huddle-core 1.0.1

//! Short-Authentication-String (SAS) verification — Phase G.
//!
//! Two peers OOB-compare a short derived code to confirm they each
//! hold the matching Ed25519 keys (defense against MITM during initial
//! contact, before fingerprint trust is established).
//!
//! Protocol shape (each step is a signed `RoomMessage` on the room's
//! gossipsub topic):
//!
//! 1. Initiator picks a random 16-byte `tx_id` + an ephemeral X25519
//!    keypair. Sends `SasInit { tx_id, ephemeral_x25519_pubkey, target_fp }`.
//! 2. Responder generates their own ephemeral X25519 keypair, computes
//!    ECDH with the initiator's pubkey, derives the SAS code via
//!    `derive_sas_code(shared, tx_id)`, and replies with
//!    `SasResponse { tx_id, ephemeral_x25519_pubkey }`. The responder
//!    sees the code locally and shows it.
//! 3. The initiator computes ECDH the other direction, derives the
//!    same code, shows it.
//! 4. Both users compare codes OOB. Each side presses Match → broadcasts
//!    `SasConfirm { tx_id, matched: true }`.
//! 5. On receiving the other side's `matched=true`, set the partner's
//!    fingerprint as `verified=true` (per-room + global `verified_peers`).
//!
//! The signatures on each envelope bind the ephemeral X25519 pubkeys to
//! the sender's Ed25519 identity. A MITM who substitutes their own
//! ephemeral key into the exchange ends up with a *different* SAS code
//! than the legitimate peer would compute, so the OOB comparison fails.
//!
//! ## SAS table — Matrix MSC 2241 alignment (huddle 0.3.x follow-up)
//!
//! Previously the emoji table was a 64-entry "in spirit" derivative;
//! it has been realigned to the canonical 49-entry Matrix MSC 2241
//! table so any future cross-client SAS interop just works. The
//! derivation now uses 7 emoji (42 bits / 6 = 7 chunks, each mod 49)
//! and 3 four-digit decimal groups (39 bits / 13 = 3 chunks, each
//! offset +1000 so values land in 1000..9192), exactly as MSC 2241
//! specifies.

use hkdf::Hkdf;
use rand::RngCore;
use sha2::Sha256;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};

use crate::error::{HuddleError, Result};

/// Length of the transaction id used as HKDF salt. 16 bytes (128 bits)
/// is plenty of unforgeability; sized to be base64-friendly.
pub const TX_ID_LEN: usize = 16;

/// SAS code information given to both sides for OOB comparison.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SasCode {
    /// 7 emoji indices into [`SAS_EMOJI`] (each 0..49). Human-friendly
    /// for visual comparison; works in any modern terminal with emoji
    /// support. Matches Matrix MSC 2241 shape.
    pub emoji_indices: [u8; 7],
    /// Three 4-digit groups separated by `-`, each in `1000..=9191`,
    /// per MSC 2241. Easier to read aloud than a flat 7-digit number.
    pub decimal: String,
}

impl SasCode {
    pub fn emoji_string(&self) -> String {
        self.emoji_indices
            .iter()
            .map(|i| SAS_EMOJI[*i as usize].0)
            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
            .join(" ")
    }

    pub fn emoji_labels(&self) -> String {
        self.emoji_indices
            .iter()
            .map(|i| SAS_EMOJI[*i as usize].1)
            .collect::<Vec<_>>()
            .join(" / ")
    }
}

/// Fresh X25519 ephemeral keypair + random tx_id. The secret stays on
/// the initiator's machine until the SAS finishes; the pubkey is
/// transmitted in the signed envelope.
pub fn new_session() -> ([u8; TX_ID_LEN], StaticSecret, PublicKey) {
    let mut tx_id = [0u8; TX_ID_LEN];
    rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut tx_id);
    // StaticSecret here is the X25519 "long-term" type from x25519-dalek;
    // we use it as ephemeral (drop after the SAS). Need the
    // `static_secrets` feature flag because the `EphemeralSecret` type
    // is more restrictive in v2 — `StaticSecret` lets us hold onto it
    // across a few async hops.
    let secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(rand::thread_rng());
    let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
    (tx_id, secret, public)
}

/// Derive the 7-emoji + 3-group-decimal SAS code from the X25519
/// shared secret and the agreed-upon `tx_id`. Both peers compute this
/// independently and must end up with the same answer for OOB
/// comparison to succeed.
///
/// Matches the MSC 2241 derivation: HKDF-SHA256 with `tx_id` as salt
/// and `b"huddle-sas-v1"` as info, expanded to 11 bytes. First 6 bytes
/// → 7 6-bit chunks (mod 49) → emoji indices. Next 5 bytes → 3 13-bit
/// chunks (+ 1000) → 3 four-digit decimal groups.
pub fn derive_sas_code(
    our_secret: &StaticSecret,
    their_public: &PublicKey,
    tx_id: &[u8; TX_ID_LEN],
) -> SasCode {
    let shared = our_secret.diffie_hellman(their_public);
    // HKDF over the shared secret. tx_id as salt prevents replay
    // (two SAS flows between the same pair must produce different
    // codes); info domain-separates from any other HKDF use.
    let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(Some(tx_id), shared.as_bytes());
    let mut okm = [0u8; 11];
    hk.expand(b"huddle-sas-v1", &mut okm)
        .expect("11 bytes is well within HKDF output limit");

    // First 6 bytes = 48 bits. Use the high 42 bits (7 × 6) for emoji.
    // Bit extraction (big-endian, MSB-first):
    let b = &okm[..6];
    let mut raw_emoji = [0u8; 7];
    raw_emoji[0] = b[0] >> 2;
    raw_emoji[1] = ((b[0] & 0x03) << 4) | (b[1] >> 4);
    raw_emoji[2] = ((b[1] & 0x0f) << 2) | (b[2] >> 6);
    raw_emoji[3] = b[2] & 0x3f;
    raw_emoji[4] = b[3] >> 2;
    raw_emoji[5] = ((b[3] & 0x03) << 4) | (b[4] >> 4);
    raw_emoji[6] = ((b[4] & 0x0f) << 2) | (b[5] >> 6);
    // huddle 0.7.11: rejection sampling instead of `raw % 49`.
    // 6-bit values in 0..64 mod 49 makes indices 0..14 twice as likely
    // (hit by raw 0..14 AND raw 49..63), measurably under-sampling the
    // 49^7 SAS space and reducing effective entropy. Now we expand
    // additional HKDF output to refill any byte that falls in 49..63
    // — the canonical MSC 2241 approach. The expansion is cheap and
    // deterministic, so both sides still derive the same code.
    let emoji_indices = derive_emoji_indices_rejection(&hk, raw_emoji);

    // Bytes 6..11 = 40 bits. Use the high 39 bits for the decimal
    // (3 × 13-bit chunks, each offset by 1000).
    let d = &okm[6..11];
    let chunk0 = ((u32::from(d[0]) << 5) | (u32::from(d[1]) >> 3)) & 0x1fff;
    let chunk1 = ((u32::from(d[1] & 0x07) << 10)
        | (u32::from(d[2]) << 2)
        | (u32::from(d[3]) >> 6))
        & 0x1fff;
    let chunk2 = ((u32::from(d[3] & 0x3f) << 7) | (u32::from(d[4]) >> 1)) & 0x1fff;
    let decimal = format!("{}-{}-{}", chunk0 + 1000, chunk1 + 1000, chunk2 + 1000);

    SasCode {
        emoji_indices,
        decimal,
    }
}

/// The canonical 49-emoji table from Matrix MSC 2241, English labels.
/// Indices 0-48; the derivation above maps 6-bit HKDF chunks mod 49.
pub const SAS_EMOJI: [(&str, &str); 49] = [
    ("🐶", "dog"),
    ("🐱", "cat"),
    ("🦁", "lion"),
    ("🐎", "horse"),
    ("🦄", "unicorn"),
    ("🐷", "pig"),
    ("🐘", "elephant"),
    ("🐰", "rabbit"),
    ("🐼", "panda"),
    ("🐓", "rooster"),
    ("🐧", "penguin"),
    ("🐢", "turtle"),
    ("🐟", "fish"),
    ("🐙", "octopus"),
    ("🦋", "butterfly"),
    ("🌷", "flower"),
    ("🌳", "tree"),
    ("🌵", "cactus"),
    ("🍄", "mushroom"),
    ("🌏", "globe"),
    ("🌙", "moon"),
    ("☁️", "cloud"),
    ("🔥", "fire"),
    ("🍌", "banana"),
    ("🍎", "apple"),
    ("🍓", "strawberry"),
    ("🌽", "corn"),
    ("🍕", "pizza"),
    ("🎂", "cake"),
    ("❤️", "heart"),
    ("🙂", "smiley"),
    ("🤖", "robot"),
    ("🎩", "hat"),
    ("👓", "glasses"),
    ("🔧", "spanner"),
    ("🎅", "santa"),
    ("👍", "thumbs up"),
    ("☂️", "umbrella"),
    ("⌛", "hourglass"),
    ("⏰", "clock"),
    ("🎁", "gift"),
    ("💡", "light bulb"),
    ("📕", "book"),
    ("✏️", "pencil"),
    ("📎", "paperclip"),
    ("✂️", "scissors"),
    ("🔒", "lock"),
    ("🔑", "key"),
    ("🔨", "hammer"),
];

/// huddle 0.7.11: rejection-sampling emoji-index derivation. Refills any
/// index ≥ 49 with deterministic additional HKDF expansion so the
/// distribution over the 49-element table is uniform.
fn derive_emoji_indices_rejection(
    hk: &Hkdf<Sha256>,
    initial: [u8; 7],
) -> [u8; 7] {
    let mut out = [0u8; 7];
    let mut accepted = 0usize;
    // Use the initial bytes first.
    for &v in &initial {
        if v < 49 {
            out[accepted] = v;
            accepted += 1;
            if accepted == 7 {
                return out;
            }
        }
    }
    // Refill by expanding additional 6-bit chunks. We pull in 6-byte
    // blocks of HKDF output, each yielding 8 candidate 6-bit values
    // (high-bit pair discarded — each byte gives one 6-bit candidate
    // via `v & 0x3f`). The info string includes a salt counter so
    // multiple refills don't repeat the same bytes.
    let mut counter: u32 = 0;
    while accepted < 7 {
        let info = {
            let mut buf = [0u8; 24];
            buf[..16].copy_from_slice(b"huddle-sas-v1-rs");
            buf[16..20].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
            buf
        };
        let mut block = [0u8; 32];
        if hk.expand(&info, &mut block).is_err() {
            // The expander only fails when len > 255 * HashLen (8160
            // bytes for SHA-256); 32 is far under, so this branch is
            // unreachable in practice. Fall back to modulo if it
            // somehow happens — degrades to pre-0.7.11 behavior but
            // never panics or hangs.
            for v in &mut initial.iter().copied() {
                if accepted < 7 {
                    out[accepted] = v % 49;
                    accepted += 1;
                }
            }
            break;
        }
        for &byte in block.iter() {
            let candidate = byte & 0x3f;
            if candidate < 49 {
                out[accepted] = candidate;
                accepted += 1;
                if accepted == 7 {
                    return out;
                }
            }
        }
        counter += 1;
    }
    out
}

/// Decode a base64-encoded 32-byte X25519 pubkey received over the wire.
pub fn parse_pubkey(b64: &str) -> Result<PublicKey> {
    use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64;
    use base64::Engine;
    let bytes = B64
        .decode(b64)
        .map_err(|e| HuddleError::Session(format!("bad x25519 pubkey b64: {e}")))?;
    if bytes.len() != 32 {
        return Err(HuddleError::Session(format!(
            "x25519 pubkey is {} bytes, expected 32",
            bytes.len()
        )));
    }
    let mut arr = [0u8; 32];
    arr.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
    Ok(PublicKey::from(arr))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn both_sides_derive_same_code() {
        let (tx_id, alice_secret, alice_pub) = new_session();
        let (_, bob_secret, bob_pub) = new_session();

        let alice_code = derive_sas_code(&alice_secret, &bob_pub, &tx_id);
        let bob_code = derive_sas_code(&bob_secret, &alice_pub, &tx_id);
        assert_eq!(alice_code, bob_code);
        // Decimal shape: three 4-digit groups joined by '-', each in
        // [1000, 9191].
        let parts: Vec<&str> = alice_code.decimal.split('-').collect();
        assert_eq!(parts.len(), 3);
        for p in parts {
            assert_eq!(p.len(), 4);
            let n: u32 = p.parse().unwrap();
            assert!((1000..=9191).contains(&n));
        }
        // Indices must all be in 0..49 (MSC 2241 table size).
        for i in alice_code.emoji_indices {
            assert!((i as usize) < SAS_EMOJI.len());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn different_tx_id_yields_different_code() {
        let (tx_id_a, alice_secret, _) = new_session();
        let (_, bob_secret, bob_pub) = new_session();
        let alice_code = derive_sas_code(&alice_secret, &bob_pub, &tx_id_a);

        let mut tx_id_b = tx_id_a;
        tx_id_b[0] ^= 0xff;
        let alice_code_b = derive_sas_code(&alice_secret, &bob_pub, &tx_id_b);
        let _ = bob_secret;
        assert_ne!(alice_code, alice_code_b);
    }

    #[test]
    fn mitm_substitute_yields_different_code() {
        // Mallory MITMs: Alice's traffic to Bob is replaced with
        // Mallory's pubkey, and vice versa. Alice computes ECDH with
        // Mallory's pub; Bob computes ECDH with Mallory's pub. Their
        // SAS codes will both differ from each other and from a
        // legitimate same-pubkey-pair derivation — so OOB comparison
        // catches the attack.
        let (tx_id, alice_secret, alice_pub) = new_session();
        let (_, bob_secret, bob_pub) = new_session();
        let (_, _mallory_secret, mallory_pub) = new_session();

        let alice_thinks_bob = derive_sas_code(&alice_secret, &mallory_pub, &tx_id);
        let bob_thinks_alice = derive_sas_code(&bob_secret, &mallory_pub, &tx_id);
        assert_ne!(alice_thinks_bob, bob_thinks_alice);

        // Sanity: without MITM, both sides agree.
        let alice_real = derive_sas_code(&alice_secret, &bob_pub, &tx_id);
        let bob_real = derive_sas_code(&bob_secret, &alice_pub, &tx_id);
        assert_eq!(alice_real, bob_real);
    }

    #[test]
    fn pubkey_round_trip() {
        let (_, _, pub_) = new_session();
        use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as B64;
        use base64::Engine;
        let encoded = B64.encode(pub_.as_bytes());
        let decoded = parse_pubkey(&encoded).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(decoded.as_bytes(), pub_.as_bytes());
    }
}