hws 0.4.0

//! `login`, `logout`, `whoami` and `config` — everything about *which* app-lb
//! this CLI talks to and as whom.
//!
//! Gateway Basic login verifies credentials and stores them in the config file.
//! Heyo account login exchanges credentials at `/login` and stores only the
//! resulting expiring bearer token; it does not retain the account password.
//! The two gates it exposes are independent — `APP_LB_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD` gates
//! the dashboard and `/metrics`, `APP_LB_ADMIN_AUTH` extends that to the
//! deployment CRUD API — so login probes both and says which it found.
//!
//! A bearer token is the other way in: an app-lb app-token, or a Heyo API key
//! against Cloud's `/namespaces/{ns}/lb` door, which only ever speaks bearer
//! and exposes neither `/healthz` nor the gate probe — so a token login skips
//! the probing and verifies with the one request that has to work,
//! `GET /deployments`.

use crate::cmd::GlobalOpts;
use crate::cmd::Client;
use crate::config::{Config, ContextEntry, resolve_endpoint};
use crate::output::{self, Table};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
use clap::{Args, Subcommand};
use std::time::Duration;

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct LoginArgs {
    /// The admin API to talk to, e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:9090`. `host:port` is
    /// accepted and assumed to be http.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "URL")]
    pub server: Option<String>,

    /// Basic-auth user. app-lb's default is `admin`.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "NAME")]
    pub user: Option<String>,

    /// Sign in as a Heyo platform administrator, storing an expiring token, not the password.
    #[arg(long, conflicts_with_all = ["user", "token", "token_stdin", "token_command", "password_command", "insecure_skip_tls_verify"])]
    pub email: Option<String>,

    /// The password. Prefer --password-stdin or the interactive prompt: an
    /// argument is visible in `ps` and your shell history.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "PASSWORD")]
    pub password: Option<String>,

    /// Read the password from stdin (the trailing newline is stripped).
    #[arg(long, conflicts_with = "password")]
    pub password_stdin: bool,

    /// Store this shell command instead of the password itself; it is run to
    /// fetch the password on each request that needs it.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "CMD", conflicts_with_all = ["password", "password_stdin"])]
    pub password_command: Option<String>,

    /// Verify the credentials but don't write the password to disk — supply it
    /// per invocation via HEYCTL_PASSWORD.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub no_store_password: bool,

    /// Log in with a bearer token instead of a Basic pair: an app-lb
    /// app-token (`applb_…`), or a namespace-scoped Heyo API key
    /// (`heyo_api_…`) together with `--server https://<cloud>/namespaces/<ns>/lb`.
    /// Prefer --token-stdin: an argument is visible in `ps`.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "TOKEN", conflicts_with_all = ["password", "password_stdin", "password_command", "user"])]
    pub token: Option<String>,

    /// Read the token from stdin (the trailing newline is stripped).
    #[arg(long, conflicts_with_all = ["token", "password", "password_stdin", "password_command", "user"])]
    pub token_stdin: bool,

    /// Store this shell command instead of the token itself; it is run to
    /// fetch the token on each request.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "CMD", conflicts_with_all = ["token", "token_stdin", "password", "password_stdin", "password_command", "user"])]
    pub token_command: Option<String>,

    /// Name for the stored context. Defaults to the server's host.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "NAME")]
    pub name: Option<String>,

    /// Accept any TLS certificate. Only for a self-signed admin endpoint you
    /// control.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub insecure_skip_tls_verify: bool,

    /// Store the context without making it the current one.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub no_switch: bool,
}

fn platform_login(server: &str, email: &str, password: &str, timeout: Duration) -> Result<String> {
    let mut url = reqwest::Url::parse(server).context("Heyo login requires an HTTPS admin origin")?;
    if url.scheme() != "https" || url.host_str().is_none() || !url.username().is_empty()
        || url.password().is_some() || url.path() != "/" || url.query().is_some() || url.fragment().is_some() {
        bail!("Heyo login requires an HTTPS admin origin without credentials, path or query");
    }
    let origin = url.origin().ascii_serialization();
    url.set_path("/login");
    let rt = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread().enable_all().build()?;
    rt.block_on(async {
        let response = reqwest::Client::builder()
            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none()).timeout(timeout).build()?
            .post(url).header("Origin", origin)
            .json(&serde_json::json!({"email":email,"password":password}))
            .send().await.context("Heyo sign-in unavailable")?;
        if !response.status().is_success() {
            bail!("Heyo sign-in refused or unavailable (HTTP {}); check the account and platform administrator access", response.status());
        }
        response.headers().get_all(reqwest::header::SET_COOKIE).iter()
            .filter_map(|h| h.to_str().ok())
            .filter_map(|h| h.split(';').next()?.strip_prefix("__Host-heyo-admin="))
            .find(|t| !t.is_empty() && t.len() <= 3800 && t.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b"._-".contains(&b)))
            .map(str::to_owned).context("Heyo sign-in returned no valid session token")
    })
}

pub fn login(globals: &GlobalOpts, args: &LoginArgs) -> Result<()> {
    let path = Config::path(globals.config.as_deref())?;
    let mut config = Config::load(&path)?;

    let server = args
        .server
        .clone()
        .or_else(|| globals.server.clone())
        .unwrap_or_else(|| crate::cmd::DEFAULT_SERVER.to_string());
    let user = args
        .user
        .clone()
        .or_else(|| globals.user.clone())
        .unwrap_or_else(|| "admin".to_string());
    let insecure = args.insecure_skip_tls_verify || globals.insecure_skip_tls_verify;
    let timeout = Duration::from_secs(globals.request_timeout);

    // A token login: no gate to probe (Cloud's door has none and answers 404
    // for `/healthz`), so the one request that must work is the verification.
    let mut token = match (&args.token_command, &args.token, args.token_stdin) {
        (Some(cmd), _, _) => Some(run_command(cmd)?),
        (None, Some(t), _) => Some(t.clone()),
        (None, None, true) => {
            let mut buf = String::new();
            std::io::Read::read_to_string(&mut std::io::stdin(), &mut buf)
                .context("reading the token from stdin")?;
            Some(buf.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string())
        }
        (None, None, false) => globals.token.clone(),
    };
    if let Some(email) = &args.email {
        if token.is_some() || globals.user.is_some() || insecure {
            bail!("--email cannot be combined with gateway credentials or insecure TLS");
        }
        let password = if args.password_stdin {
            let mut value = String::new();
            std::io::Read::read_to_string(&mut std::io::stdin(), &mut value)?;
            value.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_owned()
        } else if let Some(value) = args.password.as_ref().or(globals.password.as_ref()) {
            value.clone()
        } else {
            rpassword::prompt_password(format!("Heyo password for {email}: "))?
        };
        token = Some(platform_login(&server, email, &password, timeout)?);
    }
    if let Some(token) = token {
        if token.is_empty() {
            bail!("an empty token will not authenticate against anything");
        }
        let client = Client::connect(&server, None, None, Some(&token), insecure, timeout)?;
        // The server's own words first, when it gave any: app-lb names the token,
        // the scope and the deployment it does not admit, and the guesses below
        // are only for a server that said nothing.
        let (status, detail) = client.status_detail_of("/deployments")?;
        if let Some(why) = detail.filter(|_| status == 401 || status == 403) {
            bail!("{why}");
        }
        match status {
            200 => {}
            // 401 and 403 are the two halves of "this did not work", and
            // conflating them costs an afternoon: 401 means nothing verified
            // the token, 403 means something did and said no. They have
            // completely different fixes, so they say completely different
            // things.
            401 => bail!(
                "the server did not recognise this token. Check that it is complete and \
                 unexpired. Local app-tokens work only on their issuing server; tokens \
                 minted with --all-servers require this server to mirror their authority. \
                 An operator can inspect token_authority and token_sync at \
                 /control-plane/config for missing configuration or failed synchronization. \
                 A sign-in gate in front must also allow the credential's provider"
            ),
            403 => bail!(
                "the server knows this token but will not let it list deployments. Most \
                 often its admin scope is `none`, which is the default in the dashboard's \
                 mint form and reaches no admin route at all — mint one with `admin` \
                 (`heyctl token mint <NAME> --admin admin --all-deployments`). Otherwise \
                 it is scoped to particular deployments, or it is a namespace-scoped key \
                 that has to be used against its own namespace's door"
            ),
            404 => bail!(
                "{server} has no /deployments — for a Heyo cloud, the server is \
                 https://<cloud>/namespaces/<namespace>/lb"
            ),
            code => bail!("unexpected HTTP {code} from /deployments while verifying the token"),
        }
        println!("Logged in to {} with a token.", client.server());
        if args.no_store_password {
            println!("  token not stored — set HEYCTL_TOKEN for later commands");
        }
        return save_context(
            &mut config,
            &path,
            args,
            ContextEntry {
                server: client.server().to_string(),
                token: (!args.no_store_password && args.token_command.is_none()).then(|| token.clone()),
                token_command: args.token_command.clone(),
                insecure_skip_tls_verify: insecure,
                ..Default::default()
            },
        );
    }

    // Reachability first: a typo'd port should not look like a bad password.
    let anon = Client::connect(&server, None, None, None, insecure, timeout)?;
    anon.healthz()
        .with_context(|| format!("cannot reach an app-lb admin API at {server}"))?;
    let gates = Client::gates_of(&anon)?;

    if !gates.any() {
        println!(
            "{server} has no authentication configured — nothing to log in with.\n\
             (Set APP_LB_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD on the server to gate the dashboard and /metrics, \
             and APP_LB_ADMIN_AUTH=1 to gate the deployment API too.)"
        );
        save_context(
            &mut config,
            &path,
            args,
            ContextEntry {
                server: anon.server().to_string(),
                insecure_skip_tls_verify: insecure,
                ..Default::default()
            },
        )?;
        return Ok(());
    }

    // Resolve a password: a command is stored and run, everything else is
    // material we have to hold now to verify it.
    let password = match (&args.password_command, &args.password, args.password_stdin) {
        (Some(cmd), _, _) => run_command(cmd)?,
        (None, Some(p), _) => p.clone(),
        (None, None, true) => {
            let mut buf = String::new();
            std::io::Read::read_to_string(&mut std::io::stdin(), &mut buf)
                .context("reading the password from stdin")?;
            buf.trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r']).to_string()
        }
        (None, None, false) => match globals.password.clone() {
            Some(p) => p,
            None => rpassword::prompt_password(format!("Password for {user}@{server}: "))
                .context("reading the password")?,
        },
    };
    if password.is_empty() {
        bail!("an empty password will not authenticate against app-lb");
    }

    // Verify against whichever surface is actually gated.
    let client = Client::connect(&server, Some(&user), Some(&password), None, insecure, timeout)?;
    let verify_path = if gates.crud { "/deployments" } else { "/metrics" };
    match client.status_of(verify_path)? {
        200 => {}
        401 => bail!("the server rejected these credentials — wrong user or password"),
        code => bail!("unexpected HTTP {code} from {verify_path} while verifying credentials"),
    }

    println!(
        "Logged in to {} as {user}.\n  gated: {}",
        client.server(),
        gate_summary(gates.view, gates.crud)
    );
    if args.no_store_password {
        println!("  password not stored — set HEYCTL_PASSWORD for later commands");
    }

    save_context(
        &mut config,
        &path,
        args,
        ContextEntry {
            server: client.server().to_string(),
            user: Some(user.clone()),
            password: (!args.no_store_password && args.password_command.is_none())
                .then(|| password.clone()),
            password_command: args.password_command.clone(),
            insecure_skip_tls_verify: insecure,
            ..Default::default()
        },
    )
}

fn gate_summary(metrics: bool, crud: bool) -> String {
    match (metrics, crud) {
        (true, true) => "dashboard, /metrics and the deployment API".into(),
        (true, false) => "dashboard and /metrics (the deployment API is open)".into(),
        (false, true) => "the deployment API".into(),
        (false, false) => "nothing".into(),
    }
}

fn save_context(
    config: &mut Config,
    path: &std::path::Path,
    args: &LoginArgs,
    entry: ContextEntry,
) -> Result<()> {
    let name = args
        .name
        .clone()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| context_name_for(&entry.server));
    config.contexts.insert(name.clone(), entry);
    if !args.no_switch {
        config.current_context = Some(name.clone());
    }
    config.save(path)?;
    println!("Context {name:?} saved to {}.", path.display());
    Ok(())
}

/// Derive a context name from the server: `http://lb.example.com:9090` becomes
/// `lb.example.com`, and a loopback address becomes `local`.
fn context_name_for(server: &str) -> String {
    let host = server
        .split("://")
        .nth(1)
        .unwrap_or(server)
        .split('/')
        .next()
        .unwrap_or(server);
    let bare = host.rsplit_once(':').map(|(h, _)| h).unwrap_or(host);
    match bare {
        "127.0.0.1" | "localhost" | "::1" | "[::1]" => "local".to_string(),
        other if other.is_empty() => "default".to_string(),
        other => other.to_string(),
    }
}

fn run_command(cmd: &str) -> Result<String> {
    let out = std::process::Command::new("sh")
        .arg("-c")
        .arg(cmd)
        .output()
        .with_context(|| format!("running {cmd:?}"))?;
    if !out.status.success() {
        bail!("{cmd:?} failed: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim());
    }
    Ok(String::from_utf8(out.stdout)
        .context("the password command produced non-UTF-8 output")?
        .trim_end_matches(['\n', '\r'])
        .to_string())
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct LogoutArgs {
    /// The context to forget. Defaults to the current one.
    #[arg(value_name = "CONTEXT")]
    pub name: Option<String>,

    /// Drop only the stored password, keeping the server and user.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub keep_context: bool,
}

pub fn logout(globals: &GlobalOpts, args: &LogoutArgs) -> Result<()> {
    let path = Config::path(globals.config.as_deref())?;
    let mut config = Config::load(&path)?;

    let name = args
        .name
        .clone()
        .or_else(|| globals.context.clone())
        .or_else(|| config.current_context.clone())
        .context("no context to log out of")?;
    let entry = config
        .contexts
        .get_mut(&name)
        .with_context(|| format!("no context named {name:?}"))?;

    if args.keep_context {
        entry.password = None;
        entry.password_command = None;
        entry.token = None;
        entry.token_command = None;
        println!("Cleared the stored credentials for context {name:?}.");
    } else {
        config.contexts.remove(&name);
        if config.current_context.as_deref() == Some(name.as_str()) {
            // Fall back to whatever is left, so the next command still has a
            // target rather than silently reverting to the default server.
            config.current_context = config.contexts.keys().next().cloned();
        }
        println!("Removed context {name:?}.");
    }
    config.save(&path)
}

/// Where this invocation would connect, and what the server would let it do.
pub fn whoami(globals: &GlobalOpts) -> Result<()> {
    let path = Config::path(globals.config.as_deref())?;
    let config = Config::load(&path)?;
    let endpoint = resolve_endpoint(
        &config,
        globals.context.as_deref(),
        globals.server.as_deref(),
        globals.user.as_deref(),
        globals.password.as_deref(),
        globals.token.as_deref(),
        globals.insecure_skip_tls_verify,
    )?;

    output::section("Client");
    output::field("Config file", path.display().to_string());
    output::field("Context", &endpoint.name);
    output::field("Server", &endpoint.server);
    if endpoint.token.is_some() {
        output::field("Token", endpoint.token_source.describe_token());
        output::field("Sent as", "Authorization: Bearer (the user/password are not used)");
    } else {
        output::field("User", endpoint.user.as_deref().unwrap_or("admin (default)"));
        output::field("Password", endpoint.password_source.describe());
    }
    if endpoint.insecure_skip_tls_verify {
        output::field("TLS", "certificate verification disabled");
    }

    // A saved registry sends `heyctl artifact` straight to a store — a second
    // identity against a second service, where a `403` on a push has nothing
    // to do with the credentials above. Without one, artifact commands go
    // through app-lb with this context, reported after the server section.
    // `None` for the name: whoami reports what the *next* command would reach
    // for by default, and `--registry` is scoped to `heyctl artifact`.
    let direct_registry = crate::config::resolve_registry_endpoint(
        &config,
        None,
        None,
        None,
        globals.insecure_skip_tls_verify,
    );
    let artifacts_via_lb = direct_registry.is_err();
    if let Ok(reg) = direct_registry {
        output::section("Artifact store");
        output::field("Route", "direct (saved registry); `heyctl artifact --lb` uses app-lb");
        output::field("Registry", &reg.name);
        output::field("URL", &reg.url);
        output::field("API key", reg.api_key_source.describe_api_key());
        let c = crate::artifact::RegistryClient::new(
            &reg.url,
            reg.api_key.as_deref(),
            reg.insecure_skip_tls_verify,
            Duration::from_secs(globals.request_timeout),
        )?;
        match c.healthz() {
            Err(e) => output::field("Reachable", format!("no — {e:#}")),
            Ok(()) => {
                output::field("Reachable", "yes (GET /healthz)");
                // `/tags` is gated when `ART_API_KEY` is set and open when it
                // is not, so one request answers both "is it gated" and "does
                // this key work" — which is what somebody about to push wants.
                output::field(
                    "Writes",
                    match c.tags() {
                        Ok(_) => "allowed".to_string(),
                        Err(e) if !c.has_credentials() => {
                            format!("denied (no API key) — {e:#}")
                        }
                        Err(e) => format!("denied — {e:#}"),
                    },
                );
            }
        }
    }

    let client = Client::connect(
        &endpoint.server,
        endpoint.user.as_deref(),
        endpoint.password.as_deref(),
        endpoint.token.as_deref(),
        endpoint.insecure_skip_tls_verify,
        Duration::from_secs(globals.request_timeout),
    )?;

    output::section("Server");
    if let Err(e) = client.healthz() {
        // Cloud's namespace door has no `/healthz`; for a token context the
        // deployment list is the reachability probe that matters.
        if endpoint.token.is_some() {
            return match client.status_of("/deployments")? {
                200 => {
                    output::field("Reachable", "yes (GET /deployments)");
                    output::field("Deployment API", "allowed");
                    if artifacts_via_lb {
                        artifacts_section(&client);
                    }
                    Ok(())
                }
                code => {
                    output::field("Reachable", format!("yes, but GET /deployments answered HTTP {code}"));
                    Ok(())
                }
            };
        }
        output::field("Reachable", format!("no — {e:#}"));
        return Ok(());
    }
    output::field("Reachable", "yes (GET /healthz)");

    let gates = Client::gates_of(&client)?;
    output::field("Auth required for", gate_summary(gates.view, gates.crud));

    // What this identity can actually do right now, which is the question
    // behind "why am I getting a 401".
    let access = |path: &str| -> String {
        match client.status_of(path) {
            Ok(200) => "allowed".to_string(),
            Ok(401) if client.has_credentials() => "denied (credentials rejected)".to_string(),
            Ok(401) => "denied (no credentials)".to_string(),
            Ok(code) => format!("HTTP {code}"),
            Err(e) => format!("error: {e}"),
        }
    };
    output::field("Deployment API", access("/deployments"));
    output::field("Metrics", access("/metrics"));
    if artifacts_via_lb {
        artifacts_section(&client);
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Where `heyctl artifact` goes when no registry is saved: app-lb's gateway,
/// in this credential's namespace. One `/whoami` to name the namespace; no
/// probe of the gateway itself, which would cost a store round trip to say
/// what the first `artifact ls` will say anyway.
fn artifacts_section(client: &Client) {
    output::section("Artifacts");
    let ns = client
        .whoami()
        .ok()
        .and_then(|me| me.sole_namespace().map(str::to_string));
    output::field(
        "Route",
        match ns {
            Some(ns) => format!(
                "through app-lb (namespace {ns}, tags under {ns}/) with this context's credential"
            ),
            None => "through app-lb with this context's credential (pass -n to `heyctl \
                     artifact` — this credential is not confined to one namespace)"
                .to_string(),
        },
    );
}

#[derive(Subcommand, Debug)]
pub enum ConfigCmd {
    /// Print the config file, with passwords redacted.
    View {
        /// Print passwords in the clear.
        #[arg(long)]
        show_secrets: bool,
    },
    /// List the stored contexts.
    GetContexts,
    /// Print the name of the current context.
    CurrentContext,
    /// Switch the current context.
    UseContext {
        #[arg(value_name = "NAME")]
        name: String,
    },
    /// Create or update a context.
    SetContext(SetContextArgs),
    /// Remove a context.
    DeleteContext {
        #[arg(value_name = "NAME")]
        name: String,
    },
    /// Print the path of the config file.
    Path,
}

#[derive(Args, Debug)]
pub struct SetContextArgs {
    #[arg(value_name = "NAME")]
    pub name: String,
    #[arg(long, value_name = "URL")]
    pub server: Option<String>,
    #[arg(long, value_name = "NAME")]
    pub user: Option<String>,
    #[arg(long, value_name = "PASSWORD")]
    pub password: Option<String>,
    /// A shell command whose stdout is the password.
    #[arg(long, value_name = "CMD", conflicts_with = "password")]
    pub password_command: Option<String>,
    #[arg(long)]
    pub insecure_skip_tls_verify: bool,
    /// Make this the current context.
    #[arg(long)]
    pub current: bool,
}

pub fn config(globals: &GlobalOpts, cmd: &ConfigCmd) -> Result<()> {
    let path = Config::path(globals.config.as_deref())?;
    let mut config = Config::load(&path)?;

    match cmd {
        ConfigCmd::Path => println!("{}", path.display()),

        ConfigCmd::View { show_secrets } => {
            let mut view = serde_json::to_value(&config)?;
            if !show_secrets
                && let Some(contexts) = view.get_mut("contexts").and_then(|c| c.as_object_mut())
            {
                for (_, entry) in contexts.iter_mut() {
                    if let Some(obj) = entry.as_object_mut()
                        && obj.contains_key("password")
                    {
                        obj["password"] = serde_json::Value::String("<redacted>".into());
                    }
                }
            }
            println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&view)?);
        }

        ConfigCmd::GetContexts => {
            if config.contexts.is_empty() {
                println!(
                    "No contexts. `heyctl login` creates one; without it, commands go to {}.",
                    crate::cmd::DEFAULT_SERVER
                );
                return Ok(());
            }
            let mut table = Table::new(["CURRENT", "NAME", "SERVER", "USER", "PASSWORD"]);
            for (name, entry) in &config.contexts {
                table.row([
                    if config.current_context.as_deref() == Some(name.as_str()) {
                        "*".to_string()
                    } else {
                        String::new()
                    },
                    name.clone(),
                    entry.server.clone(),
                    entry.user.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "—".into()),
                    match (&entry.password, &entry.password_command) {
                        (_, Some(_)) => "command".to_string(),
                        (Some(_), None) => "stored".to_string(),
                        (None, None) => "—".to_string(),
                    },
                ]);
            }
            table.print();
        }

        ConfigCmd::CurrentContext => match &config.current_context {
            Some(name) => println!("{name}"),
            None => bail!("no current context is set"),
        },

        ConfigCmd::UseContext { name } => {
            if !config.contexts.contains_key(name) {
                bail!("no context named {name:?} — `heyctl config get-contexts` lists them");
            }
            config.current_context = Some(name.clone());
            config.save(&path)?;
            println!("Switched to context {name:?}.");
        }

        ConfigCmd::SetContext(args) => {
            let entry = config.contexts.entry(args.name.clone()).or_default();
            if let Some(s) = &args.server {
                entry.server = s.clone();
            }
            if let Some(u) = &args.user {
                entry.user = Some(u.clone());
            }
            if let Some(p) = &args.password {
                entry.password = Some(p.clone());
                entry.password_command = None;
            }
            if let Some(c) = &args.password_command {
                entry.password_command = Some(c.clone());
                entry.password = None;
            }
            if args.insecure_skip_tls_verify {
                entry.insecure_skip_tls_verify = true;
            }
            if entry.server.is_empty() {
                bail!("context {:?} needs a --server", args.name);
            }
            if args.current {
                config.current_context = Some(args.name.clone());
            }
            config.save(&path)?;
            println!("Context {:?} saved.", args.name);
        }

        ConfigCmd::DeleteContext { name } => {
            if config.contexts.remove(name).is_none() {
                bail!("no context named {name:?}");
            }
            if config.current_context.as_deref() == Some(name.as_str()) {
                config.current_context = config.contexts.keys().next().cloned();
            }
            config.save(&path)?;
            println!("Removed context {name:?}.");
        }
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::context_name_for;

    #[test]
    fn platform_password_never_goes_to_an_unsafe_origin() {
        for url in ["http://localhost", "https://u:p@example.com", "https://example.com/path",
            "https://example.com?query=1", "https://example.com#fragment"] {
            assert!(super::platform_login(url, "user@example.com", "not-a-real-password",
                std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)).is_err(), "{url}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn context_names_come_from_the_host() {
        assert_eq!(context_name_for("http://127.0.0.1:9090"), "local");
        assert_eq!(context_name_for("http://localhost:9090"), "local");
        assert_eq!(context_name_for("https://lb.example.com"), "lb.example.com");
        assert_eq!(context_name_for("https://lb.example.com:443/"), "lb.example.com");
    }
}