jmap_server/helpers.rs
1//! Shared helper utilities for JMAP method handlers.
2
3use std::borrow::Cow;
4use std::collections::BTreeSet;
5
6pub use jmap_types::json_type_name;
7use jmap_types::{Id, JmapError, SetObject, UTCDate};
8
9use crate::backend::{SetError, SetErrorType};
10use serde_json::{Map, Value};
11
12/// Serialize any [`serde::Serialize`] type to a [`serde_json::Value`],
13/// mapping serialization errors to [`JmapError::server_fail`].
14///
15/// Used by every `*-server` handler to project a typed domain object
16/// (e.g. `Email`, `Mailbox`, `Chat`) into the wire-format `list` /
17/// `created` payload.
18pub fn serialize_value<T: serde::Serialize>(val: T) -> Result<serde_json::Value, JmapError> {
19 serde_json::to_value(val).map_err(|e| JmapError::server_fail(e.to_string()))
20}
21
22/// Convert a slice of [`Id`]s to a JSON `notFound` value.
23///
24/// RFC 8620 §5.1 specifies `notFound` as `Id[]` — always an array, never
25/// `null`. Returns an empty array when all requested ids were found.
26///
27/// Equivalent to `serde_json::to_value(ids)` but threads through
28/// `Value::Array` directly so the call site is infallible (bd:JMAP-wlip.28).
29pub fn not_found_json(ids: &[Id]) -> Value {
30 Value::Array(
31 ids.iter()
32 .map(|id| Value::String(id.as_ref().to_owned()))
33 .collect(),
34 )
35}
36
37/// Extract an optional, deserializable argument from a method-arguments
38/// envelope (bd:JMAP-wlip.32).
39///
40/// Looks up `name` in `args`, removing it. The result is:
41///
42/// - `Ok(None)` if the key is absent OR is present with `Value::Null`
43/// (RFC 8620 §3.3 treats absent and explicit-null the same for
44/// optional fields).
45/// - `Ok(Some(value))` if the key is present and the value
46/// deserializes successfully into `T`.
47/// - `Err(invalid_arguments_with(name))` if the value is present but
48/// fails to deserialize. The error message is built by the caller-
49/// supplied `invalid_arguments_with` so the resulting `JmapError`
50/// carries a domain-specific description ("ids must be an Id
51/// array", "filter must be a Filter object", etc.).
52///
53/// Collapses six near-identical
54/// `match args.remove(...).unwrap_or(Value::Null) { Value::Null => None,
55/// v => Some(serde_json::from_value(v)...) }` blocks in `handlers.rs`
56/// into one-liners.
57///
58/// # Interaction with `ResultReference` resolution (bd:JMAP-jfia.15)
59///
60/// [`crate::parse::resolve_args`] replaces a `#key` with the value
61/// produced by walking the JSON Pointer path against a prior
62/// response. RFC 6901 §4 makes no distinction between "key absent"
63/// and "key present with `null`", so the resolved value CAN be
64/// `Value::Null`. This function then treats that resolved-null
65/// identically to "key was not sent". The behaviour is
66/// RFC-compliant — both are "optional argument not provided" — but
67/// the asymmetry between an explicit `null` argument and a
68/// `#key`-resolved `null` argument may surprise a handler author
69/// who expects "I asked for the value via a ResultReference, so it
70/// must have been there". If a handler needs to distinguish
71/// resolved-null from unsent, it has to read the raw `args` map
72/// before calling this helper.
73pub fn optional_arg<T>(
74 args: &mut Map<String, Value>,
75 name: &str,
76 invalid_arguments_with: impl FnOnce() -> JmapError,
77) -> Result<Option<T>, JmapError>
78where
79 T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
80{
81 match args.remove(name).unwrap_or(Value::Null) {
82 Value::Null => Ok(None),
83 v => Ok(Some(
84 serde_json::from_value(v).map_err(|_| invalid_arguments_with())?,
85 )),
86 }
87}
88
89/// Remove and decode the optional `filter` argument of a hand-written
90/// `/query` or `/queryChanges` handler (RFC 8620 §5.5).
91///
92/// Absent or `null` yields `None`. A value that is not a JSON object is
93/// not a filter at all and yields `invalidArguments`. An object that does
94/// not decode as `T` yields `unsupportedFilter` ("The "filter" is
95/// syntactically valid, but the server cannot process it") with the serde
96/// message as its description. With `deny_unknown_fields` on the filter
97/// types, that covers an unknown or misspelt condition property at any
98/// depth and an operator tree sent to an object whose filter is a bare
99/// condition.
100pub fn filter_arg<T>(args: &mut Map<String, Value>) -> Result<Option<T>, JmapError>
101where
102 T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
103{
104 match args.remove("filter").unwrap_or(Value::Null) {
105 Value::Null => Ok(None),
106 v @ Value::Object(_) => serde_json::from_value(v).map(Some).map_err(|e| {
107 let mut err = JmapError::unsupported_filter();
108 err.description = Some(format!("filter: {e}"));
109 err
110 }),
111 v => Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
112 "filter: expected an object, got {}",
113 json_type_name(&v)
114 ))),
115 }
116}
117
118/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope without
119/// removing it (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
120///
121/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
122/// the value is `Value::Null`. This is the canonical workspace helper for
123/// JMAP's "permissive parsing" convention on optional boolean controls
124/// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 — unknown / non-typed values coerce to the spec default).
125///
126/// Use [`take_bool_arg`] if the caller wants to consume the entry as part of
127/// a "walk the args map removing as we go" pattern.
128///
129/// Collapses ~50 near-identical
130/// `args.get(K).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)` blocks across
131/// the extension-server family into single-line calls.
132pub fn bool_arg(args: &Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
133 args.get(key).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)
134}
135
136/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope,
137/// removing it from the map (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
138///
139/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
140/// the value is `Value::Null`. Mirrors the semantics of [`bool_arg`] but
141/// consumes the entry from `args`. Matches the canonical mail-server
142/// "remove-as-we-go" parsing pattern.
143pub fn take_bool_arg(args: &mut Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
144 args.remove(key)
145 .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
146 .unwrap_or(default)
147}
148
149/// Extract `accountId` from a JMAP method arguments envelope and return both
150/// the extracted [`Id`] and the remaining argument map.
151///
152/// The caller passes the full `args: Value` from the method invocation by
153/// value; this function destructures it once, so handlers do not have to
154/// repeat the `let Value::Object(mut args) = args else { ... }` pattern after
155/// every call.
156///
157/// # Errors
158///
159/// Returns `invalidArguments` with:
160///
161/// - `"arguments must be an object containing accountId"` when `args` is
162/// not a JSON object.
163/// - `"accountId is required"` when the field is missing or not a string.
164/// - `"accountId is not a valid Id: <reason>"` when the field is a string
165/// but does not satisfy the RFC 8620 §1.2 Id grammar
166/// (`Id::new_validated`). Catches empty strings, strings longer than
167/// 255 bytes, and strings containing characters outside the SAFE-CHAR
168/// set (`%x21 / %x23-7E` — visible ASCII excluding `"`).
169/// bd:JMAP-wlip.5 closed the previous silent-pass-through behaviour
170/// where a malformed accountId reached the backend's `account_exists`
171/// call and surfaced as either `notFound` or a storage-layer parse
172/// error, depending on the backend.
173pub fn extract_account_id(args: Value) -> Result<(Id, Map<String, Value>), JmapError> {
174 let Value::Object(mut args) = args else {
175 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(
176 "arguments must be an object containing accountId",
177 ));
178 };
179 // Remove (not get) the accountId entry so the returned args map no
180 // longer carries it (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). This matches optional_arg's
181 // remove-and-consume semantics and prevents downstream handlers
182 // from re-parsing the validated id or seeing it as an unexpected
183 // residual key.
184 let raw = args
185 .remove("accountId")
186 .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
187 let s = raw
188 .as_str()
189 .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
190 let id = Id::new_validated(s)
191 .map_err(|e| JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!("accountId is not a valid Id: {e}")))?;
192 Ok((id, args))
193}
194
195/// Parse the optional `maxChanges` argument of `/changes` and
196/// `/queryChanges`. RFC 8620 §5.2: "If supplied by the client, the value
197/// MUST be a positive integer greater than 0. If a value outside of this
198/// range is given, the server MUST reject the call with an
199/// "invalidArguments" error." §5.6 gives no range of its own, so the same
200/// rule applies to `/queryChanges`.
201///
202/// Pass the raw argument as taken from the args map (`args.get(..)` or
203/// `args.remove(..).as_ref()`). Absent or `null` yields `Ok(None)`.
204///
205/// # Errors
206///
207/// Returns `invalidArguments` (`"maxChanges must be a positive integer"`)
208/// for `0`, negative numbers, non-integers, and non-number values.
209pub fn parse_max_changes(value: Option<&Value>) -> Result<Option<u64>, JmapError> {
210 match value {
211 None | Some(Value::Null) => Ok(None),
212 Some(v) => {
213 v.as_u64().filter(|&n| n > 0).map(Some).ok_or_else(|| {
214 JmapError::invalid_arguments("maxChanges must be a positive integer")
215 })
216 }
217 }
218}
219
220/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] (RFC 3339,
221/// millisecond precision, format `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ`, or
222/// `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ` when the milliseconds are zero because
223/// RFC 8620 §1.4 says the "time-secfrac" "MUST always be omitted if
224/// zero"). For years `0000..=9999` the value passes
225/// [`UTCDate::new_validated`].
226///
227/// Uses `std::time::SystemTime` so no external dependency is needed.
228///
229/// Returns a typed [`UTCDate`] rather than a `String` (bd:JMAP-wlip.20)
230/// so callers do not need to wrap the result in
231/// `UTCDate::from(now_utc_string().as_str())`. The function name is
232/// retained for back-compat across the workspace's many call sites.
233///
234/// Pre-epoch handling: `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)`
235/// fails on clocks drifted before the epoch. The function uses
236/// `Err::duration()` to recover the magnitude and negates the seconds
237/// before formatting; the result is a correct RFC 3339 timestamp
238/// anywhere from the BCE proleptic Gregorian range up to
239/// `1970-01-01T00:00:00Z`. The rem_euclid / div_euclid math at
240/// the format step handles arbitrarily-large negative offsets, not
241/// only sub-day drifts. Pre-epoch correctness is best-effort —
242/// `SystemTime` is non-monotonic and the JMAP spec does not require
243/// pre-epoch timestamps. (bd:JMAP-wlip.11 corrected the previous
244/// docstring's incorrect "1969-12-31T… through 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z"
245/// range claim.)
246///
247/// Clock-overflow handling: on a corrupted clock (system clock
248/// reporting a Duration whose `as_secs()` exceeds `i64::MAX`,
249/// `civil_from_days` reporting a year outside `i32`, or any other
250/// `SystemTime` failure mode), this function **panics**. The
251/// previous sentinel-string behaviour (`UTCDate::from("clock-out-of-range")`)
252/// was an idiom-grade defect (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): the sentinel was not a
253/// valid wire-format timestamp, had no in-band signal to distinguish
254/// it from a real value, and could silently propagate into JSON
255/// responses, audit logs, and database rows.
256///
257/// Callers that need to handle clock failure without panicking MUST
258/// use [`now_utc_string_checked`], which returns `Option<UTCDate>`.
259/// Long-running daemons, schedulers, and persistence layers SHOULD
260/// prefer the checked variant; one-shot tools and request handlers
261/// MAY accept the panic since clock corruption is unrecoverable and
262/// the dispatcher's `task::spawn` isolation already converts the
263/// panic into a `serverFail` invocation rather than crashing the
264/// process.
265///
266/// # Panics
267///
268/// Panics if `SystemTime::now()` cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
269/// timestamp — the same conditions under which
270/// [`now_utc_string_checked`] returns `None`.
271pub fn now_utc_string() -> UTCDate {
272 now_utc_string_checked().expect("system clock returned an out-of-range value (bd:JMAP-jfia.30)")
273}
274
275/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] in the same
276/// format as [`now_utc_string`], or `None` if the system clock cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
277/// timestamp.
278///
279/// Added in bd:JMAP-jfia.30 to replace the previous sentinel-string
280/// failure mode of [`now_utc_string`] with a typed `Option` shape.
281/// Callers that want to react to a clock fault (audit-log
282/// timestamps, last-seen markers, retention sweeps) SHOULD use this
283/// variant; callers for whom a panic at the first sign of clock
284/// corruption is acceptable MAY use [`now_utc_string`] directly.
285///
286/// Returns `None` when:
287/// - `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).as_secs()`
288/// exceeds `i64::MAX` (only reachable on a corrupted clock —
289/// approx ±292 billion years from epoch).
290/// - The negation of a pre-epoch duration overflows `i64`
291/// (unreachable on a `try_from`-validated input but checked
292/// defensively).
293/// - `civil_from_days` reports a year outside `i32`
294/// (bd:JMAP-jfia.2 — between the i32-year boundary and the
295/// i64::MAX-secs cap).
296///
297/// # Why `Option<UTCDate>` and not `Result<UTCDate, ClockError>` (bd:JMAP-jfia.38)
298///
299/// The three failure modes are all "corrupted clock" — each one is
300/// physically unreachable on a sane host (years 5.7M-to-292B,
301/// `try_from`-impossible negation, `i32`-overflowing year). A caller
302/// that wants to branch on which physical mechanism fired would be
303/// branching on states that don't happen. The shapes the workspace
304/// uses elsewhere for typed-variant-per-mode (`SetError`,
305/// `BackendChangesError`, `BackendSetError`, `MergePatchError`) all
306/// carry failure modes that DO occur in normal operation —
307/// `notFound`, `tooManyChanges`, `invalidPatch`, `depthExceeded`.
308/// The clock-corruption modes are different in kind. Erasing the
309/// discriminator here trades a hypothetical observability win for a
310/// cleaner contract: "the clock is unusable for RFC 3339, abandon
311/// timestamping." A future need for per-mode telemetry can be added
312/// non-breakingly as a parallel helper (e.g. `now_utc_string_diagnose
313/// -> Result<UTCDate, ClockError>`) without disturbing this shape.
314pub fn now_utc_string_checked() -> Option<UTCDate> {
315 use std::time::SystemTime;
316
317 let (secs, millis) = signed_seconds_since_epoch(SystemTime::now())?;
318 utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, millis)
319}
320
321/// Format `secs` seconds plus `millis` milliseconds since the Unix epoch
322/// in the [`now_utc_string`] format, or `None` if the year does not fit
323/// in `i32`.
324fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs: i64, millis: u32) -> Option<UTCDate> {
325 let time_of_day = secs.rem_euclid(86400);
326 let (h, m, s) = (
327 time_of_day / 3600,
328 time_of_day % 3600 / 60,
329 time_of_day % 60,
330 );
331 let (year, month, day) = civil_from_days(secs.div_euclid(86400))?;
332
333 // RFC 8620 §1.4: a zero time-secfrac MUST be omitted.
334 let frac = if millis == 0 {
335 String::new()
336 } else {
337 format!(".{millis:03}")
338 };
339 Some(UTCDate::from(format!(
340 "{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}{frac}Z"
341 )))
342}
343
344/// Convert a [`SystemTime`] into `(signed_seconds_since_epoch, millis)`,
345/// returning `None` when the system clock cannot be expressed as an
346/// `i64` second count.
347///
348/// Extracted from [`now_utc_string_checked`] in bd:JMAP-jfia.11 to
349/// flatten the previous three-level nested match
350/// (`duration_since` → `try_from` → `checked_neg`) into one
351/// linear function the reader can scan top-to-bottom. The
352/// `.checked_neg()` branch is unreachable on a `try_from`-validated
353/// input (its output is `[0, i64::MAX]` so negation cannot underflow)
354/// but is kept for defence in depth — the failure path stays total.
355pub(crate) fn signed_seconds_since_epoch(now: std::time::SystemTime) -> Option<(i64, u32)> {
356 use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
357 match now.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) {
358 Ok(d) => {
359 let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
360 Some((s, d.subsec_millis()))
361 }
362 Err(e) => {
363 // Pre-epoch clock: the instant is -d. Floor it to whole
364 // milliseconds (as truncation does post-epoch), then split
365 // it so `millis` counts forward from the floored second:
366 // -1.2 s is (-2, 800), not (-1, 200) (bd:JMAP-yt1w.46).
367 let d = e.duration();
368 let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
369 match d.subsec_nanos() {
370 0 => Some((s.checked_neg()?, 0)),
371 nanos => Some((
372 s.checked_add(1)?.checked_neg()?,
373 (1_000_000_000 - nanos) / 1_000_000,
374 )),
375 }
376 }
377 }
378}
379
380/// Format `secs` seconds since the Unix epoch as a seconds-precision
381/// [`UTCDate`] (`YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ`, RFC 8620 §1.4), or `None` if the
382/// year falls outside `0000..=9999`, which that four-digit form cannot
383/// express.
384///
385/// This is the inverse of [`UTCDate::to_epoch_seconds`], which truncates
386/// the milliseconds that [`now_utc_string`] may add.
387pub fn utc_date_from_epoch_seconds(secs: i64) -> Option<UTCDate> {
388 let time_of_day = secs.rem_euclid(86400);
389 let (h, m, s) = (
390 time_of_day / 3600,
391 time_of_day % 3600 / 60,
392 time_of_day % 60,
393 );
394 let (year, month, day) = civil_from_days(secs.div_euclid(86400))?;
395 if !(0..=9999).contains(&year) {
396 return None;
397 }
398 Some(UTCDate::from(format!(
399 "{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}Z"
400 )))
401}
402
403/// Convert a count of days since the Unix epoch (1970-01-01) to a proleptic
404/// Gregorian (year, month, day) triple, or `None` if the resulting year
405/// does not fit in `i32`.
406///
407/// Algorithm by Howard Hinnant (public domain):
408/// <https://howardhinnant.github.io/date_algorithms.html>
409///
410/// The year-narrowing cast is fallible because the algorithm's intermediate
411/// `y` value is bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a subset
412/// of which fits in `i32` (~±2.1e9 years). For a sane `SystemTime`-derived
413/// input we stay well inside `i32::MIN..=i32::MAX`, but the outer
414/// `now_utc_string` only rejects `u64` seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`
415/// (bd:JMAP-wlip.27 sentinel) — inputs between the i32-year boundary
416/// (~5.7e6 years from epoch) and that sentinel reach this function and
417/// previously panicked the dispatcher worker (bd:JMAP-jfia.2). Returning
418/// `None` lets the caller fall through to its own sentinel rather than
419/// taking down the task.
420///
421/// Month and day cannot fail: the algorithm's modular structure pins them
422/// to `[1, 12]` and `[1, 31]` respectively, narrow casts handled with
423/// `try_from(...).expect(...)` documenting the invariant.
424fn civil_from_days(z: i64) -> Option<(i32, u8, u8)> {
425 let z = z + 719_468;
426 let era: i64 = if z >= 0 { z } else { z - 146_096 } / 146_097;
427 let doe = z - era * 146_097; // [0, 146096]
428 let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146096) / 365; // [0, 399]
429 let y = yoe + era * 400;
430 let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100); // [0, 365]
431 let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153; // [0, 11]
432 let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1; // [1, 31]
433 let mo = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 }; // [1, 12]
434 let yr = if mo <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };
435 Some((
436 i32::try_from(yr).ok()?,
437 u8::try_from(mo).expect("month bounded by algorithm to [1, 12]"),
438 u8::try_from(d).expect("day bounded by algorithm to [1, 31]"),
439 ))
440}
441
442/// Maximum recursion depth for [`json_merge_patch`] application.
443///
444/// Beyond this depth [`json_merge_patch`] returns
445/// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] without applying any further levels.
446/// Mitigates stack DoS from adversarial `PatchObject` values
447/// (bd:JMAP-sc1b.97). 32 levels comfortably exceeds any legitimate JMAP
448/// `/set update` shape — the deepest standard JMAP `/set update` shape
449/// (Email with nested `bodyStructure`) tops out around 6 levels, so the
450/// cap fires only on adversarial input.
451///
452/// Crate-private (bd:JMAP-wlip.4): consumers see the cap-exceeded
453/// behaviour via [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`], not by reading the
454/// constant directly. The crate reserves the right to tighten the
455/// value (e.g. 32 → 16) without a major-version bump because the
456/// contract is "the function may return DepthExceeded", not "the cap
457/// is exactly N".
458pub(crate) const MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH: usize = 32;
459
460/// Error returned by [`json_merge_patch`] when a patch cannot be applied.
461///
462/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so future RFC 7396 failure modes (e.g. a
463/// size cap in addition to the depth cap) can be added without an API
464/// break.
465#[non_exhaustive]
466#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
467pub enum MergePatchError {
468 /// The patch nests deeper than the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
469 /// DoS-guard cap.
470 ///
471 /// Callers SHOULD map this to
472 /// [`SetError`](crate::SetError) with
473 /// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`](crate::SetErrorType::InvalidPatch)
474 /// and MUST discard any partially-mutated `target` rather than
475 /// persisting it — see the contract on [`json_merge_patch`].
476 ///
477 /// # Why no `reached` / `max` payload (bd:JMAP-jfia.39)
478 ///
479 /// The variant is intentionally unit-shaped. The cap value is
480 /// available in the `Display` impl (which interpolates
481 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`) for log-line and user-message use.
482 /// A typed payload `{ reached: usize, max: usize }` was
483 /// considered and rejected for now because (a) no current
484 /// consumer in the workspace destructures the reached depth or
485 /// the cap programmatically — all 6 call sites map to
486 /// `SetErrorType::InvalidPatch` with a generic description; and
487 /// (b) changing a unit variant to a struct variant is a breaking
488 /// pattern-match change even on a `#[non_exhaustive]` enum (the
489 /// existing `if let Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded)` pattern
490 /// would stop compiling). If a future consumer needs
491 /// programmatic access to the depth, the additive evolution is
492 /// to add a new variant alongside (e.g.
493 /// `DepthExceededDetail { reached: usize, max: usize }`) and
494 /// emit the new variant from `json_merge_patch`. The unit
495 /// variant would then become unreachable but remain valid
496 /// pattern syntax for any pinned-version consumer.
497 DepthExceeded,
498}
499
500impl std::fmt::Display for MergePatchError {
501 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
502 match self {
503 Self::DepthExceeded => write!(
504 f,
505 "merge patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels"
506 ),
507 }
508 }
509}
510
511impl std::error::Error for MergePatchError {}
512
513/// Apply a JSON Merge Patch (RFC 7396) to `target` in-place.
514///
515/// Used by every `*-server` backend's `update_object` implementation
516/// to merge a sparse `/set update` patch into the stored serialized
517/// object. Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-sc1b.103 — keep
518/// edits here so all five reference backends stay byte-identical.
519///
520/// # Errors
521///
522/// Returns [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] when the patch nests
523/// deeper than the crate's internal `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard
524/// cap (added in bd:JMAP-sc1b.97, made non-silent in bd:JMAP-wlip.1).
525/// The exact value is intentionally not exposed; consumers see the
526/// behaviour via the typed error rather than reading the constant.
527/// Below the cap the behaviour is exactly RFC 7396 and the call always
528/// returns `Ok(())`.
529///
530/// # Partial-mutation contract
531///
532/// On `Err(DepthExceeded)`, `target` may have been mutated up to the
533/// level where the cap fired — RFC 7396 merging is applied recursively
534/// in place and the function does not roll back on error. Callers MUST
535/// discard `target` rather than persist it. The standard pattern in
536/// every `*-server` `update_object` impl is to operate on a `.clone()`
537/// of the stored value and only `insert(...)` it back on `Ok(())`; that
538/// pattern is naturally safe because the stored value is left untouched
539/// on error.
540pub fn json_merge_patch(target: &mut Value, patch: Value) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
541 json_merge_patch_inner(target, patch, 0)
542}
543
544fn json_merge_patch_inner(
545 target: &mut Value,
546 patch: Value,
547 depth: usize,
548) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
549 if depth > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH {
550 return Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded);
551 }
552 match patch {
553 Value::Object(patch_map) => {
554 // Per RFC 7396 §2: "If the target value is not a JSON object,
555 // the resulting value will be the merge patch." We therefore
556 // reset a non-Object target to an empty Object before merging
557 // — this is reachable when a Patch creates a nested field that
558 // is absent from the target (the parent recursion frame inserted
559 // Value::Null as a placeholder).
560 if !target.is_object() {
561 *target = Value::Object(Map::new());
562 }
563 let target_map = target
564 .as_object_mut()
565 .expect("target was just set to Value::Object above");
566 for (key, patch_val) in patch_map {
567 if patch_val.is_null() {
568 target_map.remove(&key);
569 } else {
570 let entry = target_map.entry(key).or_insert(Value::Null);
571 json_merge_patch_inner(entry, patch_val, depth + 1)?;
572 }
573 }
574 }
575 other => *target = other,
576 }
577 Ok(())
578}
579
580/// Error returned by [`apply_jmap_patch`] and [`apply_patch_object`] when
581/// a PatchObject cannot be applied.
582///
583/// Every variant is an RFC 8620 §5.3 violation for which "the update
584/// MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error". Callers SHOULD map
585/// any variant to [`SetError`](crate::SetError) with
586/// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`](crate::SetErrorType::InvalidPatch);
587/// the `Display` form is suitable as its description.
588///
589/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so further §5.3 checks can be added
590/// without an API break.
591#[non_exhaustive]
592#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
593pub enum PatchPathError {
594 /// A part before the last does not exist on the patched object.
595 ParentMissing,
596 /// A part before the last names an array, so the pointer would
597 /// reference inside an array.
598 InsideArray,
599 /// A part before the last names a value that is neither an object nor
600 /// an array (string, number, boolean or null), which has no members.
601 ParentNotObject,
602 /// A `~` in the path is not followed by `0` or `1`, so the path is
603 /// not a valid RFC 6901 JSON Pointer.
604 InvalidEscape,
605 /// The pointer of one patch is a prefix of the pointer of another in
606 /// the same PatchObject (e.g. `"alerts/1/offset"` and `"alerts"`).
607 PrefixConflict,
608 /// The path's segment count plus the value's object/array nesting
609 /// exceeds the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap.
610 ///
611 /// Not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule: it is this crate's server limit
612 /// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests that exceed its
613 /// limits), so repeated path patches cannot grow a stored value's
614 /// depth without bound. It is still reported as invalidPatch.
615 DepthExceeded,
616}
617
618impl std::fmt::Display for PatchPathError {
619 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
620 match self {
621 Self::ParentMissing => f.write_str("patch path parent does not exist"),
622 Self::InsideArray => f.write_str("patch path references inside an array"),
623 Self::ParentNotObject => f.write_str("patch path parent is not an object"),
624 Self::InvalidEscape => f.write_str("patch path has a '~' not followed by '0' or '1'"),
625 Self::PrefixConflict => {
626 f.write_str("patch has a path that is a prefix of another path")
627 }
628 Self::DepthExceeded => {
629 write!(f, "patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels")
630 }
631 }
632 }
633}
634
635impl std::error::Error for PatchPathError {}
636
637/// Apply one RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject entry (`path` → `value`) to
638/// `target` in-place.
639///
640/// `path` is a PatchObject key: an RFC 6901 JSON Pointer with the
641/// implicit leading `/` omitted (e.g. `"mailboxIds/abc123"`). Each
642/// `/`-separated reference token is decoded per RFC 6901 §4 (`~1` → `/`,
643/// then `~0` → `~`). Every token before the last must name an existing
644/// object member; the last token names the member to set. A `null`
645/// `value` removes that member (a no-op when it is absent); any other
646/// value inserts or replaces it.
647///
648/// Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-j6ab. Extension servers
649/// MUST call this rather than reimplement it.
650///
651/// Empty tokens are legal: RFC 6901 §3 allows a zero-length
652/// `reference-token`, and its §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the member
653/// named `""`. The RFC 8620 §5.3 "null sets the property default" rule
654/// is type-specific and left to the caller. The rule that no two pointers
655/// in one PatchObject may be prefixes of each other is checked by
656/// [`apply_patch_object`].
657///
658/// # Errors
659///
660/// Returns [`PatchPathError`] when a part before the last does not exist
661/// ([`ParentMissing`](PatchPathError::ParentMissing)), is an array
662/// ([`InsideArray`](PatchPathError::InsideArray)) or is another
663/// non-object value ([`ParentNotObject`](PatchPathError::ParentNotObject)),
664/// when `path` contains an invalid escape
665/// ([`InvalidEscape`](PatchPathError::InvalidEscape)), or when the
666/// number of `/`-separated segments in `path` plus the object/array
667/// nesting of `value` (a scalar nests 0 levels) exceeds the crate's
668/// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap
669/// ([`DepthExceeded`](PatchPathError::DepthExceeded)).
670///
671/// # Mutation contract
672///
673/// A single call is all-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
674/// A PatchObject has several entries, and an error on a later entry
675/// does not undo earlier ones, so callers applying a whole PatchObject
676/// MUST use [`apply_patch_object`].
677pub fn apply_jmap_patch(
678 target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
679 path: &str,
680 value: Value,
681) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
682 let segments = path.split('/').count();
683 if segments > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH
684 || nests_deeper_than(&value, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - segments)
685 {
686 return Err(PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
687 }
688 let (parents, leaf) = match path.rsplit_once('/') {
689 Some((parents, leaf)) => (Some(parents), leaf),
690 None => (None, path),
691 };
692 let leaf = decode_pointer_token(leaf)?;
693 let mut parent = target;
694 for token in parents.into_iter().flat_map(|p| p.split('/')) {
695 parent = match parent.get_mut(decode_pointer_token(token)?.as_ref()) {
696 Some(Value::Object(map)) => map,
697 Some(Value::Array(_)) => return Err(PatchPathError::InsideArray),
698 Some(_) => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentNotObject),
699 None => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentMissing),
700 };
701 }
702 if value.is_null() {
703 parent.remove(leaf.as_ref());
704 } else {
705 parent.insert(leaf.into_owned(), value);
706 }
707 Ok(())
708}
709
710/// Check the RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject errors that `patch` alone
711/// determines, without the object it applies to.
712///
713/// A server whose spec orders these before other checks calls this
714/// first; draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-04 §3.2 says "Patch errors that can
715/// be determined from the request alone (for example, two paths where
716/// one is a prefix of the other) MUST be reported with "invalidPatch"
717/// before rule 1 is evaluated". [`apply_patch_object`] runs the same
718/// check, so calling both is redundant but harmless.
719///
720/// # Errors
721///
722/// Returns [`PatchPathError::InvalidEscape`] for a key with a `~` not
723/// followed by `0` or `1`, [`PatchPathError::DepthExceeded`] for an
724/// entry over the `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` cap, and
725/// [`PatchPathError::PrefixConflict`] when the decoded pointer of one key
726/// is a whole-segment prefix of another (`"alerts"` and
727/// `"alerts/1/offset"` conflict; `"alert"` and `"alerts/x"` do not).
728pub fn check_patch_paths(patch: &Map<String, Value>) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
729 let mut pointers = patch
730 .iter()
731 .map(|(k, v)| {
732 let segments = k
733 .split('/')
734 .map(decode_pointer_token)
735 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
736 if segments.len() > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH
737 || nests_deeper_than(v, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - segments.len())
738 {
739 return Err(PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
740 }
741 Ok(segments)
742 })
743 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
744 // Sorted, a pointer that prefixes any other also prefixes its successor.
745 pointers.sort_unstable();
746 if pointers.windows(2).any(|w| w[1].starts_with(&w[0])) {
747 return Err(PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
748 }
749 Ok(())
750}
751
752/// Apply a whole RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject to `target`.
753///
754/// Each entry is applied with [`apply_jmap_patch`]. The value at each
755/// pointer is set as given: a top-level key such as `"name"` replaces that
756/// property wholesale, with no nested merge of object values (RFC 8620
757/// §5.3: "The value to set for this property").
758///
759/// # Errors
760///
761/// Returns any error [`check_patch_paths`] returns for `patch`, and
762/// otherwise any error [`apply_jmap_patch`] returns for an entry.
763///
764/// # Mutation contract
765///
766/// All-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
767pub fn apply_patch_object(
768 target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
769 patch: &Map<String, Value>,
770) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
771 check_patch_paths(patch)?;
772 let mut patched = target.clone();
773 for (path, value) in patch {
774 apply_jmap_patch(&mut patched, path, value.clone())?;
775 }
776 *target = patched;
777 Ok(())
778}
779
780/// Whether `value` nests objects or arrays more than `limit` levels deep
781/// (a scalar nests 0 levels). Recursion is bounded by `limit`, not by the
782/// input.
783fn nests_deeper_than(value: &Value, limit: usize) -> bool {
784 match value {
785 Value::Object(map) => limit == 0 || map.values().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
786 Value::Array(items) => limit == 0 || items.iter().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
787 _ => false,
788 }
789}
790
791/// Decode one RFC 6901 reference token: `~1` → `/`, then `~0` → `~`
792/// (RFC 6901 §4 order, so `~01` becomes `~1`, not `/`).
793fn decode_pointer_token(token: &str) -> Result<Cow<'_, str>, PatchPathError> {
794 if !token.contains('~') {
795 return Ok(Cow::Borrowed(token));
796 }
797 let escapes_valid = token
798 .match_indices('~')
799 .all(|(i, _)| matches!(token.as_bytes().get(i + 1), Some(b'0' | b'1')));
800 if !escapes_valid {
801 return Err(PatchPathError::InvalidEscape);
802 }
803 Ok(Cow::Owned(token.replace("~1", "/").replace("~0", "~")))
804}
805
806/// Resolve a request-side `position` argument (RFC 8620 §5.5) into a
807/// 0-based start index suitable for slicing the full ordered result
808/// list (bd:JMAP-qz9v.48).
809///
810/// `position` is the signed offset from the `/query` request. The
811/// foundation handler at [`handle_query`](crate::handle_query) parses it
812/// via [`serde_json::Value::as_i64`], so the value reaching the
813/// backend is any `i64` (including `i64::MIN`). Non-negative values
814/// are absolute offsets from the start of the result list; negative
815/// values are end-relative offsets per RFC 8620 §5.5 ("`-1` represents
816/// the last entry, `-2` the second to last, and so on").
817///
818/// Returns a `usize` clamped to `[0, total]`. The clamp at the high
819/// end matches the slice-safety property: `all_ids[start..]` is
820/// guaranteed not to panic regardless of the input `position`.
821///
822/// # Edge cases this helper exists to centralize
823///
824/// 1. `position == 0` → `0`.
825/// 2. `position > total` → `total` (yields an empty page, matching
826/// the RFC's silent-clamp semantics — `/query` does not error on
827/// out-of-range positions).
828/// 3. `position == i64::MIN` → handled via [`i64::saturating_neg`],
829/// which returns `i64::MAX` rather than overflowing. The resulting
830/// `usize::MAX`-magnitude offset is then absorbed by
831/// [`usize::saturating_sub`].
832/// 4. `position` exceeding `usize::MAX` on a 32-bit target (`i64`
833/// values above `2^32 - 1`) → clamped to `total` rather than
834/// truncated. The previous workspace idiom (`position as usize`)
835/// silently wrapped the high bits on 32-bit, returning a small
836/// `start` index that did not match the caller's intent.
837///
838/// # Why this lives in the foundation
839///
840/// The pattern is identical across every extension server's `/query`
841/// backend impl. Centralizing it eliminates the per-crate
842/// `(position as usize)` / `(position.saturating_neg() as usize)`
843/// idiom that clippy::pedantic flags as `cast_possible_truncation` +
844/// `cast_sign_loss`, and prevents future siblings from re-introducing
845/// the strictly-worse `(-position) as usize` variant (which panics on
846/// `i64::MIN` in debug builds and wraps in release).
847///
848/// # Example
849///
850/// ```
851/// use jmap_server::resolve_query_offset;
852///
853/// // Absolute offset.
854/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
855/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(25, 100), 25);
856///
857/// // End-relative offset.
858/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
859/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
860///
861/// // Out-of-range clamps to total.
862/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1_000, 100), 100);
863/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1_000, 100), 0);
864///
865/// // i64::MIN does not overflow.
866/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
867/// ```
868#[must_use]
869pub fn resolve_query_offset(position: i64, total: usize) -> usize {
870 if position >= 0 {
871 // `i64 >= 0` → fits in `u64`. `usize::try_from` returns the
872 // value on 64-bit targets and `Err` on 32-bit targets only
873 // when the magnitude exceeds `usize::MAX`; saturating to
874 // `usize::MAX` is then clamped to `total` by `.min`.
875 usize::try_from(position).unwrap_or(usize::MAX).min(total)
876 } else {
877 // `saturating_neg` maps `i64::MIN` to `i64::MAX` instead of
878 // overflowing. Every other negative `i64` negates exactly.
879 let neg = usize::try_from(position.saturating_neg()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
880 total.saturating_sub(neg)
881 }
882}
883
884/// Convert an RFC 8620 `limit` / `maxChanges` argument (`UnsignedInt|null`)
885/// to a `usize` item count for [`Iterator::take`] (bd:JMAP-pgj7).
886///
887/// RFC 8620 §5.5: "The maximum number of results to return. If null, no
888/// limit presumed." `None` therefore maps to `usize::MAX`. A `Some(n)`
889/// larger than `usize::MAX` (only possible on 32-bit targets) saturates
890/// to `usize::MAX` instead of truncating, which is the same "take
891/// everything" outcome, since no in-memory list can exceed `usize::MAX`.
892///
893/// This replaces the per-crate `n as usize` idiom, which silently drops
894/// the high bits on 32-bit targets (a `limit` of `2^32` became `0`).
895///
896/// # Example
897///
898/// ```
899/// use jmap_server::limit_or_max;
900///
901/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(None), usize::MAX);
902/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(0)), 0);
903/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(25)), 25);
904/// ```
905#[must_use]
906pub fn limit_or_max(limit: Option<u64>) -> usize {
907 limit.map_or(usize::MAX, |n| usize::try_from(n).unwrap_or(usize::MAX))
908}
909
910/// Parse the RFC 8620 §5.5 `/query` arguments `anchor` (`Id|null`) and
911/// `anchorOffset` (`Int`, default `0`) from `args`.
912///
913/// # Errors
914///
915/// `invalidArguments` when `anchor` is neither a string nor `null`, is a
916/// string that is not an RFC 8620 §1.2 Id, or `anchorOffset` is neither an
917/// integer nor `null`.
918pub fn query_anchor_args(args: &Map<String, Value>) -> Result<(Option<Id>, i64), JmapError> {
919 let anchor = match args.get("anchor") {
920 None | Some(Value::Null) => None,
921 Some(Value::String(s)) => Some(
922 Id::new_validated(s.as_str())
923 .map_err(|e| JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!("anchor: {e}")))?,
924 ),
925 Some(v) => {
926 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
927 "anchor: expected an Id string or null, got {}",
928 json_type_name(v)
929 )));
930 }
931 };
932 let anchor_offset = match args.get("anchorOffset") {
933 None | Some(Value::Null) => 0,
934 Some(v) => v.as_i64().ok_or_else(|| {
935 JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
936 "anchorOffset: expected an integer, got {}",
937 json_type_name(v)
938 ))
939 })?,
940 };
941 Ok((anchor, anchor_offset))
942}
943
944/// Start index of a `/query` page within the filtered, sorted `ids`
945/// (RFC 8620 §5.5), for [`JmapBackend::query_objects`] implementations.
946///
947/// With an `anchor`, `position` is ignored and the start is the
948/// anchor's index plus `anchor_offset`, clamped to `0..=ids.len()`.
949/// Without one, `anchor_offset` is ignored and the start is
950/// [`resolve_query_offset`]`(position, ids.len())`.
951///
952/// # Errors
953///
954/// [`JmapError::anchor_not_found`] when `anchor` is not in `ids`.
955///
956/// [`JmapBackend::query_objects`]: crate::JmapBackend::query_objects
957pub fn resolve_query_start(
958 ids: &[Id],
959 position: i64,
960 anchor: Option<&Id>,
961 anchor_offset: i64,
962) -> Result<usize, JmapError> {
963 let Some(anchor) = anchor else {
964 return Ok(resolve_query_offset(position, ids.len()));
965 };
966 let index = ids
967 .iter()
968 .position(|id| id == anchor)
969 .ok_or_else(JmapError::anchor_not_found)?;
970 let start = i64::try_from(index)
971 .unwrap_or(i64::MAX)
972 .saturating_add(anchor_offset)
973 .max(0);
974 Ok(resolve_query_offset(start, ids.len()))
975}
976
977/// Enforce RFC 8620 §5.3 `maxObjectsInSet` cap at the top of a `/set`
978/// handler (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1).
979///
980/// Counts entries in the wire `create` (object), `update` (object), and
981/// `destroy` (array) arguments. Returns the method-level error
982/// [`JmapError::request_too_large`] (wire `type: "requestTooLarge"`,
983/// `description: "maxObjectsInSet"`) when the sum exceeds `max`. Per
984/// RFC 8620 §5.3 it is returned instead of the `Foo/set` response, so
985/// the dispatcher emits an `error` invocation and later method calls
986/// in the same request still run (bd:JMAP-yt1w.30).
987///
988/// Call at the top of every `handle_*_set` after the `account_exists`
989/// gate and before any per-entry processing. A request carrying
990/// megabytes of `/set` ops is rejected before the handler touches the
991/// storage layer:
992///
993/// ```ignore
994/// let (account_id, args) = extract_account_id(args)?;
995/// if !backend.account_exists(caller, &account_id).await
996/// .map_err(|e| server_fail_from_backend(&e))?
997/// {
998/// return Err(JmapError::account_not_found());
999/// }
1000/// jmap_server::helpers::enforce_max_objects_in_set(
1001/// &args,
1002/// backend.max_objects_in_set(caller, &account_id),
1003/// )?;
1004/// ```
1005///
1006/// # Why this lives in the foundation
1007///
1008/// `maxObjectsInSet` is a RFC 8620 §5.3 base-protocol cap, not an
1009/// extension concept. Every `jmap-*-server` extension's `handle_*_set`
1010/// needs the same check; the helper is the single source of truth so a
1011/// future revision (different error shape, additional counting rule,
1012/// alternate semantics for non-object `create` / `update`) lands in one
1013/// place instead of being propagated through 28 handler sites.
1014///
1015/// # Counting rules
1016///
1017/// - `create` is counted as `args["create"].as_object()?.len()` —
1018/// missing key, `null`, or non-object types count as 0.
1019/// - `update` is counted the same way (RFC 8620 §5.3 `update` is
1020/// `Id[PatchObject]`).
1021/// - `destroy` is counted as `args["destroy"].as_array()?.len()` —
1022/// missing key, `null`, or non-array types count as 0.
1023///
1024/// Wire-shape validation of the individual `create` / `update` /
1025/// `destroy` arguments belongs to the per-handler argument parsing,
1026/// not to this cap-enforcement helper. A non-object `create` survives
1027/// the cap check (counts as 0) and is rejected by the handler's
1028/// downstream `args.remove("create")` match arm. Conversely, a
1029/// well-formed but over-limit `create` is rejected here before the
1030/// handler runs.
1031///
1032/// # Errors
1033///
1034/// Returns `JmapError::request_too_large()` with description
1035/// `"maxObjectsInSet"` when the sum exceeds `max` (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1036pub fn enforce_max_objects_in_set(args: &Map<String, Value>, max: u64) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1037 let create_count = args
1038 .get("create")
1039 .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
1040 .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
1041 let update_count = args
1042 .get("update")
1043 .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
1044 .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
1045 let destroy_count = args
1046 .get("destroy")
1047 .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
1048 .map_or(0u64, |a| a.len() as u64);
1049 // u64 saturation: each count is bounded by serde_json's body parse
1050 // (Map::len / Vec::len are usize; on 64-bit targets usize == u64,
1051 // on 32-bit targets usize < u64). The sum cannot exceed
1052 // 3 * u32::MAX even on 32-bit hosts, well within u64 range.
1053 let count = create_count
1054 .saturating_add(update_count)
1055 .saturating_add(destroy_count);
1056 if count > max {
1057 let mut err = JmapError::request_too_large();
1058 err.description = Some("maxObjectsInSet".into());
1059 return Err(err);
1060 }
1061 Ok(())
1062}
1063
1064/// Enforce RFC 8620 §5.1 `maxObjectsInGet` at the top of a `/get`
1065/// handler (bd:JMAP-yt1w.31).
1066///
1067/// Counts the entries in the wire `ids` argument. Returns the
1068/// method-level error [`JmapError::request_too_large`] (wire
1069/// `type: "requestTooLarge"`, `description: "maxObjectsInGet"`) when the
1070/// count exceeds `max`. Per RFC 8620 §5.1 it is returned instead of the
1071/// `Foo/get` response.
1072///
1073/// Call after the `account_exists` gate and before parsing `ids`:
1074///
1075/// ```ignore
1076/// jmap_server::helpers::enforce_max_objects_in_get(
1077/// &args,
1078/// backend.max_objects_in_get(caller, &account_id),
1079/// )?;
1080/// ```
1081///
1082/// # Counting rules
1083///
1084/// `ids` is counted as `args["ids"].as_array()?.len()`. A missing key,
1085/// `null` (fetch all), or a non-array value counts as 0: RFC 8620 §5.1
1086/// bounds "the number of ids requested by the client", and a null `ids`
1087/// requests none. Bounding a fetch-all by the number of records is the
1088/// backend's job, since only it knows how many records exist. Wire-shape
1089/// validation of `ids` belongs to the handler's argument parsing.
1090///
1091/// # Errors
1092///
1093/// Returns `JmapError::request_too_large()` with description
1094/// `"maxObjectsInGet"` when the count exceeds `max` (RFC 8620 §5.1).
1095pub fn enforce_max_objects_in_get(args: &Map<String, Value>, max: u64) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1096 let count = args
1097 .get("ids")
1098 .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
1099 .map_or(0u64, |a| a.len() as u64);
1100 if count > max {
1101 let mut err = JmapError::request_too_large();
1102 err.description = Some("maxObjectsInGet".into());
1103 return Err(err);
1104 }
1105 Ok(())
1106}
1107
1108/// Reject a `/set` create object that carries a DID-bearing property, or
1109/// an update PatchObject that changes one (draft-atwood-jmap-did-00
1110/// §The `did` Property).
1111///
1112/// `entry` is one value from the `create` or `update` argument and
1113/// `did_properties` names the data type's DID-bearing properties, which the
1114/// consuming specification defines. `current` is `None` for a create and
1115/// the stored object for an update.
1116///
1117/// "Clients omit DID-bearing properties when creating objects, as
1118/// {{RFC8620}} Section 1.1 requires for server-set properties; an update
1119/// can include one only with its current value ({{RFC8620}} Section 5.3).
1120/// Servers MUST reject a create that includes a DID-bearing property, or an
1121/// update that changes one, with a SetError of type `invalidProperties`"
1122/// (draft-atwood-jmap-did-00 L247). So a create that names the property is
1123/// rejected whatever the value, even `null`. An update key equal to the
1124/// property name passes when its value equals the stored value, where an
1125/// absent stored property counts as `null`, the value's other type. A
1126/// PatchObject key is a path, and a key whose first segment is the property
1127/// name but has further segments always changes it, so it is rejected.
1128/// Keeping the value unchanged on the server side, including across a DID
1129/// migration, is the backend's job.
1130///
1131/// Returns `None` when `entry` is acceptable. Otherwise returns an
1132/// `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists every rejected
1133/// DID-bearing property, in `did_properties` order.
1134#[must_use]
1135pub fn reject_did_bearing_properties(
1136 entry: &Map<String, Value>,
1137 did_properties: &[&str],
1138 current: Option<&Map<String, Value>>,
1139) -> Option<SetError> {
1140 // ponytail: compares the raw first segment, without RFC 6901 `~0`/`~1`
1141 // decoding. That is exact for property names with no `~` or `/`, which
1142 // covers every DID-bearing name in the drafts.
1143 let rejected: Vec<&str> = did_properties
1144 .iter()
1145 .copied()
1146 .filter(|prop| {
1147 entry.iter().any(|(k, v)| {
1148 k.split('/').next() == Some(*prop)
1149 && !(k == prop
1150 && current
1151 .is_some_and(|stored| stored.get(*prop).unwrap_or(&Value::Null) == v))
1152 })
1153 })
1154 .collect();
1155 (!rejected.is_empty())
1156 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1157}
1158
1159/// Reject a `/set` create that carries a server-set property of `O`.
1160///
1161/// RFC 8620 §1.1: for a "server-set" property, "The client MUST NOT send
1162/// this property when creating a new object of this type."; RFC 8620 §5.3
1163/// makes such a record `invalidProperties`.
1164///
1165/// A `null` value asserts nothing and is treated as absent.
1166///
1167/// Returns `None` when `create` carries none of [`SetObject::SERVER_SET`]
1168/// with a non-null value. Otherwise returns an `invalidProperties`
1169/// [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists each one carried, in `SERVER_SET`
1170/// order.
1171#[must_use]
1172pub fn reject_server_set<O: SetObject>(create: &Map<String, Value>) -> Option<SetError> {
1173 let rejected: Vec<&str> = O::SERVER_SET
1174 .iter()
1175 .copied()
1176 .filter(|prop| create.get(*prop).is_some_and(|v| !v.is_null()))
1177 .collect();
1178 (!rejected.is_empty())
1179 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1180}
1181
1182/// Reject a `/set` update patch that names a server-set or immutable
1183/// property of `O`.
1184///
1185/// A patch key names a property when it equals the property name or starts
1186/// with `"<name>/"`, a JSON Pointer inside it (RFC 8620 §5.3). Changing a
1187/// [`SetObject::SERVER_SET`] property is `invalidProperties` (RFC 8620
1188/// §5.3), and a [`SetObject::IMMUTABLE`] value "MUST NOT change after the
1189/// object is created" (RFC 8620 §1.1).
1190///
1191/// `current` is the stored object, when the handler has it. RFC 8620 §5.3:
1192/// "Any server-set properties MAY be included in the patch if their value is
1193/// identical to the current server value", so a key that names the whole
1194/// property with its stored value passes. A key with further segments always
1195/// changes the property and is rejected.
1196///
1197/// Returns `None` when the patch names none. Otherwise returns an
1198/// `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists each property
1199/// named, `SERVER_SET` first, then `IMMUTABLE`, each in list order.
1200///
1201/// ponytail: compares the raw first segment, without RFC 6901 `~0`/`~1`
1202/// decoding, which is exact for property names with no `~` or `/`. With
1203/// `current` `None` an unchanged value is rejected too; a handler that can
1204/// fetch the stored object passes it.
1205#[must_use]
1206pub fn reject_read_only_patch<O: SetObject>(
1207 patch: &Map<String, Value>,
1208 current: Option<&Map<String, Value>>,
1209) -> Option<SetError> {
1210 let rejected: Vec<&str> = O::SERVER_SET
1211 .iter()
1212 .chain(O::IMMUTABLE)
1213 .copied()
1214 .filter(|prop| {
1215 patch.iter().any(|(k, v)| {
1216 k.split('/').next() == Some(*prop)
1217 && !(k == prop
1218 && current
1219 .is_some_and(|stored| stored.get(*prop).unwrap_or(&Value::Null) == v))
1220 })
1221 })
1222 .collect();
1223 (!rejected.is_empty())
1224 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1225}
1226
1227/// Whether a client may change `prop` of `O` in a `/set` update: it is in
1228/// [`SetObject::CLIENT_SETTABLE`] and not in [`SetObject::IMMUTABLE`].
1229///
1230/// For a handler whose spec lists the update keys it supports, so that any
1231/// other property is rejected rather than checked against the read-only
1232/// lists.
1233#[must_use]
1234pub fn is_client_updatable<O: SetObject>(prop: &str) -> bool {
1235 O::CLIENT_SETTABLE.contains(&prop) && !O::IMMUTABLE.contains(&prop)
1236}
1237
1238/// Resolve an Id-typed value that may be a creation-id reference
1239/// (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1240///
1241/// A value starting with `#` names a record created earlier in the same
1242/// request; it resolves to that record's server-assigned id from
1243/// `created_ids` (pass [`crate::CallContext::created_ids`]). Any other
1244/// value is a literal id and is returned as is. `None` means a `#`
1245/// reference with no matching creation; the caller rejects the
1246/// create/update, typically with an `invalidProperties` SetError naming
1247/// the property.
1248///
1249/// References to creates in the *same* `/set` call are not in
1250/// `created_ids` yet; the handler orders and resolves those itself
1251/// (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1252pub fn resolve_creation_ref(
1253 raw: &str,
1254 created_ids: &std::collections::BTreeMap<Id, Id>,
1255) -> Option<Id> {
1256 match raw.strip_prefix('#') {
1257 Some(creation_id) => created_ids.get(&Id::from(creation_id)).cloned(),
1258 None => Some(Id::from(raw)),
1259 }
1260}
1261
1262/// The `id` a `/set` create handler fills in before parsing the create
1263/// object into its typed struct, whose `id` is required.
1264///
1265/// The builder passed to the backend overwrites it with the minted id, so
1266/// it never reaches storage or the wire. It must still satisfy RFC 8620
1267/// §1.2 (at least 1 octet, URL-safe base64 alphabet) because deserializing
1268/// an [`Id`] validates it.
1269pub const CREATE_ID_PLACEHOLDER: &str = "pending";
1270
1271/// Parse a client-supplied id: a `/set` `update` key, a `destroy` element
1272/// or an Id-typed property value.
1273///
1274/// RFC 8620 §1.2: an Id "MUST be at least 1 and a maximum of 255 octets in
1275/// size, and it MUST only contain characters from the 'URL and Filename
1276/// Safe' base64 alphabet". [`Id::from`] does not check this, so every
1277/// handler routes wire ids through here instead.
1278///
1279/// # Errors
1280///
1281/// A boxed `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] naming `property` (`"id"` for an
1282/// `update` key or `destroy` element) whose description says why the
1283/// value is not an Id. The caller records it in `notCreated`,
1284/// `notUpdated` or `notDestroyed` for that entry.
1285pub fn parse_wire_id(raw: &str, property: &str) -> Result<Id, Box<SetError>> {
1286 Id::new_validated(raw).map_err(|e| {
1287 Box::new(
1288 SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties)
1289 .with_properties([property])
1290 .with_description(e.to_string()),
1291 )
1292 })
1293}
1294
1295/// `true` if `using` includes `urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata`
1296/// (draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-04 §3: the extensions "apply to requests
1297/// whose using includes urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata").
1298pub fn uses_metadata(using: &[String]) -> bool {
1299 using
1300 .iter()
1301 .any(|u| u == jmap_metadata_types::JMAP_METADATA_URI)
1302}
1303
1304/// draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-04 §3: the §3.6 filter conditions extend
1305/// `Foo/query` only for "requests whose using includes
1306/// urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata". Without it a metadata leaf anywhere in
1307/// `filter`, as `is_metadata` judges a condition, is `unsupportedFilter`
1308/// (RFC 8620 §5.5: "The filter is syntactically valid, but the server
1309/// cannot process it"). `Foo/query` and `Foo/queryChanges` handlers call
1310/// it once the filter is decoded.
1311///
1312/// # Errors
1313///
1314/// `unsupportedFilter` as above.
1315pub fn reject_metadata_filter_without_capability<T>(
1316 filter: Option<&jmap_types::Filter<T>>,
1317 is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool,
1318 using: &[String],
1319) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1320 fn any_leaf<T>(f: &jmap_types::Filter<T>, is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool) -> bool {
1321 match f {
1322 jmap_types::Filter::Condition(c) => is_metadata(c),
1323 jmap_types::Filter::Operator(op) => {
1324 op.conditions.iter().any(|f| any_leaf(f, is_metadata))
1325 }
1326 _ => false,
1327 }
1328 }
1329 if uses_metadata(using) || !filter.is_some_and(|f| any_leaf(f, is_metadata)) {
1330 return Ok(());
1331 }
1332 let mut err = JmapError::unsupported_filter();
1333 err.description = Some(
1334 "metadata filter conditions require urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata in using".to_owned(),
1335 );
1336 Err(err)
1337}
1338
1339/// [`reject_metadata_filter_without_capability`] on the undecoded
1340/// `filter` argument of a `Foo/query` or `Foo/queryChanges` request, for
1341/// handlers that pass `args` on to [`handle_query`](crate::handle_query)
1342/// or [`handle_query_changes`](crate::handle_query_changes) and so never
1343/// hold the decoded filter. A `filter` that does not decode is left for
1344/// that handler to report.
1345///
1346/// # Errors
1347///
1348/// `unsupportedFilter` for a -04 §3.6 condition without
1349/// `urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata` in `using` (-04 §3).
1350pub fn reject_metadata_filter_arg<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
1351 args: &Value,
1352 is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool,
1353 using: &[String],
1354) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1355 if uses_metadata(using) {
1356 return Ok(());
1357 }
1358 let Some(raw) = args.get("filter").filter(|v| !v.is_null()) else {
1359 return Ok(());
1360 };
1361 match serde_json::from_value::<jmap_types::Filter<T>>(raw.clone()) {
1362 Ok(filter) => reject_metadata_filter_without_capability(Some(&filter), is_metadata, using),
1363 Err(_) => Ok(()),
1364 }
1365}
1366
1367/// Which part of one metadata property a `Foo/get` returns.
1368#[derive(Debug, Default)]
1369enum Selection {
1370 /// Not returned.
1371 #[default]
1372 Omit,
1373 /// The whole stored object.
1374 All,
1375 /// Only these namespaces (-04 §3.1 subselectors, combined by union).
1376 Namespaces(BTreeSet<String>),
1377}
1378
1379impl Selection {
1380 fn add_namespace(&mut self, ns: &str) {
1381 match self {
1382 Self::All => {}
1383 Self::Omit => *self = Self::Namespaces(BTreeSet::from([ns.to_owned()])),
1384 Self::Namespaces(set) => {
1385 set.insert(ns.to_owned());
1386 }
1387 }
1388 }
1389
1390 /// The value to return for a property stored as `stored`; absent and
1391 /// `null` are `{}` (-04 §2: "When returned, its value MUST be an
1392 /// object ({} when no metadata is set), never null").
1393 fn select(&self, stored: Option<&Value>) -> Option<Value> {
1394 let stored = stored.and_then(Value::as_object);
1395 match self {
1396 Self::Omit => None,
1397 Self::All => Some(Value::Object(stored.cloned().unwrap_or_default())),
1398 Self::Namespaces(set) => Some(Value::Object(
1399 stored
1400 .into_iter()
1401 .flatten()
1402 .filter(|(k, _)| set.contains(k.as_str()))
1403 .map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), v.clone()))
1404 .collect(),
1405 )),
1406 }
1407 }
1408}
1409
1410/// How a `Foo/get` handler returns `metadata` and `privateMetadata`
1411/// (draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-04 §2 and §3.1).
1412///
1413/// Build one per request with [`MetadataProjection::new`], then call
1414/// [`MetadataProjection::apply`] on every returned object.
1415#[derive(Debug, Default)]
1416pub struct MetadataProjection {
1417 metadata: Selection,
1418 private_metadata: Selection,
1419}
1420
1421impl MetadataProjection {
1422 /// Build the projection for one `Foo/get` request.
1423 ///
1424 /// `properties` is the request's `properties` (`None` for the default
1425 /// list), `default_includes` is `false` for `Email/get`, whose
1426 /// "default property list ... is unchanged" (-04 §3.1), and `true` for
1427 /// every other type; `info` is the type's DataTypeMetadataInfo
1428 /// ([`JmapBackend::metadata_info`](crate::JmapBackend::metadata_info)),
1429 /// `None` when the type is not listed and so "does not gain the
1430 /// metadata or privateMetadata properties" (-04 §1.2.1). The rules:
1431 ///
1432 /// - Default list: both properties with the capability in `using`
1433 /// ("the server MUST include metadata and, where supportsPrivate is
1434 /// true, privateMetadata"), neither without it ("not default
1435 /// properties of Foo/get") (-04 §3, §3.1).
1436 /// - A root name returns the whole property, with or without the
1437 /// capability ("still returned when requested by name").
1438 /// - With the capability, `metadata/<namespace>` and
1439 /// `privateMetadata/<namespace>` return only the stored namespaces
1440 /// named; several combine by union and a root entry supersedes them.
1441 /// A namespace with no stored data is left out, which covers "A
1442 /// subselector naming a namespace that is not supported ... MUST be
1443 /// silently omitted ... unless the object has data stored under that
1444 /// namespace". Without the capability these entries are ignored like
1445 /// any other unknown property.
1446 /// - `privateMetadata` is never returned when `supportsPrivate` is
1447 /// false (-04 §2: "this property MUST NOT be returned").
1448 ///
1449 /// # Errors
1450 ///
1451 /// `invalidArguments` for an entry that begins with `metadata/` or
1452 /// `privateMetadata/` and is not followed by a namespace identifier
1453 /// (-04 §3.1: "Any other properties entry beginning with metadata/ or
1454 /// privateMetadata/ MUST be rejected with an "invalidArguments"
1455 /// method-level error").
1456 pub fn new(
1457 properties: Option<&[String]>,
1458 default_includes: bool,
1459 using: &[String],
1460 info: Option<&jmap_metadata_types::DataTypeMetadataInfo>,
1461 ) -> Result<Self, JmapError> {
1462 let Some(info) = info else {
1463 return Ok(Self::default());
1464 };
1465 let uses = uses_metadata(using);
1466 let mut projection = Self::default();
1467 match properties {
1468 None if uses && default_includes => {
1469 projection.metadata = Selection::All;
1470 projection.private_metadata = Selection::All;
1471 }
1472 None => {}
1473 Some(props) => {
1474 for p in props {
1475 let (root, ns) = p
1476 .split_once('/')
1477 .map_or((p.as_str(), None), |(r, n)| (r, Some(n)));
1478 let sel = match root {
1479 "metadata" => &mut projection.metadata,
1480 "privateMetadata" => &mut projection.private_metadata,
1481 _ => continue,
1482 };
1483 match ns {
1484 None => *sel = Selection::All,
1485 Some(_) if !uses => {}
1486 // A subselector names one namespace: nothing below
1487 // it ("metadata/<namespace>/<key>" is an error).
1488 // is_valid_namespace alone accepts '/' in a domain
1489 // label.
1490 Some(ns)
1491 if !ns.contains('/') && jmap_metadata_types::is_valid_namespace(ns) =>
1492 {
1493 sel.add_namespace(ns);
1494 }
1495 Some(_) => {
1496 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
1497 "properties: {p:?} is not a metadata subselector"
1498 )));
1499 }
1500 }
1501 }
1502 }
1503 }
1504 if !info.supports_private {
1505 projection.private_metadata = Selection::Omit;
1506 }
1507 Ok(projection)
1508 }
1509
1510 /// Set or remove `metadata` and `privateMetadata` on the response
1511 /// object `target` from the stored object `source`.
1512 pub fn apply(&self, source: &Value, target: &mut Value) {
1513 let Value::Object(target) = target else {
1514 return;
1515 };
1516 for (root, sel) in [
1517 ("metadata", &self.metadata),
1518 ("privateMetadata", &self.private_metadata),
1519 ] {
1520 match sel.select(source.get(root)) {
1521 Some(v) => {
1522 target.insert(root.to_owned(), v);
1523 }
1524 None => {
1525 target.remove(root);
1526 }
1527 }
1528 }
1529 }
1530}
1531
1532#[cfg(test)]
1533mod tests {
1534 use super::{
1535 MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH, MergePatchError, PatchPathError, apply_jmap_patch,
1536 apply_patch_object, civil_from_days, enforce_max_objects_in_set, extract_account_id,
1537 filter_arg, is_client_updatable, json_merge_patch, json_type_name, limit_or_max,
1538 now_utc_string, parse_max_changes, parse_wire_id, query_anchor_args,
1539 reject_did_bearing_properties, reject_read_only_patch, reject_server_set,
1540 resolve_creation_ref, resolve_query_offset, resolve_query_start,
1541 signed_seconds_since_epoch, utc_date_from_epoch_millis, utc_date_from_epoch_seconds,
1542 };
1543 use jmap_types::{Id, PushSubscription, UTCDate};
1544 use serde_json::json;
1545
1546 fn props(e: Option<crate::backend::SetError>) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
1547 e.map(|e| {
1548 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(e).unwrap()["properties"].clone()).unwrap()
1549 })
1550 }
1551
1552 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2, `id` is "(immutable; server-set)" and the
1553 /// other properties are client-sent. RFC 8620 §1.1: "The client MUST
1554 /// NOT send this property when creating". A null `id` is treated as
1555 /// absent.
1556 #[test]
1557 fn reject_server_set_names_server_set_create_properties() {
1558 let ok = json!({"id": null, "deviceClientId": "d", "url": "https://x.example/"});
1559 assert_eq!(
1560 props(reject_server_set::<PushSubscription>(
1561 ok.as_object().unwrap()
1562 )),
1563 None
1564 );
1565 let bad = json!({"id": "p1", "deviceClientId": "d"});
1566 assert_eq!(
1567 props(reject_server_set::<PushSubscription>(
1568 bad.as_object().unwrap()
1569 )),
1570 Some(vec!["id".to_owned()])
1571 );
1572 }
1573
1574 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2, `id` is server-set, `deviceClientId`, `url`
1575 /// and `keys` are "(immutable)", `expires` and `types` carry no
1576 /// attribute. `keys/auth` points inside `keys`; `urlX` is another name.
1577 #[test]
1578 fn reject_read_only_patch_names_server_set_and_immutable_keys() {
1579 let ok = json!({"expires": null, "types": ["Email"], "urlX": 1});
1580 assert_eq!(
1581 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1582 ok.as_object().unwrap(),
1583 None
1584 )),
1585 None
1586 );
1587 let bad = json!({"keys/auth": "a", "id": "p2", "url": "https://y.example/"});
1588 assert_eq!(
1589 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1590 bad.as_object().unwrap(),
1591 None
1592 )),
1593 Some(vec!["id".to_owned(), "url".to_owned(), "keys".to_owned()])
1594 );
1595 }
1596
1597 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2: `id` is "(immutable; server-set)",
1598 /// `deviceClientId` is "(immutable)", `expires` carries no attribute;
1599 /// `nope` is not a PushSubscription property.
1600 #[test]
1601 fn is_client_updatable_excludes_server_set_immutable_and_unknown() {
1602 assert!(is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("expires"));
1603 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("id"));
1604 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("deviceClientId"));
1605 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("nope"));
1606 }
1607
1608 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3, "Any server-set properties MAY be included in
1609 /// the patch if their value is identical to the current server value
1610 /// ... Otherwise, the update MUST be rejected with an
1611 /// "invalidProperties" SetError." `keys/auth` points inside `keys`, so
1612 /// it changes it even when the leaf value matches.
1613 #[test]
1614 fn reject_read_only_patch_allows_unchanged_whole_values() {
1615 let stored = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://x.example/", "keys": {"auth": "a"}});
1616 let stored = stored.as_object().unwrap();
1617 let same = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://x.example/"});
1618 assert_eq!(
1619 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1620 same.as_object().unwrap(),
1621 Some(stored)
1622 )),
1623 None
1624 );
1625 let changed = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://y.example/", "keys/auth": "a"});
1626 assert_eq!(
1627 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1628 changed.as_object().unwrap(),
1629 Some(stored)
1630 )),
1631 Some(vec!["url".to_owned(), "keys".to_owned()])
1632 );
1633 }
1634
1635 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "the client refers to the new record
1636 /// using its creation id prefixed with a '#'"; the RFC 8620 §5.3
1637 /// example request sets `"subTodoIds": [ "#k15" ]` after creating
1638 /// `k15`. A bare value is an ordinary id.
1639 #[test]
1640 fn resolve_creation_ref_maps_hash_refs_and_passes_literals() {
1641 let created = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("k15"), Id::from("T15"))]);
1642 assert_eq!(
1643 resolve_creation_ref("#k15", &created),
1644 Some(Id::from("T15"))
1645 );
1646 assert_eq!(resolve_creation_ref("k15", &created), Some(Id::from("k15")));
1647 assert_eq!(resolve_creation_ref("#k16", &created), None);
1648 }
1649
1650 /// RFC 8620 §1.2: 1 to 255 octets from `A-Za-z0-9`, `-` and `_`.
1651 #[test]
1652 fn parse_wire_id_enforces_rfc8620_id_syntax() {
1653 assert_eq!(parse_wire_id("aZ09-_", "id"), Ok(Id::from("aZ09-_")));
1654 assert!(parse_wire_id(&"a".repeat(255), "id").is_ok());
1655 for bad in [
1656 "",
1657 "has space",
1658 "line\nbreak",
1659 "#c1",
1660 "a=",
1661 &"a".repeat(256),
1662 ] {
1663 let err = parse_wire_id(bad, "mailboxId").unwrap_err();
1664 assert_eq!(
1665 serde_json::to_value(&err).unwrap()["type"],
1666 "invalidProperties",
1667 "{bad:?}"
1668 );
1669 assert_eq!(
1670 err.properties.as_deref(),
1671 Some(&["mailboxId".to_owned()][..])
1672 );
1673 }
1674 }
1675
1676 #[test]
1677 fn query_anchor_args_rejects_non_id_anchor() {
1678 let args = serde_json::json!({ "anchor": "not an id" });
1679 let err = query_anchor_args(args.as_object().unwrap()).unwrap_err();
1680 assert_eq!(
1681 err.error_type,
1682 jmap_types::MethodErrorType::InvalidArguments
1683 );
1684 let args = serde_json::json!({ "anchor": "m1", "anchorOffset": -1 });
1685 assert_eq!(
1686 query_anchor_args(args.as_object().unwrap()).unwrap(),
1687 (Some(Id::from("m1")), -1)
1688 );
1689 }
1690
1691 #[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
1692 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase", deny_unknown_fields)]
1693 struct NameCond {
1694 name: Option<String>,
1695 }
1696
1697 // draft-atwood-jmap-did-00 L247 (jmap-chat-spec 6bcd9d8): "Clients omit
1698 // DID-bearing properties when creating objects, as {{RFC8620}} Section
1699 // 1.1 requires for server-set properties; an update can include one only
1700 // with its current value ({{RFC8620}} Section 5.3). Servers MUST reject a
1701 // create that includes a DID-bearing property, or an update that changes
1702 // one, with a SetError of type `invalidProperties`, listing the
1703 // DID-bearing property name in the `properties` array."
1704 fn did_entry(v: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
1705 v.as_object().cloned().expect("object")
1706 }
1707
1708 fn invalid_did() -> serde_json::Value {
1709 json!({ "type": "invalidProperties", "properties": ["did"] })
1710 }
1711
1712 #[test]
1713 fn did_create_with_did_property_is_invalid_properties() {
1714 let entry = did_entry(json!({
1715 "name": "x",
1716 "did": "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK"
1717 }));
1718 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None).expect("L247: MUST reject");
1719 assert_eq!(
1720 serde_json::to_value(&err).expect("serialize"),
1721 invalid_did()
1722 );
1723 }
1724
1725 #[test]
1726 fn did_create_with_null_did_is_still_rejected() {
1727 // L247: "a create that includes a DID-bearing property"; null is included.
1728 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
1729 assert!(reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None).is_some());
1730 }
1731
1732 #[test]
1733 fn did_lists_every_did_bearing_property_named() {
1734 // L247 rejects each included DID-bearing property. The two names
1735 // here are arbitrary DID-bearing names the caller declares; the
1736 // `properties` array follows `did_properties` order, not key order.
1737 let entry = did_entry(json!({
1738 "ownerDid": "did:web:example.com",
1739 "did": "did:web:example.org"
1740 }));
1741 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did", "ownerDid"], None)
1742 .expect("L247: MUST reject");
1743 assert_eq!(
1744 err.properties,
1745 Some(vec!["did".to_owned(), "ownerDid".to_owned()])
1746 );
1747 }
1748
1749 #[test]
1750 fn did_update_with_current_value_passes() {
1751 // L247: "an update can include one only with its current value".
1752 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
1753 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "name": "y", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
1754 assert_eq!(
1755 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored)),
1756 None
1757 );
1758
1759 let stored_null = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": null }));
1760 let entry_null = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
1761 assert_eq!(
1762 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry_null, &["did"], Some(&stored_null)),
1763 None
1764 );
1765 }
1766
1767 #[test]
1768 fn did_update_with_null_over_absent_did_passes() {
1769 // L247: "an update can include one only with its current value".
1770 // RFC 8620 §5.3: "null ... to remove it (or reset it to its
1771 // default value)", so an absent property's current value is null.
1772 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a" }));
1773 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
1774 assert_eq!(
1775 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored)),
1776 None
1777 );
1778 }
1779
1780 #[test]
1781 fn did_update_that_changes_did_is_rejected() {
1782 // L247: "Servers MUST reject ... an update that changes one". A
1783 // different value, null over a stored DID, and a path under the
1784 // property ("did/x", RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject path) all change it.
1785 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
1786 for entry in [
1787 did_entry(json!({ "did": "did:web:example.org" })),
1788 did_entry(json!({ "did": null })),
1789 did_entry(json!({ "did/x": 1 })),
1790 ] {
1791 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored))
1792 .expect("L247: update that changes one");
1793 assert_eq!(
1794 serde_json::to_value(&err).expect("serialize"),
1795 invalid_did()
1796 );
1797 }
1798 }
1799
1800 #[test]
1801 fn did_entry_without_did_bearing_property_passes() {
1802 // A property whose name merely starts with "did" is not "did".
1803 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "name": "x", "didx": 1, "keywords/did": true }));
1804 assert_eq!(reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None), None);
1805 }
1806
1807 fn filter_of(v: serde_json::Value) -> Result<Option<NameCond>, jmap_types::JmapError> {
1808 let mut args = json!({ "filter": v }).as_object().cloned().expect("object");
1809 filter_arg::<NameCond>(&mut args)
1810 }
1811
1812 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 — "unsupportedFilter: The "filter" is
1813 /// syntactically valid, but the server cannot process it"; RFC 8620
1814 /// §3.6.2 — invalidArguments for an argument of the wrong type.
1815 /// Hand-written JSON inputs.
1816 #[test]
1817 fn filter_arg_maps_object_and_non_object_failures() {
1818 assert!(filter_of(json!(null)).expect("null").is_none());
1819 let cond = filter_of(json!({ "name": "x" })).expect("known key");
1820 assert_eq!(cond.and_then(|c| c.name).as_deref(), Some("x"));
1821 let err = filter_of(json!({ "label": "x" })).expect_err("unknown key");
1822 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "unsupportedFilter");
1823 assert!(
1824 err.description
1825 .as_deref()
1826 .is_some_and(|d| d.contains("label")),
1827 "{err:?}"
1828 );
1829 let err = filter_of(json!(42)).expect_err("scalar");
1830 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
1831 }
1832
1833 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a malformed accountId — empty string,
1834 /// containing forbidden ASCII characters, or exceeding 255 bytes —
1835 /// MUST surface as `invalidArguments`, not silently pass through to
1836 /// the backend's `account_exists` call.
1837 ///
1838 /// Test vectors hand-built from RFC 8620 §1.2's Id grammar
1839 /// (SAFE-CHAR = `%x21 / %x23-7E`).
1840 #[test]
1841 fn extract_account_id_rejects_malformed_id() {
1842 // Empty string.
1843 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "" }))
1844 .expect_err("empty accountId must fail validation");
1845 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
1846
1847 // Contains a space (0x20 — outside SAFE-CHAR's 0x21+ lower bound).
1848 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "my account" }))
1849 .expect_err("space in accountId must fail validation");
1850 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
1851
1852 // Contains a DQUOTE (0x22 — explicitly excluded by SAFE-CHAR).
1853 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "a\"b" }))
1854 .expect_err("DQUOTE in accountId must fail validation");
1855 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
1856
1857 // 256 bytes — exceeds the 255 cap.
1858 let long: String = "a".repeat(256);
1859 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": long }))
1860 .expect_err("over-long accountId must fail validation");
1861 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
1862 }
1863
1864 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a well-formed accountId passes
1865 /// validation and is returned intact. Positive control paired with
1866 /// the rejection test above.
1867 ///
1868 /// Also pins (bd:JMAP-jfia.9): the returned args map MUST NOT
1869 /// contain accountId. The helper consumes the field rather than
1870 /// leaving it as a residual key for downstream handlers to
1871 /// re-parse or surface as "unexpected key".
1872 #[test]
1873 fn extract_account_id_accepts_well_formed_id() {
1874 let (id, rest) = extract_account_id(json!({
1875 "accountId": "u123-abc_DEF",
1876 "ids": ["e1", "e2"]
1877 }))
1878 .expect("well-formed accountId must pass validation");
1879 assert_eq!(id.as_ref(), "u123-abc_DEF");
1880 // Remaining args still contain the unrelated keys.
1881 assert!(rest.contains_key("ids"));
1882 // accountId MUST have been removed from the args map
1883 // (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). matches optional_arg's consume semantics.
1884 assert!(
1885 !rest.contains_key("accountId"),
1886 "accountId must be removed from args after extraction"
1887 );
1888 }
1889
1890 /// Test vectors derived independently with Python's `datetime.date` module.
1891 /// `days` is the count of days since 1970-01-01.
1892 #[test]
1893 fn civil_from_days_known_dates() {
1894 let cases: &[(i64, (i32, u8, u8))] = &[
1895 (0, (1970, 1, 1)), // Unix epoch
1896 (365, (1971, 1, 1)), // one year later (1970 is not a leap year)
1897 (10957, (2000, 1, 1)), // Y2K
1898 (11016, (2000, 2, 29)), // leap day in a century-divisible leap year
1899 (11017, (2000, 3, 1)), // day after the leap day (era boundary in algorithm)
1900 (19358, (2023, 1, 1)), // a recent non-leap year start
1901 (19722, (2023, 12, 31)), // end of 2023
1902 (19782, (2024, 2, 29)), // leap day in 2024
1903 (19783, (2024, 3, 1)), // day after 2024 leap day
1904 ];
1905
1906 for &(days, expected) in cases {
1907 assert_eq!(
1908 civil_from_days(days),
1909 Some(expected),
1910 "civil_from_days({days}) mismatch"
1911 );
1912 }
1913 }
1914
1915 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.2): civil_from_days MUST return None rather
1916 /// than panic on inputs whose computed year overflows i32. The
1917 /// Hinnant algorithm's intermediate `y = yoe + era * 400` value is
1918 /// bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a thin slice of
1919 /// which fits in i32. The outer `now_utc_string_checked`
1920 /// u64→i64 sentinel only catches u64 seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`,
1921 /// so corrupted-clock inputs between the i32-year boundary and
1922 /// i64::MAX reach this function. A panic here would surface as
1923 /// serverFail under dispatcher task::spawn isolation — degraded,
1924 /// but a contract violation versus the function's "fallible
1925 /// without panicking" contract.
1926 ///
1927 /// Test vectors: the maximum days-from-epoch derived from
1928 /// i64::MAX seconds (the regime that reaches civil_from_days
1929 /// after passing the outer u64→i64 sentinel), and the symmetric
1930 /// negative case. These years are deep enough into the i64
1931 /// algorithm range to definitely overflow i32. Plus a
1932 /// non-overflowing positive control just below the threshold to
1933 /// prove the boundary check fires only when warranted.
1934 #[test]
1935 fn civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow() {
1936 // i64::MAX / 86400 ≈ 1.07e14 days → year ≈ 2.92e11, well past i32::MAX (~2.15e9).
1937 let max_days = i64::MAX / 86400;
1938 assert_eq!(
1939 civil_from_days(max_days),
1940 None,
1941 "i64::MAX / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
1942 );
1943
1944 // i64::MIN / 86400 ≈ -1.07e14 days — symmetric negative case.
1945 let min_days = i64::MIN / 86400;
1946 assert_eq!(
1947 civil_from_days(min_days),
1948 None,
1949 "i64::MIN / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
1950 );
1951
1952 // Positive control: a far-future but i32-fitting year should
1953 // still succeed. Year ~58_798_075 (from 10 * i32::MAX days)
1954 // fits in i32 with room to spare, so this MUST return Some.
1955 let year_58m_days = 10_i64 * i64::from(i32::MAX);
1956 let result = civil_from_days(year_58m_days);
1957 assert!(
1958 result.is_some(),
1959 "i32-fitting year must return Some; got {result:?}"
1960 );
1961 }
1962
1963 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string_checked MUST return
1964 /// `Some(UTCDate)` on a sane clock (every host the test runs on
1965 /// in practice). The civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow
1966 /// test above pins the underlying None-on-corrupted-clock
1967 /// behaviour at the algorithm level; this test pins the
1968 /// happy-path contract: a sane clock yields the typed wire format,
1969 /// not a sentinel string.
1970 #[test]
1971 fn now_utc_string_checked_returns_some_on_sane_clock() {
1972 use super::now_utc_string_checked;
1973 let dt = now_utc_string_checked().expect(
1974 "test host clock must be reasonable enough for now_utc_string_checked to succeed",
1975 );
1976 let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
1977 assert!(
1978 UTCDate::new_validated(s).is_ok(),
1979 "must be an RFC 8620 §1.4 UTCDate: {s:?}"
1980 );
1981 }
1982
1983 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string (the panicking variant)
1984 /// MUST agree with now_utc_string_checked on a sane clock — i.e.
1985 /// the .expect() in now_utc_string does not introduce a wire-format
1986 /// discrepancy versus the Option-returning variant.
1987 #[test]
1988 fn now_utc_string_matches_checked_variant_on_sane_clock() {
1989 use super::now_utc_string_checked;
1990 let panicky = now_utc_string();
1991 let checked = now_utc_string_checked().expect("test host clock must be reasonable");
1992 // Both calls observe SystemTime::now() at slightly different
1993 // instants; the seconds part can differ if the test runs across
1994 // a second boundary. Compare the prefix up to the seconds
1995 // resolution.
1996 let panicky_s: &str = panicky.as_ref();
1997 let checked_s: &str = checked.as_ref();
1998 // Compare the date portion only (YYYY-MM-DD, 10 chars).
1999 assert_eq!(
2000 &panicky_s[..10],
2001 &checked_s[..10],
2002 "date portions must match: panicky={panicky_s:?} checked={checked_s:?}"
2003 );
2004 }
2005
2006 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%TZ` (coreutils), plus the
2007 /// RFC 8620 §7.2.3 example expiry (rfc8620.txt:3879) and the RFC 8620
2008 /// §1.4 example date. -62167219200 is 0000-01-01T00:00:00Z; one second
2009 /// earlier is year -1, which the four-digit form cannot express.
2010 #[test]
2011 fn utc_date_from_epoch_seconds_known_values() {
2012 for (secs, expected) in [
2013 (0, Some("1970-01-01T00:00:00Z")),
2014 (-1, Some("1969-12-31T23:59:59Z")),
2015 (1_414_649_520, Some("2014-10-30T06:12:00Z")),
2016 (1_531_448_069, Some("2018-07-13T02:14:29Z")),
2017 (253_402_300_799, Some("9999-12-31T23:59:59Z")),
2018 (253_402_300_800, None),
2019 (-62_167_219_200, Some("0000-01-01T00:00:00Z")),
2020 (-62_167_219_201, None),
2021 ] {
2022 assert_eq!(
2023 utc_date_from_epoch_seconds(secs)
2024 .as_ref()
2025 .map(AsRef::as_ref),
2026 expected,
2027 "secs = {secs}"
2028 );
2029 }
2030 }
2031
2032 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @1414649520 +%FT%TZ` gives
2033 /// 2014-10-30T06:12:00Z (also the RFC 8620 §1.4 example). RFC 8620
2034 /// §1.4: "the "time-secfrac" MUST always be omitted if zero"
2035 /// (rfc8620.txt:346-347), so zero millis yield the 20-char form.
2036 #[test]
2037 fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis_omits_zero_secfrac() {
2038 for (millis, expected) in [
2039 (0, "2014-10-30T06:12:00Z"),
2040 (1, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.001Z"),
2041 (120, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.120Z"),
2042 (999, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.999Z"),
2043 ] {
2044 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(1_414_649_520, millis).unwrap();
2045 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "millis = {millis}");
2046 assert!(UTCDate::new_validated(expected).is_ok(), "{expected}");
2047 }
2048 }
2049
2050 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%TZ` (coreutils). Pre-epoch
2051 /// seconds must take the time of day from the floored day, not from
2052 /// truncating division (bd:JMAP-yt1w.40: -1 used to yield 00:00:59).
2053 #[test]
2054 fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis_pre_epoch_time_of_day() {
2055 for (secs, expected) in [
2056 (-1, "1969-12-31T23:59:59Z"),
2057 (-61, "1969-12-31T23:58:59Z"),
2058 (-3601, "1969-12-31T22:59:59Z"),
2059 (-86401, "1969-12-30T23:59:59Z"),
2060 (-90061, "1969-12-30T22:58:59Z"),
2061 ] {
2062 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, 0).unwrap();
2063 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "secs = {secs}");
2064 }
2065 }
2066
2067 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%T.%3NZ` (coreutils), which
2068 /// floors to the millisecond. Pre-epoch sub-second clocks used to
2069 /// format as -s + millis instead of -s - millis (bd:JMAP-yt1w.46).
2070 #[test]
2071 fn signed_seconds_since_epoch_pre_epoch_subsec() {
2072 use std::time::{Duration, UNIX_EPOCH};
2073 for (before, expected) in [
2074 (Duration::from_millis(1200), "1969-12-31T23:59:58.800Z"),
2075 (Duration::from_millis(500), "1969-12-31T23:59:59.500Z"),
2076 (Duration::from_micros(1_200_500), "1969-12-31T23:59:58.799Z"),
2077 (
2078 Duration::from_millis(86_400_001),
2079 "1969-12-30T23:59:59.999Z",
2080 ),
2081 (Duration::from_secs(1), "1969-12-31T23:59:59Z"),
2082 ] {
2083 let (secs, millis) = signed_seconds_since_epoch(UNIX_EPOCH - before).unwrap();
2084 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, millis).unwrap();
2085 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "before = {before:?}");
2086 }
2087 }
2088
2089 #[test]
2090 fn now_utc_string_format() {
2091 // bd:JMAP-wlip.20 — return type is UTCDate; AsRef<str> gives
2092 // the underlying wire-format string for shape assertions.
2093 let dt = now_utc_string();
2094 let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
2095 // YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ (24 chars), or YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ
2096 // (20 chars) when the milliseconds are zero (RFC 8620 §1.4).
2097 assert!(s.len() == 24 || s.len() == 20, "unexpected length: {s}");
2098 assert!(s.ends_with('Z'), "must end with Z: {s}");
2099 assert_eq!(&s[4..5], "-", "missing year-month separator: {s}");
2100 assert_eq!(&s[7..8], "-", "missing month-day separator: {s}");
2101 assert_eq!(&s[10..11], "T", "missing date-time separator: {s}");
2102 assert_eq!(&s[13..14], ":", "missing hour-minute separator: {s}");
2103 assert_eq!(&s[16..17], ":", "missing minute-second separator: {s}");
2104 if s.len() == 24 {
2105 assert_eq!(&s[19..20], ".", "missing decimal point before millis: {s}");
2106 assert!(
2107 s[20..23].chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()),
2108 "milliseconds must be 3 digits: {s}"
2109 );
2110 }
2111 assert!(
2112 s.starts_with("20"),
2113 "year should start with 20 in 21st century: {s}"
2114 );
2115 }
2116
2117 // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2118 // json_merge_patch (RFC 7396)
2119 //
2120 // Test oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from RFC 7396 §2 and §3
2121 // examples, plus the regression case from bd:JMAP-sc1b.87. No oracle is
2122 // computed by the function under test (test-integrity rule from
2123 // workspace AGENTS.md).
2124 // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2125
2126 /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-sc1b.97 — a 1000-deep merge patch must NOT crash
2127 /// via stack overflow. The depth cap returns
2128 /// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] beyond [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
2129 /// rather than recursing further.
2130 ///
2131 /// The test does not use the function as its own oracle: the input
2132 /// is hand-built (a 1000-deep `{ "a": { "a": ... { "a": {} } } }`
2133 /// chain where every level is Object, matching the structural
2134 /// shape of a real PatchObject — the documented latent panic from
2135 /// bd:JMAP-sc1b.87 only fires on non-Object leaves, which a typed
2136 /// PatchObject cannot produce). The assertion checks that the
2137 /// call completes without panicking AND that it surfaces the
2138 /// depth-exceeded error rather than silently succeeding (the
2139 /// pre-bd:JMAP-wlip.1 silent-truncation bug).
2140 #[test]
2141 fn json_merge_patch_does_not_stack_overflow() {
2142 const DEPTH: usize = 1000;
2143 let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
2144 for _ in 0..DEPTH {
2145 target = serde_json::json!({ "a": target });
2146 }
2147 let mut patch = serde_json::json!({});
2148 for _ in 0..DEPTH {
2149 patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
2150 }
2151 let err = json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch)
2152 .expect_err("deep patch must surface DepthExceeded, not silently truncate");
2153 assert_eq!(
2154 err,
2155 MergePatchError::DepthExceeded,
2156 "deep patch must return MergePatchError::DepthExceeded"
2157 );
2158 }
2159
2160 /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-wlip.1 — a patch at exactly [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
2161 /// levels (the deepest legal patch) MUST apply successfully. The cap
2162 /// fires only when the patch tries to recurse one level beyond. The
2163 /// expected target shape is hand-built level-by-level from the same
2164 /// counter the patch uses, so the oracle is independent of the
2165 /// recursion under test.
2166 #[test]
2167 fn json_merge_patch_at_exact_cap_applies() {
2168 // Build a patch nested exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH levels deep.
2169 // Outermost level is depth=1; innermost leaf-Object is at depth
2170 // MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH. The first depth-cap check fires at
2171 // depth == MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH + 1, so this is the deepest
2172 // patch that still applies.
2173 let mut patch = serde_json::json!({ "leaf": "value" });
2174 for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
2175 patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
2176 }
2177 let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
2178 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("patch at the cap must apply");
2179 // Walk the resulting target down its 'a' chain to verify the
2180 // leaf field landed.
2181 let mut cursor = ⌖
2182 for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
2183 cursor = cursor.get("a").expect("each level must have 'a'");
2184 }
2185 assert_eq!(
2186 cursor.get("leaf"),
2187 Some(&serde_json::Value::String("value".to_owned())),
2188 "the leaf field at exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH must be applied"
2189 );
2190 }
2191
2192 /// Oracle: a shallow merge patch under the cap still applies
2193 /// normally. Positive control paired with the stack-overflow test
2194 /// above to prove the depth cap only fires at the boundary, not on
2195 /// every call.
2196 #[test]
2197 fn json_merge_patch_shallow_applies_normally() {
2198 let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } });
2199 let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 }, "e": null });
2200 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("shallow patch must succeed");
2201 assert_eq!(
2202 target,
2203 serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 } }),
2204 "RFC 7396 merge semantics broken at shallow depth"
2205 );
2206 }
2207
2208 /// Regression: a Patch that adds a nested Object to a previously-
2209 /// absent field used to panic with `expect("merge patch target
2210 /// must be an object")` because the parent recursion frame
2211 /// inserted Value::Null as the placeholder, then recursed into
2212 /// Null with an Object patch.
2213 ///
2214 /// Per RFC 7396 §2 the correct behaviour is to reset the non-Object
2215 /// target to an empty Object and merge into it. Oracle is hand-
2216 /// derived from RFC 7396 §2's pseudocode:
2217 /// `Target[Name] = MergePatch(Target[Name], Value)` where
2218 /// MergePatch resets a non-Object target to `{}`.
2219 #[test]
2220 fn json_merge_patch_adds_nested_object_to_absent_field() {
2221 let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1 });
2222 let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 2 } });
2223 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("nested-add patch must succeed");
2224 assert_eq!(
2225 target,
2226 serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } }),
2227 "patch must add the nested object at the previously-absent field"
2228 );
2229 }
2230
2231 /// Oracle: [`MergePatchError`] implements [`std::error::Error`] and
2232 /// has a stable Display form referencing the cap value. Pinning the
2233 /// Display string keeps the error message stable across refactors;
2234 /// the cap value is interpolated from the public constant so this
2235 /// test does not need updating if the cap changes.
2236 #[test]
2237 fn merge_patch_error_display() {
2238 let err = MergePatchError::DepthExceeded;
2239 let s = err.to_string();
2240 assert!(
2241 s.contains(&MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH.to_string()),
2242 "Display must mention the cap value; got {s:?}"
2243 );
2244 assert!(
2245 s.contains("merge patch"),
2246 "Display must identify the error source; got {s:?}"
2247 );
2248 }
2249
2250 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2251 // apply_jmap_patch (RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject paths, RFC 6901)
2252 //
2253 // Oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from the quoted RFC
2254 // text; the function under test is never its own oracle.
2255 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2256
2257 /// Build a `Map` from a JSON object literal.
2258 fn obj(v: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
2259 match v {
2260 serde_json::Value::Object(m) => m,
2261 other => panic!("fixture must be a JSON object, got {other}"),
2262 }
2263 }
2264
2265 /// Apply `path` → `value` to `before` and assert it fails with `want`
2266 /// and leaves the object unchanged.
2267 fn assert_patch_rejected(
2268 before: serde_json::Value,
2269 path: &str,
2270 value: serde_json::Value,
2271 want: PatchPathError,
2272 ) {
2273 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2274 let err = apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, path, value).expect_err("patch must be rejected");
2275 assert_eq!(err, want, "wrong error for path {path:?}");
2276 assert_eq!(
2277 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2278 before,
2279 "rejected patch {path:?} must leave the object unchanged"
2280 );
2281 }
2282
2283 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "Anything else: The value to set for this
2284 /// property (this may be a replacement or addition to the object
2285 /// being patched)."
2286 #[test]
2287 fn apply_jmap_patch_non_null_adds_or_replaces() {
2288 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1 }));
2289 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", json!(2)).expect("replace");
2290 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "b", json!("x")).expect("add");
2291 assert_eq!(
2292 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2293 json!({ "a": 2, "b": "x" })
2294 );
2295 }
2296
2297 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "If null, ... remove the property from the
2298 /// patched object. If the key is not present in the parent, this a
2299 /// no-op."
2300 #[test]
2301 fn apply_jmap_patch_null_removes_and_absent_is_noop() {
2302 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1, "m": { "k": true } }));
2303 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("remove");
2304 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/k", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("nested remove");
2305 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/absent", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("no-op");
2306 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), json!({ "m": {} }));
2307 }
2308
2309 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The keys are a path in JSON Pointer
2310 /// format [RFC6901], with an implicit leading "/"". `mailboxIds/abc`
2311 /// sets member `abc` of the existing `mailboxIds` object and leaves
2312 /// its siblings alone.
2313 #[test]
2314 fn apply_jmap_patch_nested_path_sets_member_of_existing_object() {
2315 let mut target = obj(json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1 } } }));
2316 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "mailboxIds/abc", json!(true)).expect("set");
2317 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "x/y/w", json!(2)).expect("deep set");
2318 assert_eq!(
2319 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2320 json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true, "abc": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1, "w": 2 } } })
2321 );
2322 }
2323
2324 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last (i.e., the
2325 /// value after the final slash) MUST already exist on the object
2326 /// being patched." A missing parent is rejected, never created, for
2327 /// both non-null and null values.
2328 #[test]
2329 fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_parent_is_rejected() {
2330 let before = json!({ "a": { "b": {} } });
2331 for value in [json!("v"), serde_json::Value::Null] {
2332 assert_patch_rejected(
2333 before.clone(),
2334 "x/y",
2335 value.clone(),
2336 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2337 );
2338 assert_patch_rejected(
2339 before.clone(),
2340 "a/c/d",
2341 value,
2342 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2343 );
2344 }
2345 }
2346
2347 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last ... MUST
2348 /// already exist on the object being patched." A string, number,
2349 /// boolean or null has no members, so a part beneath one does not
2350 /// exist; the existing value must not be clobbered.
2351 #[test]
2352 fn apply_jmap_patch_non_object_parent_is_rejected() {
2353 let before = json!({ "s": "text", "n": 42, "b": true, "z": null });
2354 for parent in ["s", "n", "b", "z"] {
2355 assert_patch_rejected(
2356 before.clone(),
2357 &format!("{parent}/sub"),
2358 json!("would-clobber"),
2359 PatchPathError::ParentNotObject,
2360 );
2361 }
2362 }
2363
2364 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The pointer MUST NOT reference inside an
2365 /// array (i.e., you MUST NOT insert/delete from an array; the array
2366 /// MUST be replaced in its entirety instead)." Applies to numeric
2367 /// tokens and to paths that would descend through an array element.
2368 #[test]
2369 fn apply_jmap_patch_inside_array_is_rejected() {
2370 let before = json!({ "list": ["a", { "k": 1 }] });
2371 assert_patch_rejected(
2372 before.clone(),
2373 "list/0",
2374 json!("x"),
2375 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2376 );
2377 assert_patch_rejected(
2378 before.clone(),
2379 "list/1/k",
2380 json!(2),
2381 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2382 );
2383 assert_patch_rejected(
2384 before,
2385 "list/0",
2386 serde_json::Value::Null,
2387 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2388 );
2389 }
2390
2391 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "the array MUST be replaced in its entirety
2392 /// instead": setting the array-valued property itself is allowed.
2393 #[test]
2394 fn apply_jmap_patch_replaces_whole_array() {
2395 let mut target = obj(json!({ "list": ["a"] }));
2396 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "list", json!(["b", "c"])).expect("replace array");
2397 assert_eq!(
2398 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2399 json!({ "list": ["b", "c"] })
2400 );
2401 }
2402
2403 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §4 — "first transforming any occurrence of the
2404 /// sequence '~1' to '/', and then transforming any occurrence of the
2405 /// sequence '~0' to '~' ... (the string '~01' correctly becomes '~1'
2406 /// after transformation)." Decoding is per token, after splitting on
2407 /// `/`, so `a~1b/c` addresses member `c` of member `a/b`.
2408 #[test]
2409 fn apply_jmap_patch_decodes_rfc6901_escapes() {
2410 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a/b": {}, "m~n": {} }));
2411 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~1bar", json!(1)).expect("~1");
2412 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~0bar", json!(2)).expect("~0");
2413 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "~01", json!(3)).expect("~01");
2414 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a~1b/c", json!(4)).expect("escaped parent");
2415 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m~0n/~1", json!(5)).expect("escaped parent and leaf");
2416 assert_eq!(
2417 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2418 json!({
2419 "foo/bar": 1,
2420 "foo~bar": 2,
2421 "~1": 3,
2422 "a/b": { "c": 4 },
2423 "m~n": { "/": 5 }
2424 })
2425 );
2426 }
2427
2428 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `escaped = "~" ( "0" / "1" )` and "It is an
2429 /// error condition if a JSON Pointer value does not conform to this
2430 /// syntax". RFC 8620 §5.3 requires keys in JSON Pointer format, so a
2431 /// malformed escape in any token is rejected.
2432 #[test]
2433 fn apply_jmap_patch_invalid_escape_is_rejected() {
2434 let before = json!({ "a": {} });
2435 for path in ["~2", "x~", "a/~", "~x/b", "a/b~"] {
2436 assert_patch_rejected(
2437 before.clone(),
2438 path,
2439 json!(1),
2440 PatchPathError::InvalidEscape,
2441 );
2442 }
2443 }
2444
2445 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `reference-token = *( unescaped / escaped )`
2446 /// permits an empty token, and the §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the
2447 /// member named `""` (`"" : 0`). The PatchObject key `""` is the
2448 /// pointer `"/"`; `"a/"` is the pointer `"/a/"`.
2449 #[test]
2450 fn apply_jmap_patch_empty_token_names_empty_member() {
2451 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": {} }));
2452 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "", json!(0)).expect("empty top-level token");
2453 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a/", json!(1)).expect("empty nested token");
2454 assert_eq!(
2455 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2456 json!({ "": 0, "a": { "": 1 } })
2457 );
2458 }
2459
2460 /// Oracle: an empty token is an ordinary member name, so a missing
2461 /// empty-named parent is rejected like any other missing parent
2462 /// (RFC 8620 §5.3 "All parts prior to the last ... MUST already
2463 /// exist").
2464 #[test]
2465 fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_empty_parent_is_rejected() {
2466 assert_patch_rejected(
2467 json!({ "a": {} }),
2468 "a//b",
2469 json!(1),
2470 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2471 );
2472 }
2473
2474 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2475 // apply_patch_object (RFC 8620 §5.3 whole PatchObject)
2476 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2477
2478 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "There MUST NOT be two patches in the
2479 /// PatchObject where the pointer of one is the prefix of the pointer
2480 /// of the other, e.g., "alerts/1/offset" and "alerts""; on violation
2481 /// "the update MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error".
2482 #[test]
2483 fn apply_patch_object_prefix_conflict_is_rejected() {
2484 let before = json!({ "alerts": { "1": { "offset": 0 } } });
2485 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2486 let patch = obj(json!({ "alerts/1/offset": 5, "alerts": {} }));
2487 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
2488 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
2489 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
2490 }
2491
2492 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 forbids only a pointer that is "the prefix of
2493 /// the pointer of the other"; JSON Pointers are compared by reference
2494 /// token (RFC 6901 §3), so "alert" is not a prefix of "alerts/x".
2495 #[test]
2496 fn apply_patch_object_near_prefix_is_accepted() {
2497 let mut target = obj(json!({ "alerts": {} }));
2498 let patch = obj(json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts/x": 2 }));
2499 apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("no prefix conflict");
2500 assert_eq!(
2501 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2502 json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts": { "x": 2 } })
2503 );
2504 }
2505
2506 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "if there is any violation, the update MUST
2507 /// be rejected"; the valid entry "a" must not be applied either.
2508 #[test]
2509 fn apply_patch_object_partial_failure_leaves_target_unchanged() {
2510 let before = json!({ "a": 1 });
2511 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2512 let patch = obj(json!({ "a": 2, "m/k": 1 }));
2513 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
2514 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::ParentMissing);
2515 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
2516 }
2517
2518 /// A value nesting `levels` objects deep (`0` is the scalar `1`).
2519 fn nested(levels: usize) -> serde_json::Value {
2520 (0..levels).fold(json!(1), |inner, _| json!({ "k": inner }))
2521 }
2522
2523 /// Oracle: this crate's DoS guard, not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule (RFC 8620
2524 /// §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests beyond its limits). Path
2525 /// segments plus value nesting may not exceed `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
2526 /// (32): 3 + 30 = 33 is rejected before any entry is applied.
2527 #[test]
2528 fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
2529 let before = json!({ "x": 1, "a": { "b": {} } });
2530 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2531 let patch = obj(json!({ "x": 2, "a/b/c": nested(30) }));
2532 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
2533 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
2534 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
2535 }
2536
2537 /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard rejects only depth beyond
2538 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`; exactly 3 segments + 29 levels = 32 applies.
2539 #[test]
2540 fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_at_depth_cap_applies() {
2541 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": { "b": {} } }));
2542 let patch = obj(json!({ "a/b/c": nested(29) }));
2543 apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("at the cap must apply");
2544 assert_eq!(
2545 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2546 json!({ "a": { "b": { "c": nested(29) } } })
2547 );
2548 }
2549
2550 /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard; a key of 33 segments exceeds
2551 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` even with a scalar value.
2552 #[test]
2553 fn apply_patch_object_path_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
2554 let before = json!({ "a": {} });
2555 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2556 let path = format!("a{}", "/k".repeat(32));
2557 let patch = obj(json!({ path: 1 }));
2558 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
2559 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
2560 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
2561 }
2562
2563 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2564 // enforce_max_objects_in_set (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1) — RFC 8620 §5.3
2565 //
2566 // Oracles for all tests below are hand-built JmapError comparisons
2567 // and hand-built JSON args; the helper itself is never the oracle.
2568 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2569
2570 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): an empty `/set` args envelope (no
2571 /// `create` / `update` / `destroy` keys) MUST pass any positive cap.
2572 #[test]
2573 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_empty_args_is_ok() {
2574 let args = json!({}).as_object().unwrap().clone();
2575 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 500).expect("empty args must be under any positive cap");
2576 }
2577
2578 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): at the exact boundary count == max, the
2579 /// helper MUST return Ok. The cap is enforced as strictly-greater
2580 /// (`count > max`), not greater-or-equal.
2581 #[test]
2582 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_at_limit_is_ok() {
2583 // 5 + 5 + 5 = 15 entries against max=15 must pass.
2584 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
2585 let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
2586 let mut destroy = Vec::new();
2587 for i in 0..5 {
2588 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
2589 update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
2590 destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
2591 }
2592 let args = json!({
2593 "create": create,
2594 "update": update,
2595 "destroy": destroy,
2596 })
2597 .as_object()
2598 .unwrap()
2599 .clone();
2600 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15).expect("exact-boundary count must be allowed");
2601 }
2602
2603 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3, bd:JMAP-yt1w.30): one entry over the cap
2604 /// MUST return the method error "requestTooLarge" — "The total number
2605 /// of objects to create, update, or destroy exceeds the maximum number
2606 /// the server is willing to process in a single method call." — with
2607 /// description "maxObjectsInSet". The wire shape is verified by
2608 /// hand-building the expected JmapError independently of the helper.
2609 #[test]
2610 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_over_limit_returns_limit_error() {
2611 // 5 + 5 + 6 = 16 entries against max=15 must fail.
2612 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
2613 let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
2614 let mut destroy = Vec::new();
2615 for i in 0..5 {
2616 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
2617 update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
2618 }
2619 for i in 0..6 {
2620 destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
2621 }
2622 let args = json!({
2623 "create": create,
2624 "update": update,
2625 "destroy": destroy,
2626 })
2627 .as_object()
2628 .unwrap()
2629 .clone();
2630 let err = enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15)
2631 .expect_err("16-entry args against max=15 must fail");
2632 // Independent oracle — hand-built JmapError, not derived from
2633 // the function under test.
2634 let expected = jmap_types::JmapError::request_too_large();
2635 assert_eq!(
2636 err.error_type.to_string(),
2637 expected.error_type.to_string(),
2638 "type must be \"requestTooLarge\""
2639 );
2640 assert_eq!(
2641 err.description.as_deref(),
2642 Some("maxObjectsInSet"),
2643 "description must name the exceeded cap"
2644 );
2645 }
2646
2647 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-yt1w.30): RFC 8620 §5.3 (rfc8620.txt L2166-2170):
2648 /// "The following additional errors may be returned instead of the
2649 /// "Foo/set" response: "requestTooLarge": The total number of objects
2650 /// to create, update, or destroy exceeds the maximum number the server
2651 /// is willing to process in a single method call." Exceeding
2652 /// maxObjectsInSet is therefore the method-level error
2653 /// `requestTooLarge`, not the request-level `limit` error.
2654 #[test]
2655 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_over_limit_returns_request_too_large() {
2656 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
2657 for i in 0..3 {
2658 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
2659 }
2660 let args = json!({
2661 "create": create,
2662 "destroy": ["d0"],
2663 })
2664 .as_object()
2665 .unwrap()
2666 .clone();
2667 let err =
2668 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 3).expect_err("4-entry args against max=3 must fail");
2669 assert_eq!(
2670 err.error_type.to_string(),
2671 "requestTooLarge",
2672 "RFC 8620 §5.3: over-cap /set must yield method error requestTooLarge"
2673 );
2674 }
2675
2676 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-object `create` argument (e.g.
2677 /// `null` or a string) counts as 0 — wire-shape validation belongs
2678 /// to the per-handler argument parsing, not this cap helper. The
2679 /// handler will reject the malformed `create` downstream; this
2680 /// helper only counts well-formed entries.
2681 #[test]
2682 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_object_create() {
2683 let args = json!({
2684 "create": null,
2685 "update": null,
2686 "destroy": ["id1"],
2687 })
2688 .as_object()
2689 .unwrap()
2690 .clone();
2691 // Only the 1 destroy entry counts.
2692 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-object create/update count as 0");
2693 }
2694
2695 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-array `destroy` argument counts
2696 /// as 0. Same rationale as the create/update test above.
2697 #[test]
2698 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_array_destroy() {
2699 let args = json!({
2700 "create": { "c0": {} },
2701 "destroy": "not-an-array",
2702 })
2703 .as_object()
2704 .unwrap()
2705 .clone();
2706 // Only the 1 create entry counts.
2707 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-array destroy counts as 0");
2708 }
2709
2710 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): the cap counts the SUM of all three
2711 /// sources. A request whose individual create/update/destroy
2712 /// counts are each below the cap can still trip the cap when
2713 /// summed.
2714 #[test]
2715 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_sums_all_three() {
2716 // 3 + 3 + 3 = 9; against max=5, must fail because the SUM > max
2717 // even though each individual count <= max.
2718 let args = json!({
2719 "create": { "c0": {}, "c1": {}, "c2": {} },
2720 "update": { "u0": {}, "u1": {}, "u2": {} },
2721 "destroy": ["d0", "d1", "d2"],
2722 })
2723 .as_object()
2724 .unwrap()
2725 .clone();
2726 let err =
2727 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 5).expect_err("sum-of-all-three must trip the cap");
2728 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "requestTooLarge");
2729 assert_eq!(err.description.as_deref(), Some("maxObjectsInSet"));
2730 }
2731
2732 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.5 + bd:JMAP-qz9v.48): `position` is a signed
2733 /// offset where non-negative is absolute and negative is
2734 /// end-relative. All hand-computed values below come from reading
2735 /// the spec text, NOT from the implementation under test.
2736 #[test]
2737 fn resolve_query_offset_absolute() {
2738 // Non-negative position: absolute offset, clamped at total.
2739 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
2740 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 100), 1);
2741 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(50, 100), 50);
2742 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(99, 100), 99);
2743 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(100, 100), 100);
2744 // Past-the-end → clamped to total (RFC 8620 §5.5 silent-clamp).
2745 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(101, 100), 100);
2746 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(10_000, 100), 100);
2747 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 100), 100);
2748 }
2749
2750 #[test]
2751 fn resolve_query_offset_end_relative() {
2752 // RFC 8620 §5.5: "-1 represents the last entry, -2 the second
2753 // to last". Implemented as `total - |position|`, saturating at
2754 // 0 from below.
2755 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
2756 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-2, 100), 98);
2757 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-99, 100), 1);
2758 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
2759 // Past-the-start → clamped to 0.
2760 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-101, 100), 0);
2761 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-10_000, 100), 0);
2762 }
2763
2764 /// Oracle: with total=0 (empty result list), every position
2765 /// resolves to 0 (the only valid index, and a no-op slice).
2766 #[test]
2767 fn resolve_query_offset_empty_total() {
2768 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 0), 0);
2769 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 0), 0);
2770 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 0), 0);
2771 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
2772 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 0), 0);
2773 }
2774
2775 /// Oracle: `i64::MIN` would overflow `-position` (the previous
2776 /// workspace idiom at mail-server `memory/mod.rs:980`) but
2777 /// `saturating_neg` returns `i64::MAX`. The resulting end-relative
2778 /// offset of `i64::MAX` is well past any realistic `total`, so for
2779 /// any realistic total the result is 0.
2780 ///
2781 /// For the synthetic case `total == usize::MAX`, the offset stays
2782 /// within the saturation range and the result is
2783 /// `usize::MAX - i64::MAX`, which on a 64-bit target is exactly
2784 /// `0x8000_0000_0000_0000`. The point of the regression guard is
2785 /// that the call does NOT panic (which it would under the prior
2786 /// `(-position) as usize` idiom in debug builds).
2787 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 `limit` -- "If null, no limit presumed" --
2788 /// so `None` is unbounded; `Some(n)` is exactly `n` items.
2789 #[test]
2790 fn limit_or_max_follows_rfc8620_limit_semantics() {
2791 let items = [1u8, 2, 3, 4, 5];
2792 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(None)).count(), 5);
2793 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(Some(0))).count(), 0);
2794 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(Some(2))).count(), 2);
2795 // u64::MAX never truncates to a small count: on 64-bit it is
2796 // exactly usize::MAX, on 32-bit it saturates to usize::MAX.
2797 assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(u64::MAX)), usize::MAX);
2798 }
2799
2800 #[test]
2801 fn resolve_query_offset_i64_min_does_not_overflow() {
2802 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 1), 0);
2803 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
2804 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, i64::MAX as usize), 0);
2805 // Synthetic upper bound: the answer is computable but not 0.
2806 // What matters is no overflow / no panic, and start <= total.
2807 let start = resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, usize::MAX);
2808 assert_eq!(start, usize::MAX - (i64::MAX as usize));
2809 // And `i64::MAX` on the positive side is also handled.
2810 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
2811 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 1), 1);
2812 }
2813
2814 /// Oracle: the bead's specific concern was that `position as usize`
2815 /// truncates on 32-bit targets. On 64-bit (this test host) the
2816 /// `i64`-to-`usize` conversion is lossless within `[0, i64::MAX]`,
2817 /// so the truncation cannot be directly demonstrated; what we CAN
2818 /// verify is that the helper uses `usize::try_from` semantics, so
2819 /// a value above `i64::MAX` (only reachable here via direct cast
2820 /// from an unsigned constant) clamps to `total` rather than
2821 /// wrapping. The `i64::MIN` case in the prior test is the real
2822 /// regression guard.
2823 #[test]
2824 fn resolve_query_offset_truncation_resistant() {
2825 // The slice-safety property: `total..=total` is always a valid
2826 // start index for `slice[start..]` (yields empty slice). The
2827 // helper MUST return a value in `0..=total`.
2828 for &pos in &[i64::MIN, -1_000_000, -1, 0, 1, 1_000_000, i64::MAX] {
2829 for &total in &[0usize, 1, 100, 10_000] {
2830 let start = resolve_query_offset(pos, total);
2831 assert!(
2832 start <= total,
2833 "resolve_query_offset({pos}, {total}) = {start} violates start <= total"
2834 );
2835 }
2836 }
2837 }
2838 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8620.txt):
2839 /// "If found, the "anchorOffset" is then added to its index. If the
2840 /// resulting index is now negative, it is clamped to 0. ... If the
2841 /// anchor is not found, the call is rejected with an "anchorNotFound"
2842 /// error. If an "anchor" is specified, any position argument supplied
2843 /// by the client MUST be ignored. If no "anchor" is supplied, any
2844 /// "anchorOffset" argument MUST be ignored."
2845 ///
2846 /// `ids` is `[a, b, c, d]`, so anchor `c` is index 2.
2847 #[test]
2848 fn resolve_query_start_follows_rfc8620_anchor_rules() {
2849 let ids: Vec<jmap_types::Id> = ["a", "b", "c", "d"].map(jmap_types::Id::from).to_vec();
2850 let c = jmap_types::Id::from("c");
2851 let start = |position, anchor, offset| resolve_query_start(&ids, position, anchor, offset);
2852 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), 1), Ok(3));
2853 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), -1), Ok(1));
2854 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), -5), Ok(0));
2855 assert_eq!(start(3, Some(&c), 0), Ok(2));
2856 assert_eq!(start(1, None, 2), Ok(1));
2857 let missing = jmap_types::Id::from("z");
2858 assert_eq!(
2859 start(0, Some(&missing), 0).map_err(|e| e.error_type.to_string()),
2860 Err("anchorNotFound".to_owned())
2861 );
2862 }
2863
2864 /// RFC 8620 §5.2: "the value MUST be a positive integer greater than
2865 /// 0. If a value outside of this range is given, the server MUST
2866 /// reject the call with an "invalidArguments" error." The argument is
2867 /// `UnsignedInt|null`, so absent and `null` mean "not given".
2868 #[test]
2869 fn parse_max_changes_follows_rfc8620_5_2() {
2870 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(None).ok(), Some(None));
2871 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(null))).ok(), Some(None));
2872 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(1))).ok(), Some(Some(1)));
2873 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(50))).ok(), Some(Some(50)));
2874 for bad in [json!(0), json!(-1), json!(1.5), json!("5"), json!(true)] {
2875 assert_eq!(
2876 parse_max_changes(Some(&bad)).map_err(|e| e.error_type.to_string()),
2877 Err("invalidArguments".to_owned()),
2878 "maxChanges = {bad} must be rejected"
2879 );
2880 }
2881 }
2882
2883 /// Oracle: the six JSON value kinds of RFC 8259 §3 ("object, array,
2884 /// number, string ... false, null, true"), with `true`/`false` named
2885 /// "boolean", written out by hand.
2886 #[test]
2887 fn json_type_name_names_each_json_kind() {
2888 let cases = [
2889 (json!(null), "null"),
2890 (json!(true), "boolean"),
2891 (json!(false), "boolean"),
2892 (json!(-1.5), "number"),
2893 (json!("CANARY-zegc"), "string"),
2894 (json!([1, 2]), "array"),
2895 (json!({ "note": "CANARY-zegc" }), "object"),
2896 ];
2897 for (value, want) in cases {
2898 assert_eq!(json_type_name(&value), want, "{value}");
2899 }
2900 }
2901
2902 /// RFC 8620 §5.5 types `anchor` as "Id|null" and `anchorOffset` as
2903 /// "Int"; wrong types are `invalidArguments` (§3.6.2). The description
2904 /// names only the JSON type and never echoes the client value
2905 /// (§3.6.1: "unstructured English text"; bd JMAP-zegc).
2906 #[test]
2907 fn query_anchor_args_does_not_echo_wrongly_typed_value() {
2908 for (name, args) in [
2909 ("anchor", json!({ "anchor": { "note": "CANARY-zegc" } })),
2910 (
2911 "anchorOffset",
2912 json!({ "anchorOffset": { "note": "CANARY-zegc" } }),
2913 ),
2914 ] {
2915 let err = query_anchor_args(args.as_object().expect("object"))
2916 .expect_err("wrongly typed argument must be rejected");
2917 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments", "{name}");
2918 let desc = err.description.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
2919 assert!(desc.starts_with(name), "{desc}");
2920 assert!(desc.contains("got object"), "{desc}");
2921 assert!(!desc.contains("CANARY"), "{desc}");
2922 }
2923 }
2924}