use crate::error::{RuntimeError, RuntimeResult};
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SecretMatch {
pub detector: &'static str,
pub masked: String,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for SecretMatch {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"content matches secret pattern {} at masked excerpt {}. {}",
self.detector,
self.masked,
block_guidance(self.detector)
)
}
}
fn block_guidance(detector: &'static str) -> &'static str {
match detector {
"high-entropy-token"
| "uuid-near-trigger"
| "content-hash-near-trigger"
| "hex-credential-token" => {
"If this is a real credential, remove it before writing. If it is not \
(e.g. a file path, UUID, or hash that happens to sit near a word like \
key/secret/auth/token), reword so the token is not glued directly next \
to that word — e.g. move it to its own line, or insert a space or word \
between them."
}
_ => {
"If this is a real credential, remove it before writing; store secrets \
in an env var or secrets manager instead."
}
}
}
pub fn check(content: &str) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
if let Some(m) = scan(content) {
return Err(RuntimeError::SecretDetected(m));
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn check_json(value: &serde_json::Value) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
scan_json_value(value)
}
pub fn check_tags(tags: &[String]) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
for tag in tags {
check(tag)?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub const RESERVED_SECRET_GATE_KEY: &str = "khive:secret_gate";
pub fn reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(
properties: Option<&serde_json::Value>,
) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
if let Some(serde_json::Value::Object(map)) = properties {
if map.contains_key(RESERVED_SECRET_GATE_KEY) {
return Err(RuntimeError::InvalidInput(format!(
"property key `{RESERVED_SECRET_GATE_KEY}` is runtime-owned and cannot be \
created, replaced, merged, or removed by callers"
)));
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn scan_json_value(value: &serde_json::Value) -> RuntimeResult<()> {
match value {
serde_json::Value::String(s) => check(s),
serde_json::Value::Array(arr) => {
for v in arr {
scan_json_value(v)?;
}
Ok(())
}
serde_json::Value::Object(map) => {
for (k, v) in map {
check(k)?;
scan_json_value(v)?;
}
Ok(())
}
_ => Ok(()),
}
}
const REDACTION_MARKER: &str = "***MASKED***";
fn scan_match(text: &str) -> Option<(&str, &'static str)> {
scan_from(text, 0)
}
fn scan_from(text: &str, from: usize) -> Option<(&str, &'static str)> {
let base = text.as_ptr() as usize;
let mut best = check_known_patterns(&text[from..]);
keep_leftmost(&mut best, check_entropy_heuristic(text, from), base);
best
}
fn keep_leftmost<'a>(
best: &mut Option<(&'a str, &'static str)>,
cand: Option<(&'a str, &'static str)>,
base: usize,
) {
if let Some((slice, name)) = cand {
let start = slice.as_ptr() as usize - base;
let replace = match *best {
Some((incumbent, _)) => start < (incumbent.as_ptr() as usize - base),
None => true,
};
if replace {
*best = Some((slice, name));
}
}
}
fn scan(text: &str) -> Option<SecretMatch> {
scan_match(text).map(|(slice, detector)| build_match(detector, slice))
}
pub fn mask_secrets(text: &str) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> {
let base = text.as_ptr() as usize;
let mut spans: Vec<(usize, usize)> = Vec::new();
let mut from = 0;
while from < text.len() {
match scan_from(text, from) {
Some((sub, _detector)) => {
let start = sub.as_ptr() as usize - base;
let core_len = sub
.trim_end_matches(['"', '\'', '`', '}', ']', ')', ',', ';'])
.len();
let end = start + core_len.max(1);
spans.push((start, end));
from = end;
}
None => break,
}
}
if spans.is_empty() {
return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(text);
}
let mut out = String::with_capacity(text.len());
let mut cursor = 0;
for (start, end) in spans {
let start = start.max(cursor);
out.push_str(&text[cursor..start]);
out.push_str(REDACTION_MARKER);
cursor = end.max(cursor);
}
out.push_str(&text[cursor..]);
std::borrow::Cow::Owned(out)
}
const MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS: usize = 1_048_576;
const MAX_LOG_TEXT_OUTPUT_CHARS: usize = 1_024;
pub fn bounded_masked_log_text(text: &str) -> String {
let mask_input_truncated = text.chars().nth(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS).is_some();
let bounded_input: std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> = if mask_input_truncated {
std::borrow::Cow::Owned(text.chars().take(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS).collect())
} else {
std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(text)
};
let masked = mask_secrets(&bounded_input);
let masked = if mask_input_truncated {
redact_crossing_boundary_url_userinfo(&masked)
} else {
masked
};
let neutralized = neutralize_log_unsafe_chars(&masked);
let mut chars = neutralized.chars();
let mut bounded: String = chars.by_ref().take(MAX_LOG_TEXT_OUTPUT_CHARS).collect();
if chars.next().is_some() || mask_input_truncated {
bounded.push('…');
}
bounded
}
fn redact_crossing_boundary_url_userinfo(text: &str) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> {
let mut search_from = 0usize;
while let Some(rel) = text[search_from..].find("://") {
let scheme_pos = search_from + rel;
let rest = &text[scheme_pos + 3..];
let terminated =
rest.contains('@') || rest.contains(' ') || rest.contains('\n') || rest.contains('\r');
if !terminated {
let authority_end = rest.find(['/', '?', '#']).unwrap_or(rest.len());
if let Some(colon) = rest[..authority_end].find(':') {
let pass = &rest[colon + 1..];
if !pass.is_empty() {
let redact_from = scheme_pos + 3 + colon;
let mut out = String::with_capacity(redact_from + REDACTION_MARKER.len());
out.push_str(&text[..redact_from]);
out.push_str(REDACTION_MARKER);
return std::borrow::Cow::Owned(out);
}
}
}
search_from = scheme_pos + 3;
}
std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(text)
}
fn is_log_unsafe_char(c: char) -> bool {
if c == '\t' {
return false;
}
matches!(
unicode_general_category::get_general_category(c),
unicode_general_category::GeneralCategory::Control
| unicode_general_category::GeneralCategory::Format
| unicode_general_category::GeneralCategory::LineSeparator
| unicode_general_category::GeneralCategory::ParagraphSeparator
)
}
fn neutralize_log_unsafe_chars(text: &str) -> std::borrow::Cow<'_, str> {
if !text.chars().any(is_log_unsafe_char) {
return std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(text);
}
let mut out = String::with_capacity(text.len());
for c in text.chars() {
if is_log_unsafe_char(c) {
out.push_str(&format!("\\u{{{:04x}}}", c as u32));
} else {
out.push(c);
}
}
std::borrow::Cow::Owned(out)
}
const PREFIX_DETECTORS: &[(&str, &str, usize)] = &[
("aws-access-key-id", "AKIA", 20),
("aws-access-key-id", "ASIA", 20),
("github-token", "ghp_", 36),
("github-token", "gho_", 36),
("github-token", "ghu_", 36),
("github-token", "ghs_", 36),
("github-token", "ghr_", 36),
("github-token", "github_pat_", 20),
("openai-api-key", "sk-proj-", 40),
("anthropic-api-key", "sk-ant-", 20),
("stripe-secret-key", "sk_live_", 30),
("stripe-restricted-key", "rk_live_", 30),
("fly-token", "fm2_", 20),
("vercel-token", "vercel_", 20),
("slack-token", "xoxb-", 40),
("slack-token", "xoxa-", 40),
("slack-token", "xoxp-", 40),
("slack-token", "xoxr-", 40),
("slack-token", "xoxs-", 40),
("age-secret-key", "AGE-SECRET-KEY-", 60),
];
const SK_SAFE_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &["sk-learn", "sk-image", "sk-lego", "sk-base", "sk-misc"];
fn check_known_patterns(text: &str) -> Option<(&str, &'static str)> {
let base = text.as_ptr() as usize;
let mut best: Option<(&str, &'static str)> = None;
for &(name, needle, min_len) in PREFIX_DETECTORS {
keep_leftmost(
&mut best,
find_prefix_token(text, needle, min_len).map(|m| (m, name)),
base,
);
}
if let Some(token) = find_prefix_token(text, "sk-", 30) {
if !SK_SAFE_PREFIXES.iter().any(|safe| token.starts_with(safe)) {
keep_leftmost(&mut best, Some((token, "openai-api-key")), base);
}
}
if let Some(pos) = text.find("FlyV1 ") {
let at_boundary = pos == 0 || {
text[..pos]
.chars()
.next_back()
.is_none_or(|c| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
};
if at_boundary {
let payload_start = pos + 6; let payload = extract_token(&text[payload_start..]);
if payload.len() >= 4 {
let candidate = &text[pos..payload_start + payload.len()];
keep_leftmost(&mut best, Some((candidate, "fly-token")), base);
}
}
}
if text.contains("-----BEGIN") && text.contains("PRIVATE KEY-----") {
if let Some(pos) = text.find("-----BEGIN") {
let block_end = text[pos..]
.find("-----END")
.map(|rel| {
text[pos + rel..]
.find('\n')
.map(|l| pos + rel + l + 1)
.unwrap_or(text.len())
})
.unwrap_or(text.len());
let excerpt = &text[pos..block_end];
keep_leftmost(&mut best, Some((excerpt, "pem-private-key")), base);
}
}
keep_leftmost(&mut best, find_jwt(text).map(|m| (m, "jwt")), base);
keep_leftmost(
&mut best,
find_url_userinfo(text).map(|m| (m, "url-userinfo")),
base,
);
best
}
fn find_prefix_token<'a>(text: &'a str, needle: &str, min_len: usize) -> Option<&'a str> {
let mut start = 0;
while let Some(rel) = text[start..].find(needle) {
let abs = start + rel;
let at_boundary = abs == 0 || {
let prev = text[..abs].chars().next_back().unwrap_or(' ');
!prev.is_ascii_alphanumeric()
};
if at_boundary {
let token = extract_token(&text[abs..]);
if token.len() >= min_len && !is_filename_shaped_prefix_match(token, needle) {
return Some(token);
}
}
start = abs + needle.len().max(1);
}
None
}
const SOURCE_FILE_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] =
&[".py", ".rs", ".ts", ".js", ".sh", ".md", ".toml", ".json"];
fn is_filename_shaped_prefix_match(token: &str, needle: &str) -> bool {
let token = token.trim_end_matches(|c: char| {
matches!(
c,
'`' | '"' | '\'' | ')' | ']' | '}' | '>' | ',' | ';' | ':' | '!' | '?'
)
});
let token = token.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(token);
let Some(payload) = token.strip_prefix(needle) else {
return false;
};
let Some(stem) = SOURCE_FILE_EXTENSIONS
.iter()
.find_map(|extension| payload.strip_suffix(extension))
else {
return false;
};
stem.bytes().any(|byte| byte.is_ascii_lowercase())
&& stem
.bytes()
.any(|byte| matches!(byte, b'_' | b'-' | b'/' | b'.'))
&& stem
.bytes()
.all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_lowercase() || matches!(byte, b'_' | b'-' | b'/' | b'.'))
}
fn find_jwt(text: &str) -> Option<&str> {
let bytes = text.as_bytes();
let mut i = 0;
while i + 4 < bytes.len() {
if bytes[i..].starts_with(b"eyJ") {
let end = bytes[i..]
.iter()
.position(|&b| b == b' ' || b == b'\n' || b == b'\r' || b == b'\t')
.map(|p| i + p)
.unwrap_or(bytes.len());
let candidate = &text[i..end];
let dots = candidate.as_bytes().iter().filter(|&&b| b == b'.').count();
if dots >= 2 {
let parts: Vec<&str> = candidate.splitn(3, '.').collect();
if parts.len() == 3
&& parts[0].starts_with("eyJ")
&& parts[1].starts_with("eyJ")
&& parts[0].len() >= 10
&& parts[1].len() >= 10
{
return Some(candidate);
}
}
i = end + 1;
} else {
i += 1;
}
}
None
}
fn find_url_userinfo(text: &str) -> Option<&str> {
let mut search = text;
let mut base = 0usize;
while let Some(at_rel) = search.find("://") {
let at_abs = base + at_rel;
let rest_start = at_abs + 3;
let rest = &text[rest_start..];
let authority_end = rest
.find(['/', '?', '#', ' ', '\n', '\r'])
.unwrap_or(rest.len());
if let Some(at_pos) = rest[..authority_end].rfind('@') {
let userinfo = &rest[..at_pos];
if let Some(colon) = userinfo.find(':') {
let pass = &userinfo[colon + 1..];
if !pass.is_empty() {
let scheme_start = text[..at_abs]
.char_indices()
.rev()
.find(|(_, c)| {
!c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && *c != '+' && *c != '-' && *c != '.'
})
.map(|(idx, c)| idx + c.len_utf8())
.unwrap_or(0);
if !userinfo.contains(' ') && !userinfo.contains('\n') {
let end = rest_start
+ at_pos
+ 1
+ rest[at_pos + 1..]
.find([' ', '\n', '\r'])
.unwrap_or(rest[at_pos + 1..].len());
return Some(&text[scheme_start..end.min(text.len())]);
}
}
}
}
base = at_abs + 3;
search = &text[base..];
}
None
}
const TRIGGER_WORDS: &[&str] = &[
"key",
"secret",
"password",
"passwd",
"credential",
"bearer",
"auth",
"apikey",
];
const COMPOUND_TRIGGER_WORDS: &[&str] = &["api_key", "access_key", "private_key"];
const MIN_ENTROPY_LEN: usize = 24;
const ENTROPY_THRESHOLD: f64 = 4.5;
const TRIGGER_WINDOW: usize = 120;
const HEX_CREDENTIAL_LENGTHS: &[usize] = &[32, 40, 64, 128];
const MAX_BRIDGE_FRAGMENTS: usize = 6;
const MAX_BRIDGE_GLUE_TOKENS: usize = 6;
const MIN_BRIDGE_FRAGMENT_LEN: usize = 8;
fn floor_char_boundary(s: &str, i: usize) -> usize {
let mut i = i.min(s.len());
while i > 0 && !s.is_char_boundary(i) {
i -= 1;
}
i
}
fn check_entropy_heuristic(text: &str, from: usize) -> Option<(&str, &'static str)> {
let tokens: Vec<(usize, &str)> = text
.split(|c: char| c.is_ascii_whitespace() || !c.is_ascii())
.filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
.map(|t| {
let offset = t.as_ptr() as usize - text.as_ptr() as usize;
(offset, t)
})
.collect();
for (idx, &(tok_offset, raw_token)) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
let token = strip_delimiters(raw_token);
let token_offset = token.as_ptr() as usize - text.as_ptr() as usize;
if token_offset < from {
continue;
}
let is_bridge_candidate = is_bridge_fragment_shape(token);
if token.len() < MIN_ENTROPY_LEN && !is_bridge_candidate {
continue;
}
let window_start = floor_char_boundary(text, tok_offset.saturating_sub(TRIGGER_WINDOW));
let window_end = floor_char_boundary(text, tok_offset + raw_token.len() + TRIGGER_WINDOW);
let window = &text[window_start..window_end];
let raw_start = tok_offset - window_start;
let raw_end = raw_start + raw_token.len();
let near_trigger = contains_trigger(&window[..raw_start])
|| contains_trigger(&window[raw_end..])
|| has_inline_credential_trigger(raw_token);
if near_trigger && value_candidates(token).any(is_uuid_canonical) {
return Some((token, "uuid-near-trigger"));
}
if near_trigger && value_candidates(token).any(is_base64_content_hash) {
return Some((token, "content-hash-near-trigger"));
}
if !near_trigger && (is_uuid_canonical(token) || is_base64_content_hash(token)) {
continue;
}
if !near_trigger && is_pure_hex(token) {
continue;
}
if is_vcs_marker_before_hex(text, raw_token)
&& !has_clause_credential_label(
text,
token_offset,
raw_token,
ClauseValueKind::VcsReference,
)
{
continue;
}
let vcs_reference_exempt = is_git_revision_reference(text, token_offset, raw_token)
&& !has_clause_credential_label(
text,
token_offset,
raw_token,
ClauseValueKind::VcsReference,
);
if !vcs_reference_exempt
&& near_trigger
&& is_pure_hex(token)
&& HEX_CREDENTIAL_LENGTHS.contains(&token.len())
{
return Some((token, "hex-credential-token"));
}
if near_trigger {
for run in token.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric()) {
if run.len() < MIN_ENTROPY_LEN {
continue;
}
if !vcs_reference_exempt
&& is_pure_hex(run)
&& HEX_CREDENTIAL_LENGTHS.contains(&run.len())
{
return Some((token, "hex-credential-token"));
}
if shannon_entropy(run.as_bytes()) >= ENTROPY_THRESHOLD {
return Some((token, "high-entropy-token"));
}
}
if !vcs_reference_exempt && contains_normalized_hex_credential(token) {
return Some((token, "hex-credential-token"));
}
if !vcs_reference_exempt && tokens.len() > 1 {
let fragments = bridge_fragment_chain(&tokens, text, idx);
if fragments.len() > 1 {
let hex_probe = fragments.join(" ");
if contains_normalized_hex_credential(&hex_probe) {
return Some((token, "hex-credential-token"));
}
let concatenated: String = fragments.concat();
if concatenated.len() >= MIN_ENTROPY_LEN
&& concatenated.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
&& shannon_entropy(concatenated.as_bytes()) >= ENTROPY_THRESHOLD
{
return Some((token, "high-entropy-token"));
}
}
}
if is_plausible_file_path(token)
&& !has_clause_credential_label(
text,
token_offset,
raw_token,
ClauseValueKind::FilePath,
)
{
continue;
}
}
if !near_trigger && is_structured_identifier(token) {
continue;
}
let entropy = shannon_entropy(token.as_bytes());
if entropy < ENTROPY_THRESHOLD {
continue;
}
if near_trigger {
return Some((token, "high-entropy-token"));
}
}
None
}
fn is_hex_run(run: &str) -> bool {
!run.is_empty() && run.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
const VCS_MARKERS: &[&str] = &["commit", "revision", "rev", "sha"];
fn is_vcs_marker_before_hex(text: &str, raw_token: &str) -> bool {
let token = wrapper_strip_repeated(raw_token);
let marker = strip_delimiters(token);
if !VCS_MARKERS
.iter()
.any(|candidate| marker.eq_ignore_ascii_case(candidate))
{
return false;
}
let raw_offset = raw_token.as_ptr() as usize - text.as_ptr() as usize;
let next = text[raw_offset + raw_token.len()..].trim_start();
let next = wrapper_strip_repeated(extract_token(next));
next.len() == 40 && next.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
fn is_git_revision_reference(text: &str, token_offset: usize, raw_token: &str) -> bool {
const MARKERS: &[&str] = VCS_MARKERS;
let token = wrapper_strip_repeated(raw_token);
if is_vcs_marker_before_hex(text, raw_token) {
return true;
}
if token.len() == 40 && token.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
let marker = trailing_identifier(&text[..token_offset]);
return MARKERS
.iter()
.any(|candidate| marker.eq_ignore_ascii_case(candidate));
}
let Some((label, value)) = token.rsplit_once(':') else {
return false;
};
let label = wrapper_strip_repeated(label);
let value = wrapper_strip_repeated(value);
MARKERS
.iter()
.any(|candidate| label.eq_ignore_ascii_case(candidate))
&& value.len() == 40
&& value.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
fn trailing_identifier(text: &str) -> &str {
let trimmed = text.trim_end_matches(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && c != '_');
trimmed
.rsplit(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && c != '_')
.next()
.unwrap_or_default()
}
const LABEL_CLAUSE_SKIP_WORDS: &[&str] = &[
"commit",
"revision",
"rev",
"sha",
"is",
"was",
"are",
"were",
"be",
"been",
"being",
"value",
"values",
"the",
"a",
"an",
"this",
"that",
"it",
"its",
"as",
"here",
"now",
"currently",
"equals",
"for",
"of",
"to",
"in",
"on",
"at",
"by",
"with",
"from",
"per",
"and",
"or",
"our",
"my",
"your",
"their",
];
const LABEL_CLAUSE_WALK_LIMIT: usize = 8;
const FILE_PATH_NO_DELIMITER_CONTENT_LIMIT: usize = 2;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum ClauseValueKind {
VcsReference,
FilePath,
}
fn gap_has_sentence_boundary(gap: &str) -> bool {
if gap.contains("\n\n") || gap.contains("\r\n\r\n") || gap.contains([';', '!', '?']) {
return true;
}
let bytes = gap.as_bytes();
bytes.iter().enumerate().any(|(i, b)| {
*b == b'.'
&& bytes
.get(i + 1)
.is_some_and(|next| !next.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
})
}
fn is_version_fragment(word: &str) -> bool {
let digits = word
.strip_prefix('v')
.or_else(|| word.strip_prefix('V'))
.unwrap_or(word);
!digits.is_empty() && digits.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())
}
fn is_hex_fragment_word(word: &str) -> bool {
word.len() >= 12 && word.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
fn contains_ascii_case_insensitive(haystack: &str, needle: &str) -> bool {
haystack
.as_bytes()
.windows(needle.len())
.any(|window| window.eq_ignore_ascii_case(needle.as_bytes()))
}
fn clause_label_has_credential_trigger(label: &str) -> bool {
label.eq_ignore_ascii_case("token")
|| COMPOUND_TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|trigger| contains_ascii_case_insensitive(label, trigger))
|| label.split('_').any(|part| {
TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|trigger| part.eq_ignore_ascii_case(trigger))
})
}
fn is_label_clause_skip_word(label: &str) -> bool {
LABEL_CLAUSE_SKIP_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|word| label.eq_ignore_ascii_case(word))
}
fn is_clause_narrative_participle(label: &str) -> bool {
const NON_PARTICIPLE_ED_WORDS: &[&str] = &["hundred"];
label.len() >= 5
&& label
.get(label.len().saturating_sub(2)..)
.is_some_and(|suffix| suffix.eq_ignore_ascii_case("ed"))
&& !NON_PARTICIPLE_ED_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|word| label.eq_ignore_ascii_case(word))
}
fn is_clause_narrative_gerund(label: &str) -> bool {
label.len() >= 6
&& label
.get(label.len().saturating_sub(3)..)
.is_some_and(|suffix| suffix.eq_ignore_ascii_case("ing"))
}
fn has_clause_credential_label(
text: &str,
token_offset: usize,
raw_token: &str,
value_kind: ClauseValueKind,
) -> bool {
if has_inline_credential_trigger(raw_token) {
return true;
}
let mut rest = &text[..token_offset];
let mut crossed_value_delimiter = false;
let mut no_delimiter_content_words = 0usize;
let mut arrived_through_in_preposition = false;
let mut arrived_through_connector = true;
for step in 0..LABEL_CLAUSE_WALK_LIMIT {
let label = trailing_identifier(rest);
if label.is_empty() {
return false;
}
let gap = &rest[label.as_ptr() as usize - rest.as_ptr() as usize + label.len()..];
if step > 0 && gap_has_sentence_boundary(gap) {
return false;
}
if gap.contains([':', '=']) {
crossed_value_delimiter = true;
}
if clause_label_has_credential_trigger(label) {
return true;
}
let skippable = is_label_clause_skip_word(label)
|| is_version_fragment(label)
|| is_hex_fragment_word(label);
if !skippable {
let no_delimiter_file_path_narrative = !crossed_value_delimiter
&& value_kind == ClauseValueKind::FilePath
&& arrived_through_in_preposition
&& is_clause_narrative_gerund(label);
let regular_participle_narrative = is_clause_narrative_participle(label)
&& (crossed_value_delimiter || value_kind != ClauseValueKind::FilePath || step > 0);
if arrived_through_connector
&& (regular_participle_narrative || no_delimiter_file_path_narrative)
{
return false;
}
if !crossed_value_delimiter {
if value_kind != ClauseValueKind::FilePath
|| no_delimiter_content_words >= FILE_PATH_NO_DELIMITER_CONTENT_LIMIT
{
return false;
}
no_delimiter_content_words += 1;
}
}
if !label.eq_ignore_ascii_case("and") && !label.eq_ignore_ascii_case("or") {
arrived_through_connector = skippable;
}
arrived_through_in_preposition = label.eq_ignore_ascii_case("in");
let start = label.as_ptr() as usize - rest.as_ptr() as usize;
rest = &rest[..start];
}
crossed_value_delimiter
}
fn is_plausible_file_path(token: &str) -> bool {
let token = token.trim_start_matches(|c: char| {
matches!(
c,
'"' | '\'' | '`' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | '{' | '}' | ',' | ';'
)
});
let token = token.trim_end_matches(|c: char| {
matches!(
c,
'"' | '\'' | '`' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | '{' | '}' | ',' | ';' | '.'
)
});
let path = if let Some(angle_path) = token.strip_prefix('<') {
let Some(close) = angle_path.rfind('>') else {
return false;
};
if !is_line_location_suffix(&angle_path[close + 1..]) {
return false;
}
&angle_path[..close]
} else if let Some((path, suffix)) = token.rsplit_once(':') {
if is_line_location_suffix(suffix) {
path
} else {
token
}
} else {
token
};
if path.contains("://")
|| !path.contains('/')
|| !path
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(b, b'/' | b'.' | b'_' | b'-' | b'~'))
{
return false;
}
let segment_count = path
.split('/')
.filter(|segment| !segment.is_empty())
.count();
segment_count >= 2 || (path.starts_with('/') && segment_count == 1)
}
fn is_line_location_suffix(suffix: &str) -> bool {
if suffix.is_empty() {
return true;
}
let suffix = suffix.strip_prefix(':').unwrap_or(suffix);
let suffix = suffix.strip_prefix('~').unwrap_or(suffix);
let mut parts = suffix.split('-');
let Some(start) = parts.next() else {
return false;
};
!start.is_empty()
&& start.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())
&& parts
.next()
.is_none_or(|end| !end.is_empty() && end.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()))
&& parts.next().is_none()
}
fn contains_normalized_hex_credential(token: &str) -> bool {
let mut concatenated_len = 0usize;
for run in token.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric()) {
if run.is_empty() {
continue;
}
if is_hex_run(run) {
concatenated_len += run.len();
if HEX_CREDENTIAL_LENGTHS.contains(&concatenated_len) {
return true;
}
} else {
concatenated_len = 0;
}
}
false
}
fn adjacent_gap_is_bridgeable(text: &str, gap_start: usize, gap_end: usize) -> bool {
gap_end >= gap_start && !text[gap_start..gap_end].contains(|c: char| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
fn is_bridge_fragment_shape(s: &str) -> bool {
s.len() >= MIN_BRIDGE_FRAGMENT_LEN && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
fn is_delimiter_only_token(s: &str) -> bool {
!s.bytes().any(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
}
fn probe_bridge_fragment(
tokens: &[(usize, &str)],
text: &str,
edge: usize,
dir: isize,
) -> Option<usize> {
let mut i = edge;
let mut glue_skipped = 0usize;
loop {
let next_i = i.checked_add_signed(dir)?;
if next_i >= tokens.len() {
return None;
}
let (lo, hi) = if dir < 0 { (next_i, i) } else { (i, next_i) };
let (lo_offset, lo_raw) = tokens[lo];
let (hi_offset, _) = tokens[hi];
let gap_start = lo_offset + lo_raw.len();
if !adjacent_gap_is_bridgeable(text, gap_start, hi_offset) {
return None;
}
let candidate = strip_delimiters(tokens[next_i].1);
if is_bridge_fragment_shape(candidate) {
return Some(next_i);
}
if is_delimiter_only_token(candidate) && glue_skipped < MAX_BRIDGE_GLUE_TOKENS {
glue_skipped += 1;
i = next_i;
continue;
}
return None;
}
}
fn bridge_fragment_chain<'a>(
tokens: &[(usize, &'a str)],
text: &str,
anchor_idx: usize,
) -> Vec<&'a str> {
let mut start = anchor_idx;
let mut end = anchor_idx;
let mut fragment_count = 1usize;
loop {
let mut extended = false;
if fragment_count < MAX_BRIDGE_FRAGMENTS && start > 0 {
if let Some(new_start) = probe_bridge_fragment(tokens, text, start, -1) {
start = new_start;
fragment_count += 1;
extended = true;
}
}
if fragment_count < MAX_BRIDGE_FRAGMENTS && end + 1 < tokens.len() {
if let Some(new_end) = probe_bridge_fragment(tokens, text, end, 1) {
end = new_end;
fragment_count += 1;
extended = true;
}
}
if !extended {
break;
}
}
tokens[start..=end]
.iter()
.map(|&(_, raw)| strip_delimiters(raw))
.filter(|stripped| !is_delimiter_only_token(stripped))
.collect()
}
fn contains_word(low_window: &str, needle: &str, underscore_is_word_char: bool) -> bool {
let is_word_char = |c: char| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || (underscore_is_word_char && c == '_');
let mut start = 0;
while let Some(rel) = low_window[start..].find(needle) {
let abs = start + rel;
let before_ok = abs == 0
|| low_window[..abs]
.chars()
.next_back()
.is_none_or(|c| !is_word_char(c));
let after_end = abs + needle.len();
let after_ok = after_end >= low_window.len()
|| low_window[after_end..]
.chars()
.next()
.is_none_or(|c| !is_word_char(c));
if before_ok && after_ok {
return true;
}
start = abs + needle.len().max(1);
}
false
}
fn contains_bounded_word(low_window: &str, needle: &str) -> bool {
contains_word(low_window, needle, false)
}
fn contains_compound_trigger(low_text: &str) -> bool {
COMPOUND_TRIGGER_WORDS.iter().any(|needle| {
let mut start = 0;
while let Some(rel) = low_text[start..].find(needle) {
let abs = start + rel;
let before_ok = abs == 0
|| low_text[..abs]
.chars()
.next_back()
.is_none_or(|c| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric());
if before_ok {
return true;
}
start = abs + needle.len();
}
false
})
}
fn contains_trigger(text: &str) -> bool {
let low = text.to_ascii_lowercase();
TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|tw| contains_bounded_word(&low, tw))
|| contains_compound_trigger(&low)
|| has_standalone_token(&low)
|| has_token_assignment(&low)
|| has_assignment_credential_trigger(&low)
}
fn has_assignment_credential_trigger(low_text: &str) -> bool {
low_text.char_indices().any(|(index, ch)| {
if !matches!(ch, '=' | ':') {
return false;
}
let before =
low_text[..index].trim_end_matches(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && c != '_');
let label = before
.rsplit(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && c != '_')
.next()
.unwrap_or_default();
COMPOUND_TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|needle| label.contains(needle))
|| TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|tw| contains_bounded_word(label, tw))
|| label == "token"
})
}
fn has_inline_credential_trigger(raw_token: &str) -> bool {
let low = raw_token.to_ascii_lowercase();
if has_assignment_credential_trigger(&low) {
return true;
}
!low.contains(['/', '-', '.'])
&& low.contains('_')
&& (COMPOUND_TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|needle| low.contains(needle))
|| TRIGGER_WORDS
.iter()
.any(|tw| contains_bounded_word(&low, tw)))
}
fn has_standalone_token(low_window: &str) -> bool {
contains_word(low_window, "token", true)
}
fn has_token_assignment(low_window: &str) -> bool {
let needle = "token";
let mut start = 0;
while let Some(rel) = low_window[start..].find(needle) {
let abs = start + rel;
let before_ok = abs == 0
|| low_window[..abs]
.chars()
.next_back()
.is_none_or(|c| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() && c != '_');
let after_end = abs + needle.len();
let after_char = low_window[after_end..].chars().next();
let after_is_assign = matches!(after_char, Some('=') | Some(':'));
if before_ok && after_is_assign {
return true;
}
start = abs + needle.len().max(1);
}
false
}
fn is_pure_hex(token: &str) -> bool {
let hex_part = token
.strip_prefix("0x")
.or(token.strip_prefix("0X"))
.unwrap_or(token);
hex_part.len() >= 8 && hex_part.len() <= 128 && hex_part.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
fn is_base64_content_hash(token: &str) -> bool {
const VENDOR_PREFIXES: &[&str] = &[
"sk-",
"rk_live_",
"fm2_",
"vercel_",
"xoxb-",
"xoxa-",
"xoxp-",
"xoxr-",
"xoxs-",
"ghp_",
"gho_",
"ghu_",
"ghs_",
"ghr_",
"github_pat_",
"AKIA",
"ASIA",
"AGE-SECRET-KEY-",
"FlyV1",
];
if VENDOR_PREFIXES.iter().any(|p| token.starts_with(p)) {
return false;
}
let body = if let Some(rest) = token.strip_prefix("sha") {
let dash = rest.find('-').unwrap_or(rest.len());
let digits = &rest[..dash];
if !digits.is_empty() && digits.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) && dash < rest.len() {
&rest[dash + 1..] } else {
return false; }
} else {
return false; };
let stripped = body.trim_end_matches('=');
let pad_removed = body.len() - stripped.len();
if pad_removed > 2 {
return false;
}
let n = stripped.len();
if n != 43 && n != 64 && !(86..=88).contains(&n) {
return false;
}
stripped
.bytes()
.all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'+' || b == b'/' || b == b'-' || b == b'_')
}
const STRUCTURAL_SEPARATORS: [char; 4] = ['/', '-', '_', '.'];
const MAX_RUN_LEN: usize = 24;
const DENSITY_EXEMPT_LETTER_LEN: usize = 4;
const MAX_CASE_TRANSITION_DENSITY: f64 = 0.3;
fn is_structured_identifier(token: &str) -> bool {
if !token.contains(|c: char| STRUCTURAL_SEPARATORS.contains(&c)) {
return false;
}
let runs: Vec<&str> = token
.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric())
.filter(|r| !r.is_empty())
.collect();
runs.len() >= 2 && runs.iter().all(|run| is_word_shaped_run(run))
}
fn is_word_shaped_run(run: &str) -> bool {
if run.is_empty() || run.len() > MAX_RUN_LEN {
return false;
}
let bytes = run.as_bytes();
if bytes.iter().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) {
return true;
}
let letter_end = bytes
.iter()
.position(|b| !b.is_ascii_alphabetic())
.unwrap_or(bytes.len());
if letter_end == 0 {
return false;
}
if !bytes[letter_end..].iter().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit()) {
return false;
}
case_transition_density_ok(&run[..letter_end])
}
fn case_transition_density_ok(letters: &str) -> bool {
let chars: Vec<char> = letters.chars().collect();
if chars.len() <= DENSITY_EXEMPT_LETTER_LEN {
return true;
}
let transitions = chars
.windows(2)
.filter(|w| w[0].is_ascii_uppercase() != w[1].is_ascii_uppercase())
.count();
let density = transitions as f64 / (chars.len() - 1) as f64;
density <= MAX_CASE_TRANSITION_DENSITY
}
fn is_uuid_canonical(s: &str) -> bool {
let b = s.as_bytes();
if b.len() != 36 {
return false;
}
b[8] == b'-'
&& b[13] == b'-'
&& b[18] == b'-'
&& b[23] == b'-'
&& b[..8].iter().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& b[9..13].iter().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& b[14..18].iter().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& b[19..23].iter().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
&& b[24..].iter().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}
fn strip_delimiters(s: &str) -> &str {
s.trim_matches(|c| matches!(c, '"' | '\'' | '`' | ':' | '=' | ',' | ';'))
}
fn strip_wrappers(s: &str) -> &str {
s.trim_matches(|c: char| {
matches!(
c,
'{' | '}' | '(' | ')' | '[' | ']' | '"' | '\'' | '`' | '.' | ',' | ';'
)
})
}
fn wrapper_strip_repeated(token: &str) -> &str {
let mut cur = token;
loop {
let next = strip_wrappers(cur);
if next == cur {
return cur;
}
cur = next;
}
}
fn value_candidates(token: &str) -> impl Iterator<Item = &str> {
let cur = wrapper_strip_repeated(token);
std::iter::once(cur).chain(cur.char_indices().filter_map(move |(i, c)| {
if c == '=' || c == ':' {
let after = strip_wrappers(&cur[i + c.len_utf8()..]);
if !after.is_empty() {
return Some(after);
}
}
None
}))
}
fn extract_token(s: &str) -> &str {
let end = s
.find(|c: char| c.is_whitespace() || c == '\n' || c == '\r')
.unwrap_or(s.len());
&s[..end]
}
fn shannon_entropy(bytes: &[u8]) -> f64 {
if bytes.is_empty() {
return 0.0;
}
let mut counts = [0u32; 256];
for &b in bytes {
counts[b as usize] += 1;
}
let len = bytes.len() as f64;
counts
.iter()
.filter(|&&c| c > 0)
.map(|&c| {
let p = c as f64 / len;
-p * p.log2()
})
.sum()
}
fn build_match(detector: &'static str, candidate: &str) -> SecretMatch {
let chars: Vec<char> = candidate.chars().collect();
let preview: String = chars.iter().take(6).collect();
let masked = format!("{}...{}chars", preview, chars.len());
SecretMatch { detector, masked }
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn blocks_aws_akia() {
let fake = "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "AKIA must be caught");
let m = scan(fake).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.detector, "aws-access-key-id");
assert!(
!m.masked.contains("FAKEKEY1234567890"),
"must not echo the secret: {}",
m.masked
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_aws_asia() {
let fake = "ASIAFAKEKEY00000000000";
let m = scan(fake);
assert!(m.is_some(), "ASIA must be caught");
assert_eq!(m.unwrap().detector, "aws-access-key-id");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_github_ghp() {
let fake = "ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "ghp_ must be caught");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_github_gho() {
let fake = "gho_BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "gho_ must be caught");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_github_pat() {
let fake = "github_pat_AAAAAABBBBBBCCCCCC";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "github_pat_ must be caught");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_openai_sk() {
let fake = "sk-aaaaaabbbbbbccccccddddddeeeeeeffffgg";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "sk- must be caught");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_anthropic_sk_ant() {
let fake = "sk-ant-api03-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "sk-ant- must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "anthropic-api-key");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_stripe_live() {
let fake = "sk_live_FAKESTRIPE0000000000000"; assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "sk_live_ must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "stripe-secret-key");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_stripe_restricted() {
let fake = "rk_live_FAKESTRIPE0000000000000"; assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "rk_live_ must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "stripe-restricted-key");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_fly_flyv1() {
let fake = "FlyV1 FAKEFLYTOKEN000000000000000000";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "FlyV1 must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "fly-token");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_fly_fm2() {
let fake = "fm2_FAKEFLYTOKEN00000000000000000";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "fm2_ must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "fly-token");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_vercel_token() {
let fake = "vercel_FAKETOKEN00000000000000000";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "vercel_ must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "vercel-token");
}
#[test]
fn prefix_detectors_allow_lowercase_source_filenames() {
let filename_body = "provider_integration_monitoring_adapter_configuration.py";
for &(_, needle, min_len) in PREFIX_DETECTORS {
let candidate = format!("{needle}{filename_body}");
assert!(
candidate.len() >= min_len,
"negative control must exercise {needle}'s length tier"
);
assert!(
find_prefix_token(&candidate, needle, min_len).is_none(),
"lowercase source filename must not match prefix {needle}: {candidate}"
);
assert!(
check(&candidate).is_ok(),
"lowercase source filename must pass the canonical scanner: {candidate}, got {:?}",
scan(&candidate)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn prefix_detectors_keep_value_shaped_payloads_with_source_suffixes() {
for &(_, needle, min_len) in PREFIX_DETECTORS {
let required_payload_len = min_len.saturating_sub(needle.len()).max(2);
let value_payload = "A1".repeat(required_payload_len.div_ceil(2));
let candidate = format!("{needle}{value_payload}.py");
assert!(
find_prefix_token(&candidate, needle, min_len).is_some(),
"uppercase/digit value evidence must preserve prefix {needle}: {candidate}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn prefix_detectors_keep_lowercase_single_run_payloads_with_source_suffixes() {
for &(_, needle, min_len) in PREFIX_DETECTORS {
let required_payload_len = min_len.saturating_sub(needle.len()).max(24);
let value_payload = "a".repeat(required_payload_len);
let candidate = format!("{needle}{value_payload}.py");
assert!(
find_prefix_token(&candidate, needle, min_len).is_some(),
"an extension alone must not exempt prefix {needle}: {candidate}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_vercel_prefixed_source_filename_on_every_scanner_surface() {
let content = "review `vercel_deployment_monitoring_adapter.py` before release";
assert!(check(content).is_ok(), "write gate must allow filename");
assert!(scan(content).is_none(), "scanner must not report filename");
assert_eq!(
mask_secrets(content).as_ref(),
content,
"masking surface must preserve the filename byte-for-byte"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slack_xoxb() {
let fake = "xoxb-FAKE-SLACKTOKEN-000000000000000000000000";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "xoxb- must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "slack-token");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_pem_private_key() {
let header = ["-----BEGIN RSA", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat(); let fake = format!("{}\nMIIEo\u{2026}\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", header);
assert!(scan(&fake).is_some(), "PEM private key must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(&fake).unwrap().detector, "pem-private-key");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_pem_ec_private_key() {
let header = ["-----BEGIN EC", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat(); let fake = format!("{}\nMHQCAQEE\u{2026}\n-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", header);
assert!(scan(&fake).is_some(), "EC PEM must be caught");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_age_secret_key() {
let fake = "AGE-SECRET-KEY-1QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "AGE-SECRET-KEY- must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "age-secret-key");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_jwt_triple() {
let fake = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.FAKE_SIG_XXXXXXXXXXXX"; assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "JWT triple must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "jwt");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_url_userinfo() {
let fake = "postgresql://dbuser:S3cr3tP4ss@db.example.com:5432/mydb";
assert!(scan(fake).is_some(), "URL userinfo must be caught");
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "url-userinfo");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_and_masks_url_userinfo_with_short_passwords() {
for password in ["a", "ab", "abc"] {
let content = format!(
"gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:{password}@internal-host refused"
);
let detected = scan(&content).expect("short URL password must be detected");
assert_eq!(detected.detector, "url-userinfo");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"write gate must block {content:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
bounded_masked_log_text(&content),
"gate backend probe failed: ***MASKED*** refused",
"log boundary must mask {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn keeps_url_without_userinfo() {
let content = "gate backend probe failed: postgres://host:8080/path refused";
assert!(check(content).is_ok(), "host:port is not URL userinfo");
assert_eq!(bounded_masked_log_text(content), content);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_and_masks_empty_username_url_passwords() {
for password in ["a", "ab", "%40", "密码"] {
let content =
format!("gate backend probe failed: redis://:{password}@internal-host refused");
let detected = scan(&content).expect("empty-username URL password must be detected");
assert_eq!(detected.detector, "url-userinfo");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"write gate must block {content:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
bounded_masked_log_text(&content),
"gate backend probe failed: ***MASKED*** refused",
"log boundary must mask {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn keeps_colon_at_pairs_outside_the_authority() {
for content in [
"see https://host/a:x@next for details",
"see https://host?time=12:30@zone for details",
"see https://host#frag:1@anchor for details",
] {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"path/query/fragment `:`+`@` text is not userinfo: {content:?}"
);
assert_eq!(bounded_masked_log_text(content), content);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_high_entropy_near_bearer_word() {
let fake = "Bearer token: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"; assert!(
scan(fake).is_some(),
"high-entropy value near 'bearer' must be caught"
);
assert_eq!(scan(fake).unwrap().detector, "high-entropy-token");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_high_entropy_near_secret_word() {
let fake = "secret=Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"; assert!(
scan(fake).is_some(),
"high-entropy value near 'secret' must be caught"
);
}
#[test]
fn error_message_masks_secret() {
let fake = "ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let m = scan(fake).unwrap();
let masked = &m.masked;
assert!(
!masked.contains("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"),
"mask must not echo the full secret value; got: {masked}"
);
assert!(
masked.starts_with("ghp_AA"),
"mask must show first 6 chars; got: {masked}"
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_sha256_hex() {
let sha = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855";
assert!(
scan(sha).is_none(),
"sha256 hex must pass (allowlisted); fired: {:?}",
scan(sha)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_uuid() {
let uuid = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000";
assert!(
scan(uuid).is_none(),
"UUID must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(uuid)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_git_sha() {
let sha = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
assert!(
scan(sha).is_none(),
"git SHA must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(sha)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_normal_prose() {
let prose =
"The FlashAttention paper introduces IO-aware tiling for transformer self-attention.";
assert!(scan(prose).is_none(), "normal prose must pass");
}
#[test]
fn allows_code_snippet() {
let code = r#"fn create_entity(name: &str, kind: &str) -> RuntimeResult<Entity> {
self.validate_entity_kind(kind)?;
Ok(Entity::new("local", kind, name))
}"#;
assert!(
scan(code).is_none(),
"code snippet must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(code)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_long_url_without_credentials() {
let url = "https://docs.example.com/api/v2/entities?kind=concept&limit=100";
assert!(scan(url).is_none(), "URL without userinfo must pass");
}
#[test]
fn allows_base64_image_stub() {
let b64 = "";
assert!(
scan(b64).is_none(),
"base64 image stub without trigger word must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(b64)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_long_plain_url() {
let url = "https://api.github.com/repos/ohdearquant/khive/pulls/76/comments?per_page=100";
assert!(
scan(url).is_none(),
"plain URL must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(url)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_manifest_content_hash() {
let line =
"checksum = \"e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855\"";
assert!(
scan(line).is_none(),
"manifest content hash line must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(line)
);
}
#[test]
fn masked_excerpt_format() {
let fake = "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890";
let m = scan(fake).unwrap();
assert!(m.masked.contains("..."), "masked must contain '...'");
assert!(m.masked.ends_with("chars"), "masked must end with 'chars'");
}
#[test]
fn check_returns_ok_for_safe_content() {
assert!(check("A normal memory note about LoRA.").is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn check_returns_err_for_secret() {
let fake = "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890";
let result = check(fake);
assert!(result.is_err(), "check must fail for AKIA key");
let err = result.unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, RuntimeError::SecretDetected(_)),
"error variant must be SecretDetected"
);
}
#[test]
fn entropy_of_uniform_string_is_zero() {
let s = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa";
assert!(shannon_entropy(s.as_bytes()) < 0.01);
}
#[test]
fn entropy_of_random_bytes_is_high() {
let s = b"X9kZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"; assert!(shannon_entropy(s) > 4.5, "entropy={}", shannon_entropy(s));
}
#[test]
fn cjk_prose_near_trigger_is_not_flagged() {
let content = "更新 auth 配置数据库连接管理系统核心模块设计文档";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"CJK prose near a trigger word must not be flagged as a secret"
);
}
#[test]
fn ascii_secret_near_trigger_still_flagged() {
let content = "api_key X9kZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"ASCII high-entropy token near a trigger word must still be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn ascii_secret_in_cjk_context_does_not_panic_and_is_flagged() {
let cjk = "数据库连接管理系统核心模块设计文档".repeat(6); let content = format!("{cjk}x api_key X9kZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1 {cjk}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"ASCII secret in CJK context must still be blocked (and must not panic)"
);
}
#[test]
fn ascii_secret_glued_to_cjk_is_still_flagged() {
let secret = "X9kZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"; let cases = [
format!("api_key {secret}数据"), format!("api_key 「{secret}」"), format!("api_key {secret}"), format!("api_key:{secret}"), format!("数据{secret}更新 api_key"), ];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"ASCII secret glued to CJK must be blocked: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn high_entropy_ascii_run_without_trigger_is_not_flagged() {
let secret = "X9kZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"; let content = format!("数据库连接{secret}核心模块设计文档");
assert!(
check(&content).is_ok(),
"high-entropy ASCII run with no trigger word must not be flagged"
);
}
#[test]
fn known_prefix_secret_glued_after_cjk_is_still_flagged() {
let cases = [
"数据AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", "令牌github_pat_11ABCDEFG0HIJKLMNOPQR", "密钥sk-ant-api03-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "配置FlyV1 fm2_AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD", ];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"known-prefix secret glued after CJK must be blocked: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn url_userinfo_after_cjk_does_not_panic_and_is_flagged() {
let cases = [
"数据postgresql://dbuser:S3cr3tP4ss@db.example.com/db", "配置mysql://root:hunter2pw@10.0.0.1:3306/app", "连接redis://svc:V3ryS3cretPw@cache.internal:6379", ];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"credential URL after CJK must be blocked, not panic: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn non_ascii_glued_token_trigger_is_still_flagged() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let blocked = [
format!("数据token={opaque}"), format!("配置token: {opaque}"), format!("密钥token {opaque}"), format!("résumétoken: {opaque}"), format!("1token: {opaque}"), ];
for content in &blocked {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"non-ASCII-glued token trigger must flag the value: {content:?}"
);
}
let allowed = [
format!("数据next_token: {opaque}"),
format!("数据token_count: {opaque}"),
format!("servicetoken: {opaque}"),
];
for content in &allowed {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"compound token identifier must not be flagged: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_passes_sha256() {
let sha = "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855";
assert!(is_pure_hex(sha));
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_passes_uuid_canonical() {
assert!(is_uuid_canonical("550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"));
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_does_not_pass_mixed_token() {
assert!(!is_pure_hex("sk-aaaaaabbbbbbccccccddddddeeeeeeffffgg"));
}
#[test]
fn check_json_blocks_secret_in_object_value() {
let props = serde_json::json!({ "api_key": "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890" });
assert!(
check_json(&props).is_err(),
"secret in properties object value must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn check_json_blocks_secret_in_nested_object() {
let props = serde_json::json!({ "credentials": { "token": "sk-proj-FAKEKEY00000000000000000000000000000000" } }); assert!(
check_json(&props).is_err(),
"secret in nested properties object must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn check_json_blocks_secret_in_array() {
let props = serde_json::json!(["normal", "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890"]);
assert!(
check_json(&props).is_err(),
"secret in JSON array must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_passes_absent_properties() {
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(None).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_passes_unrelated_properties() {
let props = serde_json::json!({"name": "value", "tags": ["a", "b"]});
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_passes_non_object_properties() {
let props = serde_json::json!("just a string");
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).is_ok());
let arr = serde_json::json!(["a", "b"]);
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&arr)).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_blocks_top_level_key_creation() {
let props = serde_json::json!({"khive:secret_gate": "exempted:content-sha256-manifest-v1"});
let err = reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).unwrap_err();
assert!(
matches!(err, RuntimeError::InvalidInput(ref msg) if msg.contains("khive:secret_gate") && msg.contains("runtime-owned")),
"unexpected error: {err:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_blocks_regardless_of_value_shape() {
for value in [
serde_json::json!(null),
serde_json::json!(42),
serde_json::json!({"nested": "object"}),
serde_json::json!("exempted:content-sha256-manifest-v1"),
] {
let props = serde_json::json!({"khive:secret_gate": value});
assert!(
reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).is_err(),
"must reject value shape: {props:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_allows_nested_non_top_level_occurrence() {
let props = serde_json::json!({"notes": {"khive:secret_gate": "not-a-stamp"}});
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn reject_reserved_key_blocks_alongside_other_legitimate_keys() {
let props = serde_json::json!({
"name": "value",
"khive:secret_gate": "exempted:content-sha256-manifest-v1",
});
assert!(reject_reserved_secret_gate_property(Some(&props)).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn check_json_passes_safe_properties() {
let props = serde_json::json!({
"domain": "attention",
"status": "researched",
"year": 2024
});
assert!(
check_json(&props).is_ok(),
"normal properties must pass; fired: {:?}",
check_json(&props).err()
);
}
#[test]
fn check_tags_blocks_credential_tag() {
let tags = vec![
"type:concept".to_string(),
"AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890".to_string(),
];
assert!(
check_tags(&tags).is_err(),
"credential-shaped tag must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn check_tags_passes_normal_tags() {
let tags = vec!["type:concept".to_string(), "domain:attention".to_string()];
assert!(
check_tags(&tags).is_ok(),
"normal tags must pass; fired: {:?}",
check_tags(&tags).err()
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_sk_learn_prose() {
let texts = &[
"sk-learn is a Python machine learning library",
"sk-learn-compatible transformer pipeline reference",
"sk-learn scikit-learn estimator interface",
];
for t in texts {
assert!(
scan(t).is_none(),
"sk-learn prose must pass; fired: {:?} on {:?}",
scan(t),
t
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_openai_sk_proj_not_confused_with_sk_learn() {
let fake = "sk-proj-FAKEKEY00000000000000000000000000000000"; assert!(
scan(fake).is_some(),
"sk-proj- key must still be caught after sk-learn exemption"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_sri_hash_near_key_word_accepted_fp() {
let line = "integrity key: sha384-oqVuAfXRKap7fdgcCY5uykM6+R9GqQ8K/uxy9rx7HNQlGYl1kPzQho1wx4JwY8wC";
assert!(
scan(line).is_some(),
"SRI hash near trigger word 'key' must now be blocked (accepted FP); passed unexpectedly"
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_base64_tokenizer_hash_metadata() {
let line = "tokenizer_vocab_hash: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"; assert!(
scan(line).is_none(),
"tokenizer hash metadata must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_npm_lockfile_integrity() {
let body_86 = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST";
assert_eq!(body_86.len(), 86, "test body must be exactly 86 chars");
let line = format!(
"resolved: https://registry.npmjs.org/foo/-/foo-1.0.0.tgz\nintegrity: sha512-{body_86}=="
);
assert!(
scan(&line).is_none(),
"npm lockfile integrity must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_tokenizer_vocab_hash_no_block() {
let line = "tokenizer_vocab_hash = Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"; assert!(
scan(line).is_none(),
"tokenizer_vocab_hash must pass; 'token' is only standalone-word matched; fired: {:?}",
scan(line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_bare_base64url_43chars_near_key() {
let token_43 = "wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENGbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEYX123"; assert_eq!(token_43.len(), 43, "test token must be exactly 43 chars");
let line = format!("api key {token_43}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"43-char base64url token near 'key' must be caught (no sha-prefix = not a hash); fired: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_bare_base64url_64chars_near_secret() {
let token_64 = "wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENGbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEYX123wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENa"; assert_eq!(token_64.len(), 64, "test token must be exactly 64 chars");
let line = format!("secret: {token_64}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"64-char base64url token near 'secret' must be caught; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_bare_base64url_86chars_near_auth() {
let token_86 = "wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENGbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEYX123wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENwJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENabc"; assert_eq!(token_86.len(), 86, "test token must be exactly 86 chars");
let line = format!("auth header {token_86}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"86-char base64url token near 'auth' must be caught; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_service_token_opaque_value() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; assert!(
opaque.len() >= 24,
"opaque must be long enough for entropy check"
);
let line = format!("service token {opaque}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"service token <opaque> must be caught by standalone 'token' check; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_token_equals_credential() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let line = format!("token={opaque}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"token=<value> must be caught via token= trigger; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_token_colon_credential() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let line = format!("token: {opaque}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"token: <value> must be caught via token: trigger; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_next_token_technical_context() {
let line = "next_token: cursor-page-2-abcdef12345678";
assert!(
scan(line).is_none(),
"next_token technical context must not be blocked; fired: {:?}",
scan(line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_next_token_high_entropy_cursor() {
let cursor = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let line = format!("next_token: {cursor}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_none(),
"next_token with high-entropy cursor must pass (compound identifier); fired: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_token_count_high_entropy() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let line = format!("token_count: {opaque}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_none(),
"token_count with high-entropy value must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn hex_near_key_blocked_in_credential_context() {
let hex32 = "4f9c2e8a1d3b5c7e9f0a2b4d6e8c0a2b";
assert_eq!(hex32.len(), 32);
let line = format!("api key {hex32}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"32-char pure hex near 'api key' must be blocked; got None"
);
}
#[test]
fn hex_credential_lengths_blocked_near_trigger() {
let hex40 = "a3f5c2e9d1b8047e63a1f4c2d5b6e8f1a9c3d2e4";
let hex64 = "1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b";
let hex128 = format!("{hex64}{hex64}");
assert_eq!(hex40.len(), 40);
assert_eq!(hex64.len(), 64);
assert_eq!(hex128.len(), 128);
for (label, hex) in &[
("hex40", hex40),
("hex64", hex64),
("hex128", hex128.as_str()),
] {
let line = format!("secret key: {hex}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"{label} near 'secret key' must be blocked; got None"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn hex_blocked_when_trigger_and_hash_word_coexist() {
let hex32 = "4f9c2e8a1d3b5c7e9f0a2b4d6e8c0a2b";
let key_hash_line = format!("api key hash {hex32}");
let secret_sha_line = format!("secret sha {hex32}");
assert!(
scan(&key_hash_line).is_some(),
"'api key hash <hex32>' must be blocked; got None"
);
assert!(
scan(&secret_sha_line).is_some(),
"'secret sha <hex32>' must be blocked; got None"
);
}
#[test]
fn hex_near_sha_context_word_allowed() {
let hex40 = "da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709";
let sha_line = format!("sha1: {hex40}");
let commit_line = format!("commit sha {hex40}");
assert!(
scan(&sha_line).is_none(),
"hex40 near 'sha1' context must be allowed; fired: {:?}",
scan(&sha_line)
);
assert!(
scan(&commit_line).is_none(),
"hex40 near 'commit sha' context must be allowed; fired: {:?}",
scan(&commit_line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_git_revision_reference_near_ordinary_key_and_token_prose() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let contents = [
format!("the primary key behavior is pinned to commit {revision}"),
format!("revision: {revision} emits one extra token"),
format!("primary key behavior at revision:{revision};"),
format!("configuration key\n\nrev {revision}."),
format!("one extra token was introduced by sha: {revision}"),
];
for content in &contents {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"git revision reference in technical prose must pass: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn git_revision_reference_does_not_exempt_credential_assignments() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("api_key={revision}"),
format!("secret key: {revision}"),
format!("token={revision}"),
format!("api key hash {revision}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"credential assignment must remain blocked: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_after_credential_phrase_with_vcs_marker() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("api key value is commit {revision}"),
format!("api key value is revision {revision}"),
format!("the secret is rev {revision}"),
format!("token value sha {revision}"),
] {
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a credential phrase must not be hidden by connector words before \
a VCS marker: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_unicode_punctuation_between_vcs_marker_and_forty_hex() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("api_key value commit\u{200B}{revision}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"a zero-width space between marker and value must not rescue a \
labeled credential: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slash_bearing_base64_credential_in_value_syntax() {
let content = "api key value is Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"slash-bearing base64 credential in value syntax must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_angle_bracket_line_range_base64_credential_in_value_syntax() {
let content = "api key value is <Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh>:~97-103";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"angle-bracket/line-range dressing must not exempt a credential in \
value syntax"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_split_hex_credential_with_marker_adjacent_fragment() {
let content = concat!(
"api token context: commit ",
"d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf",
"\u{200B}",
"0123456789abcdef01234567"
);
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"split credential with a marker-adjacent fragment must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_behind_qualified_label_with_delimiter() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("api key for deploy: commit {revision}"),
format!("prod api key for deploy = commit {revision}"),
] {
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a qualified label before a value delimiter must not be \
hidden from the exemption guard: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slash_base64_behind_qualified_label_with_delimiter() {
let content = "api key for deploy: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"a qualified label before a value delimiter must refuse the path \
exemption for a slash-bearing base64 credential"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_behind_versioned_label() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("api key v1.2 value is commit {revision}");
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a versioned credential label must stay reachable through its \
version fragments: {content:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_labeled_inline_marker_split_credential() {
for content in [
concat!(
"api token context: rev:",
"d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf",
"\u{200B}",
"0123456789abcdef01234567"
)
.to_string(),
concat!(
"api token context: ",
"0123456789abcdef01234567",
"\u{200B}",
"rev:d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf"
)
.to_string(),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"a labeled inline-marker split credential must be blocked: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_behind_multiword_label_and_marker_delimiter() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("api key for deploy sha: {revision}"),
format!("prod api key for deploy sha: {revision}"),
format!("api key for production deploy: commit {revision}"),
] {
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a natural multiword credential label must not be hidden by \
glue words or a marker-attached delimiter: {content:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slash_base64_behind_possessive_qualified_label() {
let content = "api key for our production deploy: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"possessive-qualified credential label must refuse the path \
exemption"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_behind_participial_adjective_qualifier() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("api key for shared deploy: commit {revision}");
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a participial-adjective label qualifier must stay walkable: \
{content:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slash_base64_behind_participial_adjective_qualifier() {
let content = "api key for encrypted backup: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"a participial-adjective label qualifier must refuse the path \
exemption"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_forty_hex_behind_chained_qualifier_label() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("api key for shared encrypted deploy: commit {revision}");
assert_eq!(
scan(&content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("hex-credential-token"),
"a chained-qualifier credential label must stay walkable: \
{content:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_slash_base64_behind_chained_qualifier_label() {
let content =
"api key for shared encrypted deploy: Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"a chained-qualifier credential label must refuse the path \
exemption"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_over_limit_qualified_label_fails_closed() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
for content in [
format!("api key for the new shared encrypted staging deploy: commit {revision}"),
format!("api key for the new shared encrypted regional staging deploy: {opaque}"),
format!("api key for the new shared and encrypted staging deploy: {opaque}"),
format!(
"api key for the new shared encrypted regional staging deploy: commit {revision}"
),
format!("api key for the new shared and encrypted staging deploy: commit {revision}"),
format!("api key for the new shared encrypted staging deploy: {opaque}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"an over-limit qualified credential label must fail closed: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn accepted_false_positive_topical_trigger_before_delimited_path() {
let content = "results from testing auth against parser: \
internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"accepted-FP contract changed: topical trigger before a \
delimited path no longer blocks — update the docs if deliberate"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_participle_before_trigger_word() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
for content in [
format!("shared key: {revision}"),
format!("generated api key: {revision}"),
format!("encrypted token = {opaque}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"a participle before the trigger word must not shield the \
label: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn accepted_false_positive_docs_path_behind_attributive_trigger_and_delimiter() {
let content = "see the docs for auth setup: \
internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"accepted-FP contract changed: attributive trigger before a \
delimited path no longer blocks — update the docs if deliberate"
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_verb_phrase_prose_with_delimiter_before_trigger_word() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("one extra token was introduced by sha: {revision}"),
format!("the api key was rotated. deploy notes reference commit {revision}"),
format!("api key updated: commit {revision}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_ok(),
"verb-phrase prose must keep the VCS exemption: {content:?}, \
got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_unlabeled_unknown_connector_without_delimiter() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("the key changes are in commit {revision}"),
format!("deployed at commit {revision}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_ok(),
"prose without a value delimiter must keep the VCS exemption: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_direct_no_delimiter_labels_for_both_file_path_value_families() {
let values = [
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md",
];
for value in values {
for label in ["api key found", "auth scanner found", "secret note"] {
let content = format!("{label} {value}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"a direct no-delimiter label must refuse the file-path exemption: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_direct_gerund_and_see_labels_for_both_file_path_value_families() {
let values = [
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md",
];
for value in values {
for label in [
"api key handling",
"auth scanner handling",
"api key see",
"key: see",
] {
let content = format!("{label} {value}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"narrative-looking adjacency must not shield a direct credential label: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_direct_participle_labels_for_both_file_path_value_families() {
let values = [
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md",
];
for value in values {
for label in ["api key leaked", "auth scanner leaked"] {
let content = format!("{label} {value}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"step-zero participle adjacency must not shield a direct credential label: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_no_delimiter_narrative_file_path_prose() {
let content = "the auth scanner flagged this file \
internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"a regular participle in narrative position must preserve the path: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn suffix_word_hundred_is_not_a_narrative_participle() {
assert!(is_clause_narrative_participle("flagged"));
assert!(is_clause_narrative_participle("INTRODUCED"));
assert!(!is_clause_narrative_participle("found"));
assert!(!is_clause_narrative_participle("hundred"));
assert!(is_clause_narrative_gerund("HANDLING"));
assert!(!is_clause_narrative_gerund("found"));
for value in [
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuA/HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md",
] {
let content = format!("api key hundred: {value}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"a lexical -ed suffix must not shield a credential label: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_vcs_reference_with_prose_boundary_before_trigger_word() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
for content in [
format!("configuration key\n\nrev {revision}."),
format!("rotate the api key. the fix is commit {revision}"),
] {
assert!(
check(&content).is_ok(),
"boundary-separated trigger prose must not block a VCS \
reference: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_sha_revision_marker_immediately_labeled_as_api_key() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("api_key sha:{revision}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"credential-labeled SHA value must remain blocked: {content:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_rev_revision_marker_immediately_labeled_as_token() {
let revision = "d362950a3c9b1a4cb47d97f1623e38f1a1e6bcdf";
let content = format!("token rev:{revision}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"credential-labeled revision value must remain blocked: {content:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn hex64_near_hash_context_allowed() {
let hex64 = "1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b";
let sha_line = format!("sha256: {hex64}");
let hash_line = format!("hash value {hex64}");
assert!(
scan(&sha_line).is_none(),
"hex64 near 'sha256' must be allowed; fired: {:?}",
scan(&sha_line)
);
assert!(
scan(&hash_line).is_none(),
"hex64 near 'hash' must be allowed; fired: {:?}",
scan(&hash_line)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_high_entropy_hex_like_token_near_key() {
let mixed = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"; assert!(!is_pure_hex(mixed), "test token must not be pure hex");
let line = format!("api key {mixed}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_some(),
"mixed-charset high-entropy token near 'api key' must be caught; got: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_hex40_without_trigger() {
let hex40 = "da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709";
let line = format!("commit: {hex40}");
assert!(
scan(&line).is_none(),
"40-char hex without trigger word must pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(&line)
);
}
#[test]
fn check_json_blocks_secret_in_object_key() {
let props = serde_json::json!({ "ghp_FakeGitHubToken0000000000000000000": "redacted" }); assert!(
check_json(&props).is_err(),
"credential as JSON object key must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn check_json_blocks_nested_secret_key() {
let props = serde_json::json!({
"metadata": {
"AKIAFAKEKEY000000000": "value" }
});
assert!(
check_json(&props).is_err(),
"nested credential as JSON object key must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn pem_masked_excerpt_reflects_block_length_not_rest_of_string() {
let header = ["-----BEGIN RSA", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat(); let fake = format!(
"{}\nMIIEo\u{2026}\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nsome trailing text that is very long",
header
);
let m = scan(&fake).unwrap();
assert_eq!(m.detector, "pem-private-key");
let full_len = fake.chars().count();
let reported_len: usize = m
.masked
.trim_end_matches("chars")
.rsplit("...")
.next()
.and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
.unwrap_or(full_len + 1);
assert!(
reported_len < full_len,
"masked length ({reported_len}) should be less than full string length ({full_len})"
);
}
#[test]
fn utf8_build_match_preview_multibyte_prefix_no_panic() {
let header = ["-----BEGIN RSA", " PRIVATE KEY-----"].concat(); let fake = format!("{}\n🔑密钥\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", header);
let m = scan(&fake);
assert!(m.is_some(), "PEM with emoji body must still be caught");
let m = m.unwrap();
assert!(
!m.masked.contains("🔑密钥"),
"mask must not echo the emoji body"
);
}
#[test]
fn utf8_extract_token_multibyte_suffix_no_panic() {
let text = "FlyV1 ABCDEFGHIJ密钥";
let _ = scan(text);
}
#[test]
fn utf8_prefix_detector_multibyte_adjacent_no_panic() {
let text = "🔑AKIAFAKEKEY00000000000000";
let _ = scan(text);
let text2 = "éghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
let _ = scan(text2);
let text3 = "AKIAFAKEKEY00000000000000🔑";
let _ = scan(text3); }
#[test]
fn utf8_jwt_multibyte_adjacent_no_panic() {
let jwt = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.FAKE_SIG_XXXXXXXXXXXX"; let text = format!("数据{jwt}密钥");
let _ = scan(&text);
let text2 = format!("{jwt}\u{3000}morecontent");
let _ = scan(&text2);
let text3 = format!("{jwt}🔑");
let _ = scan(&text3); }
#[test]
fn utf8_url_userinfo_multibyte_scheme_no_panic() {
let cases = [
"🔑postgresql://dbuser:S3cr3tP4ss@db.example.com/db", "密钥mysql://root:hunter2pw@10.0.0.1:3306/app", "éredis://svc:V3ryS3cretPw@cache.internal:6379", ];
for text in &cases {
let result = scan(text);
assert!(
result.is_some(),
"URL credential after multibyte must be caught: {text:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn utf8_entropy_window_multibyte_boundary_no_panic() {
let cjk_fill = "数".repeat(39); assert_eq!(cjk_fill.len(), 117);
let secret = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"; let content = format!("{cjk_fill}xy key {secret}");
let _ = scan(&content);
let content2 = format!("key {secret}{cjk_fill}xy");
let _ = scan(&content2); }
#[test]
fn utf8_no_panic_property_test() {
let multibyte_items = [
"🔑", "密", "é", "\u{3000}", "🇺🇸", ];
let secrets = [
"AKIAFAKEKEY00000000000000",
"ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
"sk-ant-api03-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1",
"FlyV1 fm2_AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFF",
];
for mb in &multibyte_items {
for secret in &secrets {
for sep in &["", " ", "\n"] {
let s = format!("{mb}{sep}{secret}");
let _ = check(&s);
let s = format!("{secret}{sep}{mb}");
let _ = check(&s);
let s = format!("{mb}{sep}{secret}{sep}{mb}");
let _ = check(&s);
let fill = mb.repeat(50);
let s = format!("{fill} api_key {secret} {fill}");
let _ = check(&s);
}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_masks_connection_string_credentials() {
let raw =
"gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:not-a-real-secret@internal-host refused"; let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains("not-a-real-secret"),
"credential must be masked: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"masked marker must record that detail was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("gate backend probe failed"),
"non-secret diagnostic prose must survive: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_bounds_pathological_input() {
let raw = "x".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_OUTPUT_CHARS + 500);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
rendered.chars().count() <= MAX_LOG_TEXT_OUTPUT_CHARS + 1,
"output must be bounded: {} chars",
rendered.chars().count()
);
assert!(
rendered.ends_with('…'),
"truncated output must declare its own truncation"
);
let short = "gate policy file unreadable";
assert_eq!(
bounded_masked_log_text(short),
short,
"short clean text passes through unchanged"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_masks_low_entropy_password_past_old_truncation_bound() {
let long_low_entropy_password = "a".repeat(5_000);
let raw = format!(
"gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:{long_low_entropy_password}@internal-host refused"
);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"a".repeat(50)),
"long low-entropy password must not survive in the log: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"masked marker must record that the credential was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_redacts_password_crossing_mask_input_cap() {
let huge_low_entropy_password = "a".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000);
let raw =
format!("gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:{huge_low_entropy_password}@internal-host refused");
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"a".repeat(50)),
"no password fragment may survive when the password crosses the mask-input cap: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"mask marker must record that the credential was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.ends_with('…'),
"truncated record must declare its own incompleteness: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_redacts_crossing_empty_username_password() {
let huge_low_entropy_password = "b".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000);
let raw = format!(
"gate backend probe failed: redis://:{huge_low_entropy_password}@internal-host refused"
);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"b".repeat(50)),
"no empty-username password fragment may survive the cap crossing: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"mask marker must record that the credential was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_keeps_path_colon_text_crossing_the_cap() {
let filler = "z".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000);
let raw = format!("see https://host/a:x{filler}@next for details");
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"path-colon text must not read as a crossing credential: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.starts_with("see https://host/a:x"),
"the non-credential prefix must survive verbatim: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_redacts_crossing_password_containing_nested_scheme() {
let mut password = "a".repeat(1000);
password.push_str("://h:");
password.push_str(&"b".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000));
let raw =
format!("gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:{password}@internal-host refused");
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"a".repeat(50)),
"password prefix before the nested delimiter must not survive: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"b".repeat(50)),
"password tail after the nested delimiter must not survive: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"mask marker must record that the credential was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_redacts_crossing_credential_after_complete_url() {
let huge_low_entropy_password = "c".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000);
let raw = format!(
"probe of https://ok-host/health failed; retry hit postgres://svc:{huge_low_entropy_password}@internal-host refused"
);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
rendered.contains("ok-host"),
"the earlier complete URL must survive untouched: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"c".repeat(50)),
"no password fragment may survive: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"mask marker must record that the credential was redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_masks_password_just_under_cap_with_terminating_at() {
let password_under_cap = "a".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS - 1000);
let raw = format!(
"gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:{password_under_cap}@internal-host refused"
);
assert!(
raw.chars().count() < MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS,
"test precondition: whole input must stay under the mask-input cap so no truncation occurs"
);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains(&"a".repeat(50)),
"terminated credential must still be masked normally: {rendered:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
rendered.matches("***MASKED***").count(),
1,
"exactly one mask marker — the crossing fallback must not fire early: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_giant_non_credential_text_unaffected_by_crossing_fallback() {
let raw = "x".repeat(MAX_LOG_TEXT_MASK_INPUT_CHARS + 1000);
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(&raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains("***MASKED***"),
"non-credential text must never be redacted: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.ends_with('…'),
"truncated record must still declare its own incompleteness: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.starts_with("xxxx"),
"non-credential content must survive verbatim up to the output bound: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_masks_ordinary_short_connection_string() {
let raw = "gate backend probe failed: postgres://svc:hunter2pw@internal-host refused"; let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains("hunter2pw"),
"credential must be masked: {rendered:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
rendered.matches("***MASKED***").count(),
1,
"exactly one mask marker for the one credential: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
!rendered.ends_with('…'),
"short untruncated text must not declare truncation: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_neutralizes_ascii_control_chars() {
let raw = "line one\r\ninjected: \u{1b}[31mFAKE ALERT\u{1b}[0m line two";
let rendered = bounded_masked_log_text(raw);
assert!(
!rendered.contains('\r') && !rendered.contains('\n'),
"CR/LF must be neutralized so a single log line cannot be split/forged: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
!rendered.contains('\u{1b}'),
"ESC control character must be neutralized: {rendered:?}"
);
assert!(
rendered.contains("line one") && rendered.contains("line two"),
"surrounding prose must survive neutralization: {rendered:?}"
);
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_neutralizes_each_unsafe_unicode_category() {
let cases = [
("Cc", '\u{1b}', "\\u{001b}"),
("Cf", '\u{202e}', "\\u{202e}"),
("Zl", '\u{2028}', "\\u{2028}"),
("Zp", '\u{2029}', "\\u{2029}"),
];
for (category, unsafe_char, escaped) in cases {
let raw = format!("before{unsafe_char}after");
assert_eq!(
bounded_masked_log_text(&raw),
format!("before{escaped}after"),
"Unicode category {category} must be neutralized"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn bounded_masked_log_text_keeps_space_separators_tabs_accented_and_cjk_text() {
let raw = "ordinary whitespace\tcafé résumé 日本語のテキスト\u{3000}数据库连接管理";
assert_eq!(
bounded_masked_log_text(raw),
raw,
"ordinary whitespace, Zs separators, accented text, and CJK prose must pass through unmodified"
);
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_borrows_clean_text() {
let clean = "The FlashAttention paper introduces IO-aware tiling.";
let masked = mask_secrets(clean);
assert!(
matches!(masked, std::borrow::Cow::Borrowed(_)),
"clean text must not allocate"
);
assert_eq!(masked, clean);
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_redacts_shapes_the_old_mirror_regex_missed() {
let cases = [
"key: sk-proj-FAKEKEY00000000000000000000000000000000", "cred ASIAFAKEKEY00000000000", "stripe sk_live_FAKESTRIPE0000000000000", "db postgresql://dbuser:S3cr3tP4ss@db.example.com/db", ];
for c in &cases {
let masked = mask_secrets(c);
assert!(
masked.contains(REDACTION_MARKER),
"must redact: {c:?} -> {masked:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_redacts_every_span_and_keeps_prose() {
let line =
"first sk-ant-api03-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA then ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA end";
let masked = mask_secrets(line);
assert!(
!masked.contains("sk-ant-api03") && !masked.contains("ghp_AAAA"),
"no secret may survive: {masked}"
);
assert_eq!(
masked.matches(REDACTION_MARKER).count(),
2,
"both secrets must be redacted: {masked}"
);
assert!(masked.starts_with("first "), "prose preserved: {masked}");
assert!(masked.ends_with(" end"), "prose preserved: {masked}");
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_output_passes_check() {
let line = "token=ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA and AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890";
let masked = mask_secrets(line).into_owned();
assert!(
check(&masked).is_ok(),
"masked output must pass the gate: {masked}"
);
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_redacts_entropy_secret_left_of_known_secret() {
let line =
"secret=Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM and ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"; let masked = mask_secrets(line).into_owned();
assert!(
!masked.contains("Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM") && !masked.contains("ghp_AAAA"),
"neither the entropy secret nor the known secret may survive: {masked}"
);
assert_eq!(
masked.matches(REDACTION_MARKER).count(),
2,
"both secrets must be redacted exactly once: {masked}"
);
assert!(
check(&masked).is_ok(),
"masked output must pass the gate: {masked}"
);
}
#[test]
fn github_app_token_families_are_masked() {
let cases = [
"ghu_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "ghs_BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB", "ghr_CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC", ];
for token in &cases {
assert!(
check(token).is_err(),
"gate must hard-block GitHub App token {token}"
);
let line = format!("auth: {token} trailing");
let masked = mask_secrets(&line).into_owned();
assert!(
!masked.contains(token),
"GitHub App token must not survive masking: {masked}"
);
assert!(
check(&masked).is_ok(),
"masked output must pass the gate: {masked}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn mask_secrets_redacts_entropy_token_whose_trigger_is_left_of_earlier_secret() {
let line =
"api_key ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"; let masked = mask_secrets(line).into_owned();
assert!(
!masked.contains("ghp_AAAA"),
"the known secret must be redacted: {masked}"
);
assert!(
!masked.contains("Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM1"),
"the later entropy token must be redacted even though its trigger \
word sits left of the earlier redaction: {masked}"
);
assert_eq!(
masked.matches(REDACTION_MARKER).count(),
2,
"both secrets must be redacted exactly once: {masked}"
);
assert!(
check(&masked).is_ok(),
"masked output must pass the gate: {masked}"
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_high_entropy_file_path_near_secret_word() {
let content =
"workspace path fable-ops/ADR-DRAFT-adr079-slices234.md for the secret gate bug";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"structured file path in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_high_entropy_workspace_path_before_later_key_word() {
let content =
"see internal/workspaces/20260701/adr079-slices234/PACKET.md for the key behavior";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"a path before a later topical key word must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_high_entropy_short_run_path_near_auth_word() {
let content =
"auth work saved at internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"path with a short run in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_branch_and_review_filename_near_key_word() {
let content =
"branch feat-session-mirror pushed, see release_notes_v2.md for the key findings";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"branch name and review filename near 'key' must not be blocked; fired: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_adr_doc_path_near_password_word() {
let content = "password reset doc: docs/adr/ADR-055-epistemic-edge-relations.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"ADR doc path near 'password' must not be blocked; fired: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_source_file_path_near_credential_word() {
let content = "credential handling code crates/khive-pack-session/src/mirror/ingest.rs";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"source file path near 'credential' must not be blocked; fired: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_long_snake_case_identifier_near_key_word() {
let content = "api key handling lives in check_entropy_heuristic_impl";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"snake_case identifier near 'key' must not be blocked; fired: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn hyphenated_random_secret_is_not_a_structured_identifier() {
assert!(!is_structured_identifier(
"wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENGbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEYX123"
));
let line = "api key wJalrXUtnFEMI-K7MDENGbPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEYX123";
assert!(
scan(line).is_some(),
"hyphenated random secret must still be blocked; got: {:?}",
scan(line)
);
}
#[test]
fn structured_identifier_true_for_repro_paths() {
let paths = [
"fable-ops/ADR-DRAFT-adr079-slices234.md",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/adr079-slices234/PACKET.md",
"internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md",
"release_notes_v2.md",
"docs/adr/ADR-055-epistemic-edge-relations.md",
"crates/khive-pack-session/src/mirror/ingest.rs",
"check_entropy_heuristic_impl",
];
for p in paths {
assert!(
is_structured_identifier(p),
"expected structured identifier: {p}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn structured_identifier_false_without_separator() {
assert!(!is_structured_identifier(
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM"
));
}
#[test]
fn structured_identifier_false_for_leetspeak_digit_interleaving() {
assert!(!is_structured_identifier("S3cr3t-P4ssw0rd-t0ken-here!"));
}
#[test]
fn structured_identifier_false_for_run_over_length_cap() {
let long_run = "a".repeat(26);
let token = format!("prefix-{long_run}-suffix");
assert!(!is_structured_identifier(&token));
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_secret_access_key_bypass() {
let content = "secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"AWS Secret Access Key shaped bypass must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_adversarial_lowercase_only_separator_token_near_access_key() {
let content = "access_key qrstuvwxyz/abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzab";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"lowercase-only separator-delimited high-entropy token near \
'access_key' must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_adversarial_digit_and_word_mixed_token_near_api_key() {
let content = "api_key attaycofrsm827/festwqjhc493/8261947350/qwikjzx982";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"digit-and-word-mixed high-entropy token near 'api_key' must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_adversarial_token_assignment_separator_delimited_secret() {
let content = "token=zxkqwmvbpl/trfhysjgnc/dweiaoutkz-mnbvcxzlk";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"token= with lowercase-only separator-delimited high-entropy value \
must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_extension_suffix_bypass_secret_access_key() {
let content = "secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"extension-suffixed AWS Secret Access Key shaped bypass must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_extension_suffix_bypass_token_assignment() {
let content = "token=zxkqwmvbpl/trfhysjgnc/dweiaoutkz-mnbvcxzlk.rs";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"extension-suffixed token= bypass must be blocked: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_unsuffixed_separator_split_credential_bypasses() {
let cases = [
"secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk",
"token=zxkqwmvbpl/trfhysjgnc/dweiaoutkz-mnbvcxzlk",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"bypass string must still be blocked: {content:?}, got: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_digit_run_suffix_bypass_attempt() {
let cases = [
"secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk2024",
"secret_access_key abcdefghij2024/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk.md",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"digit-run-suffixed bypass attempt must be blocked: {content:?}, got: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_low_entropy_padding_run_bypass_attempts() {
let cases = [
"secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk/aaaa/R1.md",
"token=zxkqwmvbpl/trfhysjgnc/dweiaoutkz/mnbvcxzlk/aaaa/R1.rs",
"secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk/aaaa/bbbb/R1.md",
"token=zxkqwmvbpl/trfhysjgnc/dweiaoutkz/mnbvcxzlk/aaaa/bbbb/R1.rs",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"padding-run bypass attempt must be blocked: {content:?}, got: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_run_splitting_bypass_attempts() {
let cases = [
"secret_access_key abcd/efgh/ijkl/mnop/qrst/uvwx/yzab/cdef.md",
"secret_access_key abcde/fghij/klmno/pqrst/uvwxy/zabcd.md",
"secret_access_key abcdef/ghijkl/mnopqr/stuvwx/yzabcd.md",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"run-splitting bypass attempt must be blocked: {content:?}, got: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_generic_hex_credential_ascii() {
let content = "api key 0123456789abcdef0123/456789abcdef01234567";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"separator-split hex credential must be blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_generic_hex_credential_unicode_separator() {
let content = "api key 0123456789abcdef0123\u{200B}456789abcdef01234567";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"Unicode-separator split hex credential must be blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_unicode_split_hex_credential_with_path_shaped_anchor() {
let content =
"api key handling uses source/x/0123456789abcdef0123\u{200B}456789abcdef01234567";
let tokens: Vec<(usize, &str)> = content
.split(|c: char| c.is_ascii_whitespace() || !c.is_ascii())
.filter(|token| !token.is_empty())
.map(|token| (token.as_ptr() as usize - content.as_ptr() as usize, token))
.collect();
let anchor = tokens
.iter()
.position(|(_, token)| token.starts_with("source/"))
.expect("path anchor must be tokenized");
assert!(is_plausible_file_path(tokens[anchor].1));
let fragments = bridge_fragment_chain(&tokens, content, anchor);
assert_eq!(fragments.len(), 2);
assert!(contains_normalized_hex_credential(&fragments.join(" ")));
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"path-shaped anchor must not bypass fragment reconstruction: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_hex_credential_repeated_unicode_gap() {
let content = "api key 0123456789abcdef0123\u{200B}\u{200B}\u{200B}456789abcdef01234567";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"repeated-Unicode-gap split hex credential must be blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_three_way_hex_credential_mixed_case() {
let content = "api key AAAA1111bbbb22\u{200B}22cccc3333ddd\u{200B}d4444eeee5555";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"three-way mixed-case Unicode-split hex credential must be blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_base64_like_unicode_credential() {
let content = "api key Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAe\u{200B}HfBsDcGiONvMabcdefgh";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"base64-like Unicode-split credential must be blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_punctuation_glue_between_two_unicode_gaps() {
let content = "api key 0123456789abcdef0123\u{200B}---\u{200B}456789abcdef01234567";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"punctuation-glue split hex credential between two Unicode gaps must be \
blocked: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_seven_way_hex_split_beyond_fragment_cap_documented_limitation() {
let content = "api key 012345678\u{200B}9abcdef01\u{200B}23456789a\u{200B}bcdef0123\u{200B}456789abc\u{200B}def012345\u{200B}6789abcdef";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"seven-way hex split beyond MAX_BRIDGE_FRAGMENTS is a documented residual \
limitation and must stay allowed: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_six_way_sub_floor_hex_split_documented_limitation() {
let content = "api key 0123456\u{200B}789abcd\u{200B}ef01234\u{200B}56789ab\u{200B}cdef01\u{200B}234567";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"six-way sub-MIN_BRIDGE_FRAGMENT_LEN hex split is a documented residual \
limitation and must stay allowed: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_unrelated_short_fragments_cited_near_a_trigger_word() {
let content = "api key: see commits abc12345, def67890 for the fix";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"unrelated short fragments cited near a trigger word must stay allowed: \
fired {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_unrelated_short_base64_like_fragments_cited_near_a_trigger_word() {
let content = "api key: build ids Ab3Kf9 and Xy7Lm2 do not match";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"unrelated short base64-like fragments cited near a trigger word must \
stay allowed: fired {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_scattered_short_hex_runs_that_do_not_sum_to_a_credential_length() {
let content = "auth config lives in abc12345/de678901/fa234567.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"scattered short hex runs that never sum to a credential length \
must stay allowed: fired {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_fp_paths_whose_full_token_entropy_is_already_below_threshold() {
let paths = [
"release_notes_v2.md",
"docs/adr/ADR-055-epistemic-edge-relations.md",
"crates/khive-pack-session/src/mirror/ingest.rs",
"check_entropy_heuristic_impl",
];
for p in paths {
let content = format!("api_key handling in {p}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_ok(),
"{p} must stay allowed near 'api_key' (full-token entropy already \
below threshold): fired {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_adr_draft_path_near_trigger() {
let content = "api_key handling in fable-ops/ADR-DRAFT-adr079-slices234.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"ADR-DRAFT path in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_workspace_packet_path_near_trigger() {
let content = "api_key handling in internal/workspaces/20260701/adr079-slices234/PACKET.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"workspace path in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_high_entropy_repo_audit_path_near_api_key() {
let content =
"api_key handling in internal/workspaces/20260701/cloud-rebuild/R1-repo-audit.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"repository path in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_source_paths_near_ordinary_key_and_token_prose() {
let contents = [
"see <a/path/to/file.py>:~97-103 lists it as a real checkpoint-supplied key",
"see <a/path/to/file.py>:~97-103 emits one extra token",
"see /workspace/src/checkpoint_loader.rs:97-103\n\nconfiguration key behavior",
"the token behavior is implemented in src/runtime/secret_gate.rs:618-914.",
];
for content in contents {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"source path in technical prose must pass: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_adr_authorization_path_in_markdown_ingest() {
let content =
"- Evidence: `docs/adr/C-ADR-007-authorization-server.md:70` defines token handling.";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"ADR path citation in technical markdown must pass: got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_markdown_ingest_bare_opaque_value_near_token() {
let content = concat!(
"- Review evidence for token handling: ",
"Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBs",
"DcGiONvM1qPrStUvWxYz23456789"
);
assert_eq!(
scan(content).map(|matched| matched.detector),
Some("high-entropy-token"),
"bare opaque value near token must remain blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_directly_labeled_as_api_key() {
let content = "api_key 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID-shaped token labeled api_key must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_sha256_content_hash_labeled_as_secret() {
let content = "secret sha256-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopq";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha256-prefixed hash labeled secret must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_sha384_content_hash_labeled_as_api_key() {
let content =
"api_key sha384-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha384-prefixed hash labeled api_key must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_sha512_content_hash_labeled_as_auth() {
let content = "auth sha512-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUV";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha512-prefixed hash labeled auth must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_uuid_with_no_trigger_within_window() {
let content =
"task 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000 was created and assigned to the team";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"UUID with no nearby trigger word must stay allowed; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_area_id_uuid_near_authorized_substring() {
let content = "area_id: cfcea31d-6f50-4fd1-ad6d-5f160de1694c\n\n## Problem\nReduce Lion microkernel axioms. Converted authorized_write_requires_dominance from axiom to theorem.";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"internal area_id UUID near the 'authorized' substring \
(not a genuine 'auth' mention) must now pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_glued_to_assignment_equals() {
let content = "api_key=550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID glued via '=' to a trigger word must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_with_trailing_sentence_period() {
let content = "api_key 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000.";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID with a trailing sentence period near a trigger must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_wrapped_in_parens() {
let content = "api_key (550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000)";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID wrapped in parens near a trigger must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_in_json_object() {
let content = "{\"api_key\":\"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"}";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID in a JSON-ish object near a trigger key must be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_content_hash_glued_to_assignment_equals() {
let content = "secret=sha256-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopq";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha256-prefixed hash glued via '=' to a trigger word must be blocked; \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_content_hash_with_trailing_sentence_period() {
let content = "secret sha256-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopq.";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha256-prefixed hash with a trailing period near a trigger must be \
blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_content_hash_wrapped_in_parens() {
let content = "secret (sha256-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopq)";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha256-prefixed hash wrapped in parens near a trigger must be blocked; \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_content_hash_in_json_object() {
let content = "{\"secret\":\"sha256-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopq\"}";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"sha256-prefixed hash in a JSON-ish object near a trigger key must be \
blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_uuid_wrapped_in_parens_with_no_trigger_nearby() {
let content = "wrapper (550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000) present";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"UUID wrapped in parens with no trigger word nearby must stay allowed; \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_padded_content_hash_glued_to_assignment_with_trailing_period() {
let content = "secret=sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=.";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"padded sha256 hash glued via '=' with a trailing period must be \
blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_padded_content_hash_in_json_object() {
let content = "{\"secret\":\"sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\"}";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"padded sha256 hash in a JSON-ish object near a trigger key must be \
blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_when_json_label_itself_contains_colon() {
let content = "{\"api:key\":\"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"}";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID must be blocked even when the JSON label contains ':'; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_when_json_label_itself_contains_equals() {
let content = "{\"api=key\":\"550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000\"}";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID must be blocked even when the JSON label contains '='; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_uuid_behind_doubled_assignment() {
let content = "api_key=label=550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"; assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"UUID must be blocked behind a doubled assignment; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_padded_content_hash_behind_doubled_assignment_equals() {
let content = "secret=label=sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=.";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"padded content hash must be blocked behind a doubled '=' assignment; \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_padded_content_hash_behind_doubled_assignment_colon() {
let content = "secret:label=sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=.";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"padded content hash must be blocked behind a doubled ':'+'=' \
assignment; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_benign_url_with_scheme_and_path_separators() {
let content = "api_key endpoint=https://example.test/resource/for/testing";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"a benign URL near a trigger word must stay allowed; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_trigger_substrings_inside_benign_path_slugs() {
let paths = [
"docs/_archive/adr_v0/ADR-051-cli-auth-and-kg-git-workflow.md",
"docs/platform/oauth-callback-docs-and-redirect-handling-v2.md",
"docs/research/author-attribution-and-collaboration-notes.md",
"docs/security/passwordless-authentication-overview-v3.md",
"docs/platform/private_keynote-authoring-guide-v2.md",
];
for path in paths {
assert!(
check(path).is_ok(),
"trigger substring inside a benign path slug must not make the path \
its own credential context: {path:?}, got {:?}",
scan(path)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_inline_auth_assignment_with_high_entropy_value() {
let content = "auth=Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"auth=<high-entropy-value> must still be blocked; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_suffix_bearing_compound_credential_assignments() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let cases = [
format!("api_keyv2={opaque}"),
format!("access_keyv2={opaque}"),
format!("private_keyv2={opaque}"),
format!("API_KEYV2={opaque}"),
format!(r#"{{"private_keyv2":"{opaque}"}}"#),
];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"suffix-bearing compound credential assignment must be blocked: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_spaced_suffix_bearing_compound_credential_assignments() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; for label in ["api_keyv2", "access_keyv2", "private_keyv2"] {
let cases = [
format!("{label} = {opaque}"),
format!("{label} : {opaque}"),
format!(r#"{{"{label}": "{opaque}"}}"#),
];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"spaced suffix-bearing compound credential assignment must be \
blocked: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_suffix_bearing_compound_credentials_without_assignment_separator() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; for label in ["api_keyv2", "access_keyv2", "private_keyv2"] {
let cases = [format!("{label} {opaque}"), format!("{label}{opaque}")];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"suffix-bearing compound credential without an assignment separator must be \
blocked: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
assert!(
mask_secrets(content).contains(REDACTION_MARKER),
"shared secret masker must redact separator-free compound credential: \
{content:?}"
);
}
}
let prefixed = "xapi_keyv2=Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; assert!(
check(prefixed).is_err(),
"prefix-bearing compound credential assignment must be blocked: \
{prefixed:?}, got {:?}",
scan(prefixed)
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_authorized_and_authentication_prose_near_uuid() {
let cases = [
"authorized_write_requires_dominance was converted from axiom to theorem, id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"authentication flow diagram lives at 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"'authorized'/'authentication' substring must not trigger the \
entropy heuristic: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_turkey_monkey_keyword_prose_near_uuid() {
let cases = [
"the turkey and monkey story references id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"keyword research doc: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"'turkey'/'monkey'/'keyword' substring must not trigger the \
entropy heuristic: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn blocks_opaque_tokens_near_standalone_trigger_words() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let cases = [
format!("auth header {opaque}"),
format!("the key is {opaque}"),
format!("secret value: {opaque}"),
];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"a genuine standalone trigger word must still block: {content:?}, \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn accepted_false_positive_workspace_artifact_path_behind_attributive_trigger() {
let content = "writing up the secret gate false positive repro: \
.workspace/20260101/fix-secret-gate-trigger-false-positive/MEASUREMENT_REPORT.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"accepted-FP contract changed: attributive trigger before a \
delimited path no longer blocks — update the docs if deliberate"
);
}
#[test]
fn accepted_false_positive_archive_doc_path_behind_attributive_trigger() {
let content =
"secret scanner archive notes: docs/_archive/ADR051-TenantEncryption-v2Notes.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"accepted-FP contract changed: attributive trigger before a \
delimited path no longer blocks — update the docs if deliberate"
);
}
#[test]
fn allows_absolute_path_near_standalone_auth() {
let content = "the auth scanner flagged this file: /home/user/projects/workspace/SessionNotes20260107/AuthGateFollowup2.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"absolute path in technical prose must pass; got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_assignment_shaped_credential_disguised_as_path_near_api_key() {
let content = "api_key=/home/user/workspaces/2026/topic-name-example/SECRET_VALUE_HERE.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"assignment-shaped credential disguised as a path must still be \
blocked: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_separator_split_secret_access_key_compound() {
let content = "secret_access_key abcdefghij/klmnopqrst/uvwxyzabcd/efghijk.md";
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"secret_access_key bypass shape must still be blocked: {content:?}, \
got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_secret_key_assignment_when_underscore_bounds_trigger() {
let content = "SECRET_KEY=dGhpc2lzYXNlY3JldGtleXZhbHVlMTIzNDU2Nzg5MA=="; assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"SECRET_KEY=<value> (Django/Flask-style config) must still be \
blocked: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_auth_token_assignment_when_underscore_bounds_trigger() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let content = format!("auth_token={opaque}");
assert!(
check(&content).is_err(),
"auth_token=<value> must still be blocked: {content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(&content)
);
}
#[test]
fn blocks_underscore_joined_session_secret_and_signing_key_compounds() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let cases = [
format!("session_secret_{opaque}"),
format!("signing_key={opaque}"),
];
for content in &cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_err(),
"underscore-joined credential compound must still be blocked: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn allows_letter_joined_trigger_substrings_in_benign_prose() {
let cases = [
"authorized_write_requires_dominance was converted from axiom to theorem, id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"authentication flow diagram lives at 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"the turkey and monkey story references id 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
"keyword research doc: 550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
];
for content in cases {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"letter-joined substring collision must stay exempt: \
{content:?}, got {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
fn block_message_carries_actionable_guidance() {
let fake = "AKIAFAKEKEY1234567890";
let m = scan(fake).unwrap();
let rendered = m.to_string();
assert!(
rendered.contains("real credential"),
"block message must carry actionable guidance: {rendered}"
);
}
#[test]
fn block_message_shape_guidance_mentions_rewording() {
let opaque = "Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvMabcdef"; let content = format!("auth header {opaque}");
let m = scan(&content).unwrap();
let rendered = m.to_string();
assert!(
rendered.contains("reword") || rendered.contains("own line"),
"shape-based detector guidance must suggest rewording/splitting: {rendered}"
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod corpus_replay {
use super::*;
use rusqlite::{Connection, OpenFlags};
#[test]
fn blocks_hex_credential_diluted_by_filler_path_segments() {
let line = "api key vault/9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a09f8e7d6c/rotate.md";
let m = scan(line);
assert!(
m.is_some(),
"hex credential diluted by filler path segments must be blocked; got None"
);
assert_eq!(m.unwrap().detector, "hex-credential-token");
}
#[test]
fn blocks_chopped_secret_padded_by_filler_runs() {
let line = "secret path a/b/c/d/Xk9mZ2vQpLrT8nJwYuAeHfBsDcGiONvM/e/f.rs"; let m = scan(line);
assert!(
m.is_some(),
"chopped/padded secret among filler runs must be blocked; got None"
);
assert_eq!(m.unwrap().detector, "high-entropy-token");
}
#[test]
fn allows_real_paths_with_no_run_reaching_min_entropy_len() {
let contents = [
"branch feat-session-mirror pushed, see release_notes_v2.md for the key findings",
"password reset doc: docs/adr/ADR-055-epistemic-edge-relations.md",
"credential handling code crates/khive-pack-session/src/mirror/ingest.rs",
"api key handling lives in check_entropy_heuristic_impl",
];
for content in contents {
assert!(
check(content).is_ok(),
"real path with no long run must still pass; fired: {:?}",
scan(content)
);
}
}
#[test]
#[ignore]
fn replay_against_corpus() {
let db_path = std::env::var("KHIVE_REPLAY_DB")
.expect("set KHIVE_REPLAY_DB=/path/to/khive.db to run the corpus replay (read-only)");
let conn = Connection::open_with_flags(
&db_path,
OpenFlags::SQLITE_OPEN_READ_ONLY | OpenFlags::SQLITE_OPEN_NO_MUTEX,
)
.expect("open corpus DB read-only");
let mut total = 0usize;
let mut blocked = 0usize;
let mut samples: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut collect = |sql: &str| {
let mut stmt = conn.prepare(sql).expect("prepare replay query");
let mut rows = stmt.query([]).expect("query replay rows");
while let Some(row) = rows.next().expect("read replay row") {
let content: Option<String> = row.get(0).unwrap_or(None);
let Some(content) = content else { continue };
if content.is_empty() {
continue;
}
total += 1;
if let Some(m) = scan(&content) {
blocked += 1;
if samples.len() < 30 {
samples.push(format!(
"{} :: {}",
m,
content.chars().take(160).collect::<String>()
));
}
}
}
};
collect("SELECT content FROM notes WHERE deleted_at IS NULL");
collect("SELECT description FROM entities WHERE deleted_at IS NULL");
eprintln!("corpus replay: {blocked}/{total} strings blocked");
for s in &samples {
eprintln!(" BLOCKED: {s}");
}
}
#[test]
#[ignore]
fn generate_corpus_manifest() {
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
let db_path = std::env::var("KHIVE_REPLAY_DB")
.expect("set KHIVE_REPLAY_DB=/path/to/khive.db to run the corpus replay (read-only)");
let conn = Connection::open_with_flags(
&db_path,
OpenFlags::SQLITE_OPEN_READ_ONLY | OpenFlags::SQLITE_OPEN_NO_MUTEX,
)
.expect("open corpus DB read-only");
let mut total = 0usize;
let mut counts_by_detector: BTreeMap<&'static str, usize> = BTreeMap::new();
let mut hashes_by_detector: BTreeMap<&'static str, Vec<String>> = BTreeMap::new();
let mut max_run_reaching_min_entropy_len = 0usize;
let mut collect = |sql: &str| {
let mut stmt = conn.prepare(sql).expect("prepare replay query");
let mut rows = stmt.query([]).expect("query replay rows");
while let Some(row) = rows.next().expect("read replay row") {
let content: Option<String> = row.get(0).unwrap_or(None);
let Some(content) = content else { continue };
if content.is_empty() {
continue;
}
total += 1;
for token in content.split_whitespace() {
for run in token.split(|c: char| !c.is_ascii_alphanumeric()) {
max_run_reaching_min_entropy_len =
max_run_reaching_min_entropy_len.max(run.len());
}
}
if let Some(m) = scan(&content) {
*counts_by_detector.entry(m.detector).or_insert(0) += 1;
let hash = format!("{:x}", Sha256::digest(content.as_bytes()));
hashes_by_detector.entry(m.detector).or_default().push(hash);
}
}
};
collect("SELECT content FROM notes WHERE deleted_at IS NULL");
collect("SELECT description FROM entities WHERE deleted_at IS NULL");
let blocked: usize = counts_by_detector.values().sum();
println!("total_scanned: {total}");
println!("total_blocked: {blocked}");
println!("longest_alphanumeric_run_in_corpus: {max_run_reaching_min_entropy_len}");
println!("counts_by_detector:");
for (detector, count) in &counts_by_detector {
println!(" {detector}: {count}");
}
println!("blocked_content_sha256_by_detector:");
for (detector, hashes) in &hashes_by_detector {
println!(" {detector}:");
for hash in hashes {
println!(" {hash}");
}
}
}
}