recall;
/// Shell command execution tool (`Bash`).
pub mod shell;
/// Skill discovery and activation tools (`ListSkills`, `ActivateSkill`).
pub mod skill_tools;
/// Session-scoped task list tool (`TodoWrite`).
pub mod todo;
/// Pre-flight validation for tool calls (runs before approval).
pub mod validate;
/// HTTP fetch tool (`WebFetch`).
pub mod web_fetch;
/// Web search tool (`WebSearch`).
pub mod web_search;

use anyhow::Result;
use koda_sandbox::fs::{FileSystem, LocalFileSystem};
use path_clean::PathClean;
use serde_json::Value;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::SystemTime;

use crate::output_caps::OutputCaps;

use crate::providers::ToolDefinition;

/// Shared file-read cache: tracks `(size, mtime, sha256_hex)` per cache key.
///
/// The SHA-256 field is populated on full-file reads and used by `edit_file`
/// to detect whether the file changed between when the model last read it and
/// when it attempts an edit (Gemini CLI strategy, better than mtime-only because
/// mtime has 1-second granularity and can miss sub-second bash mutations).
///
/// `sha256_hex` is empty for line-range reads where only a slice was fetched.
///
/// Wrapped in `Arc` so parent and sub-agent `ToolRegistry` instances
/// share the same cache — reads by one agent benefit all others.
pub type FileReadCache = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<String, (u64, SystemTime, String)>>>;

/// Tracks which tool last wrote each absolute file path.
///
/// Keyed by canonical `PathBuf`; value is `(tool_name, when)` using a
/// monotonic `Instant`. Populated on every successful Write and Edit so
/// the validation layer can include the responsible tool in staleness
/// error messages (#804 item 7).
pub type LastWriterCache = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<PathBuf, (String, std::time::Instant)>>>;

/// Tracks the most recent successful Bash invocation.
///
/// Stores `(command_snippet, when)`. Only the latest call is kept — enough
/// context to tell the model "Bash ran 2s ago, it may have changed the file".
pub type LastBashCache = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<(String, std::time::Instant)>>>;

/// Result of executing a tool.
///
/// The `success` field is set automatically by `ToolRegistry::execute()` —
/// `Ok(…)` → `true`, `Err(…)` → `false`. Individual tool functions just
/// return `Result<String>`.
///
/// ```
/// use koda_core::tools::ToolResult;
///
/// let ok = ToolResult { output: "done".into(), success: true, full_output: None };
/// assert!(ok.success);
/// ```
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ToolResult {
    /// The tool's output string (model-facing; may be a summary for Bash).
    pub output: String,
    /// Whether the tool executed successfully.
    ///
    /// Set automatically by `ToolRegistry::execute()` — `Ok(…)` → `true`,
    /// `Err(…)` → `false`. Individual tools never set this directly;
    /// they just return `Result<String>`.
    pub success: bool,
    /// Full untruncated output, stored separately in DB for later retrieval.
    ///
    /// Only populated by Bash when output exceeds the summary threshold.
    /// `RecallContext` can search this to retrieve details the model didn't
    /// see in its context window.
    pub full_output: Option<String>,
}

/// The tool registry: maps tool names to their definitions and handlers.
pub struct ToolRegistry {
    project_root: PathBuf,
    definitions: HashMap<String, ToolDefinition>,
    read_cache: FileReadCache,
    /// Filesystem abstraction — `LocalFileSystem` by default; swap to
    /// `SandboxedFileSystem` when a sandbox slot is active (Phase 2d, #934).
    /// Explicit `+ Send + Sync` is required: trait objects don't
    /// auto-inherit auto-traits from the supertrait, so without these
    /// bounds `ToolRegistry` becomes `!Send` and any future holding
    /// it (e.g. `execute_sub_agent`) cannot be `tokio::spawn`'d.
    fs: Arc<dyn FileSystem + Send + Sync>,
    /// Per-file last-writer tracking for richer staleness errors (#804 item 7).
    last_writer: LastWriterCache,
    /// Most recent Bash invocation for staleness error context (#804 item 7).
    last_bash: LastBashCache,
    /// Undo stack for file mutations.
    pub undo: std::sync::Mutex<crate::undo::UndoStack>,
    /// Discovered skills.
    pub skill_registry: crate::skills::SkillRegistry,
    /// Database handle for tools that need session access (RecallContext).
    db: std::sync::RwLock<Option<std::sync::Arc<crate::db::Database>>>,
    /// Current session ID (for RecallContext).
    session_id: std::sync::RwLock<Option<String>>,
    /// Context-scaled output caps for all tools.
    pub caps: OutputCaps,
    /// Background process registry — tracks processes spawned with `background: true`.
    /// Dropped (SIGTERM all) when the session ends.
    pub bg_registry: bg_process::BgRegistry,
    /// Trust mode — determines sandbox configuration for Bash tool.
    trust: crate::trust::TrustMode,
    /// Active sandbox policy. Phase 5 PR-2 of #934 wires this through
    /// the Bash dispatch path so per-agent variation becomes possible.
    /// Today every constructor seeds it with `SandboxPolicy::strict_default()`
    /// so behavior is byte-for-byte unchanged — PR-3 starts populating it
    /// with non-default values via [`crate::sandbox::policy_for_agent`].
    sandbox_policy: koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy,
    /// MCP connection manager — owns all MCP server connections (#662).
    /// `None` until attached via `set_mcp_manager()`.
    mcp_manager: std::sync::RwLock<Option<Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<crate::mcp::McpManager>>>>,
    /// Loopback port of the per-session HTTP CONNECT proxy (Phase 3b of
    /// #934). When `Some`, [`crate::sandbox::build`] attaches the
    /// canonical `HTTPS_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY`/etc. env-var bouquet to every
    /// Bash invocation so child processes route HTTP through the proxy.
    /// `None` (default) preserves the pre-3b unfiltered behavior —
    /// session code opts in by calling [`Self::set_proxy_port`].
    proxy_port: std::sync::RwLock<Option<u16>>,
    /// Loopback port of the per-session SOCKS5 proxy (Phase 3d.1 of
    /// #934). When `Some`, [`crate::sandbox::build`] appends
    /// `ALL_PROXY=socks5h://127.0.0.1:port` (+ lowercase alias) so
    /// raw-TCP clients (git over ssh, gRPC) that ignore `HTTPS_PROXY`
    /// also route through the hostname-filtered proxy. Independent
    /// from `proxy_port` so tests can attach one without the other.
    socks5_port: std::sync::RwLock<Option<u16>>,
}

impl ToolRegistry {
    /// Create a new registry with all built-in tools.
    ///
    /// `max_context_tokens` scales all output caps (see `OutputCaps`).
    pub fn new(project_root: PathBuf, max_context_tokens: usize) -> Self {
        Self::with_trust(
            project_root,
            max_context_tokens,
            crate::trust::TrustMode::Safe,
        )
    }

    /// Create a new registry with a specific trust mode.
    pub fn with_trust(
        project_root: PathBuf,
        max_context_tokens: usize,
        trust: crate::trust::TrustMode,
    ) -> Self {
        let mut definitions = HashMap::new();

        // Register all built-in tools
        for def in file_tools::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }

        for def in grep::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in shell::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in agent::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in bg_task_tools::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in ask_user::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in glob_tool::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in web_fetch::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in web_search::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in todo::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in memory::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        for def in skill_tools::definitions() {
            definitions.insert(def.name.clone(), def);
        }
        // RecallContext — on-demand history retrieval
        let recall_def = recall::definition();
        definitions.insert(recall_def.name.clone(), recall_def);
        let skill_registry = crate::skills::SkillRegistry::discover(&project_root);

        Self {
            project_root,
            definitions,
            read_cache: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
            fs: Arc::new(LocalFileSystem::new()),
            last_writer: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
            last_bash: Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None)),
            undo: std::sync::Mutex::new(crate::undo::UndoStack::new()),
            skill_registry,
            db: std::sync::RwLock::new(None),
            session_id: std::sync::RwLock::new(None),
            caps: OutputCaps::for_context(max_context_tokens),
            bg_registry: bg_process::BgRegistry::new(),
            trust,
            // Phase 5 PR-2 of #934: seed with strict_default(). Callers
            // can override via [`Self::with_sandbox_policy`] (sub-agent
            // dispatch does this; the main agent inherits the default).
            sandbox_policy: koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy::strict_default(),
            mcp_manager: std::sync::RwLock::new(None),
            proxy_port: std::sync::RwLock::new(None),
            socks5_port: std::sync::RwLock::new(None),
        }
    }

    /// Share an existing file-read cache (e.g. from the parent agent).
    ///
    /// Sub-agents that share the parent's cache avoid redundant disk reads
    /// for files already loaded in the same session.
    pub fn with_shared_cache(mut self, cache: FileReadCache) -> Self {
        self.read_cache = cache;
        self
    }

    /// Override the active sandbox policy.
    ///
    /// Phase 5 PR-2 of #934. Builder-style; chains after `with_trust`
    /// (or `new`). Sub-agent dispatch uses this to install the policy
    /// produced by [`crate::sandbox::policy_for_agent`] on the child's
    /// registry. The main agent path doesn't call this and inherits
    /// the `strict_default()` seed from `with_trust` — byte-for-byte
    /// unchanged behavior in PR-2.
    pub fn with_sandbox_policy(mut self, policy: koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
        self.sandbox_policy = policy;
        self
    }

    /// Borrow the active sandbox policy. Used by the Bash dispatch
    /// path to thread the per-registry policy into
    /// [`crate::sandbox::build`].
    pub fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> &koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy {
        &self.sandbox_policy
    }

    /// Inject a custom [`FileSystem`] implementation.
    ///
    /// Call this after construction to swap `LocalFileSystem` for
    /// `SandboxedFileSystem` when a sandbox slot is ready (#934).
    pub fn set_fs(&mut self, fs: Arc<dyn FileSystem + Send + Sync>) {
        self.fs = fs;
    }

    /// Get a clone of the `Arc` file-read cache for sharing with sub-agents.
    pub fn file_read_cache(&self) -> FileReadCache {
        Arc::clone(&self.read_cache)
    }

    /// Get a clone of the last-writer cache for passing to validation.
    pub fn last_writer_cache(&self) -> LastWriterCache {
        Arc::clone(&self.last_writer)
    }

    /// Get a clone of the last-bash cache for passing to validation.
    pub fn last_bash_cache(&self) -> LastBashCache {
        Arc::clone(&self.last_bash)
    }

    /// Attach database + session for tools that need history access.
    pub fn set_session(&self, db: std::sync::Arc<crate::db::Database>, session_id: String) {
        if let Ok(mut guard) = self.db.write() {
            *guard = Some(db);
        }
        if let Ok(mut guard) = self.session_id.write() {
            *guard = Some(session_id);
        }
    }

    /// Attach an MCP connection manager and register its tools (#662).
    ///
    /// Called after MCP servers have connected and discovered their tools.
    /// Tool definitions are merged into the registry so the LLM can see them.
    pub fn set_mcp_manager(&self, manager: Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<crate::mcp::McpManager>>) {
        if let Ok(mut guard) = self.mcp_manager.write() {
            *guard = Some(manager);
        }
    }

    /// Get the MCP manager (if attached).
    pub fn mcp_manager(&self) -> Option<Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<crate::mcp::McpManager>>> {
        self.mcp_manager.read().ok().and_then(|guard| guard.clone())
    }

    /// Attach (or detach) the per-session HTTP CONNECT proxy port.
    ///
    /// Called from [`crate::session::KodaSession::new`] after spawning
    /// the always-on [`koda_sandbox::BuiltInProxy`]. Pass `None` to
    /// detach (Bash invocations revert to unfiltered network access —
    /// only used in standalone-ToolRegistry tests; production sessions
    /// keep this set for their full lifetime). Lock-poisoning is
    /// non-fatal — we silently keep the previous value, matching the
    /// precedent set by `set_mcp_manager`.
    pub fn set_proxy_port(&self, port: Option<u16>) {
        if let Ok(mut guard) = self.proxy_port.write() {
            *guard = port;
        }
    }

    /// Current proxy port, if one has been attached. Read by the Bash
    /// dispatch path; threaded into [`crate::sandbox::build`] which
    /// turns it into the env-var bouquet on the spawned `Command`.
    pub fn proxy_port(&self) -> Option<u16> {
        self.proxy_port.read().ok().and_then(|guard| *guard)
    }

    /// Attach (or detach) the per-session SOCKS5 proxy port. Mirrors
    /// [`Self::set_proxy_port`] — see that fn's docs for the
    /// lock-poisoning policy.
    pub fn set_socks5_port(&self, port: Option<u16>) {
        if let Ok(mut guard) = self.socks5_port.write() {
            *guard = port;
        }
    }

    /// Current SOCKS5 port, if one has been attached. Threaded into
    /// [`crate::sandbox::build`] which appends `ALL_PROXY` to the
    /// spawned `Command`'s env.
    pub fn socks5_port(&self) -> Option<u16> {
        self.socks5_port.read().ok().and_then(|guard| *guard)
    }

    /// Classify a tool, using MCP annotations when available.
    ///
    /// For built-in tools, delegates to `classify_tool()`.
    /// For MCP tools, looks up cached annotations in the manager.
    pub fn classify_tool_with_mcp(&self, name: &str) -> ToolEffect {
        if crate::mcp::is_mcp_tool_name(name) {
            if let Some(mgr) = self.mcp_manager()
                && let Ok(mgr) = mgr.try_read()
            {
                return mgr.classify_tool(name);
            }
            // Fallback: no manager or lock contention.
            return ToolEffect::RemoteAction;
        }
        classify_tool(name)
    }

    /// Get all built-in tool names.
    /// Used by wiring tests to verify every tool is properly integrated.
    pub fn all_builtin_tool_names(&self) -> Vec<String> {
        let mut names: Vec<String> = self.definitions.keys().cloned().collect();
        names.sort();
        names
    }

    /// Check whether a tool name is known.
    pub fn has_tool(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
        self.definitions.contains_key(name)
    }

    /// List all available skills as `(name, description, source)` tuples.
    pub fn list_skills(&self) -> Vec<(String, String, String)> {
        self.skill_registry
            .list()
            .into_iter()
            .map(|m| {
                let source = match m.source {
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::BuiltIn => "built-in",
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::User => "user",
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::Project => "project",
                };
                (m.name.clone(), m.description.clone(), source.to_string())
            })
            .collect()
    }

    /// Search skills by query, returning `(name, description, source)` tuples.
    pub fn search_skills(&self, query: &str) -> Vec<(String, String, String)> {
        self.skill_registry
            .search(query)
            .into_iter()
            .map(|m| {
                let source = match m.source {
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::BuiltIn => "built-in",
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::User => "user",
                    crate::skills::SkillSource::Project => "project",
                };
                (m.name.clone(), m.description.clone(), source.to_string())
            })
            .collect()
    }

    /// Get tool definitions, optionally filtered by allow/deny lists.
    ///
    /// Includes MCP tool definitions if a manager is attached.
    ///
    /// - `allowed` non-empty → only those tools (allowlist).
    /// - `denied` non-empty → all tools except those (denylist).
    /// - Both empty → all tools.
    /// - If both are specified, allowlist wins (deny is ignored).
    pub fn get_definitions(&self, allowed: &[String], denied: &[String]) -> Vec<ToolDefinition> {
        let mut defs: Vec<ToolDefinition> = if !allowed.is_empty() {
            allowed
                .iter()
                .filter_map(|name| self.definitions.get(name).cloned())
                .collect()
        } else if !denied.is_empty() {
            self.definitions
                .values()
                .filter(|d| !denied.contains(&d.name))
                .cloned()
                .collect()
        } else {
            self.definitions.values().cloned().collect()
        };

        // Append MCP tool definitions.
        if let Some(mgr) = self.mcp_manager()
            && let Ok(mgr) = mgr.try_read()
        {
            let mcp_defs = mgr.all_tool_definitions();
            if !allowed.is_empty() {
                // Allowlist mode: only include MCP tools in the allowlist.
                for def in mcp_defs {
                    if allowed.contains(&def.name) {
                        defs.push(def);
                    }
                }
            } else if !denied.is_empty() {
                // Denylist mode: include MCP tools not in the denylist.
                for def in mcp_defs {
                    if !denied.contains(&def.name) {
                        defs.push(def);
                    }
                }
            } else {
                // No filter: include all MCP tools.
                defs.extend(mcp_defs);
            }
        }

        defs
    }

    /// Execute a tool by name with the given JSON arguments.
    ///
    /// Empty or whitespace-only `arguments` are treated as `{}` (no args)
    /// so that tools can fall through to their own defaults instead of
    /// surfacing a raw JSON parse error.  See #513.
    ///
    /// `sink_for_streaming` is an optional `(sink, call_id)` pair. When
    /// provided, the Bash tool streams each output line as a
    /// `ToolOutputLine` event in real-time.
    pub async fn execute(
        &self,
        name: &str,
        arguments: &str,
        sink_for_streaming: Option<(&dyn crate::engine::EngineSink, &str)>,
        // Phase E of #996: forwarded to `Bash` so that bg-shell
        // entries are tagged with the calling agent's invocation id.
        // Every other tool ignores this. Top-level callers pass `None`.
        caller_spawner: Option<u32>,
    ) -> ToolResult {
        let raw = arguments.trim();
        let raw = if raw.is_empty() { "{}" } else { raw };
        let args: Value = match serde_json::from_str(raw) {
            Ok(v) => v,
            Err(e) => {
                return ToolResult {
                    output: format!("Invalid JSON arguments: {e}"),
                    success: false,
                    full_output: None,
                };
            }
        };

        tracing::info!(
            "Executing tool: {name} with args: [{} chars]",
            arguments.len()
        );

        // Snapshot file before mutation (for /undo)
        if let Some(file_path) = crate::undo::is_mutating_tool(name)
            .then(|| crate::undo::extract_file_path(name, &args))
            .flatten()
        {
            let resolved = self.project_root.join(&file_path);
            if let Ok(mut undo) = self.undo.lock() {
                undo.snapshot(&resolved);
            }
        }

        let result = match name {
            // File tools
            "Read" => {
                file_tools::read_file(&self.project_root, &args, &self.read_cache, &*self.fs).await
            }
            "Write" => file_tools::write_file(&self.project_root, &args, &*self.fs).await,
            "Edit" => {
                file_tools::edit_file(&self.project_root, &args, &self.read_cache, &*self.fs).await
            }
            "Delete" => file_tools::delete_file(&self.project_root, &args).await,
            "List" => {
                file_tools::list_files(&self.project_root, &args, self.caps.list_entries).await
            }

            // Search tools
            "Grep" => {
                grep::grep(&self.project_root, &args, self.caps.grep_matches, &*self.fs).await
            }
            "Glob" => {
                glob_tool::glob_search(&self.project_root, &args, self.caps.glob_results, &*self.fs)
                    .await
            }

            // Shell
            // Shell — returns ShellOutput with summary + full output.
            "Bash" => {
                let shell_result = shell::run_shell_command(
                    &self.project_root,
                    &args,
                    self.caps.shell_output_lines,
                    &self.bg_registry,
                    sink_for_streaming,
                    &self.trust,
                    self.sandbox_policy(),
                    self.proxy_port(),
                    self.socks5_port(),
                    caller_spawner,
                )
                .await;
                return match shell_result {
                    Ok(so) => {
                        // Record the invocation so validate_edit can hint at it
                        // in staleness error messages (#804 item 7).
                        let snippet = args["command"]
                            .as_str()
                            .unwrap_or("")
                            .chars()
                            .take(72)
                            .collect::<String>();
                        if !snippet.is_empty()
                            && let Ok(mut guard) = self.last_bash.lock()
                        {
                            *guard = Some((snippet, std::time::Instant::now()));
                        }
                        ToolResult {
                            output: so.summary,
                            success: true,
                            full_output: so.full_output,
                        }
                    }
                    Err(e) => ToolResult {
                        output: format!("Error: {e}"),
                        success: false,
                        full_output: None,
                    },
                };
            }

            // Web
            "WebFetch" => web_fetch::web_fetch(&args, self.caps.web_body_chars).await,
            "WebSearch" => web_search::web_search(&args).await,
            "TodoWrite" => {
                let db_opt = self.db.read().ok().and_then(|g| g.clone());
                let sid_opt = self.session_id.read().ok().and_then(|g| g.clone());
                match (db_opt, sid_opt) {
                    (Some(db), Some(sid)) => todo::todo_write(&db, &sid, &args).await,
                    _ => Ok("TodoWrite requires an active session.".to_string()),
                }
            }

            // Memory
            "MemoryRead" => memory::memory_read(&self.project_root).await,
            "MemoryWrite" => memory::memory_write(&self.project_root, &args).await,

            // Agent tools
            "ListAgents" => {
                let detail = args["detail"].as_bool().unwrap_or(false);
                if detail {
                    Ok(agent::list_agents_detail(&self.project_root))
                } else {
                    let agents = agent::list_agents(&self.project_root);
                    if agents.is_empty() {
                        Ok("No sub-agents configured.".to_string())
                    } else {
                        let lines: Vec<String> = agents
                            .iter()
                            .map(|(name, desc, source)| {
                                if source == "built-in" {
                                    format!("  {name} — {desc}")
                                } else {
                                    format!("  {name} — {desc} [{source}]")
                                }
                            })
                            .collect();
                        Ok(lines.join("\n"))
                    }
                }
            }
            // Skill tools
            "ListSkills" => Ok(skill_tools::list_skills(&self.skill_registry, &args)),
            "ActivateSkill" => Ok(skill_tools::activate_skill(&self.skill_registry, &args)),

            // Recall context tool
            "RecallContext" => {
                let db_opt = self.db.read().ok().and_then(|g| g.clone());
                let sid_opt = self.session_id.read().ok().and_then(|g| g.clone());
                if let (Some(db), Some(sid)) = (db_opt, sid_opt) {
                    Ok(recall::recall_context(&db, &sid, &args).await)
                } else {
                    Ok("RecallContext requires an active session.".to_string())
                }
            }

            "InvokeAgent" => {
                // Handled by tool_dispatch.rs before reaching here.
                // This branch should not be reached in normal flow.
                return ToolResult {
                    output: "InvokeAgent is handled by the inference loop.".to_string(),
                    success: false,
                    full_output: None,
                };
            }

            "AskUser" => {
                // Handled by execute_tools_sequential (needs sink + cmd_rx).
                // This branch should not be reached in normal flow.
                return ToolResult {
                    output: "AskUser is handled by the inference loop.".to_string(),
                    success: false,
                    full_output: None,
                };
            }

            other => {
                // MCP tool dispatch (#662): route `server__tool` calls
                // to the appropriate MCP server.
                if crate::mcp::is_mcp_tool_name(other) {
                    if let Some(mgr) = self.mcp_manager() {
                        let result = {
                            let mgr = mgr.read().await;
                            mgr.call_tool(other, args.clone()).await
                        };
                        return match result {
                            Ok(output) => ToolResult {
                                output,
                                success: true,
                                full_output: None,
                            },
                            Err(e) => ToolResult {
                                output: format!("Error: {e}"),
                                success: false,
                                full_output: None,
                            },
                        };
                    }
                    return ToolResult {
                        output: format!(
                            "MCP tool '{other}' not available — \
                             no MCP servers connected."
                        ),
                        success: false,
                        full_output: None,
                    };
                }

                // Detect garbled tool names (JSON blobs, very long strings)
                // — a sign the model can't do structured tool calling.
                let warning = if other.contains('{') || other.len() > 64 {
                    format!(
                        "Unknown tool: {other}. \
                         This model appears to struggle with tool calling. \
                         Consider switching to a model with native function-call support."
                    )
                } else {
                    format!("Unknown tool: {other}")
                };
                Err(anyhow::anyhow!(warning))
            }
        };

        match result {
            Ok(output) => {
                // Record successful Write/Edit so the validation layer can
                // name the responsible tool in staleness error messages.
                if matches!(name, "Write" | "Edit")
                    && let Some(path) =
                        crate::file_tracker::resolve_file_path_from_args(&args, &self.project_root)
                    && let Ok(mut guard) = self.last_writer.lock()
                {
                    guard.insert(path, (name.to_string(), std::time::Instant::now()));
                }
                ToolResult {
                    output,
                    success: true,
                    full_output: None,
                }
            }
            Err(e) => ToolResult {
                output: format!("Error: {e}"),
                success: false,
                full_output: None,
            },
        }
    }
}

/// Validate and resolve a path, preventing directory traversal.
///
/// Works for both existing and non-existing files (no `canonicalize!`).
/// Relative paths are joined to `project_root`; absolute paths must
/// still be within `project_root` **or** under an allowed tempdir
/// (`/tmp`, `/private/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or `$TMPDIR`).
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// use koda_core::tools::safe_resolve_path;
/// use std::path::Path;
///
/// let root = Path::new("/home/user/project");
///
/// // Relative paths resolve within project
/// let p = safe_resolve_path(root, "src/main.rs").unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(p, Path::new("/home/user/project/src/main.rs"));
///
/// // Traversal is blocked
/// assert!(safe_resolve_path(root, "../../etc/passwd").is_err());
///
/// // Tempdirs are allowed (matches the kernel sandbox policy)
/// assert!(safe_resolve_path(root, "/tmp/scratch.txt").is_ok());
/// ```
pub fn safe_resolve_path(project_root: &Path, requested: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    // NOTE: used only for Write / Edit / Delete.  Read-only tools call
    // resolve_path_unrestricted — see docs/src/sandbox.md for the rationale.
    let requested_path = Path::new(requested);

    // Build absolute path and normalize (removes .., . etc.)
    let resolved = if requested_path.is_absolute() {
        requested_path.to_path_buf().clean()
    } else {
        project_root.join(requested_path).clean()
    };

    // Security check: must be within project root OR an allowed tempdir.
    // Only Write / Edit / Delete are gated here — reads are unrestricted
    // (see resolve_path_unrestricted and docs/src/sandbox.md).
    //
    // The tempdir allow-list keeps in-process policy in sync with the
    // kernel sandbox (Seatbelt on macOS, bwrap on Linux), which already
    // permits writes to /tmp + cache dirs. Pre-fix this layer was the
    // outlier (#947): `bash -c 'cat > /tmp/x'` succeeded but `Write /tmp/x`
    // was rejected, blocking common scratch-file workflows.
    if !resolved.starts_with(project_root) && !is_allowed_write_root(&resolved) {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "Path {requested:?} is outside the project root ({project_root:?}) \
             and not under a writable tempdir (/tmp, /var/tmp, $TMPDIR). \
             Write, Edit, and Delete are restricted to the project directory \
             and tempdirs to prevent accidental modification of files \
             elsewhere. Tell the user: to write outside these locations, \
             restart koda from a parent directory that contains both paths."
        );
    }

    // Defense in depth: even within an allowed tempdir, never let writes
    // touch koda's own credential store. (`is_fully_denied` matches the
    // path against the credential-config denylist used by the read-only
    // tools, keeping all three perimeters — read, write, sandbox — in sync.)
    if crate::sandbox::is_fully_denied(&resolved) {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "Path {requested:?} is denied: this path contains koda's \
             internal secrets and cannot be modified by tool calls."
        );
    }

    Ok(resolved)
}

/// Returns true if `path` lives under a system tempdir that the kernel
/// sandbox (Seatbelt / bwrap) already permits writes to.
///
/// This intentionally mirrors the `(subpath "/tmp")` and
/// `(subpath "/private/tmp")` allow rules in `sandbox.rs` so the in-process
/// file tools accept the same set of paths as `bash -c 'cat > ...'`.
///
/// The check is logical (no `canonicalize`) to match `safe_resolve_path`'s
/// behaviour for non-existing files. The kernel sandbox is the real enforcer
/// at runtime; this helper is the policy-symmetry layer.
fn is_allowed_write_root(path: &Path) -> bool {
    // Hard-coded tempdir paths that the kernel sandbox always allows.
    // `/private/tmp` is macOS's realpath of `/tmp` (which is a symlink).
    const TEMPDIR_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["/tmp", "/private/tmp", "/var/tmp"];
    if TEMPDIR_PREFIXES
        .iter()
        .any(|prefix| path.starts_with(prefix))
    {
        return true;
    }

    // Per-user $TMPDIR (macOS: /var/folders/.../T/, Linux: usually /tmp).
    // Resolved at call time so test environments overriding TMPDIR
    // are honoured. `temp_dir()` is infallible — falls back to /tmp on Unix.
    path.starts_with(std::env::temp_dir())
}

/// Normalise a path without enforcing any scope restriction.
///
/// Low-level primitive — **tool implementations should call
/// [`resolve_read_path`] instead**, which adds the fully-denied list check
/// that keeps in-process policy in sync with the subprocess sandbox.
///
/// Relative paths are resolved against `project_root`; absolute paths are
/// cleaned in-place.  The result may point anywhere on the filesystem.
pub(crate) fn resolve_path_unrestricted(project_root: &Path, requested: &str) -> PathBuf {
    let path = Path::new(requested);
    if path.is_absolute() {
        path.to_path_buf().clean()
    } else {
        project_root.join(path).clean()
    }
}

/// Normalise a read-only path and enforce the fully-denied list.
///
/// This is the entry-point for **all read-only tools** (Read, List, Grep,
/// Glob).  It wraps `resolve_path_unrestricted` with a check against
/// `sandbox::is_fully_denied` so that the same paths blocked by the
/// subprocess sandbox (bwrap / Seatbelt) are also blocked when the model
/// accesses them through in-process tools.
///
/// Currently the only denied path is `~/.config/koda/db` — koda's own SQLite
/// database containing plaintext API keys.  Ordinary credential directories
/// (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, …) are readable, matching the Bash sandbox policy.
///
/// See issue #884 for Option B (OS-level enforcement via sandboxed worker).
pub fn resolve_read_path(project_root: &Path, requested: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    let resolved = resolve_path_unrestricted(project_root, requested);
    if crate::sandbox::is_fully_denied(&resolved) {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "Access to {requested:?} is denied: this path contains koda's \
             internal secrets and cannot be read by model tool calls."
        );
    }
    Ok(resolved)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::path::PathBuf;

    fn root() -> PathBuf {
        PathBuf::from("/home/user/project")
    }

    // ── Phase 3b: proxy port wiring (Bash → sandbox::build) ──────────

    #[test]
    fn proxy_port_defaults_to_none() {
        // Standalone ToolRegistry (no KodaSession) starts with no port —
        // production sessions overwrite this in `KodaSession::new`.
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(root(), 100_000);
        assert_eq!(registry.proxy_port(), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn proxy_port_round_trips_through_setter() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(root(), 100_000);
        registry.set_proxy_port(Some(31415));
        assert_eq!(registry.proxy_port(), Some(31415));
    }

    // ── Phase 3d.2: SOCKS5 port wiring (Bash → sandbox::build) ───────

    #[test]
    fn socks5_port_defaults_to_none() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(root(), 100_000);
        assert_eq!(registry.socks5_port(), None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn socks5_port_round_trips_through_setter() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(root(), 100_000);
        registry.set_socks5_port(Some(27182));
        assert_eq!(registry.socks5_port(), Some(27182));
    }

    #[test]
    fn socks5_and_http_ports_are_independent() {
        // Setting one must not clobber the other — the two proxies are
        // spawned independently and may live or die independently.
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(root(), 100_000);
        registry.set_proxy_port(Some(8080));
        registry.set_socks5_port(Some(1080));
        assert_eq!(registry.proxy_port(), Some(8080));
        assert_eq!(registry.socks5_port(), Some(1080));
        registry.set_proxy_port(None);
        assert_eq!(registry.socks5_port(), Some(1080));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_relative_path_resolves_inside_root() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "src/main.rs").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result, PathBuf::from("/home/user/project/src/main.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_dot_path_resolves_to_root() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), ".").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result, PathBuf::from("/home/user/project"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_new_file_in_new_dir_resolves() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "src/brand_new/feature.rs").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            result,
            PathBuf::from("/home/user/project/src/brand_new/feature.rs")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_dotdot_traversal_blocked() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "../../etc/passwd");
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_dotdot_sneaky_traversal_blocked() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "src/../../etc/passwd");
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_absolute_path_inside_root_allowed() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/home/user/project/src/lib.rs").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result, PathBuf::from("/home/user/project/src/lib.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_absolute_path_outside_root_blocked() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/etc/shadow");
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_outside_root_error_is_actionable_for_user() {
        let err = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "../../etc/passwd").unwrap_err();
        let msg = err.to_string();
        assert!(
            msg.contains("outside the project root"),
            "error must say 'outside the project root'; got: {msg}"
        );
        assert!(
            msg.contains("Tell the user"),
            "error must direct model to surface this to the user; got: {msg}"
        );
        // Must NOT suggest Bash — that would bypass the file-tool safety layer.
        assert!(
            !msg.contains("Bash"),
            "error must not suggest Bash as a workaround; got: {msg}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_empty_path_resolves_to_root() {
        let result = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result, PathBuf::from("/home/user/project"));
    }

    // ── resolve_read_path ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn read_path_allows_project_file() {
        let p = resolve_read_path(&root(), "src/lib.rs").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/home/user/project/src/lib.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn read_path_allows_outside_project() {
        // Reads outside the project root are intentionally unrestricted.
        let p = resolve_read_path(&root(), "/etc/hosts").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/etc/hosts"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn read_path_blocks_koda_db() {
        let home = std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "/home/user".into());
        let koda_db = format!("{home}/.config/koda/db/koda.db");
        let err = resolve_read_path(&root(), &koda_db).unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string().contains("denied"),
            "expected 'denied' in error, got: {err}"
        );
    }

    // ── #947: writes to tempdirs ASCII─ART─ ─────────────────────────
    //
    // The kernel sandbox (Seatbelt / bwrap) explicitly permits writes to
    // /tmp + cache dirs.  Pre-fix, `safe_resolve_path` rejected absolute
    // paths outside `project_root`, so `bash -c 'cat > /tmp/x'` succeeded
    // but `Write /tmp/x` failed — forcing models into shell heredoc
    // workarounds that often quote-escape badly.  These tests lock in the
    // symmetry between the two perimeters.

    #[test]
    fn write_path_allows_tmp() {
        let p = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/tmp/koda-scratch.txt").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/tmp/koda-scratch.txt"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_allows_private_tmp_macos_realpath() {
        // macOS resolves /tmp → /private/tmp via a symlink. Some tools (`find`,
        // `realpath`) emit the realpath form, so absolute paths beginning
        // with /private/tmp must also be accepted.
        let p = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/private/tmp/koda-scratch.txt").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/private/tmp/koda-scratch.txt"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_allows_var_tmp() {
        let p = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/var/tmp/koda-scratch.txt").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/var/tmp/koda-scratch.txt"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_allows_per_user_tmpdir() {
        // Whatever `std::env::temp_dir()` returns on this host — macOS gives
        // /var/folders/.../T/, Linux usually /tmp.  Either way it's writable.
        let tmpdir = std::env::temp_dir();
        let target = tmpdir.join("koda-scratch.txt");
        let p = safe_resolve_path(&root(), target.to_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, target.clean());
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_blocks_etc_hosts() {
        // System config dirs stay denied — only tempdirs are added.
        let err = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/etc/hosts").unwrap_err();
        let msg = err.to_string();
        assert!(
            msg.contains("outside the project root"),
            "system paths must still be rejected; got: {msg}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_blocks_ssh_authorized_keys() {
        // Credential dirs in $HOME stay denied — they're outside both
        // project_root and any tempdir, so the existing perimeter holds.
        let home = std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "/home/user".into());
        let target = format!("{home}/.ssh/authorized_keys");
        assert!(
            safe_resolve_path(&root(), &target).is_err(),
            "~/.ssh writes must remain blocked"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_blocks_koda_db_even_via_tmp_traversal() {
        // Defense in depth: even if a model crafts a path that lands in a
        // tempdir but cleans into koda's own credential store, `is_fully_denied`
        // catches it. Constructed path: `/tmp/../<home>/.config/koda/db/x`
        // cleans to `<home>/.config/koda/db/x` — NOT a tempdir, NOT project,
        // hits the standard "outside the project root" path. So this is
        // already covered by the primary check; this test pins it down.
        let home = std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_else(|_| "/home/user".into());
        let target = format!("/tmp/../{home}/.config/koda/db/koda.db");
        assert!(
            safe_resolve_path(&root(), &target).is_err(),
            "traversal out of /tmp must not bypass the gate"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn write_path_traversal_inside_tmp_stays_in_tmp() {
        // /tmp/foo/../bar cleans to /tmp/bar — still in /tmp, still allowed.
        let p = safe_resolve_path(&root(), "/tmp/foo/../bar").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(p, PathBuf::from("/tmp/bar"));
    }
}

// ── Tool action descriptions ──────────────────────────────────

/// Generate a human-readable description of a tool action for approval prompts.
pub fn describe_action(tool_name: &str, args: &serde_json::Value) -> String {
    match tool_name {
        "Bash" => {
            let cmd = args
                .get("command")
                .or(args.get("cmd"))
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .unwrap_or("?");
            let bg = args
                .get("background")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
                .unwrap_or(false);
            if bg {
                format!("[bg] {cmd}")
            } else {
                cmd.to_string()
            }
        }
        "Delete" => {
            let path = args
                .get("file_path")
                .or(args.get("path"))
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .unwrap_or("?");
            let recursive = args
                .get("recursive")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
                .unwrap_or(false);
            if recursive {
                format!("Delete directory (recursive): {path}")
            } else {
                format!("Delete: {path}")
            }
        }
        "Write" => {
            let path = args
                .get("path")
                .or(args.get("file_path"))
                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                .unwrap_or("?");
            let overwrite = args
                .get("overwrite")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
                .unwrap_or(false);
            if overwrite {
                format!("Overwrite file: {path}")
            } else {
                format!("Create file: {path}")
            }
        }
        "Edit" => {
            let path = if let Some(payload) = args.get("payload") {
                payload
                    .get("file_path")
                    .or(payload.get("path"))
                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                    .unwrap_or("?")
            } else {
                args.get("file_path")
                    .or(args.get("path"))
                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                    .unwrap_or("?")
            };
            format!("Edit file: {path}")
        }
        "WebFetch" => {
            let url = args.get("url").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
            format!("Fetch URL: {url}")
        }
        "WebSearch" => {
            let q = args.get("query").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
            format!("Web search: {q}")
        }
        "TodoWrite" => {
            let n = args
                .get("todos")
                .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
                .map(|a| a.len())
                .unwrap_or(0);
            format!("Update todo list ({n} tasks)")
        }
        "MemoryWrite" => {
            let fact = args.get("fact").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
            let preview = if fact.len() > 60 {
                format!("{}…", &fact[..57])
            } else {
                fact.to_string()
            };
            format!("Save to memory: {preview}")
        }
        _ => format!("Execute: {tool_name}"),
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod describe_action_tests {
    use super::*;
    use serde_json::json;

    #[test]
    fn test_describe_bash() {
        let desc = describe_action("Bash", &json!({"command": "cargo build"}));
        assert!(desc.contains("cargo build"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_describe_delete() {
        let desc = describe_action("Delete", &json!({"file_path": "old.rs"}));
        assert!(desc.contains("old.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_describe_edit() {
        let desc = describe_action("Edit", &json!({"payload": {"file_path": "src/main.rs"}}));
        assert!(desc.contains("src/main.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_describe_write() {
        let desc = describe_action("Write", &json!({"path": "new.rs"}));
        assert!(desc.contains("Create file"));
        assert!(desc.contains("new.rs"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_describe_write_overwrite() {
        let desc = describe_action("Write", &json!({"path": "x.rs", "overwrite": true}));
        assert!(desc.contains("Overwrite"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_get_definitions_deny_list() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), 128_000);
        let denied = vec![
            "Write".to_string(),
            "Edit".to_string(),
            "Delete".to_string(),
        ];
        let defs = registry.get_definitions(&[], &denied);
        let names: Vec<&str> = defs.iter().map(|d| d.name.as_str()).collect();
        assert!(!names.contains(&"Write"));
        assert!(!names.contains(&"Edit"));
        assert!(!names.contains(&"Delete"));
        assert!(names.contains(&"Read"));
        assert!(names.contains(&"Grep"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_get_definitions_allow_list_wins_over_deny() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), 128_000);
        let allowed = vec!["Read".to_string(), "Write".to_string()];
        let denied = vec!["Write".to_string()];
        // allow wins — Write should be present
        let defs = registry.get_definitions(&allowed, &denied);
        let names: Vec<&str> = defs.iter().map(|d| d.name.as_str()).collect();
        assert_eq!(names.len(), 2);
        assert!(names.contains(&"Read"));
        assert!(names.contains(&"Write"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_get_definitions_both_empty_returns_all() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), 128_000);
        let all = registry.get_definitions(&[], &[]);
        assert!(all.len() > 10, "Should have many tools");
    }

    // ── Phase 5 PR-2 of #934: SandboxPolicy threading on ToolRegistry ──
    //
    // The Bash dispatch path now reads `self.sandbox_policy()` instead
    // of synthesizing `strict_default()` inline. These tests pin:
    //   1. The default seed is `strict_default()` so unchanged callers
    //      preserve byte-for-byte behavior.
    //   2. `with_sandbox_policy` actually replaces the field (the
    //      threading is real, not a stub).
    //   3. The accessor returns the most recent setter's value (no
    //      caching/aliasing surprises).

    #[test]
    fn registry_sandbox_policy_defaults_to_strict() {
        let registry = ToolRegistry::new(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), 128_000);
        assert_eq!(
            *registry.sandbox_policy(),
            koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy::strict_default(),
            "PR-2 contract: ToolRegistry::new must seed strict_default() so \
             pre-PR callers see unchanged behavior"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn with_sandbox_policy_overrides_the_default() {
        // Build a deliberately-non-default policy by mutating one field.
        // We don't care which field — only that round-tripping through
        // `with_sandbox_policy` preserves the override and the default
        // would not match.
        let mut custom = koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy::strict_default();
        custom
            .fs
            .allow_write
            .push(koda_sandbox::PathPattern::new("/pr2-marker"));

        let registry =
            ToolRegistry::new(PathBuf::from("/tmp"), 128_000).with_sandbox_policy(custom.clone());

        assert_eq!(
            *registry.sandbox_policy(),
            custom,
            "with_sandbox_policy must replace the field, not no-op"
        );
        assert_ne!(
            *registry.sandbox_policy(),
            koda_sandbox::SandboxPolicy::strict_default(),
            "sanity: the override is observably different from the default"
        );
    }
}