# Security Policy
**Hope Genome v1.4.0 - Hardened Security Edition**
---
## π― Our Security Philosophy
> **"Not unhackable, but tamper-evident with cryptographic proof."**
Hope Genome is designed to make attacks **detectable**, not impossible. We prioritize:
1. **Transparency** over obscurity
2. **Evidence** over prevention
3. **Auditability** over invincibility
---
## π‘οΈ Supported Versions
We actively support the following versions with security updates:
| 1.4.x | β
**Active** | 2026-06-30 | **Hardened** |
| 1.3.x | β οΈ **Limited** | 2026-03-31 | Standard |
| 1.2.x | β **Unsupported** | 2025-12-31 | Legacy |
| < 1.2 | β **Unsupported** | 2025-09-30 | Legacy |
**Recommendation:** Upgrade to v1.4.0 or later for critical security fixes.
---
## π Security Features (v1.4.0)
### β
**Protected Against**
| **Marvin Attack** | Ed25519 (no padding) | `ed25519-dalek` crate | β
**Immune** |
| **Timing Attack** | Constant-time ops | Ed25519 by design | β
**Immune** |
| **Replay Attack (Pre-Restart)** | Nonce tracking | `NonceStore` trait | β
**Protected** |
| **Replay Attack (Post-Restart)** | Persistent nonces | RocksDB/Redis | β
**Protected** |
| **Cryptographic Forgery** | Ed25519 signatures | 256-bit security | β
**Protected** |
| **Oracle Attack** | Action binding | `action_hash` field | β
**Protected** |
| **TOCTOU** | Rust ownership | Borrow checker | β
**Protected** |
| **Log Tampering** | Blockchain chain | SHA-256 linkage | β
**Protected** |
### β οΈ **Known Limitations**
| **Root Access** | **Critical** | HSM + secure boot | π v1.5.0 |
| **Side-Channel (Power/EM)** | High | Use HSM in production | π v1.5.0 |
| **Sensor Manipulation** | Medium | Consensus verifier | β
Mitigated |
| **Supply Chain Attack** | Medium | OWASP AI-SBOM | β
Mitigated |
---
## π¨ Reporting a Vulnerability
### **DO NOT** Create a Public Issue
Security vulnerabilities should be reported **privately** to protect users.
### Reporting Process
1. **Email:** stratosoiteam@gmail.com
- Subject: `[SECURITY] Hope Genome - [Brief Description]`
- Include:
- Affected version(s)
- Proof-of-concept (if safe)
- Severity assessment (Critical/High/Medium/Low)
- Suggested fix (if any)
2. **PGP Encryption (Optional):**
- Public key: [Link to PGP key or fingerprint]
- Fingerprint: `[TODO: Add PGP fingerprint]`
3. **Response Timeline:**
- **Initial Response:** Within 48 hours
- **Triage:** Within 7 days
- **Fix ETA:** Depends on severity
- Critical: 7-14 days
- High: 14-30 days
- Medium: 30-60 days
- Low: Best effort
4. **Disclosure:**
- **Coordinated Disclosure:** We follow a 90-day disclosure window
- **Credit:** We acknowledge reporters (unless requested otherwise)
- **CVE Assignment:** For eligible vulnerabilities
### Severity Classification
| **Critical** | Remote code execution, authentication bypass | Buffer overflow, signature bypass |
| **High** | Data leakage, privilege escalation | Replay attack, nonce collision |
| **Medium** | DoS, information disclosure | Memory leak, timing attack |
| **Low** | Configuration issues, minor bugs | Verbose error messages |
---
## π Security Audit History
### Gemini Red Team Audit (2025-12-30)
**Auditor:** Google Gemini Red Team
**Version Tested:** 1.3.0
**Report Date:** 2025-12-25
**Score:** 8.5/10
**Critical Findings:**
1. β **Marvin Attack** - RSA PKCS#1v15 vulnerable β **Fixed in v1.4.0** (Ed25519)
2. β **Replay Post-Restart** - Nonces lost β **Fixed in v1.4.0** (RocksDB/Redis)
3. β οΈ **No HSM Support** - Keys in memory β **Addressed in v1.4.0** (Architecture ready)
**Re-Audit Status:** Pending (v1.4.0)
---
## π§ Security Best Practices
### For Developers
1. **Use Latest Version:** Always use the latest stable release (v1.4.0+)
2. **Enable Persistent Nonces:**
```toml
hope_core = { version = "1.4.0", features = ["rocksdb-nonce-store"] }
```
3. **Validate Proofs:** Always verify `IntegrityProof` before executing actions
4. **Rotate Keys:** Periodically rotate cryptographic keys (recommended: annually)
5. **Audit Logs:** Regularly review `AuditLog` for anomalies
6. **HSM in Production:** Use hardware security modules for production (v1.5.0+)
### For Operators
1. **Docker Hardening:**
```yaml
# docker-compose.yml
read_only: true
cap_drop:
- ALL
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
```
2. **Network Isolation:** Run Hope Genome in isolated networks
3. **Resource Limits:** Set CPU/memory limits to prevent DoS
4. **Monitoring:** Monitor nonce store size and proof verification rates
5. **Backups:** Regularly backup nonce store (critical for replay protection)
### For Users
1. **Verify Signatures:** Use `ProofAuditor` to verify all proofs
2. **Check Capsule Hash:** Ensure genome hasn't been tampered with
3. **Report Anomalies:** Report suspicious behavior to stratosoiteam@gmail.com
4. **Update Dependencies:** Keep `hope_core` updated via `cargo update`
---
## π Compliance & Standards
### Standards Followed
- **OWASP ASVS 4.0** - Application Security Verification Standard
- **OWASP AI-SBOM** - AI Software Bill of Materials (CycloneDX)
- **NIST Cybersecurity Framework** - Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
- **ISO/IEC 27001** - Information Security Management (aligned)
### Cryptographic Standards
- **Ed25519** - FIPS 186-4 (digital signatures)
- **SHA-256** - FIPS 180-4 (hashing)
- **RFC 8032** - Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
---
## π Security Testing
### Automated Testing
- **Unit Tests:** 79/79 passing (100% coverage on crypto, nonce store, auditor)
- **Integration Tests:** End-to-end workflows with proof verification
- **Fuzzing:** (TODO: AFL/libfuzzer for crypto module)
- **SAST:** Clippy lints with `-D warnings`
### Manual Testing
- **Code Review:** All PRs reviewed by maintainer
- **Threat Modeling:** STRIDE analysis for each major feature
- **Penetration Testing:** Annual red team engagement (Gemini)
---
## π Contact
- **Security Email:** stratosoiteam@gmail.com
- **Maintainer:** MΓ‘tΓ© RΓ³bert (@silentnoisehun)
- **GitHub:** [Hope_Genome](https://github.com/silentnoisehun/Hope_Genome)
- **Response Time:** 48 hours (weekdays), 72 hours (weekends)
---
## π Acknowledgments
We thank the following individuals and organizations for responsible disclosure:
| Gemini Red Team | 2025-12-25 | Marvin Attack (RSA) | Critical |
| Gemini Red Team | 2025-12-25 | Replay Post-Restart | High |
| [Your Name Here] | YYYY-MM-DD | [Description] | [Severity] |
**Want to be listed?** Report a vulnerability responsibly!
---
## π Changelog
| 2025-12-30 | Ed25519 migration, persistent nonces | v1.4.0 |
| 2025-12-15 | OWASP AI-SBOM compliance | v1.3.0 |
| 2025-12-01 | Initial security policy | v1.2.0 |
---
**Last Updated:** 2025-12-30
**Version:** 1.4.0
**Status:** Active