io-harness 0.6.0

A Rust agent harness: run an AI agent from a typed task contract to a verified result. Provider-agnostic (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI), multi-file edits with grep/find over a workspace, budgets, retry, full trace, resumable runs, execution-based verification, a layered permission policy with a human-approval gate, contained sub-agent composition, and an OS-native/OS-neutral execution sandbox (macOS sandbox-exec, Linux namespaces, Windows Job Objects, portable floor) that isolates model-produced code per run. Embeddable in-process.
Documentation

IO Harness

A Rust agent harness that runs AI agents from a typed task contract to a checked result.

The shared engine every initorigin app (io-cli, io-studio) and io-eval build on.

Type: Rust library crate Stack: Rust · cargo · tokio · rusqlite · rmcp · own HTTP+SSE provider client License: Apache-2.0 Status: Pre-release. v0.1 shipped the single-agent file-edit loop (filesystem tool, OpenRouter provider, deterministic verify, rusqlite audit). v0.2 adds step/time/cost budgets, retry with escalation, a full trace, resumable runs, and execution-based verification that compiles the produced file so a substring stub cannot pass. v0.3 adds repository-wide work — grep and find tools over a workspace and multi-file edits in one run — and two more providers (Anthropic and OpenAI) behind the same provider-agnostic surface, selected at run construction. v0.4 adds the permission boundary: a layered policy over reads, writes, and command execution, enforced in the tool layer rather than the prompt, plus a human-approval gate that can approve, rewrite, remember, deny, or defer a decision until after the process has exited. v0.5 adds agent composition with containment: a parent decomposes a task and spawns contained sub-agents (100+ concurrently) over one shared workspace and trace, composing their results back; a child inherits its parent's policy and can only narrow it, and the whole tree runs under one aggregate spend ceiling no spawned task can raise. v0.6 adds the execution sandbox: every command the verification gate runs — the rustc compile and the test binary it has run since v0.2 — executes inside an ephemeral, per-run sandbox (isolated workdir, resource caps that kill, network denied by default, guaranteed teardown), so model-produced code no longer runs on the host directly. The sandbox is OS-native and OS-neutral — one trait, a native backend per platform (macOS sandbox-exec, Linux namespaces, Windows Job Objects) over a portable floor that runs everywhere.

Capabilities

  • Task contract — goal, constraints, expected output, success criteria
  • Context construction — feed the model only relevant, current, trusted info
  • Tool layer — narrow, typed actions the agent invokes
  • Orchestration loop — observe, reason, act, check, stop
  • State and memory — progress, intermediate results, decisions (rusqlite)
  • Verification layer — tests, schemas, read-backs confirm the task is done
  • Permissions and guardrails — what the agent may access, change, send, spend
  • Recovery and retry — retries, fallbacks, replanning, escalation
  • Stop conditions and budgets — cap steps, time, cost, retries, risky actions
  • Observability and tracing — record prompts, decisions, tool calls, cost
  • Human approval layer — review before sensitive or irreversible actions
  • Providers — OpenRouter first, then Anthropic and OpenAI (own HTTP+SSE client)
  • Agent composition — spawn and nest many agents (100+) with shared context
  • Long-running autonomous tasks — 24h+ with no user input
  • Ephemeral local code-exec sandboxes — write, run, capture, destroy ✅ v0.6 (OS-native + OS-neutral: macOS sandbox-exec, Linux namespaces, Windows Job Objects, portable floor)
  • Built-in tools — filesystem, git, grep, find
  • Office and document tools — Word/Excel/PowerPoint/PDF create/edit/delete, PDF watermark, PDF form fill, OCR, barcode/QR read and generate
  • Media — image and video passthrough when the model supports it
  • Extensibility — MCP (rmcp), plugins, skills

See docs/CAPABILITIES.md for detail and docs/CONTRACT.md for the public contract.

Usage (v0.4)

Hand the harness a task contract; it runs the loop, verifies the result, records every step to rusqlite, and stops on success or a budget. A single-file task uses the filesystem tool; a workspace task lets the agent grep/find across a repository and edit several files. Pick any of three providers at construction. Everything else in Capabilities is roadmap.

1. Add the crate

[dependencies]
io-harness = "0.3"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros"] }

Upgrading from 0.2: TaskContract::new, run, resume, and the single-file loop are unchanged, so existing callers keep compiling. New in 0.3: TaskContract::workspace, the grep/find/read_file tools, the EachCompilesRust / WorkspaceTestPasses verifications, and the Anthropic / OpenAi providers. If you implement Provider yourself, note it gained a defaulted name() method (override it to label your provider in the trace — no change required to keep compiling). A 0.2 rusqlite database is migrated in place on open (a provider column is added; a 0.2 binary still reads it).

2. Choose a provider

Each provider reads its own key + model slug from the environment; credentials are never logged, and no default model is guessed. Selecting a provider is just constructing a different one — the task contract does not change.

# OpenRouter
export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-...
export OPENROUTER_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
# Anthropic
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
export ANTHROPIC_MODEL=claude-sonnet-4
# OpenAI
export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
export OPENAI_MODEL=gpt-4o
use io_harness::{Anthropic, OpenAi, OpenRouter};

let provider = OpenRouter::from_env()?;   // or:
let provider = Anthropic::from_env()?;    // or:
let provider = OpenAi::from_env()?;
// ...then hand `&provider` to `run` — nothing else changes.

3. Run one file-edit task, bounded and verified by execution

use std::time::Duration;
use io_harness::{run, OpenRouter, Store, TaskContract, Verification};

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> io_harness::Result<()> {
    let contract = TaskContract::new(
        "add a `hello` function that returns 42",
        "src/hello.rs",
        // Execution-based: the file must compile AND pass this test. A stub
        // that only contains the right substring fails the gate.
        Verification::RustTestPasses {
            test_src: "#[test] fn t() { assert_eq!(hello(), 42); }".into(),
        },
    )
    .with_max_steps(8)                              // step budget
    .with_time_budget(Duration::from_secs(120))     // time budget
    .with_token_budget(200_000)                     // cost budget, in tokens
    .with_max_retries(2);                           // retry transient failures

    let provider = OpenRouter::from_env()?;
    let store = Store::open("runs.db")?;

    let result = run(&contract, &provider, &store).await?;
    // Success | StepCapReached | TimeBudgetExceeded | CostBudgetExceeded
    println!("{:?}", result.outcome);
    Ok(())
}

4. Run a repository task: grep, find, and multi-file edits

Give the agent a workspace root instead of one file. It can grep file contents (regex or substring), find files by name/path glob, read_file to inspect what it found, and write_file to edit several files — all confined to the root (a .. or absolute path that escapes is refused). Verification spans the set: WorkspaceTestPasses compiles the edited files together with a test, so the run only succeeds when the whole set is correct.

use io_harness::{run, OpenRouter, Store, TaskContract, Verification};

let contract = TaskContract::workspace(
    "Make a() + b() equal 42 by editing the two source files.",
    "my-repo",                                  // workspace root
    Verification::WorkspaceTestPasses {
        files: vec!["src/a.rs".into(), "src/b.rs".into()],
        test_src: "#[test] fn t() { assert_eq!(a() + b(), 42); }".into(),
    },
);

let result = run(&contract, &OpenRouter::from_env()?, &Store::memory()?).await?;
println!("{:?}", result.outcome);

The grep/find tools skip .git, target, and node_modules. Use Verification::EachCompilesRust(files) when each edited file only needs to compile on its own.

Execution-based verification

Content checks (FileContains, FileEquals) confirm the file says the right thing but not that it works — the 0.1 live run passed FileContains("fn hello") by writing the literal string fn hello, which does not compile. v0.2 adds gates that run the artifact:

  • Verification::CompilesRust — passes only if the file compiles (rustc --crate-type lib).
  • Verification::RustTestPasses { test_src } — appends test_src and passes only if the test binary passes.

Compilation runs locally in a throwaway temp dir (removed afterwards) and touches no network.

Trace and resume

Every step's prompt, decision, tool call, and token usage is persisted. Read the full trace back, and resume an interrupted run under its original id instead of restarting:

use io_harness::{resume, Store};

// After a crash or a hit budget, continue the same run from where it stopped.
let store = Store::open("runs.db")?;
let result = resume(&contract, &provider, &store, run_id).await?;

for step in store.steps(result.run_id)? {
    println!("step {}: {} ({} tokens)", step.step, step.decision, step.tokens);
}

Or run it live end to end: cargo run --example edit_file.

Permissions and approval (v0.4)

A Policy is a stack of named layers plus a per-action default. It is evaluated deny-first across the whole stack: a deny in any layer beats an allow in any other, so a layer can add capability but can never re-allow what a layer beneath it denied.

use io_harness::{run_with, ApproveAll, Policy, Store, TaskContract, Verification};

let policy = Policy::default()          // reads open, writes ask, secrets denied
    .layer("project")
    .allow_read("*")
    .deny_read("secrets/*")
    .deny_write("secrets/*");

let result = run_with(&contract, &provider, &store, &policy, &ApproveAll).await?;

// Why was that refused? Same function the tool layer enforces with.
let verdict = policy.explain(io_harness::Act::Write, "secrets/key.txt");
println!("{:?} by rule {:?} in layer {:?}", verdict.effect, verdict.rule, verdict.layer);

The default is permissive. A caller who passes no policy — plain run() — gets no enforcement and the exact 0.3.0 behaviour. The boundary is opt-in. This is a deliberate trade-off for backward compatibility, not an oversight.

What asks, what is refused

Policy::default() sets the tiers, following the same shape Claude Code uses:

Action Default Note
Read allow .env, *.pem, id_rsa, id_ed25519, *.key denied outright
Write ask including overwriting a file the path rules already allow
Exec ask rustc and <test-binary> allowed, so verification works

A denied action never reaches the approver — it is refused and reported to the model as a tool result it can adapt to, and the refusal consumes a step, so a model retrying it reaches the step cap rather than looping. Only the ask tier prompts.

The approver

use io_harness::approve::{Approver, Decision, DecisionFuture, Request};

impl Approver for MyUi {
    fn decide<'a>(&'a self, request: &'a Request) -> DecisionFuture<'a> {
        Box::pin(async move {
            match self.ask_the_human(request).await {
                Answer::Yes      => Decision::approve(),
                Answer::No       => Decision::deny("not this one"),
                Answer::NotNow   => Decision::Defer,   // persist and decide later
            }
        })
    }
}

The trait is object-safe (Box<dyn Approver>) and the future may stay pending indefinitely — the run waits rather than timing out. Decision::Approve can also carry a rewritten action (modified) or rules to remember for the rest of the run. Both are re-checked against the policy: an approval cannot move an action across a deny, and a remembered allow cannot override one. Remembered rules come back on RunResult::remembered for you to persist.

Built-ins: ApproveAll, DenyAll, StdinApprover.

Deferring past the end of the process

match result.outcome {
    RunOutcome::AwaitingApproval { request_id, .. } => {
        // ...hours later, another process, same rusqlite file
        let store = Store::open("runs.db")?;
        io_harness::resume_with_decision(
            &contract, &provider, &store, run_id, request_id,
            Decision::approve(), &policy, &approver,
        ).await?
    }
    _ => result,
};

The pending action is persisted with the content the human was shown, so the resumed action is exactly the one approved. The policy is re-checked on resume, so a deny that landed while it waited still holds.

Sharing one policy between apps

Policy is serde-serializable, so io-cli and io-studio read the same format and neither writes its own parser. Compose layers with merge:

let effective = shared_base.merge(app_local);

The recommended convention is user base → project layer → app overlay, each app keeping its own config file over a shared base. The crate composes a stack it is handed; it does not discover config files — locations and precedence are the adopting app's responsibility. Because denies are absolute across layers, a shared base stays trustworthy no matter what an app stacks on top.

Run it live: cargo run --example policy_run.

Agent composition and containment (v0.5)

A single loop does work one step wide. For large or parallelisable tasks, a parent agent decomposes the work and spawns sub-agents — up to 100+ at once — each running the same observe/reason/act/verify/stop loop over the same workspace and the same trace. A child's result composes back so the parent continues from what it produced, and children may nest.

Sub-agents are opt-in: only [run_tree] offers the spawn_agent tool. Pass a Containment and the tree runs under it.

use io_harness::{run_tree, ApproveAll, Containment, Policy, Store, TaskContract, Verification};

# async fn demo() -> io_harness::Result<()> {
let provider = io_harness::OpenRouter::from_env()?;
let store = Store::memory()?;

let contract = TaskContract::workspace(
    "Coordinate: delegate each file to a sub-agent, then combine.",
    "path/to/workspace",
    Verification::WorkspaceFileContains { file: "summary.txt".into(), needle: "DONE".into() },
);

// Caps for the WHOLE tree — no spawned task can raise them.
let containment = Containment::new(
    /* max_total_agents */ 100,
    /* max_concurrent   */ 16,
    /* max_depth         */ 3,
    /* max_total_tokens  */ 500_000,
);

let result = run_tree(&contract, &provider, &store, &Policy::permissive(), &ApproveAll, &containment).await?;
# Ok(())
# }

Containment is inherit-and-narrow

The 0.4 policy becomes the boundary for spawned agents. Where Policy::merge lets an overlay widen a base (allows union), Policy::contain derives a child policy that can only narrow:

  • denies union downward — a child adds restrictions;
  • allows intersect downward — a child can never read, write, or execute anything its parent could not;
  • the rule holds at any depth — no descendant can hold an effective allow the root did not grant.
let child_effective = parent_policy.contain(&child_overlay); // child cannot widen

One spend ceiling above the task contract

The whole tree draws its token spend from one shared ledger. A spawned TaskContract can set a tighter budget but never a looser one than the tree has left; when the aggregate max_total_tokens is reached the tree halts as a whole. A spawn that would breach any cap — agents, depth, or budget — is refused as a tool result the parent can adapt to, and every spawn, refusal, and budget draw is in the rusqlite trace as one reconstructable graph.

Run it live: cargo run --example subagents.

Execution sandbox (v0.6)

Since v0.2 the verification gate has compiled and run model-produced code. Until v0.6 that ran directly on the host — the "compiles locally, no isolation" limitation, made sharper by v0.5's many concurrent agents. v0.6 routes every such execution through a Sandbox:

  • Ephemeral workdir — created per run and destroyed on every exit path (success, failure, cap kill), so nothing it writes or spawns outlives it.
  • Resource caps that kill, not throttleSandboxLimits caps CPU time, wall-clock, and memory; a breach returns a typed cap hit, never a hang.
  • Network denied by default — a configurable egress allow-list is deferred to v0.8; v0.6 is deny-by-default only.
  • Trace — every create, the argv and the backend that ran it, each cap hit, and each teardown land in the rusqlite trace, so an operator can audit where each piece of code ran and how it was isolated.

OS-native and OS-neutral

One trait, a real native backend per platform, over a portable floor that runs everywhere — so a task isolates the same way on mac, linux, and windows:

Backend Isolation
macOS sandbox-exec profile confines writes to the workdir and denies network; rlimits cap CPU/fds; an RSS monitor caps memory (macOS does not enforce address-space rlimits)
Linux namespaces user/mount/pid/net namespaces — a hard network boundary and a private root — plus rlimits (cfg-gated; compiled + unit-tested, not live-run on the macOS build host)
Windows Job Object kill-on-close + memory / active-process / CPU limits and a restricted token (cfg-gated; compiled + unit-tested, not live-run here)
Portable floor the guaranteed minimum on every OS: fresh subprocess, ephemeral workdir, resource caps, network env stripped. Deliberately the weakest backend — filesystem-scoped and resource-capped, not a full syscall jail

select picks the strongest backend available on the running OS and records which ran. Sandboxing is the new default for the verification gate and is transparent to it — the same code passes or fails as before — and a caller who wants the exact v0.5 direct-host execution can opt it off, so the change is additive and reversible.

Run it live: cargo run --example sandbox_run.

Part of initorigin

IO Harness is one of the initorigin products:

Repo What it is
io-harness The Rust agent harness (the center product)
io-eval Benchmark harness for io-harness
io-cli Terminal app on io-harness
io-studio Desktop coding studio on io-harness
website Marketing site, docs, and blog

Contributing

Read CONTRIBUTING.md. Work branches from develop, lands via PR, and every user-facing change updates CHANGELOG.md. Releases follow docs/RELEASE_PROCESS.md.

Security

Report vulnerabilities per SECURITY.md.

License

Apache-2.0. Copyright 2026 Aakash Pawar (InitOrigin). See LICENSE and NOTICE.