kerbcore 0.3.0

Pure-Rust Kerberos: full etype crypto (AES-SHA1/SHA2 + RC4, RFC 3961/3962/8009/4757) + DER/RFC 4120 codec + AS/TGS client. No FFI, no host krb5.
Documentation

kerbcore

Pure-Rust Kerberos building blocks — no FFI, no dependency on a host krb5, #![forbid(unsafe_code)].

kerbcore implements the modern Kerberos encryption-type matrix, a from-scratch DER / RFC 4120 message codec, and a plain AS / TGS client — the protocol core a defender, DFIR engineer, or interoperability author needs without linking a system krb5. The crate is pure: bytes in, bytes out. Network I/O stays with the caller.

Install

[dependencies]
kerbcore = "0.2"

Requires Rust 1.88+.

Status

Pre-1.0 — 0.2.x is the current line (typed-key enctype dispatch, AP-REP mutual auth, GSS RFC 4121, SPNEGO, FAST, KKDCP, kpasswd, cross-realm referrals). A 0.3.0 API-freeze candidate is planned before 1.0. The AS/TGS crypto, codec, and client are complete and live-validated end-to-end against Windows Server 2019, 2022, and 2025 KDCs: each obtains a real TGT and service ticket, handling the three different salt schemes the servers return (the salt is parsed from the KDC's ETYPE-INFO2, never guessed).

When to reach for kerbcore (honest table)

Kerbcore covers a specific niche in the Rust Kerberos ecosystem. It is not the right choice for everyone; the alternatives are legitimately better for other use cases.

You want... Reach for Why
Kerberos client that just works everywhere your OS runs libgssapi-sys Battle-tested MIT/Heimdal FFI; largest user base; the boring safe default
Windows-native SSPI parity from Rust sspi-rs Real SSPI reimplementation; substantial user base; handles Windows quirks
Just KRB message codec, no client picky-krb Smallest surface; long history; used by sspi-rs internally
Static binary, no libclang at build, no libkrb5 at runtime kerbcore Zero FFI, zero system deps
Cross-compile to musl / minimal Alpine / embedded kerbcore Pure-Rust, #![forbid(unsafe_code)], tiny external tree (8 deps)
Wire-level control (roast, forge, inspect PA-data, walk KDC-REP by hand) kerbcore Types are yours; the codec is total (no panic on hostile input)
Environments where the MIT/Heimdal C audit surface is unacceptable kerbcore Pure-Rust, no unsafe
A production-mature Kerberos crate with a large ecosystem not kerbcore yet Pre-1.0, small user base — pick libgssapi or sspi-rs

The pure-Rust-Kerberos-with-no-FFI category is a small niche. Kerbcore's goal is to be the honest top of that niche, not to displace libgssapi.

Examples

Three runnable examples under examples/:

  • get_tgt — obtain a real TGT from a live KDC (env-configured), from scratch in ~90 LOC. AS-REQ → KRB-ERROR (salt) → PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP → AS-REP → decrypt session key.
  • asrep_roast — no-preauth account → hashcat -m 18200 line. The offline-cracking primitive behind AS-REP roasting, in ~90 LOC and no runtime.
  • gss_wrap_unwrap — RFC 4121 message protection round-trip (offline, no KDC needed). Shows the post-handshake Wrap / Unwrap / GetMIC / VerifyMIC primitives you'd otherwise reach for through libgssapi.
cargo run --example gss_wrap_unwrap

Used by

  • ccache-io — MIT ccache v4 reader/writer. Its kerbcore cargo feature bridges Principal / KeyBlock to PrincipalName / EncryptionKey, so callers who already speak kerbcore fold ccache I/O in with no manual field-shuffling.
  • ms-pac-forge — MS-PAC forge / verify. Uses kerbcore as a differential oracle for the RC4-HMAC path (dev-dependency today; runtime dep after ms-pac-forge's typed-error refactor).
  • adhammer — AD security assessment CLI. Consumes kerbcore's crypto + codec + client for AS-REP roast, TGS-REP kerberoast, S4U2Self / S4U2Proxy (RBCD), Golden / Silver / Diamond forge, and PKINIT.

Encryption-type coverage

The modern Active Directory encryption-type matrix — not a single profile:

etype profile status
17 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 (RFC 3962) ✅
18 aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 (RFC 3962) ✅
19 aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 (RFC 8009) ✅ — RFC 8009 §7 KAT
20 aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 (RFC 8009) ✅ — RFC 8009 §7 KAT
23 rc4-hmac (RFC 4757) ✅ — differential-tested
1 / 3 des-cbc-* out of scope — no weak/legacy crypto shipped

RFC 8009 (etypes 19/20) is implemented from scratch — few Rust libraries do. On Windows these are added in Server 2025 / Windows 11 24H2 (disabled by default); MIT krb5, Heimdal, and Samba negotiate them today.

ASN.1 / RFC 4120 message codec

A hand-rolled DER (X.690) codec — no external ASN.1 crate — with a total, no-panic decoder: every malformed byte returns a DerError, never a crash.

  • der — canonical DER encoder + total decoder (KAT'd integer/length encodings).
  • types — PrincipalName, KerberosTime, EncryptionKey, EncryptedData, PaData, Checksum, Realm.
  • messages — Ticket [APP 1], KDC-REQ (AS-REQ / TGS-REQ), KDC-REP (AS-REP / TGS-REP), KRB-ERROR [APP 30].

Every message round-trips, application/context tags are verified, and Ticket, AS-REP, and KRB-ERROR encode byte-identically to picky-krb (kerbcore DER → strict decode → re-encode → same bytes). picky-krb is used only as a dev-dependency differential oracle.

Crypto primitives

The RFC 3961 / 3962 primitive set, key-length-generic across the AES-SHA1 profiles:

  • nfold — RFC 3961 §5.2 n-fold
  • aes_cts_encrypt / aes_cts_decrypt — RFC 3962 §5 AES CBC-CTS (CS3), AES-128 and AES-256
  • dr / dk — RFC 3961 §5.1 DR/DK derivation
  • hmac_sha1_96 — RFC 2104 HMAC-SHA1 truncated to 96 bits
  • derive_kc / derive_ke / derive_ki — RFC 3961 §5.3 subkey derivation
  • encrypt_message / decrypt_message — the generic encrypt-then-integrity primitive
  • string_to_key — RFC 3962 §4 (PBKDF2) and RFC 8009 §4 string-to-key

The RFC 8009 (SHA-2) and RC4-HMAC families live in the rfc8009 and rc4 modules.

Conformance

Known-answer tested, not just round-tripped:

  • nfold("012345", 64) == 0xbe072631276b1955 (RFC 3961 §5.2)
  • PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 vs RFC 6070; HMAC-SHA1/MD5 vs RFC 2202; NT-hash + RC4 vs canonical vectors
  • AES-SHA1 string-to-key vs RFC 3962; DR/DK determinism + AES random_to_key = identity
  • AES-128/256 CTS round-trips across the CTS edge lengths (16 / 17 / 31 / 32 / 47 / 48 / 64 B)
  • RFC 8009 §7 vectors — Kc/Ke/Ki derivation + all four sample encryptions, both etypes
  • RC4-HMAC — byte-exact differential vs an independent reference, across key-usages × lengths
  • encrypt-then-integrity round-trip + tamper / wrong-usage / truncation rejection
  • the DER/message decoders fuzz-clean (coverage-guided, billions of iterations, zero panics)

Bringing up the RFC 8009 §7 known-answer vectors surfaced and fixed a latent CBC-CS3 edge case (the last-two-block swap for exact-multiple inputs) that round-trip tests alone did not catch.

cargo test → 65 passing (crypto + DER/message codec + client), plus one env-gated live-KDC integration test that no-ops without credentials (so cargo test and CI stay offline; no credentials or host identifiers live in the source).

Dependencies

aes, hmac, sha1, sha2, md4, md-5 (RustCrypto) and getrandom; RC4 is hand-rolled. No FFI, no system krb5, #![forbid(unsafe_code)]. The differential oracles (picky-krb, picky-asn1-der, ms-pac-forge) are dev-dependencies only.

Scope

kerbcore is the protocol core — encryption-type crypto, the wire codec, and a plain AS/TGS client. It performs no network I/O (the caller owns the socket) and ships no ticket-forging or attack tooling; those belong in higher-level tools built on top.

License

MIT.