keyhog-scanner 0.5.38

//! Shannon entropy analysis for distinguishing secrets from ordinary text.
//!
//! Real secrets have high entropy (4.5+), while hashes, UUIDs, and placeholders
//! have characteristic entropy profiles that help separate true positives.

pub mod keywords;
pub(crate) mod scanner;

pub use scanner::{find_entropy_secrets, find_entropy_secrets_with_threshold, is_sensitive_file};

/// Threshold for keyword-context entropy detection.
pub const LOW_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD: f64 = 3.0;
pub const HIGH_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD: f64 = 4.5;
/// Threshold for keyword-independent entropy detection.
pub const VERY_HIGH_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD: f64 = 5.8;
/// Threshold for keyword-independent detection in clearly sensitive files.
pub const SENSITIVE_FILE_VERY_HIGH_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD: f64 = 5.5;

/// Shannon entropy in bits per byte, with thread-local caching for repeat
/// inputs ≤1KB (typical credential size). Cache evicts wholesale when full
/// to bound memory under adversarial input.
pub fn shannon_entropy(data: &[u8]) -> f64 {
    // Length gate: don't cache entropy for massive buffers (e.g. minified JS)
    // that won't repeat exactly. Just calculate directly.
    if data.len() > 1024 {
        return shannon_entropy_uncached(data);
    }

    use std::cell::RefCell;
    use std::collections::HashMap;

    thread_local! {
        static CACHE: RefCell<HashMap<u64, f64>> = RefCell::new(HashMap::with_capacity(256));
    }

    // FNV-1a content key, shared seed with every other per-scan cache.
    let hash = crate::util_hash::hash_fast(data);
    crate::util_hash::memoize_by_hash(
        &CACHE,
        hash,
        crate::util_hash::DEFAULT_MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES,
        || shannon_entropy_uncached(data),
    )
}

fn shannon_entropy_uncached(data: &[u8]) -> f64 {
    crate::entropy_fast::shannon_entropy_simd(data)
}

/// Shannon entropy rescaled to `0.0..=1.0` by dividing by `log2(unique_bytes)`.
pub fn normalized_entropy(data: &[u8]) -> f64 {
    if data.is_empty() {
        return 0.0;
    }

    let unique_chars = {
        let mut seen = [false; 256];
        for &byte in data {
            seen[byte as usize] = true;
        }
        seen.iter().filter(|&&value| value).count()
    };

    if unique_chars <= 1 {
        return 0.0;
    }

    let max_entropy = (unique_chars as f64).log2();
    if max_entropy == 0.0 {
        return 0.0;
    }

    shannon_entropy(data) / max_entropy
}

/// Entropy-based candidate match returned by fallback secret detection.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct EntropyMatch {
    /// The candidate string that exceeded the entropy threshold.
    pub value: String,
    /// Shannon entropy measured for `value`.
    pub entropy: f64,
    /// The keyword context that caused the candidate to be evaluated.
    pub keyword: String,
    /// One-based source line number for the match.
    pub line: usize,
    /// Byte offset of the start of the containing line.
    pub offset: usize,
}

/// True if the file at `path` is worth running entropy scanning on.
///
/// Path-only gate: `.json` and all source-code extensions are hard-OFF here.
/// For the keyword-anchored lift of those hard-OFFs (a `.json` body or a
/// source file that carries a secret-keyword assignment line still holds
/// real, unprefixed high-entropy secrets), call
/// [`is_entropy_appropriate_with_content`], which the entropy fallback uses.
pub fn is_entropy_appropriate(path: Option<&str>, allow_source_files: bool) -> bool {
    is_entropy_appropriate_inner(path, allow_source_files, false)
}

/// Content-aware variant of [`is_entropy_appropriate`].
///
/// `has_secret_keyword_line` is true when the chunk text contains at least one
/// secret-keyword assignment line (same predicate the entropy scanner uses to
/// seed keyword contexts, [`keywords::find_keyword_assignment_lines`]). When
/// set, two path-only hard-OFFs are lifted:
///
///   * `.json` files (the single biggest FN wrapper - `{"auth": "<40-char
///     base64>"}` was scoring 0 while the identical `auth: "<same>"` in
///     `.yaml` was caught), and
///   * source-code files when `allow_source_files` is false (the dominant
///     go/rust/js FN shape `const apiKey = "<base64-40>"` lives in a quoted
///     RHS of a const/assignment with a secret keyword).
///
/// Both lifts are contract-safe: the keyword-assignment anchor confines the
/// recall expansion to credential-shaped lines, away from prose / identifiers,
/// and the per-candidate suppression gates on the emit path
/// (pure-identifier, prose, kebab, filename-shape, ...) still run.
///
/// `.lock` / `.map` / minified bundles stay hard-OFF unconditionally - they
/// are not credential wrappers, only alphabet-coincidence noise.
pub fn is_entropy_appropriate_with_content(
    path: Option<&str>,
    allow_source_files: bool,
    text: &str,
    secret_keywords: &[String],
) -> bool {
    let has_secret_keyword_line = !keywords::find_keyword_assignment_lines(
        &text.lines().collect::<Vec<_>>(),
        secret_keywords,
    )
    .is_empty();
    is_entropy_appropriate_inner(path, allow_source_files, has_secret_keyword_line)
}

fn is_entropy_appropriate_inner(
    path: Option<&str>,
    allow_source_files: bool,
    has_secret_keyword_line: bool,
) -> bool {
    let Some(path) = path else { return true };
    // ASCII case-insensitive byte comparison - no whole-path lowercase
    // allocation per call. Hot path on every chunk during a scan.
    let bytes = path.as_bytes();
    let ends_ci = |suffix: &[u8]| -> bool {
        bytes.len() >= suffix.len()
            && bytes[bytes.len() - suffix.len()..].eq_ignore_ascii_case(suffix)
    };

    // `.lock` / `.map` are never credential wrappers - stay hard-OFF even with
    // a keyword line. `.json` is lifted when a secret-keyword assignment line
    // is present (part (a) of the FN-recall fix): JSON is the biggest FN
    // wrapper, but only the keyword-anchored bodies hold real secrets.
    for extension in [b".lock".as_slice(), b".map"] {
        if ends_ci(extension) {
            return false;
        }
    }
    if ends_ci(b".json") && !has_secret_keyword_line {
        return false;
    }
    if ends_ci(b".min.js") || ends_ci(b".min.css") {
        return false;
    }
    if allow_source_files {
        return true;
    }

    // Last segment after `/` or `\` - index into bytes, no alloc.
    let last_sep = bytes
        .iter()
        .rposition(|&b| b == b'/' || b == b'\\')
        .map(|i| i + 1)
        .unwrap_or(0);
    let filename = &bytes[last_sep..];

    // Package-manifest exclusion: Cargo.toml / package.json / pyproject.toml
    // / Pipfile / Gemfile / pom.xml / build.gradle have [package.keywords]
    // / "keywords" / "categories" array data that look like high-entropy
    // strings but are package metadata, not credentials. Entropy fires on
    // ["compression", "encryption", "history"] as `entropy-api-key`
    // because the array literal happens to clear the keyword + entropy
    // thresholds. Suppress on stem match, ASCII case-insensitive.
    // #15 regression: envseal dogfood, ~10 FPs per Cargo.toml.
    for stem in [
        b"Cargo.toml".as_slice(),
        b"package.json",
        b"pyproject.toml",
        b"composer.json",
        b"Pipfile",
        b"Gemfile",
        b"pom.xml",
        b"build.gradle",
        b"build.gradle.kts",
        b"build.sbt",
        b"mix.exs",
    ] {
        if filename.eq_ignore_ascii_case(stem) {
            return false;
        }
    }

    for extension in [
        b".env".as_slice(),
        b".yaml",
        b".yml",
        b".toml",
        b".properties",
        b".cfg",
        b".conf",
        b".ini",
        b".config",
        b".secrets",
        b".pem",
        b".key",
        b".tfvars",
        b".hcl",
    ] {
        if ends_ci(extension) {
            return true;
        }
    }

    // Filename-prefix match: `.env-staging`, `.env.production` should count
    // as a secret file. But `secrets.rs`, `credentials.py`, `apikeys.go`
    // are source code ABOUT credentials, not credential files - the
    // surrounding code uses `secret` / `credential` / `apikey` as
    // identifiers, and the entropy fallback was misclassifying every
    // identifier-shaped value on those lines as `entropy-api-key`.
    //
    // Split policy:
    //   - `.env` keeps the prefix-match semantics (legitimate variants
    //     exist: `.env-staging`, `.env.production`, `.envfile`).
    //   - All other names require an EXACT filename match (no extension)
    //     OR a prefix match followed by a known config extension
    //     (`secrets.env`, `credentials.yaml`, `apikeys.toml`).
    //
    // #15 regression: envseal/cli/src/tui/secrets.rs fired entropy on
    // every `Style`/`Paragraph::new` call because filename prefix
    // "secrets" matched. After this filter, scanning a `secrets.rs`
    // requires `--entropy-source-files`.
    const PREFIX_MATCH_NAMES: &[&[u8]] = &[b".env", b".npmrc", b".pypirc", b".netrc"];
    for name in PREFIX_MATCH_NAMES {
        let starts_ci =
            filename.len() >= name.len() && filename[..name.len()].eq_ignore_ascii_case(name);
        if starts_ci {
            return true;
        }
    }

    const EXACT_OR_CONFIG_EXT_NAMES: &[&[u8]] =
        &[b"credentials", b"secrets", b"apikeys", b"docker-compose"];
    const CONFIG_EXTENSIONS_AFTER_STEM: &[&[u8]] = &[
        b".env",
        b".yaml",
        b".yml",
        b".toml",
        b".properties",
        b".cfg",
        b".conf",
        b".ini",
        b".config",
        b".secrets",
        b".pem",
        b".key",
        b".tfvars",
        b".hcl",
        b".enc",
        b".vault",
        b".prod",
        b".txt",
    ];
    for name in EXACT_OR_CONFIG_EXT_NAMES {
        if filename.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) {
            return true;
        }
        // Prefix + config extension: `secrets.yaml`, `credentials.env`,
        // `apikeys.toml`, `secrets-prod.toml`. The trailing extension
        // gate keeps `secrets.rs`, `credentials.py`, etc. on the
        // source-code path (skipped unless --entropy-source-files).
        if filename.len() > name.len() && filename[..name.len()].eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) {
            let tail = &filename[name.len()..];
            for ext in CONFIG_EXTENSIONS_AFTER_STEM {
                if tail.len() >= ext.len()
                    && tail[tail.len() - ext.len()..].eq_ignore_ascii_case(ext)
                {
                    return true;
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Source-file lift (part (b) of the FN-recall fix). Everything that
    // reaches here is a genuine source-code file (`.rs`, `.go`, `.js`,
    // `.py`, ...) that is neither a recognized config/secret file nor a
    // package manifest (both returned earlier). The dominant go/rust/js
    // FN shape is a quoted RHS of a const/assignment with a secret keyword,
    // `const apiKey = "<base64-40>"`. When the chunk carries such a
    // secret-keyword assignment line, allow entropy scanning here even
    // without `--entropy-source-files`; the per-candidate emit gates
    // (pure-identifier, prose, kebab, filename-shape, ...) reject the
    // identifier noise that motivated the source-file hard-OFF, so the
    // keyword anchor keeps this contract-safe. Manifests are unaffected -
    // they already returned `false` above, so a `name = "my-secret"` line
    // in `Cargo.toml` cannot re-enable scanning here.
    has_secret_keyword_line
}