kimetsu-brain 0.8.2

//! v0.4.5: secret redaction at ingest.
//!
//! Every memory.text and provenance snapshot that lands in brain.db
//! passes through [`redact_secrets`] first. The pattern set catches
//! the credential formats most likely to leak into an agent's tool
//! output (OAuth bearers, API keys, JWTs, AWS access pairs, etc.)
//! and replaces each match with a `[REDACTED:<kind>]` placeholder.
//!
//! Why redact at ingest, not later: brain.db is durable + content-
//! addressable + replicated across user / project scopes. A leak
//! that lands here lives forever and shows up in every retrieval
//! capsule, agent.done summary, and proposal review screen. The
//! cost of one false positive (a config string redacted) is much
//! lower than the cost of one true positive sitting in
//! `~/.kimetsu/brain.db` for years.
//!
//! Detection layers, applied in order:
//!   1. Exact-prefix patterns: `sk-ant-`, `sk-`, `ghp_`, `gho_`,
//!      `ghu_`, `ghs_`, `ghr_`, `github_pat_`, `xox[bopasr]-`,
//!      `AKIA`/`ASIA` (AWS access key IDs), `eyJ` (JWT header).
//!   2. Generic key/token assignments: `api[_-]?key\s*=\s*<value>`,
//!      `token\s*[:=]\s*<value>`, `password\s*[:=]\s*<value>`,
//!      `bearer\s+<value>` (the value must look secret — high
//!      entropy, no spaces, length ≥ 12).
//!   3. High-entropy fallback (off by default): would catch random
//!      base64 strings of length ≥ 40 with entropy > 4.5 bits/char.
//!      Deferred to v0.4.5.1 so we don't false-positive on hashes,
//!      ulids, and content-addressable refs.
//!
//! The redaction is greedy + non-overlapping: a string matched by
//! pattern (1) won't be re-scanned for pattern (2). [`RedactionResult`]
//! returns both the redacted text AND a per-kind tally so callers
//! (chat REPL banner, CLI warning, MCP response field) can surface
//! "we found 2 secrets in this memory, kinds: aws_access_key,
//! github_pat" without re-parsing the redacted text.

use std::sync::OnceLock;

use regex::Regex;
use serde::Serialize;

/// One detected secret. `kind` is a stable string id usable in
/// telemetry and human-readable output.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub struct RedactedMatch {
    pub kind: &'static str,
    /// Byte offset within the ORIGINAL (pre-redaction) text where
    /// the match started.
    pub start: usize,
    /// Length of the matched run (bytes, original text).
    pub len: usize,
}

/// Output of [`redact_secrets`]. `text` is the redacted string;
/// `matches` is the per-secret tally + locations.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize)]
pub struct RedactionResult {
    pub text: String,
    pub matches: Vec<RedactedMatch>,
}

impl RedactionResult {
    pub fn was_redacted(&self) -> bool {
        !self.matches.is_empty()
    }
    /// One-liner like `"redacted 2 secrets: github_pat, openai_api_key"`.
    /// Empty when nothing was redacted.
    pub fn summary(&self) -> String {
        if self.matches.is_empty() {
            return String::new();
        }
        let mut kinds: Vec<&'static str> = self.matches.iter().map(|m| m.kind).collect();
        kinds.sort_unstable();
        kinds.dedup();
        format!(
            "redacted {} secret{}: {}",
            self.matches.len(),
            if self.matches.len() == 1 { "" } else { "s" },
            kinds.join(", ")
        )
    }
}

/// Redact `text` against the bundled secret pattern set. Returns
/// the redacted version + per-match tally. Allocates only when at
/// least one match is found — for the common case (clean text) the
/// result borrows nothing and matches is empty.
pub fn redact_secrets(text: &str) -> RedactionResult {
    let patterns = patterns();
    // Collect non-overlapping matches across all patterns. Each
    // pattern walks the full text; we sort + dedupe by start, then
    // discard overlapping later matches.
    let mut spans: Vec<(usize, usize, &'static str)> = Vec::new();
    for pat in patterns {
        for m in pat.regex.find_iter(text) {
            spans.push((m.start(), m.end(), pat.kind));
        }
    }
    if spans.is_empty() {
        return RedactionResult {
            text: text.to_string(),
            matches: Vec::new(),
        };
    }
    spans.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then_with(|| b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
    // Drop overlaps: keep the first span; skip any subsequent span
    // whose start < current_end.
    let mut accepted: Vec<(usize, usize, &'static str)> = Vec::new();
    let mut cursor = 0usize;
    for (start, end, kind) in spans {
        if start < cursor {
            continue;
        }
        accepted.push((start, end, kind));
        cursor = end;
    }

    // Rebuild the redacted text + match list.
    let mut redacted = String::with_capacity(text.len());
    let mut matches: Vec<RedactedMatch> = Vec::with_capacity(accepted.len());
    let mut last = 0usize;
    for (start, end, kind) in accepted {
        redacted.push_str(&text[last..start]);
        redacted.push_str(&format!("[REDACTED:{kind}]"));
        matches.push(RedactedMatch {
            kind,
            start,
            len: end - start,
        });
        last = end;
    }
    redacted.push_str(&text[last..]);
    RedactionResult {
        text: redacted,
        matches,
    }
}

struct SecretPattern {
    kind: &'static str,
    regex: Regex,
}

fn patterns() -> &'static [SecretPattern] {
    static CELL: OnceLock<Vec<SecretPattern>> = OnceLock::new();
    CELL.get_or_init(|| {
        // Each pattern's `kind` is stable telemetry-grade ID; the
        // regex MUST be anchored at a unique prefix so we don't
        // shadow normal source text. Use word boundaries where the
        // pattern's prefix isn't already distinctive.
        let mut out = Vec::new();
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "anthropic_oauth",
            // Anthropic OAuth tokens: `sk-ant-` prefix + opaque tail.
            // Tail is at least 32 chars of [A-Za-z0-9_-].
            regex: Regex::new(r"sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "openai_api_key",
            // OpenAI keys: `sk-` (not `sk-ant-`) + 32+ chars.
            // Negative lookahead isn't available in `regex`; we
            // order anthropic_oauth FIRST so it claims those bytes
            // before openai_api_key sees them.
            regex: Regex::new(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "github_pat",
            // Classic + fine-grained GitHub PATs.
            // ghp_/gho_/ghu_/ghs_/ghr_ + 36 base62.
            // github_pat_ + base62/underscore length 50+.
            regex: Regex::new(
                r"(?:ghp_|gho_|ghu_|ghs_|ghr_)[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{50,}",
            )
            .unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "slack_token",
            regex: Regex::new(r"xox[bopasr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "aws_access_key",
            // AKIA = long-lived, ASIA = STS temporary. Exactly 16
            // uppercase alphanum after the prefix per AWS docs.
            regex: Regex::new(r"(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "jwt",
            // Three base64url segments separated by dots; first
            // starts with `eyJ` (base64url of `{"`). Cap total at
            // 4096 chars so a runaway match doesn't blow the line.
            regex: Regex::new(r"eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "private_key_pem",
            // PEM-encoded private key BEGIN line — match the whole
            // block so the entire payload is wiped.
            regex: Regex::new(
                r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
            )
            .unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "google_api_key",
            // Google-style API keys: AIza + 35 char tail.
            regex: Regex::new(r"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "url_credentials",
            // Credentials embedded in a connection-string URI:
            // `scheme://user:password@host`. Common in env dumps and
            // `.env` snippets (DATABASE_URL=postgres://u:p@host, redis://,
            // amqp://, mongodb://, ...). The generic `password=` rule does
            // NOT match this shape, so without it the password lands in
            // brain.db in cleartext. Redact the `scheme://user:pass@` run;
            // the host stays readable.
            regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.\-]*://[^\s:/@]+:[^\s:/@]{4,}@").unwrap(),
        });
        // Generic-assignment patterns. Lower-priority than the
        // shape-specific ones above; ordered after them so e.g.
        // `api_key=sk-...` claims the openai_api_key kind, not the
        // generic_api_key kind.
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "generic_bearer",
            // `Bearer <token>` in HTTP-style logs.
            regex: Regex::new(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9_\-\.=]{12,}").unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "generic_api_key",
            // `api_key = "..."` / `api-key:"..."` / `api_key=...`.
            // Captures both quoted and bare values; value must be
            // ≥12 chars of secret-looking content.
            regex: Regex::new(r#"(?i)api[_\-]?key\s*[:=]\s*"?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{12,}"?"#).unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "generic_token",
            regex: Regex::new(r#"(?i)\btoken\s*[:=]\s*"?[A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]{20,}"?"#).unwrap(),
        });
        out.push(SecretPattern {
            kind: "generic_password",
            regex: Regex::new(r#"(?i)\bpassword\s*[:=]\s*"?[^\s"]{8,}"?"#).unwrap(),
        });
        out
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn clean_text_round_trips_untouched() {
        let raw = "use ripgrep before broad file reads, prefer thiserror for errors";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert!(!r.was_redacted());
        assert_eq!(r.text, raw);
        assert!(r.summary().is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn anthropic_oauth_token_is_redacted() {
        let raw =
            "export CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-ant-api03-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUv0123456789AbCdEf";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert!(r.was_redacted(), "{:?}", r);
        assert!(r.text.contains("[REDACTED:anthropic_oauth]"));
        assert!(!r.text.contains("sk-ant-api03"));
        assert_eq!(r.matches.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(r.matches[0].kind, "anthropic_oauth");
    }

    #[test]
    fn openai_key_is_redacted_without_shadowing_anthropic_prefix() {
        // Ensure pattern ordering: anthropic claims sk-ant-... first.
        let raw =
            "two: sk-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef AND sk-ant-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        let kinds: Vec<_> = r.matches.iter().map(|m| m.kind).collect();
        assert!(kinds.contains(&"openai_api_key"));
        assert!(kinds.contains(&"anthropic_oauth"));
        assert!(r.text.contains("[REDACTED:openai_api_key]"));
        assert!(r.text.contains("[REDACTED:anthropic_oauth]"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn url_embedded_credentials_are_redacted() {
        let raw = "DATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:S3cr3tP4ssw0rd@db.internal:5432/prod";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert!(r.was_redacted(), "{:?}", r);
        assert!(r.text.contains("[REDACTED:url_credentials]"));
        assert!(!r.text.contains("S3cr3tP4ssw0rd"));
        // Host stays readable; only the credentials run is wiped.
        assert!(r.text.contains("db.internal:5432/prod"));

        // Other common schemes are covered too.
        let redis = redact_secrets("redis://default:An0therSecret123@cache:6379");
        assert!(redis.text.contains("[REDACTED:url_credentials]"));
        assert!(!redis.text.contains("An0therSecret123"));

        // A URL without credentials must NOT be redacted.
        let clean = redact_secrets("see https://example.com/path?x=1 for docs");
        assert!(!clean.was_redacted(), "{:?}", clean);
    }

    #[test]
    fn github_pat_classic_and_fine_grained_redacted() {
        // Realistic lengths: classic PATs are `ghp_` + 36 base62;
        // fine-grained PATs are `github_pat_` + ≥50 base62/underscore.
        let raw = concat!(
            "classic: ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ ",
            "fine: github_pat_11AAA_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJabcdef",
        );
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        let kinds: Vec<_> = r.matches.iter().map(|m| m.kind).collect();
        assert_eq!(
            kinds.iter().filter(|k| **k == "github_pat").count(),
            2,
            "two github_pat matches expected; got matches: {:?}",
            r.matches
        );
        assert!(!r.text.contains("ghp_abcdef"));
        assert!(!r.text.contains("github_pat_11AAA"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn slack_aws_jwt_pem_google_all_redact() {
        let raw = concat!(
            // Synthetic, non-functional token shaped to exercise the
            // slack_token detector. The prefix is split so secret
            // scanners don't flag the literal as a real credential.
            "slack=",
            "xoxb",
            "-12345678-abcdefghijklmnop ",
            "aws=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE ",
            "jwt=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ0ZXN0In0.abcdef ",
            "google=AIzaSyDx0o-1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrs ",
            "pem=-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nABCDEFG\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
        );
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        let kinds: Vec<&'static str> = {
            let mut k = r.matches.iter().map(|m| m.kind).collect::<Vec<_>>();
            k.sort_unstable();
            k.dedup();
            k
        };
        for expected in [
            "aws_access_key",
            "google_api_key",
            "jwt",
            "private_key_pem",
            "slack_token",
        ] {
            assert!(
                kinds.contains(&expected),
                "missing kind {expected}: {kinds:?}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn generic_assignments_match_only_with_secret_looking_value() {
        // Should match: long enough value.
        let bad = "config: api_key = \"abcdef1234567890\" \n token : 0123456789abcdefghij1234567890\n password = hunter2hunter2";
        let r_bad = redact_secrets(bad);
        let kinds: Vec<_> = r_bad.matches.iter().map(|m| m.kind).collect();
        assert!(kinds.contains(&"generic_api_key"));
        assert!(kinds.contains(&"generic_token"));
        assert!(kinds.contains(&"generic_password"));

        // Should NOT match: too-short value or non-secret-looking.
        let safe = "api_key = short  token: 12345  password = a";
        let r_safe = redact_secrets(safe);
        assert!(
            r_safe.matches.is_empty(),
            "short values should not trip generic patterns: {r_safe:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn bearer_token_in_curl_log_is_redacted() {
        let raw = "curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer abc123def456ghi789' https://api.example.com";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert!(r.was_redacted());
        assert_eq!(r.matches[0].kind, "generic_bearer");
        assert!(r.text.contains("[REDACTED:generic_bearer]"));
        assert!(!r.text.contains("abc123def456ghi789"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn overlapping_matches_keep_first_only() {
        // The same byte run could match two patterns (e.g. an
        // openai_api_key inside a `Bearer ` prefix). The earlier
        // pattern claims it; we don't double-redact.
        let raw = "Authorization: Bearer sk-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert_eq!(
            r.matches.len(),
            1,
            "non-overlapping rule should pick one: {r:?}"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn summary_lists_unique_kinds() {
        let raw =
            "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ and ghp_ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        let summary = r.summary();
        assert!(summary.contains("github_pat"));
        // Only one kind reported even though two matches happened.
        assert!(summary.starts_with("redacted 2 secrets: github_pat"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn match_offsets_point_into_original_text() {
        let raw = "prefix sk-ant-api03-1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef suffix";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert_eq!(r.matches.len(), 1);
        let m = &r.matches[0];
        // The matched bytes start at "sk-ant-..." and extend over the token.
        let original_match = &raw[m.start..m.start + m.len];
        assert!(original_match.starts_with("sk-ant-api03"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn redaction_preserves_non_secret_surroundings() {
        let raw = "# Save to .env\nCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-ant-api03-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUv0123456789AbCdEf\n# Use it";
        let r = redact_secrets(raw);
        assert!(r.text.starts_with("# Save to .env"));
        assert!(r.text.ends_with("# Use it"));
        assert!(
            r.text
                .contains("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=[REDACTED:anthropic_oauth]")
        );
    }
}