hide-mls 0.10.0

Group messaging for HIDE identities over MLS (RFC 9420). Experimental, unaudited.
Documentation
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//! What the identity/MLS join must guarantee.
//!
//! MLS itself is exercised only enough to build a real group; the tests that
//! matter here are the ones about HIDE identities, because that join is the
//! part this crate actually implements.

use hide_identity::{IdentityLog, device_id};
use hide_mls::{
    HideIdentityProvider, MAX_MLS_MESSAGE, MlsError, accept_from_trusted, client_for,
    client_with_provider, decode_message, encode_message, sender_device, untrusted_members,
};
use hide_sign::SigningIdentity;

fn key() -> SigningIdentity {
    SigningIdentity::generate().unwrap()
}

/// An identity with two devices: a laptop that founded it and a phone.
fn identity() -> (IdentityLog, SigningIdentity, SigningIdentity) {
    let laptop = key();
    let phone = key();
    let recovery = key();
    let mut log = IdentityLog::create(&laptop, "laptop", &recovery.verifying_key()).unwrap();
    log.enrol(&laptop, &phone.verifying_key(), "phone").unwrap();
    (log, laptop, phone)
}

#[test]
fn a_trusted_device_gets_a_client() {
    let (log, laptop, _) = identity();
    assert!(client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).is_ok());
}

/// `mls-rs` is third-party and unaudited, so nothing arbitrarily large is
/// handed to its parser: the size is refused before the message is read.
#[test]
fn an_oversized_message_is_refused_before_parsing() {
    let oversized = vec![0u8; MAX_MLS_MESSAGE + 1];
    assert!(matches!(
        decode_message(&oversized),
        Err(MlsError::MessageTooLarge)
    ));
}

#[test]
fn a_device_the_identity_does_not_know_is_refused() {
    let (log, _, _) = identity();
    let stranger = key();
    assert!(matches!(
        client_for(&log.membership(), &stranger),
        Err(MlsError::UntrustedDevice)
    ));
}

#[test]
fn a_revoked_device_can_no_longer_get_a_client() {
    let (mut log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    log.revoke(&laptop, device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
        .unwrap();

    assert!(matches!(
        client_for(&log.membership(), &phone),
        Err(MlsError::UntrustedDevice)
    ));
}

#[test]
fn two_devices_exchange_a_message() {
    two_devices_exchange_a_message_impl();
}

/// §15.8 closed: a long-lived client learns of a revocation through
/// `update`, without being rebuilt, and refuses to add the revoked device.
#[test]
fn a_running_client_refuses_a_device_revoked_after_it_was_built() {
    let (mut log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let provider = HideIdentityProvider::new(log.membership());
    let alice = client_with_provider(provider.clone(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();

    log.revoke(&laptop, device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
        .unwrap();
    provider.update(log.membership());
    assert!(
        !provider
            .membership()
            .contains(&device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
    );

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let added = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .and_then(|builder| builder.build());
    assert!(
        added.is_err(),
        "a revoked device was admitted by a stale client"
    );
}

fn two_devices_exchange_a_message_impl() {
    let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let commit = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
    let (mut bobs, _) = bob
        .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
        .unwrap();

    let sent = group
        .encrypt_application_message(b"salut", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let received = bobs.process_incoming_message(sent).unwrap();

    match &received {
        hide_mls::Received::ApplicationMessage(m) => assert_eq!(m.data(), b"salut"),
        other => panic!("unexpected message: {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// The join that this crate exists for: a group member carries a HIDE device
/// id, so a revoked device is visible as stale membership.
#[test]
fn a_revoked_device_is_reported_as_stale_group_membership() {
    let (mut log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();

    // Everyone is trusted while the identity still lists both devices.
    assert!(
        untrusted_members(&group, &log.membership())
            .unwrap()
            .is_empty()
    );

    // Revoking the phone must surface it, even though MLS itself is unaware.
    let phone_id = device_id(&phone.verifying_key());
    log.revoke(&laptop, phone_id).unwrap();
    assert_eq!(
        untrusted_members(&group, &log.membership()).unwrap(),
        vec![phone_id]
    );
}

/// MLS proves a message came from a group member; it cannot know the member's
/// device was revoked in the identity log. That gap is what this closes.
#[test]
fn a_message_from_a_revoked_device_is_rejected() {
    let (mut log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let commit = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
    let (mut bobs, _) = bob
        .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
        .unwrap();

    // Bob sends while still trusted.
    let sent = bobs
        .encrypt_application_message(b"still trusted", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let received = group.process_incoming_message(sent).unwrap();
    assert!(accept_from_trusted(&group, &received, &log.membership()).is_ok());

    // The phone is revoked; a later message from it must be refused.
    log.revoke(&laptop, device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
        .unwrap();
    let sent = bobs
        .encrypt_application_message(b"no longer trusted", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let received = group.process_incoming_message(sent).unwrap();
    assert!(matches!(
        accept_from_trusted(&group, &received, &log.membership()),
        Err(MlsError::UntrustedSender)
    ));
}

#[test]
fn the_sender_device_is_recoverable_from_a_message() {
    let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let commit = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
    let (mut bobs, _) = bob
        .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
        .unwrap();

    let sent = bobs
        .encrypt_application_message(b"from the phone", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let received = group.process_incoming_message(sent).unwrap();

    assert_eq!(
        sender_device(&group, &received).unwrap(),
        Some(device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
    );
}

#[test]
fn a_message_round_trips_through_its_encoding() {
    let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let commit = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
    let (mut bobs, _) = bob
        .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
        .unwrap();

    let sent = group
        .encrypt_application_message(b"over the wire", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let bytes = encode_message(&sent).unwrap();
    let decoded = decode_message(&bytes).unwrap();

    match bobs.process_incoming_message(decoded).unwrap() {
        hide_mls::Received::ApplicationMessage(m) => assert_eq!(m.data(), b"over the wire"),
        other => panic!("unexpected: {other:?}"),
    }
}

#[test]
fn a_corrupted_message_is_refused() {
    let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();

    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let commit = group
        .commit_builder()
        .add_member(kp)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap();
    group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
    let (mut bobs, _) = bob
        .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
        .unwrap();

    let sent = group
        .encrypt_application_message(b"tamper me", Default::default())
        .unwrap();
    let mut bytes = encode_message(&sent).unwrap();
    let last = bytes.len() - 1;
    bytes[last] ^= 1;

    let refused = match decode_message(&bytes) {
        Err(_) => true,
        Ok(message) => bobs.process_incoming_message(message).is_err(),
    };
    assert!(refused, "a corrupted message was accepted");
}

/// The API must not imply post-quantum protection it does not have.
#[test]
fn the_pq_status_is_stated_and_says_group_messages_are_classical() {
    assert!(hide_mls::PQ_STATUS.contains("not post-quantum"));
    assert!(hide_mls::PQ_STATUS.contains("Internet-Draft"));
}

/// Builds an MLS client that presents an arbitrary credential, bypassing
/// `client_for`. This is what an attacker who controls their own client does.
/// It advertises the HIDE credential type like an honest client would, so the
/// group cannot refuse it on capabilities alone — only the binding check can.
fn rogue_client(
    membership: &hide_identity::Membership,
    credential: mls_rs::identity::Credential,
) -> mls_rs::Client<impl mls_rs::client_builder::MlsConfig + use<>> {
    use mls_rs::{CipherSuite, CryptoProvider};
    use mls_rs_core::crypto::CipherSuiteProvider;
    let crypto = mls_rs_crypto_rustcrypto::RustCryptoProvider::default();
    let suite = CipherSuite::CURVE25519_AES128;
    let provider = crypto.cipher_suite_provider(suite).unwrap();
    let (secret, public) = provider.signature_key_generate().unwrap();
    mls_rs::Client::builder()
        .identity_provider(hide_mls::HideIdentityProvider::new(membership.clone()))
        .crypto_provider(crypto)
        .signing_identity(
            mls_rs::identity::SigningIdentity::new(credential, public),
            secret,
            suite,
        )
        .build()
}

/// The attack this crate must stop: Mallory, who is nobody in the identity,
/// builds a key package whose credential simply NAMES Alice's laptop. Under a
/// self-asserted credential she would be admitted and every message she sent
/// would be attributed to Alice. The binding signature makes that impossible:
/// she does not hold the laptop's HIDE signing key.
#[test]
fn a_credential_that_merely_names_a_trusted_device_is_refused() {
    let (log, laptop, _) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();

    let laptop_id = device_id(&laptop.verifying_key());
    let mallory = rogue_client(
        &log.membership(),
        mls_rs::identity::basic::BasicCredential::new(laptop_id.to_vec()).into_credential(),
    );
    let kp = mallory
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();

    // Leaf validation runs when the commit is built, not when the member is
    // staged; either error is a refusal.
    let refused = match group.commit_builder().add_member(kp) {
        Err(_) => true,
        Ok(builder) => builder.build().is_err(),
    };
    assert!(
        refused,
        "a bare device id is not a HIDE credential and must not be admitted"
    );
}

/// A subtler forgery: Mallory copies Alice's REAL credential bytes (device id,
/// verifying key, binding signature) out of a key package she has seen, and
/// attaches them to her own MLS key. The binding signature covers the MLS key,
/// so it does not verify for hers.
#[test]
fn a_real_credential_transplanted_onto_another_mls_key_is_refused() {
    let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
    let alice = client_for(&log.membership(), &laptop).unwrap();
    let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();
    let mut group = alice
        .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();

    // Bob's genuine credential, as any observer of his key package sees it.
    let bobs_kp = bob
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();
    let bobs_credential = bobs_kp
        .as_key_package()
        .unwrap()
        .signing_identity()
        .credential
        .clone();

    let mallory = rogue_client(&log.membership(), bobs_credential);
    let kp = mallory
        .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
        .unwrap();

    let refused = match group.commit_builder().add_member(kp) {
        Err(_) => true,
        Ok(builder) => builder.build().is_err(),
    };
    assert!(
        refused,
        "a binding for one MLS key must not admit a different MLS key"
    );
}

/// Builds a two-member group and returns both sides plus the identity log and
/// the provider the founding device keeps. The MLS types are unnameable, so
/// this is a macro rather than a function.
macro_rules! two_member_group {
    () => {{
        let (log, laptop, phone) = identity();
        let provider = HideIdentityProvider::new(log.membership());
        let alice = client_with_provider(provider.clone(), &laptop).unwrap();
        let bob = client_for(&log.membership(), &phone).unwrap();
        let mut alice_group = alice
            .create_group(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
            .unwrap();
        let kp = bob
            .generate_key_package_message(Default::default(), Default::default(), None)
            .unwrap();
        let commit = alice_group
            .commit_builder()
            .add_member(kp)
            .unwrap()
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        alice_group.apply_pending_commit().unwrap();
        let (bob_group, _) = bob
            .join_group(None, &commit.welcome_messages[0], None)
            .unwrap();
        (log, laptop, phone, provider, alice_group, bob_group)
    }};
}

/// The commit a hostile member would send: remove the founding device.
/// `remove_member(0)` is the laptop, which is always at index 0.
fn hostile_commit<C: mls_rs::client_builder::MlsConfig>(
    bob_group: &mut mls_rs::Group<C>,
) -> mls_rs::MlsMessage {
    bob_group
        .commit_builder()
        .remove_member(0)
        .unwrap()
        .build()
        .unwrap()
        .commit_message()
        .clone()
}

/// B-02: MLS validates the roster when a device is added and never again, so a
/// device HIDE revoked afterwards is still a member MLS will hear from. The
/// rules must refuse its commit, or revocation means nothing inside a group the
/// device is already in.
#[test]
fn a_revoked_device_cannot_commit_into_a_group_it_is_still_in() {
    let (mut log, laptop, phone, provider, mut alice_group, mut bob_group) = two_member_group!();
    let hostile = hostile_commit(&mut bob_group);

    // The founding device learns of the revocation the way a running client
    // does: replay a newer log into the provider it shares with the rules.
    log.revoke(&laptop, device_id(&phone.verifying_key()))
        .unwrap();
    provider.update(log.membership());

    assert!(
        alice_group.process_incoming_message(hostile).is_err(),
        "a revoked device's commit was applied by an honest member"
    );
    // A refused commit must leave nothing pending either, or a later apply
    // would land it after all.
    assert!(
        alice_group.apply_pending_commit().is_err(),
        "a refused commit was left pending"
    );
    // Nothing was applied, so the honest device is still in the group.
    assert_eq!(alice_group.roster().members().len(), 2);
}

/// The control for the test above: the identical commit is accepted while its
/// author is trusted, so the refusal is about the revocation and not about the
/// commit's shape.
#[test]
fn the_same_commit_is_applied_while_its_author_is_trusted() {
    let (_log, _laptop, _phone, _provider, mut alice_group, mut bob_group) = two_member_group!();
    let hostile = hostile_commit(&mut bob_group);

    let received = alice_group
        .process_incoming_message(hostile)
        .expect("a trusted member's commit is processed");
    // A received commit is applied inline; a locally built one is left pending.
    // Accepting either keeps the control about trust rather than about plumbing.
    let _ = alice_group.apply_pending_commit();
    // The removal was committed: the honest device is gone from the group. That
    // is what the test above must prevent when the author has been revoked.
    match received {
        hide_mls::Received::Commit(description) => assert!(
            matches!(
                description.effect,
                mls_rs::group::CommitEffect::Removed { .. }
            ),
            "expected a removal, got {:?}",
            description.effect
        ),
        other => panic!("unexpected message: {other:?}"),
    }
}