jerrycan 0.7.13

//! Generated acceptance tests: the design contract as runnable assertions.

use jerrycan::platform::design::Design;
use jerrycan::platform::testgen;

const GOLDEN: &str = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/todo-api.design.json");

fn golden(db: bool) -> Design {
    let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(GOLDEN).unwrap();
    if db {
        v["dependencies"] = serde_json::json!(["db"]);
    }
    serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap()
}

/// Issue #43: the identity-FK omission is db-gated in testgen too, so a MEMORY-mode
/// design's probe body KEEPS `user_id` (there is no `{Entity}Request` DTO to drop it
/// into — the memory struct has no fk columns and serde ignores the extra key). WHY
/// (Rule 9): the omission is a db-mode contract; in memory mode the probe, the
/// OpenAPI request schema, and genroute's `Json<Entity>` must all agree, and genroute
/// keeps the plain entity. The DB-mode twin of the SAME design drops `user_id`.
#[test]
fn memory_mode_probe_body_keeps_the_identity_fk() {
    const IDENTITY_FK: &str = r#"{
        "name": "notes-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "notes",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Note",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "body", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_note", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "auth_required": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Note" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Note" } }
            ]
        }]
    }"#;
    let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(IDENTITY_FK).unwrap();
    // Memory mode (no `db`): the probe keeps user_id.
    let mem: Design = serde_json::from_value(v.clone()).unwrap();
    assert!(!mem.wants_db());
    let mem_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&mem, &mem.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        mem_gen.contains("\"user_id\": 1"),
        "memory-mode probe body must keep the identity fk (no DTO to drop it): {mem_gen}"
    );
    // DB mode (same design + `db`): the probe drops user_id (the #34 DTO omission).
    v["dependencies"] = serde_json::json!(["db", "auth"]);
    let dbm: Design = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
    let db_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&dbm, &dbm.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !db_gen.contains("\"user_id\":"),
        "db-mode probe body omits the server-owned identity fk: {db_gen}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn memory_mode_tests_cover_success_and_listed_errors() {
    let design = golden(false);
    let module = &design.modules[0]; // todos (with comments subroute)
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);

    assert!(
        generated.contains("GENERATED by jerrycan gen-tests"),
        "tool-owned banner"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("use route_todos::module;"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    // success tests:
    for expected in [
        "async fn list_todos_returns_200",
        "async fn create_todo_returns_201",
        "async fn show_todo_returns_200",
        "async fn delete_todo_returns_204",
        "async fn list_comments_returns_200",
        "async fn create_comment_returns_201",
    ] {
        assert!(
            generated.contains(expected),
            "missing {expected}\n{generated}"
        );
    }
    // listed 404s:
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn show_todo_missing_id_is_404"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    assert!(generated.contains("/todos/999999"), "{generated}");
    // seed-then-request flow uses the creator:
    assert!(generated.contains("post_json(\"/todos/\""), "{generated}");
    // memory preamble — no db:
    assert!(!generated.contains("jerrycan::db"), "{generated}");
    assert_eq!(
        testgen::test_count(&generated),
        8,
        "6 success + 2 listed 404s"
    );
}

#[test]
fn db_mode_preamble_migrates_an_in_memory_database() {
    let design = golden(true);
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("Db::connect(\"sqlite::memory:\")"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("include_str!(\"../migrations/sqlite/0001_create_tables.sql\")"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    assert!(generated.contains(".extend(db)"), "{generated}");
}

/// A module's TestApp migrates the FULL workspace schema (issue #14), not just
/// its own tables — so a handler that legitimately writes ANOTHER module's table
/// no longer 500s with "no such table" under the module TestApp. The `orders`
/// TestApp must include BOTH its own migration (relative) AND the `products`
/// module's migration (cross-crate `../../products/...`).
#[test]
fn module_testapp_migrates_the_full_workspace_schema() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "shop-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [
            { "name": "products",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Product", "fields": [
                  { "name": "sku", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "list_products", "method": "GET", "path": "/",
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Product", "list": true } }] },
            { "name": "orders",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Order", "fields": [
                  { "name": "total", "type": "integer" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "list_orders", "method": "GET", "path": "/",
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Order", "list": true } }] }
        ]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let orders = design.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "orders").unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, orders);
    // Its own tables (relative include).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("include_str!(\"../migrations/sqlite/0001_create_tables.sql\")"),
        "orders TestApp migrates its own tables: {generated}"
    );
    // AND the products module's tables (cross-crate include) — the whole point:
    // an orders handler may write the products table.
    assert!(
        generated
            .contains("include_str!(\"../../products/migrations/sqlite/0001_create_tables.sql\")"),
        "orders TestApp must also migrate the products module's tables: {generated}"
    );
}

#[test]
fn unsupported_error_cases_become_an_agent_todo_comment() {
    let mut design = golden(false);
    design.modules[0].endpoints[1]
        .errors
        // `platform::design` config structs are `#[non_exhaustive]` (#145): a
        // downstream crate (an integration test is a separate crate) constructs
        // them via the design contract (serde), never a struct literal.
        .push(
            serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
                "status": 409,
                "code": "JC0409",
                "when": "duplicate title",
            }))
            .unwrap(),
        );
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0].clone());
    assert!(
        generated.contains("// AGENT TODO: design lists 409 (duplicate title)"),
        "{generated}"
    );
}

/// A PUBLIC endpoint in an auth design gets a success test but NO
/// `_without_auth_is_401` test, and its request carries no session cookie. WHY
/// (Rule 9): `public: true` marks a credential-issuing route (login/register)
/// that is unauthenticated BY DESIGN — generating a 401 test or threading a
/// cookie would assert the opposite of the contract (fix F1).
#[test]
fn public_endpoints_get_no_401_test_and_no_cookie() {
    // An auth design (so guarded endpoints would normally get cookies + 401
    // tests) with one PUBLIC register POST and one ordinary guarded POST.
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "auth-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "accounts",
            "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [
                { "name": "email", "type": "string" },
                { "name": "password", "type": "string" }
            ]}],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "register", "method": "POST", "path": "/register",
                  "public": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "User" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "User" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_account", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "auth_required": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "User" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "User" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);

    // The public register route still gets its success test...
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn register_returns_201"),
        "public route still gets a success test: {generated}"
    );
    // ...but NO 401 test (it is unauthenticated by design)...
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("register_without_auth_is_401"),
        "public route must NOT get a 401 test: {generated}"
    );
    // ...and its request uses the plain (cookie-less) verb.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("t.post_json(\"/accounts/register\""),
        "public route request must carry no cookie: {generated}"
    );

    // The ordinary guarded endpoint still gets BOTH a credentialed success request
    // and a 401 test — the carve-out is narrow to public routes.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("create_account_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded route still gets its 401 test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("t.post_json_with(\"/accounts/\""),
        "a guarded route still threads the credential: {generated}"
    );

    // JWT model (issue #29): the credential is a `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`
    // header minted with `jwt::encode` + `Auth::jwt_key()`, NOT a session cookie —
    // this is what proves the generated tests exercise the REAL Bearer guard.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("(\"authorization\", &test_cookie())"),
        "jwt guarded request threads the Authorization header, not a cookie: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("jerrycan::auth::jwt::encode(&shared::SessionUser")
            && generated.contains("auth.jwt_key())")
            && generated.contains("format!(\"Bearer {token}\")"),
        "jwt preamble mints a Bearer token via jwt::encode + jwt_key: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("jerrycan_session=") && !generated.contains("(\"cookie\","),
        "jwt model must not mint or thread a session cookie: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A tenant-owned module's guarded handlers take `Dep<Tenant>`; the generated
/// test app must register the `tenant` factory and SEED a membership row, or the
/// guard 403s every guarded request (a false stub-test failure). WHY this matters:
/// the seed is what keeps these acceptance tests failing for the RIGHT reason
/// (stub-500), not an unseeded-membership 403. It must (a) migrate the tenant
/// module's tables (the `{tenant}_members` table the guard queries lives there),
/// (b) insert a tenant row whose enum column uses a DECLARED value so the CHECK
/// passes, and (c) insert the membership row, then provide the `tenant` factory.
#[test]
fn tenancy_module_tests_seed_membership_and_provide_the_guard() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let leads = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "leads")
        .expect("leads module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, leads);

    // The Tenant factory is registered app-wide for the guard to resolve.
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".provide_dep(shared::tenant)"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    // The tenant module's migration is pulled in (cross-crate) so the membership
    // table exists in this module's test database.
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "include_str!(\"../../workspaces/migrations/sqlite/0001_create_tables.sql\")"
        ),
        "tenant migration cross-included: {generated}"
    );
    // Seeds: a tenant row (enum `plan` uses a declared value, not 'test-value', so
    // the CHECK passes) and the membership row for user 1.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"workspaces\\\"") && generated.contains("'trial'"),
        "tenant row seeded with a valid enum value: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "INSERT INTO \\\"workspace_members\\\" (user_id, workspace_id, role) VALUES (1, 1, 'owner')"
        ),
        "membership row seeded for user 1: {generated}"
    );
    // The raw-SQL seed needs ConnectionTrait in scope.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("use jerrycan::db::sea_orm::ConnectionTrait;"),
        "{generated}"
    );

    // The tenant module ITSELF (workspaces) owns no tenant-owned entity, so its
    // REGULAR app() neither seeds nor provides the guard (no false coupling —
    // its create tests must see an empty tenant table so the id echo holds).
    // Its own reads (`list_workspaces`/`show_workspace`) are `public: true`
    // (public discovery, per the design), so no endpoint here takes `Dep<Tenant>`.
    // The #107 member tests bring their own SELF-CONTAINED member_app(); the
    // membership seeds + guard registration live there, never in app().
    let workspaces = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "workspaces")
        .expect("workspaces module");
    let ws_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, workspaces);
    let app_fn = ws_gen
        .split("async fn app()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("app() present")
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        !app_fn.contains(".provide_dep(shared::tenant)") && !app_fn.contains("workspace_members"),
        "the tenant module's regular app() must neither seed membership nor provide the guard: {app_fn}"
    );
    let member_fn = ws_gen
        .split("async fn member_app()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("member_app() present (#107)")
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        member_fn.contains(".provide_dep(shared::tenant)")
            && member_fn.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"workspace_members\\\""),
        "member_app() seeds membership and provides the guard itself: {member_fn}"
    );
}

/// The generated JSON request BODY for an enum field must use a DECLARED value,
/// not the generic `"test-value"` placeholder. WHY: the generator's own
/// migration emits `CHECK ("role" IN ('admin','user'))`, so a body with
/// `"role": "test-value"` makes the happy-path acceptance test fail at run time
/// with an opaque `JC0510` even when the handler is correctly implemented — the
/// gen-test would contradict the gen-migration. The body must agree with the
/// SQL seed (`seed_sql_value`), which already uses the first declared value.
#[test]
fn generated_request_body_uses_a_declared_enum_value_not_the_placeholder() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let users = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "users")
        .expect("users module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, users);
    // `register`'s body posts the `User` entity, whose `role` is an enum
    // `["admin","user"]` → the first declared value, NOT `"test-value"`.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"role\": \"admin\""),
        "enum field uses its first declared value: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("\"role\": \"test-value\""),
        "enum field must NOT use the placeholder (trips the CHECK): {generated}"
    );
    // A plain (non-enum) string field still uses the placeholder.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"email\": \"test-value\""),
        "non-enum string keeps the placeholder: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A tenant-owned entity's create/update bodies must carry the fk column the
/// `belongs_to` derives, valued at the SEEDED tenant (workspace 1). WHY: without
/// it the generated request body is missing a NOT-NULL column, so the handler's
/// `Json<Lead>` deserialization rejects it 422 — the test fails before reaching
/// the stub, masking whether the handler is actually implemented. With the fk
/// present the request reaches the stub (500 on stubs → green when implemented).
#[test]
fn tenant_owned_fixtures_carry_the_foreign_key() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let leads = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "leads")
        .expect("leads module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, leads);
    // create_lead (POST /) and update_lead (PUT /{id}) both send a Lead body;
    // each must include the workspace_id fk valued at the seeded tenant (1).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"workspace_id\": 1"),
        "Lead fixture bodies must carry workspace_id: 1: {generated}"
    );

    // A non-tenant-owned entity's body must NOT gain a phantom fk.
    let workspaces = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "workspaces")
        .expect("workspaces module");
    let ws_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, workspaces);
    assert!(
        !ws_gen.contains("\"workspace_id\""),
        "Workspace (the tenant itself) must not carry a self fk: {ws_gen}"
    );
}

/// A tenant-owned module with a creator + GET /{id} gets a cross-tenant
/// isolation test: user 1 creates a row in workspace 1, user 2 (workspace 2)
/// must NOT be able to read it. This is the security contract — it fails on
/// stubs (500) and stays red if the agent uses unscoped repo methods (which
/// would return the foreign row), going green only with scoped get_for.
#[test]
fn tenant_owned_modules_get_isolation_tests() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let leads = d
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "leads")
        .expect("leads module");
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, leads);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_leads()"),
        "{out}"
    );
    assert!(out.contains("404"), "cross-tenant get must 404: {out}");
    // The isolation test seeds a SECOND tenant (workspace 2) + membership for
    // user 2, and mints user 2's cookie via the generalized helper.
    assert!(
        out.contains("fn seed_second_tenant(") && out.contains("test_cookie_for("),
        "isolation test needs a second-tenant seed + per-user cookie helper: {out}"
    );
    // test_cookie() stays back-compat (delegates to test_cookie_for(1)).
    assert!(
        out.contains("test_cookie_for(1)"),
        "test_cookie() must delegate to test_cookie_for(1): {out}"
    );
    // The DELETE leg is role-gated (owner); user 2's membership must seed the
    // owner role so the role check passes and the SCOPED remove_for 404s (proving
    // isolation, not a role rejection).
    assert!(
        out.contains("'owner'"),
        "second tenant membership seeds the owner role: {out}"
    );

    // The non-tenant-owned tenant module (workspaces) gets NO cross-tenant
    // isolation test — AND, because its list is `public: true` (public discovery,
    // per the design), no I1 test either (a public list can't be membership-scoped).
    let workspaces = d
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "workspaces")
        .expect("workspaces module");
    let ws_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, workspaces);
    assert!(
        !ws_gen.contains("cannot_read_tenant_b"),
        "non-tenant-owned module gets no isolation test: {ws_gen}"
    );
    assert!(
        !ws_gen.contains("seeds_only_the_creators_membership"),
        "a public tenant list can't be membership-scoped, so no I1 test: {ws_gen}"
    );
}

/// #96/#97: a FLAT (MembershipSet) tenant-owned module with a guarded creator gets
/// the flat-WRITE isolation test — user 1 POSTs a create whose tenant fk is tenant 2
/// (foreign) and must get 403 (`create_for_memberships`'s WITH CHECK). This is the
/// write-side backstop that #97's make-impossible needs: the bare `insert` is gone,
/// so a create MUST scope to the caller's memberships. A path-scoped (nested) module
/// and the tenant ROOT do NOT get it (their writes are not body-fk scoped).
#[test]
fn flat_tenant_module_gets_the_write_403_isolation_test() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();

    // leads (FLAT) — the write-403 test is emitted, aimed at tenant 2, asserting 403.
    let leads = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "leads").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, leads);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn leads_flat_write_into_foreign_tenant_is_403()"),
        "the flat-write isolation test must be emitted for a flat tenant module: {out}"
    );
    // The body's tenant fk is aimed at tenant 2 (a tenant user 1 is not a member of).
    let iso = out
        .split("async fn leads_flat_write_into_foreign_tenant_is_403()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("flat-write isolation fn present");
    assert!(
        iso.contains("\"workspace_id\": 2"),
        "the create body must aim its tenant fk at the foreign tenant 2: {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        iso.contains("test_cookie_for(1)") && iso.contains("403"),
        "user 1 POSTs and must get 403 (create_for_memberships WITH CHECK): {iso}"
    );

    // api-keys (also FLAT) gets its own write-403 test.
    let api_keys = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "api-keys").unwrap();
    let ak = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, api_keys);
    assert!(
        ak.contains("async fn api_keys_flat_write_into_foreign_tenant_is_403()"),
        "the flat-write isolation test must be emitted for api-keys too: {ak}"
    );

    // The tenant ROOT (workspaces) is NOT tenant-OWNED → no flat-write test.
    let workspaces = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "workspaces").unwrap();
    let ws = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, workspaces);
    assert!(
        !ws.contains("flat_write_into_foreign_tenant_is_403"),
        "the tenant root gets no flat-write isolation test: {ws}"
    );

    // A PATH-SCOPED (nested) module is scoped by the verified path tenant, not a body
    // fk, so it gets the path-scoped read isolation test but NOT the flat-write test.
    const CLUBS: &str = r#"{
        "name": "clubs-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Club", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            { "name": "clubs",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Club", "fields": [
                  { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_club", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Club" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Club" } } ] },
            { "name": "books", "mount": "/clubs/{club_id}",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Book", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Club" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_book", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Book" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Book" } },
                  { "operation_id": "get_book", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Book" } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let nested: Design = serde_json::from_str(CLUBS).unwrap();
    let books = nested.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "books").unwrap();
    let books_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&nested, books);
    assert!(
        !books_gen.contains("flat_write_into_foreign_tenant_is_403"),
        "a path-scoped nested module gets no flat-write isolation test: {books_gen}"
    );
}

/// A per-user (identity-owned) module gets a #79 isolation test: user B cannot
/// read/list/delete user A's row. WHY (Rule 9): the identity shape JC0540 steers
/// toward had NO backstop; this is it. It passes only with the owner-scoped
/// accessors — the unscoped repo methods are not even generated.
#[test]
fn per_user_identity_owned_modules_get_isolation_tests() {
    const FITNESS: &str = r#"{
        "name": "fitness-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["user"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "modules": [
            { "name": "users",
              "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [] },
            { "name": "workouts",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Workout",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                             { "name": "distance", "type": "float" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_workout", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Workout" },
                    "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Workout" } },
                  { "operation_id": "list_workouts", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workout", "list": true } },
                  { "operation_id": "get_workout", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workout" } },
                  { "operation_id": "delete_workout", "method": "DELETE", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 204 } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(FITNESS).unwrap();
    let workouts = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "workouts").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, workouts);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn user_a_cannot_read_user_b_workouts()"),
        "per-user isolation test emitted: {out}"
    );
    // Two distinct user sessions, NO tenant seeding.
    assert!(
        out.contains("test_cookie_for(1)") && out.contains("test_cookie_for(2)"),
        "acts as two distinct users: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        !out.contains("seed_second_tenant"),
        "per-user isolation needs no tenant seed: {out}"
    );
    // Cross-user get + list + delete all assert 404/absent.
    assert!(
        out.contains("cross-user get must 404") && out.contains("cross-user delete must 404"),
        "get + delete legs present: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("cross-user list must NOT contain user 1's row"),
        "list leg present: {out}"
    );
}

/// #240 Part B: a per-user module with a creator + `PUT /{id}` ONLY (no list, no
/// `GET /{id}`, no delete) emits NO isolation test. WHY (Rule 9): a `PUT` is not a
/// read leg, so there is no way to READ another user's row to probe — the previous
/// setup-only body asserted NOTHING about isolation yet bound `row`/`cookie2`
/// unused, which `jerrycan check`'s `clippy -D warnings` rejects. A clean omission
/// is honest; a vacuous `*_cannot_read_*` body is not. The write's own success +
/// 401 probes still cover it, and genroute's owner-scoped repo is the enforcement.
#[test]
fn per_user_create_update_only_module_gets_no_isolation_test() {
    const NOTES: &str = r#"{
        "name": "notes-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["user"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "modules": [
            { "name": "users",
              "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [] },
            { "name": "notes",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Note",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "body", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_note", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Note" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Note" } },
                  { "operation_id": "update_note", "method": "PUT", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Note" }, "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Note" } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(NOTES).unwrap();
    let notes = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "notes").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, notes);
    // No isolation test at all — not even a vacuous setup-only negative control.
    assert!(
        !out.contains("cannot_read_user_b"),
        "a read-less per-user module must emit NO isolation test: {out}"
    );
    // And no orphaned `cookie2` (the tell of the old setup-only body).
    assert!(
        !out.contains("let cookie2 = test_cookie_for(2)"),
        "no orphaned user-2 credential without a probe to consume it: {out}"
    );
    // Sanity: the write endpoints still get their own probes (the suite isn't empty).
    assert!(
        out.contains("create_note") && out.contains("update_note"),
        "the write endpoints still get their success/401 probes: {out}"
    );
}

/// The public-read/owner-write feed design (#105): Post is per-user identity-owned
/// with `public_read: true`; `list_posts` is DECLARED `auth_required` (the entity
/// flag must override it — the exact shape the blessed fixture uses).
const FEED: &str = r#"{
    "name": "feedapp", "contract_version": 1,
    "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["user"] },
    "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
    "modules": [
        { "name": "users",
          "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [] },
        { "name": "posts",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Post", "public_read": true,
              "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "list_posts", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Post", "list": true } },
              { "operation_id": "get_post", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Post" } },
              { "operation_id": "create_post", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Post" },
                "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Post" } },
              { "operation_id": "update_post", "method": "PUT", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Post" },
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Post" } },
              { "operation_id": "delete_post", "method": "DELETE", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 204 } } ] }
    ]
}"#;

/// #105 gate-lie fix: genroute emits a `public_read` GET UNGUARDED (no
/// CurrentUser) even when the design declares it `auth_required` — so testgen
/// must NOT emit its `_without_auth_is_401` probe. WHY (Rule 9): before the
/// shared predicate, testgen keyed on the raw `is_guarded()` and asserted a
/// no-cookie `list_posts` 401s, while the correct generated handler 200s — a
/// valid design produced a PERMANENTLY-RED acceptance test (green-means-safe
/// broken in the worst direction). The success probe must also run WITHOUT a
/// credential (anonymous is the contract). Writes keep their 401 probes.
#[test]
fn public_read_gets_lose_the_401_probe_and_probe_anonymously() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(FEED).unwrap();
    let posts = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "posts").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, posts);
    assert!(
        !out.contains("list_posts_without_auth_is_401")
            && !out.contains("get_post_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a public_read GET must not get a 401 probe (the handler is unguarded — the test would be red-when-correct): {out}"
    );
    let list_probe = out
        .split("async fn list_posts_returns_200")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("list success probe present")
        .split("async fn")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        list_probe.contains("t.get(\"/posts/\")") && !list_probe.contains("test_cookie"),
        "the public list probes anonymously: {list_probe}"
    );
    // Writes stay guarded: probe with a credential AND keep the 401 test.
    for probe in [
        "create_post_without_auth_is_401",
        "update_post_without_auth_is_401",
        "delete_post_without_auth_is_401",
    ] {
        assert!(out.contains(probe), "{probe} must stay: {out}");
    }
}

/// The #105 isolation variant: a `public_read` module gets the public-read/
/// owner-write test — anon list contains ANOTHER user's row, anon detail 200s,
/// anon create 401s, a non-owner PUT/DELETE 404s with the row SURVIVING, the
/// owner's PUT succeeds — and does NOT get the #79 cross-user test (whose
/// read-denial legs would be red on a correct public feed).
#[test]
fn public_read_modules_get_the_owner_write_isolation_test() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(FEED).unwrap();
    let posts = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "posts").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, posts);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn anon_reads_but_only_the_owner_writes_posts()"),
        "public_read isolation test emitted: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("SECURITY (#105)"),
        "carries the #105 security doc-comment: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        !out.contains("async fn user_a_cannot_read_user_b_posts()"),
        "the #79 cross-user test must NOT be emitted for a public_read entity: {out}"
    );
    let body = out
        .split("async fn anon_reads_but_only_the_owner_writes_posts()")
        .nth(1)
        .unwrap()
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    for leg in [
        "anonymous list must 200 (public_read)",
        "must contain ANOTHER user's row",
        "anonymous detail must 200 (public_read)",
        "an anonymous create must 401",
        "a non-owner update must 404",
        "a non-owner delete must 404",
        "must SURVIVE a non-owner write attempt",
        "the OWNER's update must succeed",
    ] {
        assert!(body.contains(leg), "leg `{leg}` present: {body}");
    }
}

/// The `required_roles.is_empty()` conjunct in the shared predicate is
/// LOAD-BEARING: a role-gated GET on a `public_read` entity KEEPS its guard, so
/// it keeps its 401 probe and probes WITH a credential. Deleting the conjunct
/// (treating every GET on the entity as public) must turn this red — otherwise
/// an explicit role demand would be silently dropped.
#[test]
fn role_gated_get_on_a_public_read_entity_keeps_the_401_probe() {
    let mut d: Design = serde_json::from_str(FEED).unwrap();
    let posts_idx = d.modules.iter().position(|m| m.name == "posts").unwrap();
    d.modules[posts_idx]
        .endpoints
        .iter_mut()
        .find(|ep| ep.operation_id == "list_posts")
        .unwrap()
        .required_roles = vec!["user".to_string()];
    let posts = &d.modules[posts_idx];
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, posts);
    assert!(
        out.contains("list_posts_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a role-gated GET keeps its guard and its 401 probe: {out}"
    );
    let list_probe = out
        .split("async fn list_posts_returns_200")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("list success probe present")
        .split("async fn")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        list_probe.contains("test_cookie"),
        "a role-gated GET probes WITH a credential: {list_probe}"
    );
}

/// The strict-resolution pin (#105 whole-branch review): an ENTITY-LESS
/// `auth_required` GET (`GET /stats`, custom-JSON success, no body, no
/// `{param}`) in the `public_read` module KEEPS its `_without_auth_is_401`
/// probe. WHY (Rule 9): the lenient first-entity fallback classified it as a
/// public read of `Post` — an entity it never reads — so the
/// declared-authenticated endpoint shipped anonymous with NO 401 probe: a
/// silent guard drop under a green gate. The explicit public reads keep losing
/// their probes (they are genuinely public), and the probe suite stays green
/// on a correct app.
#[test]
fn entityless_authed_get_keeps_the_401_probe_beside_public_read() {
    let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(FEED).unwrap();
    v["modules"][1]["endpoints"]
        .as_array_mut()
        .unwrap()
        .push(serde_json::json!({
            "operation_id": "get_stats", "method": "GET", "path": "/stats",
            "auth_required": true, "success": { "status": 200 }
        }));
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
    let posts = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "posts").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, posts);
    assert!(
        out.contains("get_stats_without_auth_is_401"),
        "an entity-less auth_required GET keeps its 401 probe: {out}"
    );
    // The explicit public reads stay probe-free — the fix must not over-guard.
    assert!(
        !out.contains("list_posts_without_auth_is_401")
            && !out.contains("get_post_without_auth_is_401"),
        "the explicit public_read GETs stay 401-probe-free: {out}"
    );
}

/// A path-scoped NESTED tenant module (BookClubs `/clubs/{club_id}/books`) gets a
/// cross-tenant isolation test with the mount pinned to tenant 1 — the exact #78
/// nested-creator leak that had NO coverage before. A member of club 2 gets 404 on
/// club 1's book; the list leg is skipped (user 2 can't reach club 1's collection).
#[test]
fn nested_path_scoped_module_gets_isolation_test_with_pinned_tenant() {
    const CLUBS: &str = r#"{
        "name": "clubs-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Club", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            { "name": "clubs",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Club", "fields": [
                  { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_club", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Club" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Club" } },
                  { "operation_id": "list_clubs", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Club", "list": true } } ] },
            { "name": "books", "mount": "/clubs/{club_id}",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Book", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Club" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_book", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Book" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Book" } },
                  { "operation_id": "get_book", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Book" } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(CLUBS).unwrap();
    let books = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "books").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, books);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_books()"),
        "nested isolation test emitted: {out}"
    );
    // In the ISOLATION test the mount's tenant fk is pinned to tenant 1 (not the
    // literal `{club_id}`): user 1 creates club 1's book, user 2 (a member of club 2
    // only) reads it and 404s. (The per-endpoint success tests now pin the mount the
    // same way — issue #81, covered by `subroute_mount_param_is_substituted_in_per_endpoint_urls`.)
    let iso = out
        .split("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_books()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("isolation fn present");
    assert!(
        iso.contains("\"/clubs/1/\"") && iso.contains("/clubs/1/{id}"),
        "isolation probe URLs pin the tenant fk to 1: {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        !iso.contains("{club_id}"),
        "the isolation test carries no unsubstituted tenant param: {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("cross-tenant get must 404"),
        "get leg 404s: {out}"
    );
    // The list leg is skipped for a nested route (user 2 can't reach club 1's list).
    assert!(
        !out.contains("user 2 lists their own"),
        "nested route emits no list leg: {out}"
    );

    // The tenant module (clubs) — guarded create AND guarded list — gets the I1 test.
    let clubs = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "clubs").unwrap();
    let clubs_out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, clubs);
    assert!(
        clubs_out.contains("async fn creating_a_club_seeds_only_the_creators_membership()"),
        "I1 tenant-collection-create test emitted: {clubs_out}"
    );
    assert!(
        clubs_out.contains("the creator's list MUST contain the new Club")
            && clubs_out.contains("a non-creator's list must NOT contain the new Club"),
        "I1 asserts creator-lists-own + second-user-empty: {clubs_out}"
    );
}

/// #245 (the #240 sibling): a tenant-owned entity mounted on a param whose name
/// DIFFERS from the canonical tenant fk (`/happenings/{org_id}` for tenancy
/// `Organization`, canonical fk `organization_id`) must still get a CONCRETE
/// isolation probe. Before the fix, `tenant_owned_isolation_test` pinned only the
/// canonical fk / join child_fk tokens, so the non-canonical `{org_id}` survived
/// verbatim into the URL — `/happenings/{org_id}/` — and the cross-tenant negative
/// control 400'd at setup (`Path<i64>` can't parse `{org_id}`), never greenable. The
/// fix routes the probe base through `concrete_mount_base`, pinning EVERY `{param}`
/// to the seeded id 1 (the same helper the per-endpoint tests already use). WHY
/// (Rule 9): a security negative control that can NEVER go green is worse than none —
/// the agent deletes it or wedges on it. This is the regression guard.
#[test]
fn tenant_isolation_probe_pins_a_noncanonical_mount_param() {
    const HAPPENINGS: &str = r#"{
        "name": "orgs-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Organization", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            { "name": "organizations",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Organization", "fields": [
                  { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_organization", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Organization" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Organization" } } ] },
            { "name": "events", "mount": "/happenings/{org_id}",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Event", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Organization" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_event", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Event" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Event" } },
                  { "operation_id": "list_events", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Event", "list": true } },
                  { "operation_id": "get_event", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Event" } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(HAPPENINGS).unwrap();
    let events = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "events").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, events);
    let iso = out
        .split("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_events()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("isolation fn present")
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    // The mount param is pinned to the seeded id 1 in EVERY probe leg (create, get,
    // list) — `{org_id}` (the non-canonical mount param) is the regression signal:
    // pre-fix it survived verbatim; the get leg's `format!("/happenings/{org_id}/…")`
    // would not even compile (`org_id` is an undefined named arg).
    assert!(
        !iso.contains("{org_id}"),
        "the isolation probe must carry NO unsubstituted mount param (#245): {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        iso.contains("t.post_json_with(\"/happenings/1/\"")
            && iso.contains("t.get_with(\"/happenings/1/\"")
            && iso.contains("/happenings/1/{id}"),
        "every isolation probe URL pins the non-canonical mount param to 1: {iso}"
    );
}

/// A NESTED tenant module whose isolation probe carries create + LIST but no
/// `GET /{id}` shared by the two #240 nested-tenant tests below.
const NESTED_TENANT_LIST_ONLY: &str = r#"{
    "name": "orgs-api", "contract_version": 1,
    "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
    "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "modules": [
        { "name": "orgs",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Org", "fields": [
              { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_org", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Org" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Org" } } ] },
        { "name": "events", "mount": "/orgs/{org_id}",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Event", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Org" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_event", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Event" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Event" } },
              { "operation_id": "list_events", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Event", "list": true } } ] }
    ]
}"#;

/// #240 Part A: a NESTED tenant module with a creator + LIST but NO `GET /{id}` gets
/// a REAL cross-tenant isolation test. The list leg — SUPPRESSED for nested mounts
/// before, leaving ZERO isolation coverage AND unused `row`/`cookie2` bindings that
/// broke `clippy -D warnings` — now asserts a 404: user 2, a non-member of tenant 1,
/// is denied the pinned collection by the `Dep<Tenant>` path guard (proven in
/// `shared::tenant`). WHY (Rule 9): the negative control must actually ASSERT
/// isolation, not merely seed a row and bind unused credentials.
#[test]
fn nested_tenant_list_only_module_gets_a_cross_tenant_list_404_probe() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(NESTED_TENANT_LIST_ONLY).unwrap();
    let events = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "events").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, events);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_events()"),
        "the nested tenant isolation test is emitted: {out}"
    );
    let iso = out
        .split("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_events()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("isolation fn present")
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    // The nested list leg carries a REAL 404 assertion at the pinned tenant-1 path.
    assert!(
        iso.contains("cross-tenant list must 404") && iso.contains("t.get_with(\"/orgs/1/\""),
        "the nested list leg asserts 404 at the pinned tenant path: {iso}"
    );
    // It consumes user 2's credential (so `cookie2` is not an unused binding)...
    assert!(
        iso.contains("&cookie2"),
        "the probe consumes cookie2: {iso}"
    );
    // ...and does NOT bind an unused `row` (a nested-list 404 leg reads neither the
    // by-id `id` nor the flat-list `id_value` derived from `row`).
    assert!(
        !iso.contains("let row"),
        "a nested-list-only probe must not bind an unused `row`: {iso}"
    );
    // NOT the FLAT 200-absent shape — that would false-fail against the guard 404.
    assert!(
        !iso.contains("user 2 lists their own"),
        "the nested list must not use the flat 200-absent assertion: {iso}"
    );
}

/// #240 Part B (tenant): a NESTED tenant module with a creator ONLY (no list, no
/// `GET /{id}`, no delete) emits NO isolation test — there is nothing to probe, so a
/// setup-only body with unused `row`/`cookie2` is wrong. A clean omission is honest.
#[test]
fn nested_tenant_create_only_module_gets_no_isolation_test() {
    let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(NESTED_TENANT_LIST_ONLY).unwrap();
    // Drop the events LIST, leaving events with a creator only.
    let events_eps = v["modules"][1]["endpoints"].as_array_mut().unwrap();
    events_eps.retain(|ep| ep["operation_id"] != "list_events");
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
    let events = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "events").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, events);
    assert!(
        !out.contains("cannot_read_tenant_b"),
        "a read-less nested tenant module must emit NO isolation test: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        !out.contains("let cookie2 = test_cookie_for(2)"),
        "no orphaned user-2 credential without a probe to consume it: {out}"
    );
}

/// #172: the tenant ROOT module whose own `GET /{id}` detail route is GUARDED gets
/// a cross-tenant non-member-404 probe (the collection test only covers the root's
/// LIST, and `tenant_owned_isolation_test` skips the root). A root whose detail
/// route is PUBLIC (public discovery) gets NO probe — asserting 404 against a route
/// that returns 200 to everyone would false-fail it.
#[test]
fn tenant_root_with_a_guarded_detail_route_gets_the_non_member_404_probe() {
    // Base shape: a Workspace tenant root with a guarded create + guarded detail.
    const GUARDED: &str = r#"{
        "name": "ws-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Workspace", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            { "name": "workspaces",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Workspace", "fields": [
                  { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_workspace", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Workspace" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Workspace" } },
                  { "operation_id": "list_workspaces", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workspace", "list": true } },
                  { "operation_id": "show_workspace", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workspace" } } ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(GUARDED).unwrap();
    let ws = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "workspaces").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, ws);
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn a_non_member_cannot_read_the_workspace_detail()"),
        "guarded root detail route must get the non-member-404 probe: {out}"
    );
    let probe = out
        .split("async fn a_non_member_cannot_read_the_workspace_detail()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("root-detail probe fn present");
    // The probe seeds a tenant-1 row as user 1, then asserts user 2 (a member of
    // tenant 2 only) gets 404 on the root's own detail route.
    assert!(
        probe.contains("&test_cookie_for(1))]).await;") && probe.contains("\"/workspaces/\""),
        "user 1 seeds the tenant-1 root row via the create: {probe}"
    );
    assert!(
        probe.contains("&format!(\"/workspaces/{id}\"), &[(\"cookie\", &test_cookie_for(2))])")
            && probe.contains("cross-tenant get on the tenant root must 404"),
        "the probe asserts a non-member (test_cookie_for(2)) 404s on the root detail route: {probe}"
    );

    // A root whose detail route is PUBLIC (discovery) emits NO probe — a 404
    // assertion would false-fail a route that returns 200 to everyone.
    let public_detail = GUARDED.replace(
        r#"{ "operation_id": "show_workspace", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workspace" } }"#,
        r#"{ "operation_id": "show_workspace", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "public": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workspace" } }"#,
    );
    let dp: Design = serde_json::from_str(&public_detail).unwrap();
    let wsp = dp.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "workspaces").unwrap();
    let outp = testgen::acceptance_rs(&dp, wsp);
    assert!(
        !outp.contains("a_non_member_cannot_read_the_workspace_detail"),
        "a PUBLIC root detail route must emit NO non-member-404 probe: {outp}"
    );
}

/// A GRANDCHILD entity — transitively tenant-owned (`Contact belongs_to Account
/// belongs_to Org`, mount `/accounts/{account_id}`) — gets a cross-tenant
/// isolation test (issue #102). Before the transitive fix the generator BAILED on
/// such entities (direct-`belongs_to` finder returned `""`), leaving the exact
/// deep-graph leak with NO runtime coverage. WHY (Rule 9): user 1 creates a
/// Contact under Account 1 (owned by Org 1); user 2 (an Org 2 member, NOT Org 1)
/// must 404 on GET and DELETE — GREEN only when the handler scopes through the
/// JOIN chain (`get_for_memberships`/`remove_for_memberships`), RED on the
/// unscoped accessor that would leak the foreign row. The intermediate Account is
/// seeded in tenant 1 so the nested create resolves, and the mount's parent fk is
/// pinned to the seeded id.
const ORG_ACCOUNT_CONTACT_NESTED: &str = r#"{
    "name": "crm-api", "contract_version": 1,
    "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
    "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "modules": [
        { "name": "orgs",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Org", "fields": [
              { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_org", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Org" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Org" } } ] },
        { "name": "accounts",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Account", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Org" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_account", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Account" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Account" } } ] },
        { "name": "contacts", "mount": "/accounts/{account_id}",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Contact", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Account" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_contact", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Contact" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Contact" } },
              { "operation_id": "get_contact", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Contact" } },
              { "operation_id": "delete_contact", "method": "DELETE", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 204 } } ] }
    ]
}"#;

#[test]
fn grandchild_gets_a_transitive_isolation_test() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(ORG_ACCOUNT_CONTACT_NESTED).unwrap();
    let contacts = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "contacts").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, contacts);
    // The isolation test IS emitted for the transitively-owned grandchild.
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_contacts()"),
        "grandchild isolation test emitted: {out}"
    );
    // The intermediate parent (Account) is seeded in tenant 1 (org_id = 1) so the
    // nested create resolves through the JOIN chain.
    assert!(
        out.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"accounts\\\" (id, org_id) VALUES (1, 1)"),
        "seeds the intermediate Account in tenant 1: {out}"
    );
    // The probe URLs thread the seeded parent id into the nested mount — no
    // unsubstituted `{account_id}` token survives.
    let iso = out
        .split("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_contacts()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("isolation fn present");
    assert!(
        iso.contains("\"/accounts/1/\"") && iso.contains("/accounts/1/{id}"),
        "probe URLs pin the parent fk to the seeded id 1: {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        !iso.contains("{account_id}"),
        "no unsubstituted parent mount param in the isolation test: {iso}"
    );
    // user 2 (Org 2 member, NOT Org 1) is denied read AND delete.
    assert!(
        iso.contains("cross-tenant get must 404"),
        "get leg 404s for user 2: {iso}"
    );
    assert!(
        iso.contains("cross-tenant delete must 404"),
        "delete leg 404s for user 2: {iso}"
    );
    // A nested route's list is itself tenant-path-guarded — user 2 can't reach
    // tenant 1's collection — so the list leg is skipped.
    assert!(
        !out.contains("user 2 lists their own"),
        "nested grandchild route emits no list leg: {out}"
    );
    // The scaffolding a grandchild module needs is present (transitive
    // `module_needs_tenant`): tenant 1 (Org) + user 1 membership are seeded, and
    // the second tenant (Org 2) + user 2 membership for the isolation probe.
    assert!(
        out.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"orgs\\\" (id")
            && out.contains(
                "INSERT INTO \\\"org_members\\\" (user_id, org_id, role) VALUES (1, 1, 'owner')"
            ),
        "tenant 1 Org + user 1 membership seeded for the grandchild module: {out}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("fn seed_second_tenant(") && out.contains("test_cookie_for("),
        "grandchild isolation needs a second tenant + per-user cookie helper: {out}"
    );
}

/// AUGMENT (issue #102 eval): a MULTI-PARENT entity — `Comment belongs_to
/// [Ticket, User]`, where `Ticket` reaches the tenant (`Ticket belongs_to Org`)
/// and `User` is the auth identity — must be classified TENANT-owned (scoped
/// through the Ticket chain), NOT per-user. The presence of the identity fk
/// `user_id` must NOT downgrade it to a per-user backstop when a genuine tenant
/// path exists. WHY: a per-user-only test would let a tenant member read ANOTHER
/// tenant's comment (the identity check passes if they authored it, but the
/// tenant boundary is what matters). So the tenant isolation test fires and the
/// per-user one does not.
const TICKET_COMMENT_MULTIPARENT: &str = r#"{
    "name": "helpdesk-api", "contract_version": 1,
    "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
    "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "modules": [
        { "name": "orgs",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Org", "fields": [
              { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_org", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Org" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Org" } } ] },
        { "name": "tickets",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Ticket", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Org" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_ticket", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Ticket" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Ticket" } } ] },
        { "name": "comments",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Comment",
              "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Ticket" }, { "entity": "User" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "body", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_comment", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Comment" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Comment" } },
              { "operation_id": "get_comment", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Comment" } } ] }
    ]
}"#;

#[test]
fn multi_parent_entity_reaching_tenant_is_tenant_owned_not_per_user() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(TICKET_COMMENT_MULTIPARENT).unwrap();
    let comments = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "comments").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, comments);
    // Classified TENANT-owned (via the Ticket chain) → the cross-tenant isolation
    // test is emitted.
    assert!(
        out.contains("async fn tenant_a_cannot_read_tenant_b_comments()"),
        "multi-parent entity reaching the tenant gets the tenant isolation test: {out}"
    );
    // NOT classified per-user, despite carrying `user_id` — no #79 test.
    assert!(
        !out.contains("async fn user_a_cannot_read_user_b_comments()"),
        "a tenant-owned multi-parent entity must NOT also get a per-user test: {out}"
    );
    // The tenant-reaching parent (Ticket) is seeded in tenant 1 so the flat
    // create's `ticket_id` resolves through the chain.
    assert!(
        out.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"tickets\\\" (id, org_id) VALUES (1, 1)"),
        "seeds the intermediate Ticket in tenant 1: {out}"
    );
}

/// A credential/signature-gated endpoint's SUCCESS test would be UN-GREENABLE: the
/// generator can't supply the credential, so a minimal-body probe can never reach
/// the designed success status (a `public` login 401s bad creds; a signed webhook
/// 400/401s a bad signature). WHY (Rule 9): emitting a hard `_returns_<status>`
/// assertion for these would leave a generated test that NO correct implementation
/// can pass — `jerrycan check` could never go green. So the generator must emit an
/// `// AGENT TODO` instead, and the agent writes the credentialed test by hand.
/// This locks BOTH gated shapes: (a) a public POST declaring 401 and (b) a
/// signature-authenticated webhook (declares a 4xx whose `when` names "signature").
#[test]
fn credential_gated_endpoints_get_an_agent_todo_not_a_success_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "gated-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "accounts",
            "endpoints": [
                // (a) a public login: declares 401 on bad creds, no body.
                { "operation_id": "login", "method": "POST", "path": "/login",
                  "public": true,
                  "success": { "status": 200 },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 401, "when": "invalid email or password" }] },
                // (b) a signature-authenticated webhook: declares a 400 whose
                // `when` names a signature check (Stripe-style).
                { "operation_id": "stripe_webhook", "method": "POST", "path": "/webhook",
                  "success": { "status": 200 },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 400, "when": "Stripe signature is missing or invalid" }] }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);

    // Neither gated endpoint gets an un-greenable `_returns_` success assertion...
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn login_returns_"),
        "credential-gated login must NOT get a success test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn stripe_webhook_returns_"),
        "signature webhook must NOT get a success test: {generated}"
    );
    // ...each instead carries an AGENT TODO naming the credential it needs.
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "// AGENT TODO: login (POST /accounts/login) authenticates via a credential/signature"
        ),
        "login must get a credential AGENT TODO: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "// AGENT TODO: stripe_webhook (POST /accounts/webhook) authenticates via a credential/signature"
        ),
        "webhook must get a credential AGENT TODO: {generated}"
    );
}

/// An explicit `probe: "skip"` hint (issue #11) makes the generator drop the
/// un-greenable 2xx probe even when the heuristic MISSES the endpoint — here a
/// `public` webhook that declares NO 401/403 error, so `endpoint_is_credential_gated`
/// wouldn't flag it. WHY (Rule 9): without the hint the generator would emit a
/// `_returns_200` probe that a correct signature-checking handler MUST reject,
/// so `jerrycan check` could never reach ok:true. With the hint it emits a TODO,
/// and an ordinary (auto) endpoint in the same module still gets its success probe.
#[test]
fn probe_skip_hint_drops_the_ungreenable_success_probe() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "ingest-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": [],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "ingest",
            "endpoints": [
                // A public webhook the heuristic misses (no declared 401/403, no
                // "signature" in a `when`), marked probe: skip explicitly.
                { "operation_id": "receive_hook", "method": "POST", "path": "/hook",
                  "public": true, "probe": "skip",
                  "success": { "status": 202 } },
                // An ordinary endpoint (auto) still gets its happy-path probe.
                { "operation_id": "health_ping", "method": "GET", "path": "/ping",
                  "success": { "status": 200 } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn receive_hook_returns_"),
        "probe: skip must drop the un-greenable success probe: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated
            .contains("// AGENT TODO: receive_hook (POST /ingest/hook) is marked `probe: skip`"),
        "probe: skip must emit an explanatory TODO: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn health_ping_returns_200()"),
        "an ordinary (auto) endpoint still gets its success probe: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #123(b): `probe: "skip"` on a GUARDED endpoint drops ONLY the
/// un-greenable success probe — the `_without_auth_is_401` guard test survives.
/// WHY (Rule 9): the 401 test is a GREENABLE security assertion (the generated
/// guard rejects a credential-less request before any handler logic, so it
/// needs no credential and no seed); before this fix `skip` silently deleted
/// it, so a hand-weakened guard stayed green. A param path pins its `{param}`
/// to a literal id — the guard 401s before the id is ever looked up.
#[test]
fn probe_skip_on_a_guarded_endpoint_keeps_the_401_guard_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "vault-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "vault",
            "endpoints": [
                // Guarded, but its success needs a credential the generator
                // can't synthesize — marked probe: skip.
                { "operation_id": "rotate_key", "method": "POST", "path": "/rotate",
                  "auth_required": true, "probe": "skip",
                  "success": { "status": 202 } },
                // The same, on a parameterized path.
                { "operation_id": "reveal_secret", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}/reveal",
                  "auth_required": true, "probe": "skip",
                  "success": { "status": 200 } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    // The un-greenable success probes stay dropped...
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn rotate_key_returns_"),
        "probe: skip still drops the un-greenable success probe: {generated}"
    );
    // ...but the 401 guard tests survive the skip.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn rotate_key_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded probe:skip endpoint keeps its 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn reveal_secret_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded param-path probe:skip endpoint keeps its 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
    // The param path is pinned to a literal id — a 401 rejection needs no seed.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"/vault/1/reveal\""),
        "the 401 probe pins the path param to a literal id: {generated}"
    );
    // The TODO is retained, now asking for the success test ONLY (the rejection
    // test is generated, so the old "write the rejection test yourself" is gone).
    assert!(
        generated
            .contains("// AGENT TODO: rotate_key (POST /vault/rotate) is marked `probe: skip`"),
        "the probe:skip TODO is retained: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("and its 401/403 rejection test"),
        "a guarded skip TODO must not ask for the generated rejection test: {generated}"
    );
    // expected_failing flows through push_401_test's count — no special-casing.
    let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("jc123b-{}", std::process::id()));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(tmp.join("crates/routes/vault/tests")).unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) = testgen::write_acceptance(&tmp, &design, "vault").unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing, 2,
        "both 401 guard tests count toward expected_failing: {generated}"
    );
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}

/// Issue #153: a GUARDED `/{id}` endpoint with NO seed creator keeps its
/// `_without_auth_is_401` guard test — only the un-seedable success probe
/// becomes a TODO. WHY (Rule 9): the 401 assertion is GREENABLE without a seed
/// (the generated guard rejects a credential-less request before the id is
/// ever looked up, so a literal id stands in); before this fix the no-creator
/// branch silently dropped it, so a hand-weakened guard on such an endpoint
/// stayed green — the same hole #123b closed for `probe: skip`. An UNGUARDED
/// endpoint of the same shape must NOT gain a 401 test (asserting 401 on an
/// open endpoint would be permanently red on a correct app).
#[test]
fn guarded_id_endpoint_without_creator_keeps_the_401_guard_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "audit-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session" },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "audits",
            "endpoints": [
                // Guarded detail route with no POST creator anywhere in the
                // module — the success probe cannot be seeded.
                { "operation_id": "show_audit", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
                  "auth_required": true,
                  "success": { "status": 200 } },
                // The same shape UNGUARDED: no 401 test may be emitted.
                { "operation_id": "show_open_audit", "method": "GET", "path": "/open/{id}",
                  "success": { "status": 200 } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    // The un-seedable success probes stay TODOs...
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn show_audit_returns_"),
        "no creator still drops the un-seedable success probe: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("// AGENT TODO: show_audit (GET /audits/{id}) has no creator route"),
        "the no-creator TODO is retained: {generated}"
    );
    // ...but the guarded endpoint keeps its 401 guard test, on a literal id.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn show_audit_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded no-creator /{{id}} endpoint keeps its 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"/audits/1\""),
        "the 401 probe pins the id param to a literal id: {generated}"
    );
    // The unguarded control gains nothing.
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("show_open_audit_without_auth_is_401"),
        "an unguarded no-creator endpoint must NOT get a 401 test: {generated}"
    );
    // expected_failing flows through push_401_test's count — no special-casing.
    let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("jc153a-{}", std::process::id()));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(tmp.join("crates/routes/audits/tests")).unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) = testgen::write_acceptance(&tmp, &design, "audits").unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing, 1,
        "the 401 guard test counts toward expected_failing: {generated}"
    );
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}

/// Issue #153: a GUARDED 2+-param endpoint keeps its `_without_auth_is_401`
/// guard test with EVERY `{param}` pinned to a literal id — only the seeded
/// success probe stays a TODO (the generator can't seed a multi-param path).
/// WHY (Rule 9): same silently-dropped-401 as the no-creator branch — a 401
/// rejection precedes any id lookup, so no seed is needed and dropping the
/// test un-tested a real guard. The UNGUARDED control of the same shape must
/// NOT gain a false 401 assertion.
#[test]
fn guarded_multi_param_endpoint_keeps_the_401_guard_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "grid-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session" },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "grids",
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "get_cell", "method": "GET",
                  "path": "/{row}/cells/{col}",
                  "auth_required": true,
                  "success": { "status": 200 } },
                { "operation_id": "get_open_cell", "method": "GET",
                  "path": "/{row}/open/{col}",
                  "success": { "status": 200 } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn get_cell_returns_"),
        "a multi-param endpoint still gets no auto-seeded success probe: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated
            .contains("// AGENT TODO: get_cell (GET /grids/{row}/cells/{col}) needs a creator"),
        "the multi-param TODO is retained: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn get_cell_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded multi-param endpoint keeps its 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"/grids/1/cells/1\""),
        "the 401 probe pins EVERY param to a literal id: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("get_open_cell_without_auth_is_401"),
        "an unguarded multi-param endpoint must NOT get a 401 test: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A db-mode module whose EVERY endpoint is a TODO (e.g. a billing module whose
/// only route is a signature-gated webhook) emits ZERO `#[tokio::test]` functions.
/// The generated file must then carry NO `app()` helper and NO `use` imports —
/// they would be dead code and trip the generated workspace's `-D warnings`,
/// blocking `jerrycan check` from ever going green. WHY (Rule 9): this is the
/// exact regression Fix 1 first introduced (billing's webhook became a TODO,
/// leaving `app()` unused); the file must degrade to banner + TODOs only.
#[test]
fn module_with_only_todos_emits_no_dead_app_helper() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "webhook-only-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "billing",
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "stripe_webhook", "method": "POST", "path": "/webhook",
                  "success": { "status": 200 },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 400, "when": "Stripe signature is missing or invalid" }] }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    // The webhook becomes a TODO, so there are no tests at all.
    assert_eq!(
        testgen::test_count(&generated),
        0,
        "a signature-only billing module emits no tests: {generated}"
    );
    // The TODO is still present (the agent must hand-write the webhook test)...
    assert!(
        generated.contains("// AGENT TODO: stripe_webhook"),
        "the webhook TODO must be emitted: {generated}"
    );
    // ...but the dead `app()` helper and the `use` imports must be GONE, or the
    // generated crate fails to build under `-D warnings`.
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn app()"),
        "a tests-less module must NOT emit a dead app() helper: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("use jerrycan::prelude::*;") && !generated.contains("::module;"),
        "a tests-less module must NOT emit dead imports: {generated}"
    );
    // The banner stays (it identifies the tool-owned file).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("GENERATED by jerrycan gen-tests"),
        "the tool banner must remain: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A public POST that declares NO 401/403 (e.g. register: 409/422) is NOT
/// credential-gated — a minimal body CAN reach success — so it keeps its
/// `_returns_` test. WHY: the gate is narrow; widening it to every public route
/// would drop greenable success coverage for register/create-style endpoints.
#[test]
fn public_post_without_401_keeps_its_success_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "reg-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "accounts",
            "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [
                { "name": "email", "type": "string" }
            ]}],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "register", "method": "POST", "path": "/register",
                  "public": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "User" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "User" },
                  "errors": [
                    { "status": 409, "when": "email already registered" },
                    { "status": 422, "when": "request body fails validation" }
                  ] }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn register_returns_201"),
        "a public POST with no 401/403 keeps its success test: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A POST-only `/{id}` action that declares a 404 must get a 404 probe built with
/// the endpoint's REAL method (POST), not a hardcoded GET. WHY (Rule 9): the router
/// returns 405 for a GET against a POST-only route, so a GET probe would assert 404
/// against an observed 405 and fail forever — an un-greenable generated test. The
/// fix routes the missing-id probe through `request_expr` (the success builder), so
/// it POSTs and the handler's real 404-on-missing path is exercised.
#[test]
fn post_only_id_action_404_probe_uses_post_not_get() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "tickets-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "modules": [{
            "name": "tickets",
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "close_ticket", "method": "POST", "path": "/{id}/close",
                  "success": { "status": 200 },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn close_ticket_missing_id_is_404"),
        "POST-only /{{id}} action with a 404 gets a 404 test: {generated}"
    );
    // The probe must POST to the missing id (use the endpoint's method), NOT GET —
    // a GET would 405 and the 404 assertion could never pass.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("t.post_json(\"/tickets/999999/close\""),
        "404 probe must POST (the endpoint's method), not GET: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("t.get(\"/tickets/999999/close\")"),
        "404 probe must NOT be a hardcoded GET: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A tenant entity with a `unique` non-PK column must seed tenant 1 and tenant 2
/// with DISTINCT values for that column, or the second-tenant seed the isolation
/// test depends on crashes every test at setup with a UNIQUE-constraint violation.
/// WHY (Rule 9): tenant 1 and tenant 2 previously shared `'test-value'` for every
/// string column; a `unique` column then collides. Tenant 1 seeds a value distinct
/// from BOTH tenant 2 (`'test-value-2'`) AND the create-probe body (`'test-value'`,
/// `fixture_value`) — the latter is the #85 D3 fix: without it a create probe on the
/// tenant entity 409s on the pre-seeded row.
#[test]
fn two_tenant_seed_uses_distinct_values_for_a_unique_field() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "slug-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            {
                "name": "orgs",
                "entities": [{ "name": "Org", "fields": [
                    { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                    { "name": "slug", "type": "string", "unique": true }
                ]}],
                "endpoints": []
            },
            {
                "name": "projects",
                "entities": [{ "name": "Project",
                    "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Org" }],
                    "fields": [
                        { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                        { "name": "title", "type": "string" }
                    ]}],
                "endpoints": [
                    { "operation_id": "list_projects", "method": "GET", "path": "/",
                      "auth_required": true,
                      "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Project", "list": true } },
                    { "operation_id": "create_project", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                      "auth_required": true,
                      "request_body": { "entity": "Project" },
                      "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Project" } },
                    { "operation_id": "show_project", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
                      "auth_required": true,
                      "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Project" },
                      "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] }
                ]
            }
        ]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let projects = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "projects")
        .expect("projects module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, projects);

    // Tenant 1's seed uses a value DISTINCT from the create-probe body (#85 D3), so
    // it collides with neither tenant 2 nor a create probe on the tenant entity.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("VALUES (1, 'seed-test-value')"),
        "tenant 1 seeds a unique slug distinct from the probe fixture: {generated}"
    );
    // Tenant 2's seed (in seed_second_tenant) must NOT reuse the SAME slug literal —
    // it carries a distinct value so the UNIQUE constraint holds.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("VALUES (2, 'test-value-2')"),
        "tenant 2 seeds a DISTINCT slug so the unique column doesn't collide: {generated}"
    );
    // Belt-and-suspenders: the two org INSERTs must not share the same slug literal.
    let org_inserts: Vec<&str> = generated
        .lines()
        .filter(|l| l.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"orgs\\\""))
        .collect();
    assert_eq!(org_inserts.len(), 2, "two org rows seeded: {generated}");
    assert_ne!(
        org_inserts[0], org_inserts[1],
        "the two tenant org INSERTs must differ on the unique slug: {generated}"
    );
}

/// The server-owned-FK rule (issue #34): a GUARDED endpoint whose body entity
/// `belongs_to` the auth identity entity (fk column `user_id`) gets probe
/// bodies WITHOUT `user_id` — the handler injects the session user's id, so a
/// clean client that omits it must reach the designed success (the agent-eval
/// 422 scenario). Non-identity FKs stay in the body; an UNGUARDED endpoint on
/// the same entity keeps `user_id` (no session to inject). WHY: the generated
/// probes ARE the wire contract — if they still carried user_id, the contract
/// would keep lying about a field the server overwrites anyway.
#[test]
fn guarded_identity_fk_is_omitted_from_probe_bodies() {
    let s = r#"{
        "name": "linkvault",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "modules": [
            { "name": "users",
              "entities": [{ "name": "User", "fields": [
                  { "name": "email", "type": "string" } ]}],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "list_users", "method": "GET", "path": "/",
                    "auth_required": true,
                    "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "User", "list": true } }
              ] },
            { "name": "collections",
              "entities": [
                  { "name": "Collection",
                    "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
                    "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] },
                  { "name": "Bookmark",
                    "belongs_to": [
                        { "entity": "User", "on_delete": "cascade" },
                        { "entity": "Collection", "on_delete": "cascade" }
                    ],
                    "fields": [{ "name": "url", "type": "string" }] }
              ],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_collection", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                    "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Collection" },
                    "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Collection" } },
                  { "operation_id": "create_bookmark", "method": "POST", "path": "/bookmarks",
                    "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Bookmark" },
                    "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Bookmark" } },
                  { "operation_id": "import_collection", "method": "POST", "path": "/import",
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Collection" },
                    "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Collection" } }
              ] }
        ]
    }"#;
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let collections = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "collections")
        .expect("collections module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, collections);

    // (a) guarded + identity FK: the create probe body omits user_id entirely.
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "t.post_json_with(\"/collections/\", &serde_json::json!({\"title\": \"test-value\"})"
        ),
        "guarded create body must omit user_id: {generated}"
    );
    // (c) guarded + non-identity FK: collection_id stays required client input.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("serde_json::json!({\"collection_id\": 1, \"url\": \"test-value\"})"),
        "non-identity fk stays in the body: {generated}"
    );
    // (b) unguarded + identity FK: user_id stays (no session to inject).
    assert!(
        generated.contains(
            "t.post_json(\"/collections/import\", &serde_json::json!({\"user_id\": 1, \"title\": \"test-value\"}))"
        ),
        "unguarded body keeps user_id: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #47: an endpoint whose request body carries an enum `values` field gets a
/// generated acceptance test proving an OUT-OF-RANGE value is rejected with 422 at
/// the request boundary (before the DB), on BOTH the create (POST /) and update
/// (PUT /{id}) paths. WHY (Rule 9): the docs promise enum inputs are validated;
/// this pins that an out-of-range value 422s (JC0422), never dies as a 500 DB CHECK.
#[test]
fn enum_request_body_gets_out_of_range_reject_test() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let leads = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "leads")
        .expect("leads module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, leads);
    // create path (POST /) and update path (PUT /{id}) both reject out-of-range.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn create_lead_rejects_out_of_range_status"),
        "create reject test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn update_lead_rejects_out_of_range_status"),
        "update reject test: {generated}"
    );
    // the reject body carries an out-of-range sentinel and asserts 422.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"status\": \"__invalid_enum_value__\""),
        "reject body uses an out-of-range sentinel: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("as_u16(), 422"),
        "reject test asserts 422: {generated}"
    );
    // guarded endpoints thread the credential so the guard doesn't 401 first.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("_rejects_out_of_range_status() {\n    let t = app().await;\n    let res = t.post_json_with"),
        "guarded create reject threads the cookie: {generated}"
    );
}

/// The enum reject tests PASS on stubs (extraction 422s before the handler runs),
/// so gen-tests must NOT count them toward `expected_failing` — mirrors the storage
/// acceptance-test convention. Otherwise the RED-on-stubs invariant (`failed ==
/// expected_failing`) would over-count.
#[test]
fn enum_reject_tests_are_excluded_from_expected_failing() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let leads = design
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "leads")
        .expect("leads module");
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, leads);
    let total = testgen::test_count(&generated);
    let rejects = generated.matches("_rejects_out_of_range_").count();
    assert!(
        rejects >= 2,
        "at least create + update reject tests: {rejects}"
    );

    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) =
        testgen::write_acceptance(tmp.path(), &design, "leads").expect("write acceptance");
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing,
        total - rejects,
        "expected_failing must exclude exactly the reject tests (total {total}, rejects {rejects})"
    );
}

/// Slice one generated `#[tokio::test]` function body out of the acceptance file
/// (from its `async fn NAME(` to the next test), so a seeding assertion can be
/// scoped to the probe under test rather than the whole file.
fn test_body<'a>(generated: &'a str, fn_name: &str) -> &'a str {
    let start = generated
        .find(&format!("async fn {fn_name}("))
        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no `async fn {fn_name}` in:\n{generated}"));
    let rest = &generated[start..];
    match rest[1..].find("#[tokio::test]") {
        Some(i) => &rest[..=i],
        None => rest,
    }
}

/// The design behind the J3 face-off failure (issue #51): ONE module holding a
/// root entity (Project at `/`) AND a second entity (Task) with its OWN creator
/// (`POST /tasks`) and its own `/{id}` routes. `contract_version` 1, db mode, no
/// auth — the minimal reproduction.
fn j3_two_entity_module() -> Design {
    serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "j3-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "projects",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "Task", "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Project", "fields": [{ "name": "name", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "list_projects", "method": "GET", "path": "/",
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Project", "list": true } },
                { "operation_id": "create_project", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Project" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Project" } },
                { "operation_id": "list_tasks", "method": "GET", "path": "/tasks",
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Task", "list": true } },
                { "operation_id": "create_task", "method": "POST", "path": "/tasks",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Task" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Task" } },
                { "operation_id": "update_task", "method": "PUT", "path": "/tasks/{id}",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Task" },
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Task" },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] },
                { "operation_id": "delete_task", "method": "DELETE", "path": "/tasks/{id}",
                  "success": { "status": 204 },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap()
}

/// Issue #51: a `/{id}` probe for a NON-root entity must seed a row of THAT
/// entity via its own creator (`POST /tasks`), not reuse the module-root creator
/// (`POST /`, which makes a Project). Before the fix, `update_task`/`delete_task`
/// seeded a Project and then hit `/tasks/1` — 404 on a CORRECT handler.
#[test]
fn second_entity_id_probe_seeds_via_its_own_creator() {
    let design = j3_two_entity_module();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);

    for probe in ["update_task_returns_200", "delete_task_returns_204"] {
        let body = test_body(&generated, probe);
        assert!(
            body.contains("post_json(\"/projects/tasks\""),
            "{probe} must seed a Task via its own creator POST /projects/tasks:\n{body}"
        );
        // The probe addresses the seeded Task id, under the /tasks collection.
        assert!(
            body.contains("/projects/tasks/1"),
            "{probe} must address the seeded Task:\n{body}"
        );
        // ...and it must NOT reuse the root Project creator for an independent
        // entity (that seed row is the wrong table entirely).
        assert!(
            !body.contains("post_json(\"/projects/\""),
            "{probe} must not seed a Project for a Task probe:\n{body}"
        );
    }
}

/// Issue #51: when the target entity `belongs_to` another entity that has its own
/// creator in the module, the probe seeds the PARENT first (so the enforced
/// intra-module FK resolves), THEN the entity.
#[test]
fn id_probe_seeds_belongs_to_parents_before_the_entity() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "j3-fk-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "projects",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "Task",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Project" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Project", "fields": [{ "name": "name", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_project", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Project" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Project" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_task", "method": "POST", "path": "/tasks",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Task" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Task" } },
                { "operation_id": "update_task", "method": "PUT", "path": "/tasks/{id}",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Task" },
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Task" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);
    let body = test_body(&generated, "update_task_returns_200");
    let parent = body
        .find("post_json(\"/projects/\"")
        .expect("parent Project must be seeded (POST /projects/)");
    let child = body
        .find("post_json(\"/projects/tasks\"")
        .expect("Task must be seeded (POST /projects/tasks)");
    assert!(
        parent < child,
        "the parent Project must be seeded before the Task:\n{body}"
    );
    assert!(
        body.contains("\"project_id\": 1"),
        "the Task fixture must carry the fk pointing at the seeded parent:\n{body}"
    );
}

/// Issue #51: a `/{id}` endpoint whose entity has NO creator route can't be
/// seeded — degrade to an AGENT TODO instead of emitting a guaranteed-red probe.
#[test]
fn id_probe_without_a_creator_becomes_agent_todo() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "j3-nocreate-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "projects",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "Project", "fields": [{ "name": "name", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Task", "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_project", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Project" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Project" } },
                { "operation_id": "update_task", "method": "PUT", "path": "/tasks/{id}",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Task" },
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Task" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn update_task_returns_200"),
        "no un-greenable success probe when the entity can't be seeded:\n{generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("// AGENT TODO: update_task")
            && generated.contains("no creator route to seed"),
        "must emit an AGENT TODO naming the missing creator:\n{generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #48a: a design-declared format type must yield a FORMAT-VALID fixture, so
/// the endpoint's own happy-path probe is greenable against a handler that
/// validates it. `uuid` used the NIL uuid (a valid string but NOT a valid v4 — a
/// v4 validator rejects it); `datetime` was already valid RFC3339.
#[test]
fn format_typed_fields_use_valid_fixtures_not_placeholders() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "fmt-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "events",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Event", "fields": [
                { "name": "ref_id", "type": "uuid" },
                { "name": "at", "type": "datetime" }
            ]}],
            "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "create_event", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                "request_body": { "entity": "Event" },
                "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Event" } }]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);

    const V4: &str = "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479";
    assert!(
        generated.contains(V4),
        "uuid fixture must be a valid v4:\n{generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"),
        "the nil uuid is not a valid v4 — un-greenable against a v4 validator:\n{generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
        "datetime fixture stays valid RFC3339:\n{generated}"
    );
    // WHY (Rule 9): a v4-validating handler requires the version nibble = 4 and the
    // variant nibble in 8..=b. The generated literal must satisfy both or the
    // endpoint's own 2xx probe can never pass.
    let b = V4.as_bytes();
    assert_eq!(b[14], b'4', "uuid v4 version nibble");
    assert!(
        matches!(b[19], b'8' | b'9' | b'a' | b'b'),
        "uuid v4 variant nibble"
    );
}

/// Issue #53a (defaulted fields): the happy-path probe body OMITS every field
/// with a server-owned `default`, so `POST /subscribers/ {"email": ...}` proves a
/// minimal client body reaches 201 (the server applies confirmed=false /
/// status="active"). A defaulted ENUM field gets no reject probe — it is not on
/// the wire, so a bad value would be ignored, not 422'd.
#[test]
fn defaulted_fields_are_omitted_from_the_probe_body() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "news",
        "contract_version": 0,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{ "name": "subscribers",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Subscriber", "fields": [
                { "name": "email", "type": "string" },
                { "name": "confirmed", "type": "boolean", "default": false },
                { "name": "status", "type": "string", "values": ["active", "expired"], "default": "active" } ] }],
            "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "create_subscriber", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                "request_body": { "entity": "Subscriber" },
                "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Subscriber" } }] }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn create_subscriber_returns_201"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    // The probe body carries email but NOT the defaulted fields.
    assert!(generated.contains("\"email\""), "{generated}");
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("\"confirmed\"") && !generated.contains("\"status\""),
        "defaulted fields must not appear in any probe body: {generated}"
    );
    // A defaulted enum field is off the wire — no reject probe.
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("rejects_out_of_range_status"),
        "a defaulted enum field gets no boundary-reject probe: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #53b (nested parent fk): a checkin created under `POST /{habit_id}/checkins`
/// seeds a parent Habit, addresses `/habits/1/checkins`, and OMITS `habit_id` from
/// the body — the handler injects it from the path, so the row attaches to the
/// path's habit.
#[test]
fn nested_parent_fk_is_omitted_from_the_probe_body_and_taken_from_the_path() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "habits",
        "contract_version": 0,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{ "name": "habits",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "Habit", "fields": [{ "name": "name", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Checkin", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Habit" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "note", "type": "string" }] } ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_habit", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Habit" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Habit" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_checkin", "method": "POST", "path": "/{habit_id}/checkins",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Checkin" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Checkin" } }] }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn create_checkin_returns_201"),
        "{generated}"
    );
    // Seeds a Habit, then posts the checkin under the seeded habit's id.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("post_json(\"/habits/\""),
        "seed habit: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("post_json(\"/habits/1/checkins\""),
        "checkin addressed under the path's habit: {generated}"
    );
    // The checkin body carries `note` but NOT the path-redundant `habit_id`.
    assert!(generated.contains("\"note\""), "{generated}");
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("\"habit_id\""),
        "path-redundant fk must not appear in the body: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #67: the minted test credential's `SessionUser.role` must satisfy the
/// design's role gate. A HelpDesk-shaped design (roles agent/customer, an
/// `agent`-gated endpoint) must mint role `"agent"` — a hardcoded `"admin"`
/// (never a declared role) makes a CORRECT `require_role("agent")` handler 403 the
/// happy-path probe, un-greenable by construction. WHY (Rule 9): the credential
/// role is the difference between a green and a 403 on a role-gated endpoint.
#[test]
fn credential_role_is_drawn_from_the_designs_role_gate() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "helpdesk",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["agent", "customer"] },
        "modules": [{
            "name": "tickets",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Ticket", "fields": [{ "name": "subject", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "resolve_ticket", "method": "POST", "path": "/resolve",
                  "auth_required": true, "required_roles": ["agent"],
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Ticket" },
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Ticket" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("role: \"agent\".into()"),
        "the minted credential must carry the gate's role `agent`, not a hardcoded `admin`: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("role: \"admin\""),
        "no hardcoded admin role when the design declares none: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #67: a design that declares roles but gates no endpoint mints the
/// design's FIRST declared role; only a design that declares NO roles at all
/// falls back to `"admin"`. Guards the derivation's two lower rungs.
#[test]
fn credential_role_falls_back_to_first_declared_then_admin() {
    // Declares roles, gates nothing -> first declared role ("owner").
    let roled: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "roled", "contract_version": 1, "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [{ "name": "notes",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Note", "fields": [{ "name": "body", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "create_note", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                "auth_required": true, "request_body": { "entity": "Note" },
                "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Note" } }] }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let g = testgen::acceptance_rs(&roled, &roled.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        g.contains("role: \"owner\".into()"),
        "first declared role: {g}"
    );

    // Declares no roles -> "admin" fallback (byte-identical to the pre-#67 output).
    let roleless: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "roleless", "contract_version": 1, "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "auth": { "model": "session" },
        "modules": [{ "name": "notes",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Note", "fields": [{ "name": "body", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [{ "operation_id": "create_note", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                "auth_required": true, "request_body": { "entity": "Note" },
                "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Note" } }] }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let g2 = testgen::acceptance_rs(&roleless, &roleless.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        g2.contains("role: \"admin\".into()"),
        "no roles -> admin fallback: {g2}"
    );
}

/// Issue #66: the TestApp harness must wire the design's declared extensions
/// (mirroring mounting.rs) so the generated probes exercise the SAME app main.rs
/// builds. Without the realtime extension a handler's `Dep<RealtimeHandle>` fails
/// to resolve → JC1001 500 → the happy-path probe is un-greenable until the agent
/// hand-patches the harness. WHY (Rule 9): a probe that 500s on a MISSING
/// extension is testing the harness, not the contract.
#[test]
fn testapp_wires_declared_realtime_and_jobs_extensions() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "live",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "auth": { "model": "jwt", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "realtime": {
            "broadcast": [{ "name": "feed", "scope": "auth" }],
            "presence": [{ "name": "cursors", "scope": "auth" }]
        },
        "jobs": [{ "name": "sweep", "schedule": "0 * * * *", "queue": "default" }],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "posts",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Post", "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_post", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "auth_required": true, "request_body": { "entity": "Post" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Post" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".extend(jerrycan::realtime::Realtime::new(db.clone())"),
        "realtime design's TestApp must wire the realtime extension (else JC1001): {generated}"
    );
    // Issue #84: the realtime extension must also DECLARE the app's topics, so a
    // handler that publishes to one resolves instead of failing JC0404 (undeclared
    // topic) on a bare `Realtime::new`. WHY (Rule 9): a probe that 404s on a MISSING
    // topic tests the harness, not the contract.
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".broadcast(\"feed\", jerrycan::realtime::TopicScope::Auth)"),
        "realtime TestApp must declare the app's broadcast topics (issue #84): {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".presence(\"cursors\", jerrycan::realtime::TopicScope::Auth)"),
        "realtime TestApp must declare the app's presence topics (issue #84): {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".extend(jerrycan::jobs::Jobs::postgres(db.clone()))"),
        "jobs design's TestApp must wire the jobs extension: {generated}"
    );
    // The extensions take db.clone() and precede `.extend(db)` (which moves db),
    // matching mounting.rs's order. Scope the check to the builder line so the doc
    // comment (which mentions `.extend(db)` in prose) doesn't confuse the search.
    let builder = generated
        .lines()
        .find(|l| l.contains("App::new()"))
        .expect("app() builder line");
    let realtime_at = builder.find(".extend(jerrycan::realtime").unwrap();
    let db_at = builder.find(".extend(db)").unwrap();
    assert!(
        realtime_at < db_at,
        "extensions must precede .extend(db): {builder}"
    );
    // The deliberately EXCLUDED extensions are documented in the harness comment.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("issue #66")
            && generated.contains("observe")
            && generated.contains("validate"),
        "the harness must document which extensions it excludes and why: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #66: a storage design's TestApp wires the storage extension with a
/// test-env-safe in-memory store (no `from_env`/secrets), mirroring storagegen.
#[test]
fn testapp_wires_declared_storage_extension() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "files",
        "contract_version": 2,
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "storage": { "buckets": [{ "name": "avatars", "visibility": "public" }] },
        "modules": [{
            "name": "profiles",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Profile", "fields": [{ "name": "handle", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_profile", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "auth_required": true, "request_body": { "entity": "Profile" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Profile" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains(".extend(jerrycan::storage::Storage::memory().with_sign_secret("),
        "storage design's TestApp must wire an in-memory Storage extension: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #66: a plain db(+validate) design declares none of storage/jobs/realtime,
/// so the harness stays byte-for-byte as before — no new extension extends, no
/// exclusion comment. This is the no-drift guard for todo-api's generated bytes.
#[test]
fn plain_db_design_harness_is_unchanged_by_extension_wiring() {
    let design = golden(true); // todo-api, db mode, no extensions
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("issue #66"),
        "no extension-wiring comment for a design that declares no extensions: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("jerrycan::jobs::")
            && !generated.contains("jerrycan::realtime::")
            && !generated.contains("jerrycan::storage::"),
        "no extension extends for a plain db design: {generated}"
    );
}

/// Issue #68: when the creator that seeds a sibling `/{id}` probe is marked
/// `probe: "skip"` (a hand-written validator rejects the generated fixture), the
/// seed POST would 404 every downstream probe. The generator must NOT emit those
/// guaranteed-red sibling probes — it emits an AGENT TODO instead, and the doomed
/// probes are excluded from `expected_failing`. This is JR4's exact shape.
#[test]
fn skipped_creator_suppresses_sibling_id_probes() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "sitemonitor",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "monitors",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Monitor",
                "fields": [{ "name": "url", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [
                // The creator rejects the generated fixture (url must be http/https),
                // so it is marked probe: skip. It must not seed sibling /{id} probes.
                { "operation_id": "create_monitor", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "probe": "skip", "request_body": { "entity": "Monitor" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Monitor" } },
                { "operation_id": "get_monitor", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Monitor" },
                  "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] },
                { "operation_id": "delete_monitor", "method": "DELETE", "path": "/{id}",
                  "success": { "status": 204 } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);
    // No guaranteed-red sibling success probes seeded through the skipped creator.
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn get_monitor_returns_200"),
        "a probe:skip creator must not seed a sibling GET /{{id}} success probe: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn delete_monitor_returns_204"),
        "a probe:skip creator must not seed a sibling DELETE /{{id}} success probe: {generated}"
    );
    // It emits an AGENT TODO naming the skipped-creator reason instead.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("// AGENT TODO: get_monitor") && generated.contains("probe: skip"),
        "must emit an AGENT TODO explaining the skipped seed creator: {generated}"
    );
    // The 404 missing-id probe does NOT need a seed (it hits a missing id), so it
    // stays — the creator's validator never touches the getter.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn get_monitor_missing_id_is_404"),
        "the missing-id 404 probe needs no seed and must remain greenable: {generated}"
    );

    // expected_failing counts only the emitted, greenable tests. The doomed sibling
    // success probes are NOT counted.
    let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("jc68-{}", std::process::id()));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(tmp.join("crates/routes/monitors/tests")).unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) = testgen::write_acceptance(&tmp, &design, "monitors").unwrap();
    // Only the create_monitor probe:skip TODO + the get/delete sibling TODOs remain;
    // the sole greenable RED-on-stubs test is get_monitor_missing_id_is_404.
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing, 1,
        "only the 404 missing-id probe is a counted RED-on-stubs test: {generated}"
    );
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}

/// Issue #123(b): a GUARDED `/{id}` sibling of a `probe: "skip"` creator loses
/// its seeded success probe (issue #68 — the skipped creator can't seed it) but
/// KEEPS its `_without_auth_is_401` guard test. WHY (Rule 9): the guard rejects
/// a credential-less request before the id lookup, so a literal id stands in
/// and no seed is needed — dropping the test would silently un-test a real guard.
#[test]
fn skipped_creator_guarded_sibling_keeps_the_401_guard_test() {
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "sitemonitor",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["admin"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "monitors",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Monitor",
                "fields": [{ "name": "url", "type": "string" }] }],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_monitor", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "auth_required": true, "probe": "skip",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Monitor" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Monitor" } },
                { "operation_id": "get_monitor", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
                  "auth_required": true,
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Monitor" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, &design.modules[0]);
    // The seeded success probe stays suppressed (issue #68)...
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("async fn get_monitor_returns_200"),
        "a probe:skip creator still suppresses the sibling success probe: {generated}"
    );
    // ...but the guarded sibling keeps its 401 guard test, on a literal id.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn get_monitor_without_auth_is_401"),
        "a guarded sibling of a skipped creator keeps its 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"/monitors/1\""),
        "the sibling 401 probe pins {{id}} to a literal — no seed needed: {generated}"
    );
    // The guarded skipped creator itself keeps its own 401 guard test too.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn create_monitor_without_auth_is_401"),
        "the guarded skipped creator keeps its own 401 guard test: {generated}"
    );
}

/// A subroute-mounted, tenant-owned module: `channels` mounts at
/// `/workspaces/{workspace_id}/channels` (the tenant fk rides in the MOUNT prefix,
/// not `ep.path`), and each Channel `belongs_to` the tenant Workspace.
const WORKSPACE_CHANNELS_NESTED: &str = r#"{
    "name": "chat-api", "contract_version": 1,
    "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
    "tenancy": { "entity": "Workspace", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
    "modules": [
        { "name": "workspaces",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Workspace", "fields": [
              { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_workspace", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Workspace" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Workspace" } },
              { "operation_id": "list_workspaces", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Workspace", "list": true } } ] },
        { "name": "channels", "mount": "/workspaces/{workspace_id}/channels",
          "entities": [{ "name": "Channel", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Workspace" }],
              "fields": [{ "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "name", "type": "string" }] }],
          "endpoints": [
              { "operation_id": "create_channel", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                "request_body": { "entity": "Channel" }, "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Channel" } },
              { "operation_id": "get_channel", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}", "auth_required": true,
                "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Channel" },
                "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] } ] }
    ]
}"#;

/// Issue #81: a subroute-mounted module's per-endpoint acceptance URLs must
/// substitute the mount-inherited path param with the seeded parent id (1), not
/// leave the literal `{workspace_id}` token. WHY (Rule 9): `channels` inherits
/// `{workspace_id}` in its MOUNT (not `ep.path`); left literal, the router
/// 400/404s the whole test group, so a correct app's tests are red BY CONSTRUCTION
/// and the builder re-scaffolds (the round-5 eval's biggest token sink). The mount
/// param is the tenant fk, seeded at id 1 by app()'s tenant chain, so pinning it to
/// `1` makes every probe URL concrete AND resolvable.
#[test]
fn subroute_mount_param_is_substituted_in_per_endpoint_urls() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(WORKSPACE_CHANNELS_NESTED).unwrap();
    let channels = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "channels").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, channels);

    // No REQUEST url (`t.<verb>(...)`) may carry the literal mount param. The router
    // registration line (`.mount("/workspaces/{workspace_id}/channels", ...)`) keeps
    // the param PATTERN by design, so it is excluded from this check.
    for line in out
        .lines()
        .filter(|l| l.contains("    t.") || l.contains("= t."))
    {
        assert!(
            !line.contains("{workspace_id}"),
            "a request URL carries the literal mount param:\n{line}\n---\n{out}"
        );
    }
    // The create success test posts to the concrete, seeded-parent collection URL.
    let create = test_body(&out, "create_channel_returns_201");
    assert!(
        create.contains("t.post_json_with(\"/workspaces/1/channels/\""),
        "create URL pins the mount param to the seeded id 1:\n{create}"
    );
    // The by-id GET success test seeds via the concrete collection URL, then probes
    // the seeded row under the concrete mount (own `{id}` -> seeded id 1 as well).
    let get = test_body(&out, "get_channel_returns_200");
    assert!(
        get.contains("post_json_with(\"/workspaces/1/channels/\"")
            && get.contains("/workspaces/1/channels/1"),
        "get URL seeds + probes under the concrete mount:\n{get}"
    );
    // The missing-id 404 probe substitutes the mount param and probes a missing id.
    let missing = test_body(&out, "get_channel_missing_id_is_404");
    assert!(
        missing.contains("/workspaces/1/channels/999999"),
        "404 probe substitutes the mount param:\n{missing}"
    );
}

/// A FLAT module (no mount param) with a standalone `/{id}` route.
const FLAT_CUSTOMERS: &str = r#"{
    "name": "shop", "contract_version": 1, "dependencies": ["db"],
    "modules": [{
        "name": "customers",
        "entities": [{ "name": "Customer", "fields": [
            { "name": "id", "type": "integer" }, { "name": "email", "type": "string" } ]}],
        "endpoints": [
            { "operation_id": "create_customer", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
              "request_body": { "entity": "Customer" },
              "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Customer" } },
            { "operation_id": "show_customer", "method": "GET", "path": "/{id}",
              "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Customer" },
              "errors": [{ "status": 404, "when": "unknown id" }] }
        ]
    }]
}"#;

/// Issue #81 (byte-identity guard): a FLAT module (no mount param) must be
/// UNCHANGED by the mount-substitution fix — its accumulated mount carries no
/// `{param}` to substitute, so the substitution is the identity. WHY (Rule 9): the
/// fix is test-generation-only and must touch ONLY nested-mount modules; a
/// regression that rewrote flat URLs would silently change every non-nested app's
/// generated tests.
#[test]
fn flat_module_urls_are_unchanged_by_mount_substitution() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(FLAT_CUSTOMERS).unwrap();
    let customers = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "customers").unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, customers);
    // The flat create posts to the plain collection URL (no cookie: no auth)...
    assert!(
        out.contains("t.post_json(\"/customers/\""),
        "flat create URL is the plain collection path: {out}"
    );
    // ...the by-id probe addresses the seeded row directly under it, and the 404
    // probe hits a missing id — both plain, no nested segment.
    let show = test_body(&out, "show_customer_returns_200");
    assert!(
        show.contains("/customers/1"),
        "flat by-id URL is the plain path:\n{show}"
    );
    assert!(
        out.contains("/customers/999999"),
        "flat 404 URL is the plain path: {out}"
    );
    // No substitution artifact leaks into a flat file (no nested `/customers/<id>/…`).
    assert!(
        !out.contains("/customers/1/"),
        "a flat module must not gain a nested mount segment: {out}"
    );
}

/// Issue #85 (D3): a `unique` field on the tenant entity must seed a value
/// DISTINCT from the create-probe body, or the create probe 409s on the
/// pre-seeded tenant row. This tenant module owns a child (`Project`), so `app()`
/// pre-seeds the `Org` tenant row — and `create_org`'s probe body must not reuse
/// that row's unique `slug`. WHY (Rule 9): the round-4 `index` workaround did NOT
/// prevent the collision; only a distinct seed value keeps the create probe green.
#[test]
fn unique_tenant_field_seed_does_not_collide_with_the_create_probe() {
    const UNIQUE_TENANT: &str = r#"{
        "name": "orgs", "contract_version": 0,
        "auth": { "model": "session" },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner"] },
        "modules": [{ "name": "orgs",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "Org", "fields": [
                    { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                    { "name": "slug", "type": "string", "unique": true } ] },
                { "name": "Project", "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Org" }],
                  "fields": [
                    { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                    { "name": "title", "type": "string" } ] } ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "list_orgs", "method": "GET", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Org", "list": true } },
                { "operation_id": "create_org", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Org" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Org" } } ] }]
    }"#;
    let design: Design = serde_json::from_str(UNIQUE_TENANT).unwrap();
    let module = &design.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&design, module);
    // The create probe carries the ordinary string fixture for the unique slug.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"slug\": \"test-value\""),
        "create probe posts the string fixture for slug:\n{generated}"
    );
    // The pre-seeded tenant-1 row must NOT reuse that same unique value, else the
    // create probe 409s on the seeded row.
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("VALUES (1, 'test-value')"),
        "tenant-1 seed must not reuse the probe's unique slug value (would 409):\n{generated}"
    );
}

/// #107 (0.6.0 §D): the TENANT module's acceptance file carries the generated
/// member-surface tests — list, add (201), non-admin add (403), set-role (204,
/// persisted), remove (204, persisted), last-admin 409 on BOTH demote and
/// remove, self-removal without the admin role (204), and out-of-set role
/// (422). WHY (Rule 9): these routes are tool-owned real handlers, and these
/// tests are the runtime backstop that keeps the #107 security rules (admin
/// gate, last-admin lockout, role allow-list) from silently regressing in any
/// scaffolded app. They run under `jerrycan check` like every generated test.
#[test]
fn tenant_module_gets_member_surface_tests() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let workspaces = d
        .modules
        .iter()
        .find(|m| m.name == "workspaces")
        .expect("workspaces module");
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, workspaces);

    // All nine tests, named after the member-route operation ids.
    for expected in [
        "async fn list_workspace_members_returns_200",
        "async fn add_workspace_member_returns_201",
        "async fn add_workspace_member_without_the_admin_role_is_403",
        "async fn set_workspace_member_role_returns_204",
        "async fn remove_workspace_member_returns_204",
        "async fn set_workspace_member_role_last_admin_demotion_is_409",
        "async fn remove_workspace_member_last_admin_is_409",
        "async fn remove_workspace_member_self_leave_returns_204",
        "async fn add_workspace_member_rejects_out_of_range_role",
    ] {
        assert!(out.contains(expected), "missing {expected}\n{out}");
    }
    // member_app() seeds the setup via RAW SQL (never the stubbed creator):
    // tenant 1, user 1 as the admin (member_roles[0] = owner), user 2 as the
    // non-admin member the 403/self-leave probes act as.
    let member_fn = out
        .split("async fn member_app()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("member_app() helper")
        .split("#[tokio::test]")
        .next()
        .unwrap();
    assert!(
        member_fn.contains(
            "INSERT INTO \\\"workspace_members\\\" (user_id, workspace_id, role) VALUES (1, 1, 'owner')"
        ) && member_fn.contains(
            "INSERT INTO \\\"workspace_members\\\" (user_id, workspace_id, role) VALUES (2, 1, 'member')"
        ),
        "member_app seeds the admin (user 1) and a non-admin member (user 2) in tenant 1: {member_fn}"
    );
    assert!(
        member_fn.contains("INSERT INTO \\\"workspaces\\\"") && member_fn.contains("'trial'"),
        "member_app seeds the tenant row with a CHECK-valid enum value: {member_fn}"
    );
    assert!(
        member_fn.contains(".provide_dep(shared::tenant)"),
        "member_app registers the Tenant factory the member handlers resolve: {member_fn}"
    );
    // The probe URLs are path-scoped under the seeded tenant fk, and the jwt
    // credential is threaded per the auth model.
    assert!(
        out.contains("t.get_with(\"/workspaces/1/members\"")
            && out.contains("/workspaces/1/members/2")
            && out.contains("(\"authorization\", &test_cookie_for(2))"),
        "member probes hit the path-scoped member routes as distinct users: {out}"
    );
    // The 403 probe acts as the NON-admin (user 2); the last-admin probes act
    // on the SOLE admin (user 1).
    let forbidden = test_body(&out, "add_workspace_member_without_the_admin_role_is_403");
    assert!(
        forbidden.contains("test_cookie_for(2)") && forbidden.contains("403"),
        "the 403 probe must act as the non-admin member:\n{forbidden}"
    );
    let last_admin = test_body(&out, "remove_workspace_member_last_admin_is_409");
    assert!(
        last_admin.contains("/workspaces/1/members/1") && last_admin.contains("409"),
        "the last-admin probe removes the sole admin (user 1) and expects 409:\n{last_admin}"
    );
    // Self-leave: user 2 deletes their OWN membership — 204 without the admin role.
    let leave = test_body(&out, "remove_workspace_member_self_leave_returns_204");
    assert!(
        leave.contains("/workspaces/1/members/2") && leave.contains("test_cookie_for(2)"),
        "self-leave acts as user 2 on their own membership:\n{leave}"
    );

    // Confinement: a NON-tenant module of the same design gains nothing…
    let leads = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "leads").unwrap();
    let leads_out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, leads);
    assert!(
        !leads_out.contains("member_app") && !leads_out.contains("_members_returns_"),
        "non-tenant modules must not gain member tests: {leads_out}"
    );
    // …and a non-tenancy design stays byte-free of the surface.
    let plain = golden(true);
    let plain_out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&plain, &plain.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !plain_out.contains("member_app"),
        "a non-tenancy design must not gain member tests: {plain_out}"
    );
}

/// #107: the member-surface tests PASS on a fresh scaffold (tool-owned real
/// handlers, raw-SQL seeds), so they must be EXCLUDED from the RED-on-stubs
/// `expected_failing` baseline — exactly like the enum reject probes. WHY
/// (Rule 9): `jerrycan check` compares observed failures against this count; if
/// the 9 green member tests were counted, every tenancy app's check would
/// report a broken baseline forever.
#[test]
fn member_surface_tests_are_excluded_from_expected_failing() {
    let s = include_str!("../../../conformance/designs/reference-slice.design.json");
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(s).unwrap();
    let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("jc107-{}", std::process::id()));
    std::fs::create_dir_all(tmp.join("crates/routes/workspaces/tests")).unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) = testgen::write_acceptance(&tmp, &d, "workspaces").unwrap();
    let generated =
        std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.join("crates/routes/workspaces/tests/acceptance.rs")).unwrap();
    std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
    // workspaces emits 15 tests. Its reads are `public: true` (public discovery),
    // so no read 401 probe and no I1 test. Counted toward expected_failing: list(1)
    // + create(1) + create-401(1) + show(1) + show-404(1) = 5 (the long-standing
    // baseline). Excluded: the create enum-reject probe (1) and the member
    // surface (9) — both pass on stubs.
    assert_eq!(
        testgen::test_count(&generated),
        15,
        "5 endpoint probes + 1 enum reject + 9 member tests: {generated}"
    );
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing, 5,
        "the enum reject probe and the 9 member tests must be excluded: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #107: a SINGLE-role tenancy design (member_roles = ["owner"]) keeps only the
/// member tests that need no second, non-admin role: list, add (another admin),
/// last-admin remove 409, and the 422 role probe. The 403/re-role/remove/
/// demote/self-leave probes all REQUIRE a seeded non-admin member, which a
/// one-role design cannot express — emitting them would produce un-greenable
/// tests (user 2 would be an admin, so the 403 could never fire).
#[test]
fn single_role_tenancy_keeps_only_the_roleless_member_tests() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "solo-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Org", "member_roles": ["owner"] },
        "modules": [{
            "name": "orgs",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Org", "fields": [
                { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                { "name": "name", "type": "string" } ]}],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_org", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Org" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Org" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let out = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    for expected in [
        "async fn list_org_members_returns_200",
        "async fn add_org_member_returns_201",
        "async fn remove_org_member_last_admin_is_409",
        "async fn add_org_member_rejects_out_of_range_role",
    ] {
        assert!(out.contains(expected), "missing {expected}\n{out}");
    }
    for absent in [
        "without_the_admin_role_is_403",
        "set_org_member_role_returns_204",
        "async fn remove_org_member_returns_204",
        "last_admin_demotion_is_409",
        "self_leave_returns_204",
    ] {
        assert!(
            !out.contains(absent),
            "a one-role design must not emit `{absent}` (needs a non-admin member):\n{out}"
        );
    }
    // No second membership is seeded — there is no second role to hold.
    assert!(
        !out.contains("VALUES (2, 1,"),
        "single-role member_app seeds no user-2 membership: {out}"
    );
    // The single add test adds another admin (the only declared role).
    let add = test_body(&out, "add_org_member_returns_201");
    assert!(
        add.contains("\"role\": \"owner\""),
        "single-role add uses the only declared role:\n{add}"
    );
}

// ---- #80: constraint-aware fixtures/seeds + the out-of-range 422 probe ----

/// One module, one entity with the given fields, a POST "/" creator and a
/// PUT "/{id}" updater — the minimal design the #80 testgen changes act on.
fn constrained_design(fields: serde_json::Value) -> Design {
    serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "shop-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "items",
            "entities": [{ "name": "Item", "fields": fields }],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_item", "method": "POST", "path": "/",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Item" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Item" } },
                { "operation_id": "update_item", "method": "PUT", "path": "/{id}",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Item" },
                  "success": { "status": 200, "entity": "Item" } }
            ]
        }]
    }))
    .unwrap()
}

/// #80: a constrained field's happy-path fixture must be IN-RANGE — the design
/// declares the bound precisely so the generator can derive a fixture that
/// clears the deserialize validator and the migration CHECK (the whole point
/// of #80: no more hand-written `Valid` impls rejecting `"test-value"`/`1`).
#[test]
fn constrained_fixtures_are_derived_in_range() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "quantity", "type": "integer", "min": 5, "max": 600 },
        { "name": "code", "type": "string", "max_len": 5 },
        { "name": "body", "type": "string", "min_len": 12 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    // Integer: the default 1 clamps up to min (5).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"quantity\": 5"),
        "int fixture must clamp into [5, 600]: {generated}"
    );
    // String over max_len: "test-value" truncates to 5 code points.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"code\": \"test-\""),
        "string fixture must truncate to max_len: {generated}"
    );
    // String under min_len: a synthesized minimum-length value.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"body\": \"aaaaaaaaaaaa\""),
        "string fixture must satisfy min_len (12): {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80: a constrained request body gets an out-of-range 422 reject probe on
/// BOTH the create and update paths (mirroring the #47 enum probes). WHY
/// (Rule 9): the docs promise a declared bound is enforced at the request
/// boundary; this pins that an out-of-range value 422s (JC0422), never dies
/// as a 500 at the DB CHECK.
#[test]
fn constrained_body_gets_out_of_range_reject_probe_on_create_and_update() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "quantity", "type": "integer", "min": 1, "max": 600 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn create_item_rejects_out_of_range_quantity"),
        "create reject probe: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn update_item_rejects_out_of_range_quantity"),
        "update reject probe: {generated}"
    );
    // The probe corrupts ONLY the constrained field, to max + 1.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"quantity\": 601"),
        "reject body carries max + 1: {generated}"
    );
    let probe = test_body(&generated, "create_item_rejects_out_of_range_quantity");
    assert!(probe.contains("as_u16(), 422"), "asserts 422:\n{probe}");
    // The happy-path fixture stays in-range (1 is inside [1, 600]).
    let happy = test_body(&generated, "create_item_returns_201");
    assert!(
        happy.contains("\"quantity\": 1"),
        "in-range fixture:\n{happy}"
    );
}

/// #80 (0.6.5 final review, Critical): `serde_json::json!` types a bare
/// numeric literal as `i32`, so a constrained-integer fixture or reject value
/// OUTSIDE i32 range must be emitted `i64`-suffixed — a plain `3000000000`
/// inside a probe body is a HARD compile error in the generated suite
/// (deny-by-default `overflowing_literals`), failing `cargo test` on a
/// JC0552-clean design. Values inside i32 range stay unsuffixed, keeping
/// every existing design's output byte-identical.
#[test]
fn out_of_i32_range_bounds_emit_i64_suffixed_literals() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "starts_at", "type": "integer", "min": 0, "max": 4102444800i64 },
        { "name": "seq", "type": "integer", "min": 3000000000i64 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    // Happy-path fixture: clamp(1) up to min 3000000000 — beyond i32, suffixed.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"seq\": 3000000000i64"),
        "out-of-i32-range fixture must be i64-suffixed: {generated}"
    );
    // Reject literal: max + 1 = 4102444801 — beyond i32, suffixed.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"starts_at\": 4102444801i64"),
        "out-of-i32-range reject literal must be i64-suffixed: {generated}"
    );
    // A constrained value INSIDE i32 range stays a plain literal (the
    // byte-identity guarantee for every existing design).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"starts_at\": 1,"),
        "in-i32-range fixture stays unsuffixed: {generated}"
    );

    // The negative direction: a bound below i32::MIN suffixes too.
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "depth", "type": "integer", "max": -3000000000i64 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"depth\": -3000000000i64"),
        "below-i32::MIN fixture must be i64-suffixed: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80: the constraint reject probes PASS on stubs (the 422 precedes the
/// handler), so `expected_failing` must exclude them — exactly like the #47
/// enum rejects. Otherwise the RED-on-stubs invariant over-counts.
#[test]
fn constraint_reject_probes_are_excluded_from_expected_failing() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "quantity", "type": "integer", "min": 1, "max": 600 },
        { "name": "code", "type": "string", "max_len": 5 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    let total = testgen::test_count(&generated);
    let rejects = generated
        .matches("async fn create_item_rejects_out_of_range_")
        .count()
        + generated
            .matches("async fn update_item_rejects_out_of_range_")
            .count();
    assert!(rejects >= 2, "create + update reject probes: {generated}");

    let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let (_rel, expected_failing) =
        testgen::write_acceptance(tmp.path(), &d, "items").expect("write acceptance");
    assert_eq!(
        expected_failing,
        total - rejects,
        "expected_failing must exclude exactly the reject probes (total {total}, rejects {rejects})"
    );
}

/// #80: a string bound's reject literal is emitted as a `"a".repeat(n)`
/// EXPRESSION (serde_json::json! accepts expressions), so the generated file
/// never embeds a giant literal; over-max is preferred, under-min is the
/// fallback.
#[test]
fn string_reject_probe_uses_a_repeat_expression() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "code", "type": "string", "max_len": 5 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"code\": \"a\".repeat(6)"),
        "over-max reject sends max_len + 1 code points: {generated}"
    );

    // min_len-only: the under-min direction (min_len - 1).
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "body", "type": "string", "min_len": 3 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"body\": \"a\".repeat(2)"),
        "under-min reject sends min_len - 1 code points: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80 (T1 review, Important-b): a very large `max_len` must NOT materialize a
/// multi-megabyte over-max string at test run time — above the 4096 fixture
/// cap the probe falls back to the under-`min_len` direction, or (no usable
/// min_len) emits no probe at all.
#[test]
fn huge_max_len_never_materializes_an_over_max_reject_string() {
    // No min_len: nothing rejectable below, over-max too large — no probe.
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "body", "type": "string", "max_len": 100000 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("_rejects_out_of_range_"),
        "an over-cap max_len with no min_len emits no probe: {generated}"
    );
    // The happy fixture still fits (10 <= 100000) and stays the plain literal.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"body\": \"test-value\""),
        "{generated}"
    );

    // With a usable min_len the probe flips to the under-min direction.
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "body", "type": "string", "min_len": 3, "max_len": 100000 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"body\": \"a\".repeat(2)"),
        "over-cap max_len falls back to under-min: {generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("repeat(100001)"),
        "never materialize an over-cap string: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80: a bound at the i64 extreme is vacuous — the generated validator gates
/// it out (`bounds_rules`), so the probe must not target it: `max: i64::MAX`
/// falls back to `min - 1`; with BOTH extremes gated nothing is rejectable and
/// no probe is emitted.
#[test]
fn i64_extreme_bounds_fall_back_or_skip_the_probe() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "views", "type": "integer", "min": 1, "max": i64::MAX }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        generated.contains("\"views\": 0"),
        "max at i64::MAX falls back to min - 1: {generated}"
    );

    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "views", "type": "integer", "min": i64::MIN, "max": i64::MAX }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("_rejects_out_of_range_"),
        "both extremes gated: nothing rejectable, no probe: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80: a defaulted constrained field is omitted from the create request DTO
/// (issue #53a), so a bad value would be dropped, not 422'd — no reject probe
/// (the same rule `first_enum_field` applies to defaulted enum fields).
#[test]
fn defaulted_constrained_field_gets_no_reject_probe() {
    let d = constrained_design(serde_json::json!([
        { "name": "quantity", "type": "integer", "min": 1, "max": 600, "default": 1 }
    ]));
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("_rejects_out_of_range_"),
        "a defaulted field cannot be rejected at the boundary: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #80: the SQL tenant seeds stay IN-RANGE and (for `unique` fields) DISTINCT
/// from each other and from the HTTP probe fixture — a constrained unique
/// field must survive the migration CHECK on tenant 1 AND tenant 2 without
/// colliding with the create probe's body (#85's invariant, now under bounds).
#[test]
fn tenant_seeds_for_constrained_unique_fields_stay_in_range_and_distinct() {
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
        "name": "crm-api",
        "contract_version": 1,
        "auth": { "model": "session", "roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "dependencies": ["db", "auth"],
        "tenancy": { "entity": "Workspace", "member_roles": ["owner", "member"] },
        "modules": [
            { "name": "workspaces",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Workspace", "fields": [
                  { "name": "id", "type": "integer" },
                  { "name": "slots", "type": "integer", "unique": true, "min": 5, "max": 600 },
                  { "name": "slug", "type": "string", "unique": true, "max_len": 8 }
              ]}],
              "endpoints": [] },
            { "name": "leads",
              "entities": [{ "name": "Lead",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "Workspace", "on_delete": "cascade" }],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "name", "type": "string" }] }],
              "endpoints": [
                  { "operation_id": "create_lead", "method": "POST", "path": "/", "auth_required": true,
                    "request_body": { "entity": "Lead" },
                    "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Lead" } }
              ] }
        ]
    }))
    .unwrap();
    let leads = d.modules.iter().find(|m| m.name == "leads").unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, leads);
    // Tenant 1: slots = the 1st distinct in-range value after the fixture
    // anchor (5) → 6; slug = 'seed-test-value' fitted to max_len 8.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("VALUES (1, 6, 'seed-tes')"),
        "tenant-1 seed must be in-range and distinct from the fixture: {generated}"
    );
    // Tenant 2: slots = the 2nd distinct value (7); slug keeps its
    // discriminator through the fit (front-loaded '2').
    assert!(
        generated.contains("VALUES (2, 7, '2-test-v')"),
        "tenant-2 seed must be in-range and distinct from tenant 1: {generated}"
    );
}

/// #115 composite / multi-column UNIQUE: an entity with `unique: [["user_id",
/// "post_id"]]` gets a `{entity}_composite_unique_{ordinal}_is_409` test — seed the
/// parents, create a row, then POST a body that agrees on the group → assert 409
/// (the DB unique index makes the duplicate a conflict). Byte-identity twin: an
/// entity with no composite `unique` emits no such test.
#[test]
fn composite_unique_emits_a_409_conflict_test() {
    const LIKES: &str = r#"{
        "name": "likes-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "engagement",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Post", "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Like",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User" }, { "entity": "Post" }],
                  "unique": [["user_id", "post_id"]],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "reaction", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_user", "method": "POST", "path": "/users",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "User" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "User" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_post", "method": "POST", "path": "/posts",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Post" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Post" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_like", "method": "POST", "path": "/likes",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Like" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Like" } }
            ]
        }]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(LIKES).unwrap();
    let module = &d.modules[0];
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, module);
    // The named test exists, keyed on the entity snake + the group ordinal.
    assert!(
        generated.contains("async fn like_composite_unique_0_is_409()"),
        "the composite-unique 409 test must be emitted:\n{generated}"
    );
    // It seeds both belongs_to parents (an enforced intra-module fk must resolve).
    assert!(
        generated.contains("/engagement/users") && generated.contains("/engagement/posts"),
        "the 409 test must seed the User and Post parents:\n{generated}"
    );
    // It posts the create body twice and asserts the second is a 409.
    let body = generated
        .split("async fn like_composite_unique_0_is_409()")
        .nth(1)
        .unwrap();
    let body = body.split("\n}\n").next().unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        body.matches("/engagement/likes").count(),
        2,
        "two POSTs to the likes collection (first + duplicate):\n{body}"
    );
    assert!(
        body.contains("assert_eq!(dup.status().as_u16(), 409"),
        "the duplicate insert must assert 409:\n{body}"
    );

    // Byte-identity twin: drop the composite unique → no such test.
    let plain = d.clone();
    let mut v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::to_value(&plain).unwrap();
    v["modules"][0]["entities"][2]
        .as_object_mut()
        .unwrap()
        .remove("unique");
    let plain: Design = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
    let plain_gen = testgen::acceptance_rs(&plain, &plain.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !plain_gen.contains("_composite_unique_"),
        "an entity with no composite unique emits no 409 conflict test:\n{plain_gen}"
    );
}

/// #115 review — isolation: the composite-unique 409 test must trip ONLY on the
/// composite index, so its two create bodies AGREE on the group columns
/// (`user_id`, `course_id`) and DIFFER on every OTHER unique key — a `unique`
/// field `code` and the explicit string pk `id`. Without this the dup would 409 on
/// `code` (or on the constant pk) and pass GREEN even if the composite index were
/// missing — a green-means-safe erosion (spec §D).
#[test]
fn composite_unique_dup_bumps_competing_unique_columns_and_pk() {
    const ENROLL: &str = r#"{
        "name": "enroll-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "enrollments",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "User", "fields": [{ "name": "email", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Course", "fields": [{ "name": "title", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Enrollment",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "User" }, { "entity": "Course" }],
                  "unique": [["user_id", "course_id"]],
                  "fields": [
                      { "name": "id", "type": "string" },
                      { "name": "code", "type": "string", "unique": true }
                  ] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_user", "method": "POST", "path": "/users",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "User" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "User" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_course", "method": "POST", "path": "/courses",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Course" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Course" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_enrollment", "method": "POST", "path": "/enrollments",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Enrollment" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Enrollment" } }
            ]
        }]
    }"#;
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(ENROLL).unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    // Isolate the 409 test body (first POST + dup POST).
    let body = generated
        .split("async fn enrollment_composite_unique_0_is_409()")
        .nth(1)
        .expect("the composite-unique 409 test must be emitted");
    let body = body.split("\n}\n").next().unwrap();
    // Two POSTs to the enrollments collection: the first + the duplicate.
    let first = body.split("let dup =").next().unwrap();
    let dup = &body[body.find("let dup =").unwrap()..];

    // The GROUP columns are held constant: both bodies carry the SAME fk values
    // (fk_fixture_value → 1 for both user_id and course_id).
    assert!(
        first.contains("\"user_id\": 1") && first.contains("\"course_id\": 1"),
        "the first body must carry the seeded group fks:\n{first}"
    );
    assert!(
        dup.contains("\"user_id\": 1") && dup.contains("\"course_id\": 1"),
        "the dup must AGREE with the first on the group columns:\n{dup}"
    );
    // The competing `unique` field `code` is bumped: the first uses the fixture
    // value, the dup a DISTINCT one, so the dup can't 409 on the `code` unique.
    assert!(
        first.contains("\"code\": \"test-value\""),
        "the first body uses the `code` fixture value:\n{first}"
    );
    assert!(
        dup.contains("\"code\": \"test-value-2\"") && !dup.contains("\"code\": \"test-value\""),
        "the dup must bump the competing `code` unique to a DISTINCT value:\n{dup}"
    );
    // The explicit string pk `id` is bumped too (else a constant pk would 409).
    assert!(
        first.contains("\"id\": \"test-value\""),
        "the first body carries the constant fixture pk:\n{first}"
    );
    assert!(
        dup.contains("\"id\": \"test-value-2\"") && !dup.contains("\"id\": \"test-value\""),
        "the dup must bump the explicit pk to a DISTINCT value:\n{dup}"
    );
    assert!(
        dup.contains("assert_eq!(dup.status().as_u16(), 409"),
        "the duplicate insert must assert 409:\n{dup}"
    );
}

/// #115 review — isolation escape hatch: with `>1` composite group and no
/// single-column `unique`/pk to bump, a second fk-only group is held fully constant
/// by the dup and would 409 on ITS index — so neither group's 409 can be attributed
/// to one index. The generator emits an AGENT TODO instead of a false-green probe.
#[test]
fn composite_unique_skips_with_agent_todo_when_a_competing_group_masks() {
    const TWO_GROUPS: &str = r#"{
        "name": "pairs-api", "contract_version": 1,
        "dependencies": ["db"],
        "modules": [{
            "name": "pairs",
            "entities": [
                { "name": "A", "fields": [{ "name": "label", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "B", "fields": [{ "name": "label", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "C", "fields": [{ "name": "label", "type": "string" }] },
                { "name": "Pair",
                  "belongs_to": [{ "entity": "A" }, { "entity": "B" }, { "entity": "C" }],
                  "unique": [["a_id", "b_id"], ["a_id", "c_id"]],
                  "fields": [{ "name": "note", "type": "string" }] }
            ],
            "endpoints": [
                { "operation_id": "create_a", "method": "POST", "path": "/as",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "A" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "A" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_b", "method": "POST", "path": "/bs",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "B" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "B" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_c", "method": "POST", "path": "/cs",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "C" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "C" } },
                { "operation_id": "create_pair", "method": "POST", "path": "/pairs",
                  "request_body": { "entity": "Pair" },
                  "success": { "status": 201, "entity": "Pair" } }
            ]
        }]
    }"#;
    // Two DISTINCT fk-only groups (JC0559-valid): the dup for group 0 holds c_id
    // constant too, so group 1 (a_id, c_id) also trips — un-isolable → both TODO.
    let d: Design = serde_json::from_str(TWO_GROUPS).unwrap();
    let generated = testgen::acceptance_rs(&d, &d.modules[0]);
    assert!(
        !generated.contains("_composite_unique_0_is_409()")
            && !generated.contains("_composite_unique_1_is_409()"),
        "a masked composite group must NOT emit a false-green probe:\n{generated}"
    );
    assert!(
        generated.contains("AGENT TODO: pair composite UNIQUE(a_id, b_id) (group #0)")
            && generated.contains("AGENT TODO: pair composite UNIQUE(a_id, c_id) (group #1)"),
        "each masked composite group must emit an AGENT TODO:\n{generated}"
    );
}